mirror of
https://github.com/BigBodyCobain/Shadowbroker.git
synced 2026-05-28 18:11:31 +02:00
Reported by @tg12 in the external security/correctness audit.
Before this change, backend/limiter.py was:
from slowapi.util import get_remote_address
limiter = Limiter(key_func=get_remote_address)
get_remote_address only ever returns request.client.host — it does
not look at X-Forwarded-For. Behind the bundled Next.js proxy (or any
other reverse proxy), every connected operator's client.host is the
frontend container's bridge IP, so @limiter.limit("120/minute")
collapses into one shared bucket for everybody on the same backend.
One heavy tab can starve every other operator on that node.
This change swaps in shadowbroker_rate_limit_key, which:
* Reads X-Forwarded-For ONLY when the immediate peer matches the
SAME hostname-bound allowlist we use for Docker-bridge local-operator
trust (auth._resolve_trusted_bridge_ips — fix #250). Default is
`frontend,shadowbroker-frontend`, override via
SHADOWBROKER_TRUSTED_FRONTEND_HOSTS.
* Picks the FIRST entry in the XFF chain — that's the operator end,
not the proxy end.
* Falls back to request.client.host for any peer not on the
allowlist. Direct hits, unrelated containers, and unknown hosts
are bucketed exactly like before.
* Falls back to request.client.host when the resolver itself raises
(e.g. DNS down). XFF is never accepted on a peer we can't confirm
is the trusted frontend — there is no way to spoof another
operator's bucket from outside.
No new env vars. No new operator config. Single-operator nodes are
unaffected — same behaviour as before. The 120/minute and 60/minute
windows on the existing endpoints are unchanged; only the KEY they
bucket on changes.
Tests cover:
* Direct loopback → keys on peer (regression check vs.
get_remote_address default).
* Untrusted peer sending XFF → XFF ignored, keys on peer.
* Trusted frontend peer with XFF → keys on first XFF entry.
* First XFF entry picked from a multi-hop chain.
* Trusted peer without XFF → falls back to peer IP.
* Empty/whitespace XFF entries skipped.
* Header lookup is case-insensitive.
* Two operators behind same proxy → different keys (the whole
point of the fix).
* Spoof attempt from internet-facing untrusted IP can't steal the
victim's bucket.
* Resolver raising is treated as untrusted (fail-closed).
* No-client request shape doesn't raise.
Co-authored-by: BigBodyCobain <moatbc@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Shadowbroker
+105
-1
@@ -1,4 +1,108 @@
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"""Rate-limit key function for slowapi.
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Issue #287 (tg12): the previous implementation used
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``slowapi.util.get_remote_address`` which only ever returns
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``request.client.host``. Behind the bundled Next.js proxy (or any other
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reverse proxy), every connected operator's ``client.host`` is the
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frontend container's bridge IP. ``@limiter.limit("120/minute")`` then
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collapses into one shared bucket for everybody on the same backend —
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one heavy tab can starve every other operator on the node.
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This module replaces that key function with one that:
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* Reads ``X-Forwarded-For`` ONLY when the immediate peer is a trusted
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frontend container (same allowlist used by the Docker bridge
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local-operator trust path — see ``backend/auth.py`` ``#250``).
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* Picks the FIRST entry in the XFF chain. That's the client end of
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the proxy chain, which is the operator we want to bucket on.
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* Falls back to ``request.client.host`` for any peer that isn't on
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the trusted-frontend allowlist. Direct hits, unrelated containers,
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and unknown hosts are bucketed exactly like before — there is no
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way for an untrusted caller to spoof XFF and steal another
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operator's rate-limit bucket.
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Single-operator nodes are unaffected: the frontend resolves to one IP,
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that IP is on the trust list, the XFF header is read, and you get one
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bucket per operator (i.e. you).
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from typing import Any
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from slowapi import Limiter
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from slowapi.util import get_remote_address
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limiter = Limiter(key_func=get_remote_address)
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def _client_host(request: Any) -> str:
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"""Return the immediate peer's IP, normalised to a lowercase string."""
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client = getattr(request, "client", None)
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if client is None:
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return ""
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host = getattr(client, "host", "") or ""
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return host.lower()
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def _first_forwarded_for(value: str) -> str:
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"""Return the first non-empty entry from an ``X-Forwarded-For`` header.
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RFC 7239 / de-facto XFF format is ``client, proxy1, proxy2, …``. The
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client end is what we want to bucket on. Empty parts (which appear
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in some malformed headers) are skipped so we don't end up keying on
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an empty string.
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"""
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for raw in value.split(","):
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candidate = raw.strip()
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if candidate:
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return candidate.lower()
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return ""
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def _is_trusted_frontend_peer(host: str) -> bool:
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"""True iff ``host`` is one of the resolved trusted-frontend IPs.
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Imported lazily so this module stays usable in unit tests that
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don't want to pull the whole auth module into scope.
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"""
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if not host:
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return False
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try:
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from auth import _resolve_trusted_bridge_ips
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except Exception: # pragma: no cover - defensive
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return False
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try:
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trusted_ips = _resolve_trusted_bridge_ips()
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except Exception: # pragma: no cover - defensive
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return False
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return host in trusted_ips
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def shadowbroker_rate_limit_key(request: Any) -> str:
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"""slowapi key_func that is proxy-aware on trusted frontend peers only.
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Behaviour matrix:
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* Direct loopback / unknown peer → ``request.client.host``
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(identical to slowapi's default ``get_remote_address``).
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* Peer is a trusted frontend container AND ``X-Forwarded-For`` is
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present → first XFF entry (the actual operator).
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* Peer is a trusted frontend container but no XFF → fall back to
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``request.client.host`` (the bridge IP). One shared bucket for
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everyone in that case, same as before — but you only get there
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if the trusted frontend forgot to forward XFF, which it won't.
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"""
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peer = _client_host(request)
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if _is_trusted_frontend_peer(peer):
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headers = getattr(request, "headers", None)
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if headers is not None:
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xff = headers.get("x-forwarded-for") or headers.get("X-Forwarded-For")
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if xff:
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first = _first_forwarded_for(xff)
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if first:
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return first
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# Untrusted peer (or trusted peer without XFF): match the original
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# get_remote_address behaviour byte-for-byte.
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return get_remote_address(request)
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limiter = Limiter(key_func=shadowbroker_rate_limit_key)
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@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
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"""Tests for issue #287: proxy-aware slowapi key function.
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Contract:
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* Untrusted peer → key is the peer IP (matches old get_remote_address).
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* Trusted frontend peer with X-Forwarded-For → key is first XFF entry.
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* Trusted frontend peer without X-Forwarded-For → key is the peer IP
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(fail-soft: no behaviour change vs. before #287).
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* XFF from an untrusted peer is IGNORED — there must be no way to
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spoof another operator's bucket by sending XFF directly.
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* The first XFF entry is used (not the last — that's the trusted
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proxy talking to the backend, not the actual operator).
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"""
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import pytest
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class _FakeClient:
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def __init__(self, host: str):
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self.host = host
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class _FakeRequest:
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"""Minimal slowapi-compatible request shim — has ``client`` and
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``headers`` attributes, which is all the key_func touches."""
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def __init__(self, client_host: str, headers: dict | None = None):
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self.client = _FakeClient(client_host) if client_host is not None else None
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self.headers = dict(headers or {})
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# slowapi's get_remote_address also tries request.client; we
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# exercise both branches via the same shim.
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# ───────────────────────── untrusted peers ──────────────────────────────
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class TestUntrustedPeer:
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def test_direct_loopback_uses_client_host(self, monkeypatch):
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"""Direct hit from 127.0.0.1 — no XFF — keys on the peer IP."""
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from limiter import shadowbroker_rate_limit_key
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# Make sure the trusted-frontend cache resolves to nothing relevant.
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monkeypatch.setattr("auth._resolve_trusted_bridge_ips", lambda: frozenset())
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req = _FakeRequest("127.0.0.1")
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assert shadowbroker_rate_limit_key(req) == "127.0.0.1"
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def test_xff_from_untrusted_peer_is_ignored(self, monkeypatch):
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"""A random caller sending X-Forwarded-For must NOT steal another
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operator's bucket. The XFF is dropped on the floor."""
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from limiter import shadowbroker_rate_limit_key
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# Trusted set deliberately does NOT include 1.2.3.4.
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monkeypatch.setattr("auth._resolve_trusted_bridge_ips", lambda: frozenset({"172.20.0.5"}))
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req = _FakeRequest("1.2.3.4", {"X-Forwarded-For": "9.9.9.9"})
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# Falls back to the peer IP, not 9.9.9.9.
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assert shadowbroker_rate_limit_key(req) == "1.2.3.4"
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def test_unknown_host_with_xff_uses_peer_host(self, monkeypatch):
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from limiter import shadowbroker_rate_limit_key
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monkeypatch.setattr("auth._resolve_trusted_bridge_ips", lambda: frozenset())
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req = _FakeRequest("10.0.0.5", {"X-Forwarded-For": "1.1.1.1"})
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assert shadowbroker_rate_limit_key(req) == "10.0.0.5"
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# ───────────────────────── trusted frontend peers ───────────────────────
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class TestTrustedFrontendPeer:
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def test_trusted_peer_with_xff_uses_first_xff_entry(self, monkeypatch):
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"""When the immediate peer is the trusted frontend container and
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XFF carries the operator's chain, we key on the operator."""
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from limiter import shadowbroker_rate_limit_key
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monkeypatch.setattr("auth._resolve_trusted_bridge_ips", lambda: frozenset({"172.20.0.5"}))
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req = _FakeRequest("172.20.0.5", {"X-Forwarded-For": "203.0.113.7"})
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assert shadowbroker_rate_limit_key(req) == "203.0.113.7"
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def test_first_xff_entry_picked_in_chain(self, monkeypatch):
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"""`client, proxy1, proxy2` → we pick the client, not the proxies.
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Picking the last entry would mean every operator behind the same
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upstream gets bucketed together, which is the bug we're fixing."""
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from limiter import shadowbroker_rate_limit_key
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monkeypatch.setattr("auth._resolve_trusted_bridge_ips", lambda: frozenset({"172.20.0.5"}))
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req = _FakeRequest(
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"172.20.0.5",
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{"X-Forwarded-For": "203.0.113.7, 198.51.100.1, 10.0.0.1"},
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)
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assert shadowbroker_rate_limit_key(req) == "203.0.113.7"
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def test_trusted_peer_without_xff_falls_back_to_peer(self, monkeypatch):
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"""If the trusted frontend forgot to forward XFF (legacy clients,
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broken deploys), don't crash — bucket on the bridge IP exactly
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like the pre-#287 behaviour."""
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from limiter import shadowbroker_rate_limit_key
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monkeypatch.setattr("auth._resolve_trusted_bridge_ips", lambda: frozenset({"172.20.0.5"}))
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req = _FakeRequest("172.20.0.5", headers={})
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assert shadowbroker_rate_limit_key(req) == "172.20.0.5"
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def test_trusted_peer_with_empty_xff_falls_back(self, monkeypatch):
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"""``X-Forwarded-For: , ,`` → no usable entries → falls back."""
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from limiter import shadowbroker_rate_limit_key
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monkeypatch.setattr("auth._resolve_trusted_bridge_ips", lambda: frozenset({"172.20.0.5"}))
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req = _FakeRequest("172.20.0.5", {"X-Forwarded-For": " , , "})
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assert shadowbroker_rate_limit_key(req) == "172.20.0.5"
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def test_xff_header_case_insensitive(self, monkeypatch):
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"""HTTP header names are case-insensitive — slowapi normalises
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but our shim doesn't, so we explicitly check both forms."""
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from limiter import shadowbroker_rate_limit_key
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monkeypatch.setattr("auth._resolve_trusted_bridge_ips", lambda: frozenset({"172.20.0.5"}))
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req = _FakeRequest("172.20.0.5", {"x-forwarded-for": "203.0.113.7"})
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assert shadowbroker_rate_limit_key(req) == "203.0.113.7"
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# ───────────────────────── isolation guarantees ─────────────────────────
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class TestIsolation:
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def test_two_operators_behind_same_proxy_get_different_keys(self, monkeypatch):
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"""The whole reason this fix exists — two operators behind the
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SAME proxy must end up in DIFFERENT buckets."""
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from limiter import shadowbroker_rate_limit_key
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monkeypatch.setattr("auth._resolve_trusted_bridge_ips", lambda: frozenset({"172.20.0.5"}))
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op_a = _FakeRequest("172.20.0.5", {"X-Forwarded-For": "10.1.1.1"})
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op_b = _FakeRequest("172.20.0.5", {"X-Forwarded-For": "10.1.1.2"})
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key_a = shadowbroker_rate_limit_key(op_a)
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key_b = shadowbroker_rate_limit_key(op_b)
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assert key_a != key_b
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assert key_a == "10.1.1.1"
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assert key_b == "10.1.1.2"
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def test_no_xff_spoof_from_outside(self, monkeypatch):
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"""If we ever expose the backend port directly to the internet,
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an attacker MUST NOT be able to steal another operator's bucket
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by sending their own XFF header."""
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from limiter import shadowbroker_rate_limit_key
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# Trusted set is the frontend container IP; the attacker is on a
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# different (untrusted) IP and tries to spoof a victim's IP.
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monkeypatch.setattr("auth._resolve_trusted_bridge_ips", lambda: frozenset({"172.20.0.5"}))
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attacker = _FakeRequest("203.0.113.66", {"X-Forwarded-For": "10.1.1.1"})
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victim_via_proxy = _FakeRequest("172.20.0.5", {"X-Forwarded-For": "10.1.1.1"})
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assert shadowbroker_rate_limit_key(attacker) == "203.0.113.66"
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assert shadowbroker_rate_limit_key(victim_via_proxy) == "10.1.1.1"
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# The attacker burning their own bucket doesn't touch the victim's.
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assert shadowbroker_rate_limit_key(attacker) != shadowbroker_rate_limit_key(
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victim_via_proxy
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)
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def test_limiter_object_uses_proxy_aware_key(self):
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"""Smoke check that the module-level Limiter exports the new key
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function rather than slowapi's default."""
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from limiter import limiter, shadowbroker_rate_limit_key
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# slowapi stores it as ._key_func; we don't want to depend on
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# that internal name, so just check the function is reachable.
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assert callable(shadowbroker_rate_limit_key)
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assert limiter is not None
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# ───────────────────────── defensive corners ────────────────────────────
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class TestDefensive:
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def test_no_client_object(self, monkeypatch):
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"""Some upstream middleware paths (websocket, ASGI lifespan)
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produce requests with no ``client`` attribute — must not raise."""
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from limiter import shadowbroker_rate_limit_key
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monkeypatch.setattr("auth._resolve_trusted_bridge_ips", lambda: frozenset())
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class _NoClient:
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def __init__(self):
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self.client = None
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self.headers = {}
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# slowapi's get_remote_address returns "127.0.0.1" as a default
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# in this case, so we just ensure no exception escapes.
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result = shadowbroker_rate_limit_key(_NoClient())
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assert isinstance(result, str)
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def test_resolver_raises_is_treated_as_untrusted(self, monkeypatch):
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"""If DNS blows up inside the trusted-bridge resolver, we MUST
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fall back to peer IP — never accept XFF blindly."""
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from limiter import shadowbroker_rate_limit_key
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def _explode():
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raise RuntimeError("DNS down")
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monkeypatch.setattr("auth._resolve_trusted_bridge_ips", _explode)
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req = _FakeRequest("172.20.0.5", {"X-Forwarded-For": "9.9.9.9"})
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# XFF must be ignored when we can't confirm peer is trusted.
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assert shadowbroker_rate_limit_key(req) == "172.20.0.5"
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user