mirror of
https://github.com/BigBodyCobain/Shadowbroker.git
synced 2026-05-28 10:01:31 +02:00
1d7fa5185a
Private gate messages and offline DMs now ride the Infonet hashchain as ciphertext-only events, replicated across nodes via private transports (Tor onion / RNS / loopback) and decrypted only by parties holding the gate or recipient keys. Hashchain core (mesh_hashchain.py) ---------------------------------- * New ``append_private_gate_message`` and ``append_private_dm_message`` append paths with full signature verification, public-key binding, revocation check, and replay protection in a dedicated sequence domain (so a gate post does not consume the author's public broadcast sequence, and a DM cannot replay-block a public message at sequence=1). * Fork validation and full-chain validation now accept the gate signature compatibility variants — older signatures that canonicalize with/without epoch or reply_to still verify, so a re-sync from an older peer doesn't reject still-valid history. * DM hashchain spool: capped at 2 active sealed offline DMs per recipient mailbox, plus a per-(sender, recipient) cap so one prolific sender can't consume both slots. 1-hour TTL on the cap counter. Spool intentionally small — it's an offline bootstrap channel, not a persistent mailbox. * Rebuild-state preserves the gate sequence domain across reloads so a chain reload doesn't accidentally let an old gate sequence replay-collide on next append. Schema enforcement (mesh_schema.py) ----------------------------------- * Private gate + DM payloads have closed allowlists of fields. Plaintext keys (``message``, ``plaintext``, ``_local_plaintext``, ``_local_reply_to``) are explicit rejection-bait — they raise before the event ever touches the chain. * DM ciphertext + nonce must look like base64-ish sealed bytes; obvious base64-encoded plaintext shapes are rejected. * ``transport_lock`` required: DM hashchain spool requires ``private_strong``; gate accepts ``private``/``private_strong``/ ``rns``/``onion``. Defense-in-depth at the network layer (main.py + mesh_public.py) ---------------------------------------------------------------- * ``_infonet_sync_response_events`` now silently redacts private events (gate_message + dm_message) unless the request looks like a loopback / onion / RNS / private transport caller. If an operator accidentally exposes :8000 to the public internet, an external puller gets public events only — never ciphertext. * ``_sync_from_peer`` raises ``PeerSyncRateLimited`` for 429 (handled as 4-tuple return with retry_after_s) and ``PeerSyncHTTPError`` for other non-200 statuses (handled by ``_run_public_sync_cycle`` to honor server cooldown hints even outside the 429 path). DM relay hydration (main.py) ----------------------------- * New ``_hydrate_dm_relay_from_chain``: when accepted dm_message chain events arrive on a node, they get deposited into the local DM relay store with a deterministic sender_token_hash so re-sync of the same event is idempotent. Recipients see the ciphertext as a normal DM on their next poll and decrypt with their existing recipient key. Other surfaces -------------- * meshnode.bat / meshnode.sh now set ``MESH_INFONET_ALLOW_CLEARNET_SYNC= false`` and the participant runtime flags by default so a freshly spun-up node defaults to private-only sync. * InfonetTerminal/InfonetShell.tsx adds a gate directory renderer for the new private-gate workflow. * docker-compose.relay.yml binds the relay backend to 127.0.0.1:8000 only; Tor's hidden service forwards onion traffic into 127.0.0.1. Public clearnet :8000 stays off the network edge. Tests ----- * 7 new tests in test_private_gate_hashchain.py + test_private_dm_ hashchain.py covering: gate fork accepts ciphertext propagation, gate fork rejects plaintext, append rejects plaintext before normalize, append requires private_strong, append rejects non-sealed ciphertext shape, DM spool 2-per-recipient + 1-per-pair cap, DM hydration delivers to poll/claim. * Updated test_mesh_node_bootstrap_runtime.py covers 429 backoff via PeerSyncRateLimited 4-tuple AND PeerSyncHTTPError exception. * Updated test_s14b_public_sync_gate_filter.py + test_s9b_gate_store_ hydration.py + test_gate_write_cutover.py cover the new private redaction on public sync responses. * test_private_gate_hashchain.py + test_private_dm_hashchain.py: 10 passed locally. * Combined mesh-relevant suite (the 5 modified existing tests + 2 new): 17 passed. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
124 lines
6.0 KiB
YAML
124 lines
6.0 KiB
YAML
## Default registry is GHCR because the GitHub release workflow publishes:
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## ghcr.io/bigbodycobain/shadowbroker-backend:latest
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## ghcr.io/bigbodycobain/shadowbroker-frontend:latest
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##
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## GitLab mirror images can still be used by swapping the image lines to:
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## registry.gitlab.com/bigbodycobain/shadowbroker/backend:latest
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## registry.gitlab.com/bigbodycobain/shadowbroker/frontend:latest
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services:
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backend:
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image: ghcr.io/bigbodycobain/shadowbroker-backend:latest
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container_name: shadowbroker-backend
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ports:
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- "${BIND:-127.0.0.1}:${BACKEND_PORT:-8000}:8000"
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environment:
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- AIS_API_KEY=${AIS_API_KEY:-}
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- OPENSKY_CLIENT_ID=${OPENSKY_CLIENT_ID:-}
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- OPENSKY_CLIENT_SECRET=${OPENSKY_CLIENT_SECRET:-}
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- LTA_ACCOUNT_KEY=${LTA_ACCOUNT_KEY:-}
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- ADMIN_KEY=${ADMIN_KEY:-}
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- FINNHUB_API_KEY=${FINNHUB_API_KEY:-}
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# Override allowed CORS origins (comma-separated). Auto-detects LAN IPs if empty.
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- CORS_ORIGINS=${CORS_ORIGINS:-}
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# Private Infonet bootstrap seeds. Seeds are discovery hints, not fixed roots.
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- MESH_BOOTSTRAP_SEED_PEERS=${MESH_BOOTSTRAP_SEED_PEERS:-http://gqpbunqbgtkcqilvclm3xrkt3zowjyl3s62kkktvojgvxzizamvbrqid.onion:8000}
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- MESH_DEFAULT_SYNC_PEERS=${MESH_DEFAULT_SYNC_PEERS:-}
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- MESH_SYNC_TIMEOUT_S=${MESH_SYNC_TIMEOUT_S:-5}
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- MESH_RELAY_PUSH_TIMEOUT_S=${MESH_RELAY_PUSH_TIMEOUT_S:-45}
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# Explicitly opt into HTTPS/IP-based peer sync. Default remains private transports only.
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- MESH_INFONET_ALLOW_CLEARNET_SYNC=${MESH_INFONET_ALLOW_CLEARNET_SYNC:-false}
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# Tor/Arti SOCKS transport for private .onion Infonet sync.
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- MESH_ARTI_ENABLED=${MESH_ARTI_ENABLED:-false}
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- MESH_ARTI_SOCKS_PORT=${MESH_ARTI_SOCKS_PORT:-9050}
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# Operator-trusted sync/push peers. Leave empty unless you control the peer secret on both sides.
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- MESH_RELAY_PEERS=${MESH_RELAY_PEERS:-}
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- MESH_PUBLIC_PEER_URL=${MESH_PUBLIC_PEER_URL:-}
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# Shared transport auth for operator peer push. Must be set to a unique secret per deployment.
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- MESH_PEER_PUSH_SECRET=${MESH_PEER_PUSH_SECRET:-}
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# Issue #256: optional per-peer HMAC secrets. Comma-separated
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# `url=secret` pairs (no spaces). When a peer URL appears here, only
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# the listed per-peer secret is accepted for it — the global
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# MESH_PEER_PUSH_SECRET above is ignored for that specific URL. This
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# closes the cross-peer impersonation surface for multi-peer fleets.
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# Single-peer installs leave this empty (default) for unchanged
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# behavior. Both sides of a peering must agree on the per-peer
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# secret for a given URL.
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- MESH_PEER_SECRETS=${MESH_PEER_SECRETS:-}
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# Meshtastic MQTT is opt-in to avoid passive load on the public broker.
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# Set MESH_MQTT_ENABLED=true in .env only when this node should join live MQTT.
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- MESH_MQTT_ENABLED=${MESH_MQTT_ENABLED:-false}
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- MESH_MQTT_BROKER=${MESH_MQTT_BROKER:-mqtt.meshtastic.org}
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- MESH_MQTT_PORT=${MESH_MQTT_PORT:-1883}
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- MESH_MQTT_USER=${MESH_MQTT_USER:-meshdev}
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- MESH_MQTT_PASS=${MESH_MQTT_PASS:-large4cats}
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- MESH_MQTT_PSK=${MESH_MQTT_PSK:-}
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- MESH_MQTT_INCLUDE_DEFAULT_ROOTS=${MESH_MQTT_INCLUDE_DEFAULT_ROOTS:-true}
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- MESH_MQTT_EXTRA_ROOTS=${MESH_MQTT_EXTRA_ROOTS:-}
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- MESH_MQTT_EXTRA_TOPICS=${MESH_MQTT_EXTRA_TOPICS:-}
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- MESHTASTIC_OPERATOR_CALLSIGN=${MESHTASTIC_OPERATOR_CALLSIGN:-}
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# The bundled Docker UI talks to the backend across Docker's private bridge.
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# Treat that bridge as local operator access while ports remain bound to 127.0.0.1 by default.
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- SHADOWBROKER_TRUST_DOCKER_BRIDGE_LOCAL_OPERATOR=${SHADOWBROKER_TRUST_DOCKER_BRIDGE_LOCAL_OPERATOR:-1}
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# Issue #250: bridge trust is now bound to specific container hostnames
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# (default: 'frontend' compose service + 'shadowbroker-frontend' container
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# name). If you rename the frontend service or run with a different
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# container_name, list the hostnames here (comma-separated, no spaces).
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- SHADOWBROKER_TRUSTED_FRONTEND_HOSTS=${SHADOWBROKER_TRUSTED_FRONTEND_HOSTS:-frontend,shadowbroker-frontend}
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# Third-party fetcher opt-ins. Default OFF — these phone home to
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# politically/commercially sensitive upstreams (Polymarket, Kalshi,
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# Yahoo Finance, EU disinfo trackers, NUFORC dataset host, etc.).
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# Set to "true" in your .env only if you want the node's IP to
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# contact each of these services. The dashboard panel for each
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# feature reads as "no data" until the corresponding flag is on.
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- PREDICTION_MARKETS_ENABLED=${PREDICTION_MARKETS_ENABLED:-false}
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- FINANCIAL_ENABLED=${FINANCIAL_ENABLED:-false}
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- CROWDTHREAT_ENABLED=${CROWDTHREAT_ENABLED:-false}
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- FIMI_ENABLED=${FIMI_ENABLED:-false}
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- NUFORC_ENABLED=${NUFORC_ENABLED:-false}
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- NEWS_ENABLED=${NEWS_ENABLED:-true}
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volumes:
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- backend_data:/app/data
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restart: unless-stopped
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healthcheck:
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test: ["CMD", "curl", "-f", "http://localhost:8000/api/health"]
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interval: 15s
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timeout: 10s
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retries: 5
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start_period: 60s
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deploy:
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resources:
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limits:
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memory: ${BACKEND_MEMORY_LIMIT:-4G}
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cpus: '2'
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frontend:
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image: ghcr.io/bigbodycobain/shadowbroker-frontend:latest
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container_name: shadowbroker-frontend
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ports:
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- "${BIND:-127.0.0.1}:${FRONTEND_PORT:-3000}:3000"
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environment:
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# Points the Next.js server-side proxy at the backend container via Docker networking.
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# Change this if your backend runs on a different host or port.
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- BACKEND_URL=http://backend:8000
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# Lets the server-side proxy authenticate protected local-node API calls.
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- ADMIN_KEY=${ADMIN_KEY:-}
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depends_on:
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backend:
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condition: service_healthy
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restart: unless-stopped
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healthcheck:
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test: ["CMD", "wget", "-q", "--spider", "http://127.0.0.1:3000/"]
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interval: 30s
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timeout: 10s
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retries: 3
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start_period: 20s
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deploy:
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resources:
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limits:
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memory: 512M
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cpus: '1'
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volumes:
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backend_data:
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