Files
Shadowbroker/backend/limiter.py
T
Shadowbroker 35cd4e4c71 Fix #287: proxy-aware rate-limit key (#295)
Reported by @tg12 in the external security/correctness audit.

Before this change, backend/limiter.py was:

    from slowapi.util import get_remote_address
    limiter = Limiter(key_func=get_remote_address)

get_remote_address only ever returns request.client.host — it does
not look at X-Forwarded-For. Behind the bundled Next.js proxy (or any
other reverse proxy), every connected operator's client.host is the
frontend container's bridge IP, so @limiter.limit("120/minute")
collapses into one shared bucket for everybody on the same backend.
One heavy tab can starve every other operator on that node.

This change swaps in shadowbroker_rate_limit_key, which:

  * Reads X-Forwarded-For ONLY when the immediate peer matches the
    SAME hostname-bound allowlist we use for Docker-bridge local-operator
    trust (auth._resolve_trusted_bridge_ips — fix #250). Default is
    `frontend,shadowbroker-frontend`, override via
    SHADOWBROKER_TRUSTED_FRONTEND_HOSTS.
  * Picks the FIRST entry in the XFF chain — that's the operator end,
    not the proxy end.
  * Falls back to request.client.host for any peer not on the
    allowlist. Direct hits, unrelated containers, and unknown hosts
    are bucketed exactly like before.
  * Falls back to request.client.host when the resolver itself raises
    (e.g. DNS down). XFF is never accepted on a peer we can't confirm
    is the trusted frontend — there is no way to spoof another
    operator's bucket from outside.

No new env vars. No new operator config. Single-operator nodes are
unaffected — same behaviour as before. The 120/minute and 60/minute
windows on the existing endpoints are unchanged; only the KEY they
bucket on changes.

Tests cover:
  * Direct loopback → keys on peer (regression check vs.
    get_remote_address default).
  * Untrusted peer sending XFF → XFF ignored, keys on peer.
  * Trusted frontend peer with XFF → keys on first XFF entry.
  * First XFF entry picked from a multi-hop chain.
  * Trusted peer without XFF → falls back to peer IP.
  * Empty/whitespace XFF entries skipped.
  * Header lookup is case-insensitive.
  * Two operators behind same proxy → different keys (the whole
    point of the fix).
  * Spoof attempt from internet-facing untrusted IP can't steal the
    victim's bucket.
  * Resolver raising is treated as untrusted (fail-closed).
  * No-client request shape doesn't raise.

Co-authored-by: BigBodyCobain <moatbc@gmail.com>
2026-05-22 00:51:54 -06:00

109 lines
4.1 KiB
Python

"""Rate-limit key function for slowapi.
Issue #287 (tg12): the previous implementation used
``slowapi.util.get_remote_address`` which only ever returns
``request.client.host``. Behind the bundled Next.js proxy (or any other
reverse proxy), every connected operator's ``client.host`` is the
frontend container's bridge IP. ``@limiter.limit("120/minute")`` then
collapses into one shared bucket for everybody on the same backend —
one heavy tab can starve every other operator on the node.
This module replaces that key function with one that:
* Reads ``X-Forwarded-For`` ONLY when the immediate peer is a trusted
frontend container (same allowlist used by the Docker bridge
local-operator trust path — see ``backend/auth.py`` ``#250``).
* Picks the FIRST entry in the XFF chain. That's the client end of
the proxy chain, which is the operator we want to bucket on.
* Falls back to ``request.client.host`` for any peer that isn't on
the trusted-frontend allowlist. Direct hits, unrelated containers,
and unknown hosts are bucketed exactly like before — there is no
way for an untrusted caller to spoof XFF and steal another
operator's rate-limit bucket.
Single-operator nodes are unaffected: the frontend resolves to one IP,
that IP is on the trust list, the XFF header is read, and you get one
bucket per operator (i.e. you).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from typing import Any
from slowapi import Limiter
from slowapi.util import get_remote_address
def _client_host(request: Any) -> str:
"""Return the immediate peer's IP, normalised to a lowercase string."""
client = getattr(request, "client", None)
if client is None:
return ""
host = getattr(client, "host", "") or ""
return host.lower()
def _first_forwarded_for(value: str) -> str:
"""Return the first non-empty entry from an ``X-Forwarded-For`` header.
RFC 7239 / de-facto XFF format is ``client, proxy1, proxy2, …``. The
client end is what we want to bucket on. Empty parts (which appear
in some malformed headers) are skipped so we don't end up keying on
an empty string.
"""
for raw in value.split(","):
candidate = raw.strip()
if candidate:
return candidate.lower()
return ""
def _is_trusted_frontend_peer(host: str) -> bool:
"""True iff ``host`` is one of the resolved trusted-frontend IPs.
Imported lazily so this module stays usable in unit tests that
don't want to pull the whole auth module into scope.
"""
if not host:
return False
try:
from auth import _resolve_trusted_bridge_ips
except Exception: # pragma: no cover - defensive
return False
try:
trusted_ips = _resolve_trusted_bridge_ips()
except Exception: # pragma: no cover - defensive
return False
return host in trusted_ips
def shadowbroker_rate_limit_key(request: Any) -> str:
"""slowapi key_func that is proxy-aware on trusted frontend peers only.
Behaviour matrix:
* Direct loopback / unknown peer → ``request.client.host``
(identical to slowapi's default ``get_remote_address``).
* Peer is a trusted frontend container AND ``X-Forwarded-For`` is
present → first XFF entry (the actual operator).
* Peer is a trusted frontend container but no XFF → fall back to
``request.client.host`` (the bridge IP). One shared bucket for
everyone in that case, same as before — but you only get there
if the trusted frontend forgot to forward XFF, which it won't.
"""
peer = _client_host(request)
if _is_trusted_frontend_peer(peer):
headers = getattr(request, "headers", None)
if headers is not None:
xff = headers.get("x-forwarded-for") or headers.get("X-Forwarded-For")
if xff:
first = _first_forwarded_for(xff)
if first:
return first
# Untrusted peer (or trusted peer without XFF): match the original
# get_remote_address behaviour byte-for-byte.
return get_remote_address(request)
limiter = Limiter(key_func=shadowbroker_rate_limit_key)