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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 5
40b047b9e7
Written against what disclosed bug-bounty reports and public write-ups actually turn up, and chosen by diffing the existing 245 skills rather than restating them. Each one is built around the same discipline the harness now enforces: the client-side discovery is a lead, and the finding is what the SERVER did. Browser instrumentation and client trust: - browser_runtime_hooking — hook fetch/XHR/postMessage/storage/WebCrypto at document_start to find what the client is trusted to decide, then prove the server accepts the tampered value with an independent read-back. - prototype_pollution_gadget_hunt — pollution is a precondition, not a finding. Hunt the gadget with a getter on Object.prototype that breaks into the debugger, quote it as file:line from the bundle, and prove the end effect. - js_source_deep_analysis — recover original sources from source maps, extract the API surface the UI never shows, and pair every client-side discovery with the server request that confirms or refutes it. - client_side_path_traversal — the evidence is which URL left the browser, and it is Low until chained to something otherwise unreachable. Authentication: - webauthn_passkey_downgrade — passkeys as a system: the usual finding is a weaker factor nobody removed, or enrollment needing only a session. - email_verification_bypass — the gate is normally on the login screen, not the API; address normalisation is where pre-account-takeover lives. - jwt_jku_x5u_injection — whether the token gets to choose its own verifier. Server-side reach and money: - ssrf_render_pipeline — PDF/screenshot/unfurl renderers browse on the server's behalf, usually with no egress restrictions and often with JS enabled; the returned document is the exfiltration channel. - payment_webhook_forgery — prove the ORDER changed state, not that the endpoint returned 200; idempotency failures are their own finding. - presigned_url_abuse — the bug is what the API is willing to SIGN, which is an IDOR with a cloud signature on top. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
37 lines
2.3 KiB
Markdown
37 lines
2.3 KiB
Markdown
# Payment / Webhook Signature Forgery Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are testing **{target}**'s webhook and payment callbacks for missing or bypassable verification.
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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**METHODOLOGY:**
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### 1. Find the callback endpoints
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`/webhook`, `/callback`, `/ipn`, `/notify`, `/payments/confirm`, provider-named paths (stripe, paypal, mercadopago, pagseguro). They are usually unauthenticated by design and identified in the JS or the docs.
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### 2. Test verification, in this order
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- Send a well-formed event with NO signature header — accepted?
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- Wrong signature — accepted?
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- Valid signature from a DIFFERENT account/test-mode key — accepted?
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- Replay a legitimate event verbatim — processed twice? (idempotency, not just signatures)
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- Timestamp outside the tolerance window — accepted?
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### 3. Test the business logic behind it
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Even with a valid signature, the amount/currency/status in the body may be trusted:
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- `amount` lower than the order total, `currency` swapped, `status: "paid"` on an unpaid order
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- Does the server re-fetch the payment from the provider, or believe the body?
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### 4. Prove with a read-back
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Order state is the evidence: show the order marked paid without payment, read from a normal authenticated request.
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### 5. Safety
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Use the provider's TEST mode and your own test order. Never forge an event against another customer's order or a live payment.
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### 6. Report
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: [webhook accepts unsigned events | order marked paid from body values]
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- Severity: Critical when it produces goods/credit without payment
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- CWE: CWE-345 / CWE-347
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- Endpoint: [callback URL]
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- Request: [the forged event]
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- Read-back: [the order showing as paid]
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- Impact: [what was obtained without paying]
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- Remediation: verify the signature with the provider's secret before parsing; re-fetch the payment by id from the provider API; enforce idempotency by event id
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```
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## System Prompt
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You prove a state change, not a 200. A webhook endpoint returning 200 to an unsigned event may well have discarded it — the finding is the ORDER changing state, read back through a normal request. Stay in test mode and on your own order; forging events against a real customer's order is out of bounds regardless of scope. Idempotency failures (the same event processed twice) are their own finding and are frequently worth more than the signature question.
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