Update README.md

```
DYLIB:/Applications/NordVPN.app/Contents/Frameworks/norddropFFI.framework/Versions/A/norddropFFI

/* No comment provided by engineer. */
"Update Error!" = "Virhe p�ivEXECUTE:/Applications/KnockKnock.app/Contents/MacOS/KnockKnock
```

App Bundle Extension/custom/check_bundle_exe

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+# CHECK BUNDLE EXECUTABLE
+# A tool for extracting executable names from macOS app bundles Info.plist
+
+get_executable_name() {
+    local plist="$1"
+    local value
+
+    value=$(/usr/libexec/PlistBuddy -c "Print :CFBundleExecutable" "$plist" 2>/dev/null)
+    if [ $? -eq 0 ] && [ -n "$value" ]; then
+        echo "$value"
+        return 0
+    fi
+
+    local app_dir
+    app_dir=$(dirname "$(dirname "$plist")")
+    local app_name
+    app_name=$(basename "$app_dir" .app)
+    if [ -n "$app_name" ] && [ "$app_name" != "Contents" ]; then
+        echo "$app_name"
+        return 0
+    fi
+
+    echo "UNKNOWN"
+    return 1
+}
+
+process_app() {
+    local app_path="$1"
+    local exec_name="UNKNOWN"
+    local plist
+    local found=false
+
+    app_path="${app_path%/}"
+
+    if [[ "$app_path" =~ /Wrapper/.*\.app$ ]]; then
+        return
+    fi
+
+    if [ -d "$app_path" ]; then
+        plist="$app_path/Contents/Info.plist"
+        if [ -f "$plist" ]; then
+            exec_name=$(get_executable_name "$plist")
+            if [ "$exec_name" != "UNKNOWN" ]; then
+                found=true
+            fi
+        fi
+
+        if [ "$found" = false ]; then
+            local wrapped_bundle="$app_path/WrappedBundle"
+            if [ -L "$wrapped_bundle" ] && [ -d "$wrapped_bundle" ]; then
+                plist="$wrapped_bundle/Contents/Info.plist"
+                if [ -f "$plist" ]; then
+                    exec_name=$(get_executable_name "$plist")
+                    if [ "$exec_name" != "UNKNOWN" ]; then
+                        found=true
+                    fi
+                fi
+            fi
+        fi
+
+        if [ "$found" = false ]; then
+            while IFS= read -r nested_plist; do
+                exec_name=$(get_executable_name "$nested_plist")
+                if [ "$exec_name" != "UNKNOWN" ]; then
+                    found=true
+                    break
+                fi
+            done < <(find "$app_path" -name "Info.plist" -path "*/Wrapper/*.app/Contents/Info.plist" 2>/dev/null)
+        fi
+
+        if [ "$found" = false ]; then
+            while IFS= read -r nested_plist; do
+                exec_name=$(get_executable_name "$nested_plist")
+                if [ "$exec_name" != "UNKNOWN" ]; then
+                    found=true
+                    break
+                fi
+            done < <(find "$app_path" -name "Info.plist" -maxdepth 3 2>/dev/null | grep -E "($app_path/Info.plist|$app_path/Wrapper/.*Info.plist)")
+        fi
+
+        echo "$exec_name"
+    else
+        echo "UNKNOWN" >&2
+    fi
+}
+
+if [ "$#" -ge 1 ]; then
+    for app in "$@"; do
+        process_app "$app"
+    done
+else
+    while IFS= read -r line; do
+        process_app "$line"
+    done
+fi
+
+

App Bundle Extension/custom/diff_apss.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash 
+
+# Check if the correct number of arguments provided
+if [ $# -ne 2 ]; then
+    echo "Usage: $0 OLD_APP NEW_APP"
+    echo "Example: $0 OLD/Fantastical.app NEW/Fantastical.app"
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+OLD_APP="$1"
+NEW_APP="$2"
+
+# Check if directories exist
+if [ ! -d "$OLD_APP" ]; then
+    echo "Error: Old app directory '$OLD_APP' does not exist"
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+if [ ! -d "$NEW_APP" ]; then
+    echo "Error: New app directory '$NEW_APP' does not exist"
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+echo "=========================================="
+echo "APP PATCHING ANALYSIS"
+echo "=========================================="
+echo "Old App: $OLD_APP"
+echo "New App: $NEW_APP"
+echo "=========================================="
+
+# Run diff with -r for recursive and -q for brief output
+DIFF_OUTPUT=$(diff -rq "$OLD_APP" "$NEW_APP" 2>/dev/null)
+
+# Process new files
+echo -e "\n🆕 NEW FILES:"
+echo "----------------------------------------"
+NEW_LIST=$(echo "$DIFF_OUTPUT" | grep "Only in $NEW_APP" | sed "s|Only in $NEW_APP/||" | sed 's|: | → |')
+if [ -n "$NEW_LIST" ]; then
+    echo "$NEW_LIST" | while read -r line; do
+        echo "  + $line"
+    done
+else
+    echo "  (No new files)"
+fi
+
+# Process deleted files
+echo -e "\n❌ DELETED FILES:"
+echo "----------------------------------------"
+DELETED_LIST=$(echo "$DIFF_OUTPUT" | grep "Only in $OLD_APP" | sed "s|Only in $OLD_APP/||" | sed 's|: | → |')
+if [ -n "$DELETED_LIST" ]; then
+    echo "$DELETED_LIST" | while read -r line; do
+        echo "  - $line"
+    done
+else
+    echo "  (No deleted files)"
+fi
+
+# Process modified files
+echo -e "\n📝 MODIFIED FILES:"
+echo "----------------------------------------"
+MODIFIED_LIST=$(echo "$DIFF_OUTPUT" | grep "^Files.*differ$" | sed "s|Files $OLD_APP/||" | sed "s| and $NEW_APP/.*differ$||")
+if [ -n "$MODIFIED_LIST" ]; then
+    echo "$MODIFIED_LIST" | while read -r line; do
+        echo "  ~ $line"
+    done
+else
+    echo "  (No modified files)"
+fi
+
+# Find and report symlink changes
+echo -e "\n🔗 SYMLINK CHANGES:"
+echo "----------------------------------------"
+SYMLINK_CHANGES=""
+
+# Find all symlinks in OLD_APP
+while IFS= read -r old_symlink; do
+    rel_path="${old_symlink#$OLD_APP/}"
+    new_symlink="$NEW_APP/$rel_path"
+    
+    if [ ! -L "$new_symlink" ]; then
+        # Symlink was removed or converted to regular file
+        SYMLINK_CHANGES="${SYMLINK_CHANGES}  - Removed: $rel_path\n"
+    else
+        # Check if symlink target changed
+        old_target=$(readlink "$old_symlink")
+        new_target=$(readlink "$new_symlink")
+        if [ "$old_target" != "$new_target" ]; then
+            SYMLINK_CHANGES="${SYMLINK_CHANGES}  ~ Modified: $rel_path\n"
+            SYMLINK_CHANGES="${SYMLINK_CHANGES}      Old target: $old_target\n"
+            SYMLINK_CHANGES="${SYMLINK_CHANGES}      New target: $new_target\n"
+        fi
+    fi
+done < <(find "$OLD_APP" -type l)
+
+# Find new symlinks in NEW_APP
+while IFS= read -r new_symlink; do
+    rel_path="${new_symlink#$NEW_APP/}"
+    old_symlink="$OLD_APP/$rel_path"
+    
+    if [ ! -L "$old_symlink" ]; then
+        # New symlink added
+        new_target=$(readlink "$new_symlink")
+        SYMLINK_CHANGES="${SYMLINK_CHANGES}  + Added: $rel_path → $new_target\n"
+    fi
+done < <(find "$NEW_APP" -type l)
+
+if [ -n "$SYMLINK_CHANGES" ]; then
+    echo -e "$SYMLINK_CHANGES"
+else
+    echo "  (No symlink changes)"
+fi
+
+# Count totals
+NEW_COUNT=$(echo "$DIFF_OUTPUT" | grep -c "Only in $NEW_APP" 2>/dev/null || echo "0")
+DELETED_COUNT=$(echo "$DIFF_OUTPUT" | grep -c "Only in $OLD_APP" 2>/dev/null || echo "0")
+MODIFIED_COUNT=$(echo "$DIFF_OUTPUT" | grep -c "^Files.*differ$" 2>/dev/null || echo "0")
+
+# Ensure counts are single integers
+NEW_COUNT=$(echo "$NEW_COUNT" | head -n1 | tr -d '\n')
+DELETED_COUNT=$(echo "$DELETED_COUNT" | head -n1 | tr -d '\n')
+MODIFIED_COUNT=$(echo "$MODIFIED_COUNT" | head -n1 | tr -d '\n')
+
+# Summary
+echo -e "\n📊 SUMMARY:"
+echo "=========================================="
+echo "New files:      $NEW_COUNT"
+echo "Deleted files:  $DELETED_COUNT"  
+echo "Modified files: $MODIFIED_COUNT"
+echo "Total changes:  $((NEW_COUNT + DELETED_COUNT + MODIFIED_COUNT))"
+echo "=========================================="
+
+# Binary file detection
+BINARY_CHANGES=""
+while IFS= read -r file; do
+    if [ -n "$file" ]; then
+        full_path="$NEW_APP/$file"
+        if [ -f "$full_path" ] && [ ! -L "$full_path" ]; then
+            file_type=$(file -b "$full_path" 2>/dev/null)
+            if echo "$file_type" | grep -qE "(executable|shared library)"; then
+                BINARY_CHANGES="$BINARY_CHANGES$file\n"
+            fi
+        fi
+    fi
+done <<< "$MODIFIED_LIST"
+
+if [ -n "$BINARY_CHANGES" ]; then
+    echo "⚠️  Binary files modified:"
+    echo -e "$BINARY_CHANGES" | sed 's/^/    /'
+fi

App Bundle Extension/custom/electron_patcher.py

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ class ASARPatcher:
     def extractASAR(self, app_path, output_path):
         '''Extracts {input_path} asar file to {output_path} directory.'''
         input_path = os.path.join(app_path, "Contents/Resources/app.asar")
-        status_code = os.system(f"npx asar extract {input_path} {output_path}")
+        status_code = os.system(f"npx @electron/asar extract '{input_path}' '{output_path}'")
 
         if status_code == 0:
             print(f"Extracted {input_path} to {output_path} directory.")
@@ -44,8 +44,8 @@ class ASARPatcher:
 
     def dumpEntitlements(self, app_path):
         output_path='/tmp/extracted_entitlements.xml'
-        status_code = os.system(f"codesign -d --entitlements :- {app_path} > {output_path}")
-        
+        status_code = os.system(f"codesign -d --entitlements :- '{app_path}' > '{output_path}'")
+
         if status_code == 0:
             print(f"Dumped entitlements from {app_path} to {output_path}")
 
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ class ASARPatcher:
             print(f"Failed to dump entitlements from {app_path} to {output_path}. Error code: {status_code}")
 
     def checkIfElectronAsarIntegrityIsUsed(self, app_path):
-        status_code = os.system(f"plutil -p {app_path}/Contents/Info.plist | grep -q ElectronAsarIntegrity")
+        status_code = os.system(f"plutil -p '{app_path}/Contents/Info.plist' | grep -q ElectronAsarIntegrity")
         if status_code == 0:
             return True
         else:
@@ -62,12 +62,12 @@ class ASARPatcher:
     def packASAR(self, input_path, app_path):
         '''Packs {input_path} directory to {output_path} asar file.
         Check if ElectronAsarIntegrity is used in Info.plist, and if so, calculate hash and replace it.
-        Codesign the 
+        Codesign the
         '''
         output_path = os.path.join(app_path, "Contents/Resources/app.asar")
         info_plist_path = os.path.join(app_path, "Contents/Info.plist")
 
-        status_code =  os.system(f"npx asar pack {input_path} {output_path}")
+        status_code =  os.system(f"npx @electron/asar pack '{input_path}' '{output_path}'")
         if status_code == 0:
             print(f"Packed {input_path} into {output_path}")
 
@@ -77,14 +77,14 @@ class ASARPatcher:
                 new_hash = asar_calculator.calcASARHeaderHash()
                 print(f"New hash: {new_hash}")
                 print("Replacing ElectronAsarIntegrity in Info.plist")
-                os.system(f"/usr/libexec/PlistBuddy -c 'Set :ElectronAsarIntegrity:Resources/app.asar:hash {new_hash}' {info_plist_path}")
+                os.system(f"/usr/libexec/PlistBuddy -c 'Set :ElectronAsarIntegrity:Resources/app.asar:hash {new_hash}' '{info_plist_path}'")
 
             print("Resigning app")
             self.dumpEntitlements(app_path)
 
-            os.system(f"codesign --force --entitlements /tmp/extracted_entitlements.xml --sign - {app_path}")
+            os.system(f"codesign --force --entitlements /tmp/extracted_entitlements.xml --sign - '{app_path}'")
             os.remove('/tmp/extracted_entitlements.xml')
-            
+
             print("Done!")
 
 def main():
@@ -113,4 +113,4 @@ def main():
         print("Invalid command. Use 'extract' or 'pack'.")
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":
-    main()
+    main()

I. Mach-O/python/MachOFileFinder.py

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import sys
 import argparse
 import struct
 from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor
+from threading import Lock
 import stat
 
 class MachOFileFinder:
@@ -37,6 +38,7 @@ class MachOFileFinder:
         self.directory_path = directory_path
         self.recursive = recursive
         self.only_arm64 = only_arm64
+        self.print_lock = Lock()
 
     def isRegularFile(self, file_path):
         """Check if the specified file is a regular file."""
@@ -178,7 +180,8 @@ class MachOFileFinder:
             # Check if the file is a Mach-O binary or FAT binary
             file_type = self.getMachoInfo(file_path)
             if file_type:
-                print(f"{file_type}:{file_path}")
+                with self.print_lock:
+                    print(f"{file_type}:{file_path}")
 
     def processFiles(self):
         """Walk through the directory and process files using threading for faster execution."""
@@ -202,4 +205,4 @@ if __name__ == "__main__":
         sys.exit(1)
 
     finder = MachOFileFinder(directory_path, recursive=args.recursive, only_arm64=args.only_arm64)
-    finder.processFiles()
+    finder.processFiles()

I. Mach-O/python/find_symbol.py

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+'''
+Example usage - find _sandbox_check function across extracted libraries from Dyld Shared Cache:
+$ python3 find_symbol.py . _sandbox_check
+./usr/lib/libspindump.dylib
+                 U _sandbox_check
+----
+./usr/lib/dyld
+0000000180141a6c T _sandbox_check
+0000000180141b4c t _sandbox_check_common
+----
+./usr/lib/libnetworkextension.dylib
+                 U _sandbox_check
+'''
+
+import os
+import subprocess
+import sys
+
+def find_symbol(target_dir, symbol):
+    if not os.path.exists(target_dir):
+        print(f"Error: Directory '{target_dir}' does not exist.")
+        sys.exit(1)
+
+    # Walk recursively through all files
+    for root, _, files in os.walk(target_dir):
+        for file in files:
+            file_path = os.path.join(root, file)
+
+            # Construct the command using nm instead of disarm
+            # nm FILE_PATH | grep SYMBOL
+            cmd = f"nm \"{file_path}\" 2>/dev/null | grep \"{symbol}\""
+
+            try:
+                result = subprocess.run(
+                    cmd,
+                    shell=True,
+                    capture_output=True,
+                    text=True
+                )
+
+                if result.stdout:
+                    print(file_path)
+                    print(result.stdout.rstrip())
+                    print("----")
+
+            except Exception:
+                continue
+
+def main():
+    if len(sys.argv) != 3:
+        print(f"Usage: {sys.argv[0]} <directory_path> <symbol>")
+        sys.exit(1)
+
+    target_dir = sys.argv[1]
+    symbol = sys.argv[2]
+
+    find_symbol(target_dir, symbol)
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()

I. Mach-O/python/r2_dd.py

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+import sys
+import subprocess
+import os
+
+def print_usage():
+    print("Usage: r2_dd BINARY_PATH START_ADDR END_ADDR OUT_FILE")
+    print("Example: r2_dd ./kernelcache 0xFFFFFF80002A0000 0xFFFFFF80002A0500 ./dump.bin")
+    print("\nNote: Addresses can be Hex (0x...) or Decimal.")
+
+def parse_addr(addr_str):
+    """Parses hex or decimal string to integer."""
+    try:
+        if addr_str.lower().startswith("0x"):
+            return int(addr_str, 16)
+        else:
+            return int(addr_str)
+    except ValueError:
+        print(f"Error: Invalid address format '{addr_str}'")
+        sys.exit(1)
+
+def main():
+    if len(sys.argv) != 5:
+        print_usage()
+        sys.exit(1)
+
+    bin_path = sys.argv[1]
+    start_str = sys.argv[2]
+    end_str = sys.argv[3]
+    out_file = sys.argv[4]
+
+    if not os.path.exists(bin_path):
+        print(f"Error: Binary file not found at '{bin_path}'")
+        sys.exit(1)
+
+    start_ea = parse_addr(start_str)
+    end_ea = parse_addr(end_str)
+
+    if end_ea <= start_ea:
+        print("Error: END_ADDR must be greater than START_ADDR")
+        sys.exit(1)
+
+    size = end_ea - start_ea
+
+    print(f"--- Extraction Details ---")
+    print(f"Binary: {bin_path}")
+    print(f"Start : {hex(start_ea)}")
+    print(f"End   : {hex(end_ea)}")
+    print(f"Size  : {size} bytes")
+    print(f"--------------------------")
+
+    # We use radare2 (r2) because it automatically maps Virtual Addresses 
+    # to file offsets for Mach-O/ELF files.
+    # -q : quiet mode
+    # -N : no user settings (clean environment)
+    # -c : execute command
+    # s  : seek to address
+    # pr : print raw bytes
+    
+    r2_cmd = ["r2", "-q", "-N", "-c", f"s {start_str}; pr {size}", bin_path]
+
+    try:
+        print("Running r2...")
+        with open(out_file, "wb") as f:
+            # We pipe stderr to DEVNULL to avoid r2 warnings cluttering output
+            result = subprocess.run(r2_cmd, stdout=f, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)
+        
+        if result.returncode == 0:
+            print(f"Success! Saved to: {out_file}")
+            # Verify file size
+            if os.path.exists(out_file):
+                dump_size = os.path.getsize(out_file)
+                if dump_size == size:
+                    print("Verification: File size matches requested size.")
+                else:
+                    print(f"Warning: Dumped size ({dump_size}) differs from expected ({size}).")
+        else:
+            print("Error: r2 command failed. Do you have radare2 installed?")
+            
+    except FileNotFoundError:
+        print("Error: 'r2' command not found. Please install radare2 (brew install radare2).")
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()

II. Code Signing/custom/check_cs.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+# Usage: check_cs PATH
+
+codesign -dvvvv --entitlements - "$1" 2>&1

IX. TCC/mac/TCC CheatSheet.md

@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+| TCC Service | Combined Description |
+| :-- | :-- |
+| kTCCService | Serves as a general identifier for TCC services. |
+| kTCCServiceAccessibility | Enables apps to control the computer, often for assistive tools like screen readers or automation scripts. Apps may prompt: "Allows client to control computer." |
+| kTCCServiceAddressBook | Permits access to contacts; prompts might say: "Client would like to access your contacts." |
+| kTCCServiceAll | Grants broad access to all TCC-protected resources. |
+| kTCCServiceAppleEvents | Allows sending Apple Events for app control; e.g., "Client wants access to control indirect_object_identifier, providing access to its documents and actions." |
+| kTCCServiceAudioCapture | Enables audio input capture, useful for recording apps. |
+| kTCCServiceBluetoothAlways | Provides ongoing Bluetooth access; prompts: "Client would like to use Bluetooth." |
+| kTCCServiceBluetoothPeripheral | Facilitates connections to Bluetooth devices. |
+| kTCCServiceBluetoothWhileInUse | Limits Bluetooth access to active app use. |
+| kTCCServiceCalendar | Allows calendar access; e.g., "Client would like to access your calendar." |
+| kTCCServiceCalls | Handles call-related functionalities. |
+| kTCCServiceCamera | Grants camera access; common prompt: "Client would like to access the camera." |
+| kTCCServiceContactlessAccess | Supports features like NFC or contactless interactions. |
+| kTCCServiceContactsFull | Provides complete contacts access; e.g., "Client would like to access all of your contacts information." |
+| kTCCServiceContactsLimited | Offers restricted contacts access; e.g., "Client would like to access your contacts basic information." |
+| kTCCServiceCrashDetection | Enables crash detection capabilities. |
+| kTCCServiceDeveloperTool | Allows running non-secure software locally; e.g., "Allows client to run software that does not meet the system’s security policy." |
+| kTCCServiceEndpointSecurityClient | Provides endpoint security features. |
+| kTCCServiceExposureNotification | Manages exposure alerts, such as for health notifications. |
+| kTCCServiceExposureNotificationRegion | Handles region-based exposure notifications. |
+| kTCCServiceFaceID | Permits Face ID usage. |
+| kTCCServiceFacebook | Integrates with Facebook features. |
+| kTCCServiceFallDetection | Supports fall detection sensors. |
+| kTCCServiceFileProviderDomain | Allows access to managed file domains; e.g., "Client wants to access files managed by indirect_object_identifier." |
+| kTCCServiceFileProviderPresence | Tracks file usage in providers; e.g., "Do you want to allow client to see when you are using files managed by it?" |
+| kTCCServiceFinancialData | Enables access to financial information. |
+| kTCCServiceFocusStatus | Shares Focus mode status; e.g., "Allow client to share that you have notifications silenced when using Focus?" |
+| kTCCServiceFSKitBlockDevice | Manages block devices in FSKit. |
+| kTCCServiceGameCenterFriends | Connects to Game Center friends; e.g., "Allow client to connect you with your Game Center friends?" |
+| kTCCServiceKeyboardNetwork | Permits network access for keyboards. |
+| kTCCServiceLinkedIn | Integrates with LinkedIn. |
+| kTCCServiceListenEvent | Monitors keyboard or system events; e.g., "Allows client to monitor your keyboard." |
+| kTCCServiceLiverpool | Internal identifier for Liverpool-related features. |
+| kTCCServiceLocation | Accesses location data; e.g., "Client would like to use your current location." |
+| kTCCServiceMediaLibrary | Grants media library access; e.g., "Client would like to access Apple Music, your music and video activity, and your media library." |
+| kTCCServiceMicrophone | Allows microphone use; e.g., "Client would like to access the microphone." |
+| kTCCServiceMotion | Accesses motion and fitness data; e.g., "Client would like to access your Motion \& Fitness Activity." |
+| kTCCServiceMSO | Supports mobile service operator features. |
+| kTCCServiceNearbyInteraction | Enables nearby device interactions. |
+| kTCCServicePasteboard | Accesses clipboard data. |
+| kTCCServicePhotos | Permits photo library access; e.g., "Client would like to access your Photos." |
+| kTCCServicePhotosAdd | Allows adding to photos; e.g., "Client would like to add to your Photos." |
+| kTCCServicePostEvent | Enables sending keystrokes or events; e.g., "Allows client to send keystrokes." |
+| kTCCServicePrototype3Rights | Internal prototype rights (version 3); e.g., "Client would like authorization to Test Service Proto3Right." |
+| kTCCServicePrototype4Rights | Internal prototype rights (version 4); e.g., "Client would like authorization to Test Service Proto4Right." |
+| kTCCServiceReminders | Accesses reminders; e.g., "Client would like to access your reminders." |
+| kTCCServiceRemoteDesktop | Supports remote desktop access. |
+| kTCCServiceScreenCapture | Enables screen recording; e.g., "Client would like to capture the contents of the system display." |
+| kTCCServiceSecureElementAccess | Handles secure elements like NFC. |
+| kTCCServiceSensorKit* (various) | Provides access to sensor data (e.g., ambient light, pedometer, heart rate); specific variants target metrics like elevation, motion, or watch-based stats. |
+| kTCCServiceShareKit | Enables content sharing via ShareKit. |
+| kTCCServiceSinaWeibo | Integrates with Sina Weibo. |
+| kTCCServiceSiri | Allows Siri interactions; e.g., "Would you like to use client with Siri?" |
+| kTCCServiceSpeechRecognition | Enables speech recognition; e.g., "Client would like to access Speech Recognition." |
+| kTCCServiceSystemPolicyAllFiles | Grants full disk access; e.g., "Client would like Full Disk Access." |
+| kTCCServiceSystemPolicyAppBundles | Allows modifying app bundles; e.g., "Client would like to modify apps on your Mac." |
+| kTCCServiceSystemPolicyAppData | Accesses app-specific data. |
+| kTCCServiceSystemPolicyDesktopFolder | Accesses Desktop files; e.g., "Client would like to access files in your Desktop folder." |
+| kTCCServiceSystemPolicyDeveloperFiles | Accesses development files; e.g., "Client would like to access a file used in Software Development." |
+| kTCCServiceSystemPolicyDocumentsFolder | Accesses Documents; e.g., "Client would like to access files in your Documents folder." |
+| kTCCServiceSystemPolicyDownloadsFolder | Accesses Downloads; e.g., "Client would like to access files in your Downloads folder." |
+| kTCCServiceSystemPolicyNetworkVolumes | Accesses network volumes; e.g., "Client would like to access files on a network volume." |
+| kTCCServiceSystemPolicyRemovableVolumes | Accesses removable volumes; e.g., "Client would like to access files on a removable volume." |
+| kTCCServiceSystemPolicySysAdminFiles | Allows admin tasks; e.g., "Client would like to administer your computer." |
+| kTCCServiceTencentWeibo | Integrates with Tencent Weibo. |
+| kTCCServiceTwitter | Integrates with Twitter (now X). |
+| kTCCServiceUbiquity | Enables iCloud syncing. |
+| kTCCServiceUserAvailability | Accesses availability info; e.g., "Client would like to access your Availability." |
+| kTCCServiceUserTracking | Handles user tracking features. |
+| kTCCServiceVirtualMachineNetworking | Supports VM networking. |
+| kTCCServiceVoiceBanking | Enables voice-based banking. |
+| kTCCServiceWebBrowserPublicKeyCredential | Manages passkeys; e.g., "Would you like to allow client to access and use your saved passkeys?" |
+| kTCCServiceWebKitIntelligentTrackingPrevention | Provides tracking prevention in WebKit. |
+| kTCCServiceWillow | Internal identifier for Home-related data; e.g., "Client would like to access your Home data." |
+
+### Practical Applications of TCC Services
+
+TCC ensures apps can't access private data without approval, which is crucial for security research. Here's why certain services are commonly requested:
+
+- Assistive technologies rely on accessibility permissions to enable features like voice commands.
+- Video apps need camera and microphone access for calls or recordings.
+- Productivity tools use calendar, contacts, or reminders to sync schedules and people.
+- Device integrations, like Bluetooth or motion sensors, support wearables and fitness tracking.
+- File-related permissions are vital for apps handling documents, downloads, or network storage.
+- Advanced features, such as screen capture or Siri, enhance sharing and voice control in collaborative or automated workflows.
+
+These permissions appear in System Settings under Privacy \& Security, updating dynamically as apps request them.
+
+### Retrieving the Latest TCC Service List
+
+To get an up-to-date list directly from your system (tested on macOS Ventura and later), use these methods. Ensure Terminal has Full Disk Access for queries.
+
+1. **Database Query**:
+
+```bash
+sqlite3 ~/Library/Application\ Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db "SELECT * FROM access"
+sqlite3 /Library/Application\ Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db "SELECT * FROM access"
+```
+
+This pulls from the user-level / system-level database.
+
+2. **Extract from Framework**:
+
+```bash
+strings /System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/TCC.framework/Support/tccd | grep -iEo "^kTCCService.*" | sort -u
+```
+
+This scans for service strings in the TCC framework.
+
+### Modifying TCC Permissions via Command Line
+
+TCC stores data in SQLite databases at `~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db` (user-specific) and `/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db` (system-wide). The key table is `access`, with fields like `service` (permission type), `client` (app bundle ID or path), `client_type` (0 for bundle ID, 1 for path), and `auth_value` (2 for allowed, 0 for denied).
+
+#### Viewing Permissions
+
+List apps with Full Disk Access:
+
+```bash
+sqlite3 ~/Library/Application\ Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db 'SELECT client FROM access WHERE auth_value > 0 AND service = "kTCCServiceSystemPolicyAllFiles"'
+```
+
+Check system database similarly.
+
+#### Editing Permissions
+
+- Deny a permission (sets `auth_value` to 0):
+
+```bash
+sqlite3 ~/Library/Application\ Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db 'UPDATE access SET auth_value = 0 WHERE client = "com.example.app" AND service = "kTCCServiceCamera"'
+```
+
+- Delete a specific entry:
+
+```bash
+sqlite3 ~/Library/Application\ Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db "DELETE FROM access WHERE client = 'com.example.app' AND service = 'kTCCServiceCamera'"
+```
+
+- Add an entry (requires code signing requirement blob via `codesign` and `csreq`):
+First, extract the blob for the app and target:
+
+```bash
+codesign -dr - /Path/To/App.app 2>&1 | awk -F ' => ' '/designated/{print $2}' | csreq -r- -b /tmp/csreq.bin
+xxd -p /tmp/csreq.bin | tr -d '\n'  # Output for INSERT
+```
+
+Then insert (adapt values accordingly).
+
+For simpler resets, use Apple's `tccutil reset` command to revoke permissions for a service or all for an app `tccutil reset All com.apple.Terminal`.

README.md

@@ -1,25 +1,37 @@
 # Snake & Apple
-![alt](img/Snake_Apple.jpg)
-The code repository for the `Snake&Apple` article series, which documents my research about macOS security.
+[![alt](img/Snake_Apple.jpg)](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/snake-apple-ff87a399ecc4?sk=v2%2Fb2295773-88e6-4654-9d3d-61d73b9001e5)  
+This is the code repository for the "[Snake & Apple](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/list/snakeapple-50baea541374)" article series, which documents my research on macOS security. The primary tool developed during the creation of the series is called `CrimsonUroboros`. You can find its description, along with instructions for other tools in this repository, in [Tools.md](https://github.com/Karmaz95/Snake_Apple/blob/main/TOOLS.md).
 
-Each article directory contains three subdirectories:
+## ARTICLES
+I have been writing about Apple Security across different platforms for years, compiling them in this repository. Currently, I am writing on [Patreon](https://www.patreon.com/Karol_Mazurek). All articles are free, except those marked with a `*`, which are [exclusive content](https://www.patreon.com/collection/1529482) for Elite Patrons—my "thank-you" to the folks who support me.
+
+---
+Each main article directory contains three subdirectories:
 * `mac` - source code of macOS for references and copy of presentations.
 * `custom` - code, for example, programs written for articles.
 * `python` - contains the latest CrimsonUroboros and other Python scripts created during research. 
-
-## ARTICLES
-The short introduction is written in [Snake&Apple Intro](https://karol-mazurek95.medium.com/snake-apple-ff87a399ecc4?sk=v2%2Fb2295773-88e6-4654-9d3d-61d73b9001e5)  
+---
+The short introduction is written in [Snake&Apple Intro](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/snake-apple-ff87a399ecc4?sk=v2%2Fb2295773-88e6-4654-9d3d-61d73b9001e5)  
 The tags for each article are in the [Article_tags.md](Article_tags.md).  
 The table of contents showing links to all articles is below:
 * ☑ [App Bundle Extension](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/snake-apple-app-bundle-ext-f5c43a3c84c4?sk=v2%2F3ff105ad-f4f0-464d-b4d5-46b86c66fe14)
   * ☑ [Cracking macOS apps](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/cracking-macos-apps-39575dd672e0?sk=v2%2F727dce55-53ee-45f6-b051-2979e62f2ba1)
   * ☑ [Cracking Electron Integrity](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/cracking-electron-integrity-0a10e0d5f239?sk=v2%2F7726b99c-c6c9-4d70-8c37-da9f2f0874e8)
   * ☑ [XPC Programming on macOS](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/xpc-programming-on-macos-7e1918573f6d?sk=v2%2F21c4e9c7-40a5-43dd-804b-0d8f9bc4e94c)
-* ☑ [I. Mach-O](https://karol-mazurek95.medium.com/snake-apple-i-mach-o-a8eda4b87263?sk=v2%2Ffc1cbfa4-e2d4-4387-9a82-b27191978b5b)
+  * ☑ [AppleScript for Vulnerability Research](https://www.patreon.com/posts/applescript-for-130305213) `*`
+  * ☑ [LLDB for Vulnerability Research](https://www.patreon.com/posts/lldb-for-131084875) `*`
+  * ☑ [Scaling Vulnerability Discovery on macOS](https://www.patreon.com/posts/scaling-on-macos-131937045) `*`
+  * ☑ [Applications Patch Diffing on macOS](https://www.patreon.com/posts/applications-on-131618568) `*`
+  * ☑ [Threats of Unvalidated XPC Clients on macOS](https://afine.com/threats-of-unvalidated-xpc-clients-on-macos/)
+* ☑ [I. Mach-O](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/snake-apple-i-mach-o-a8eda4b87263?sk=v2%2Ffc1cbfa4-e2d4-4387-9a82-b27191978b5b)
   * ☑ [Optimizing Mach-O Detection](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/optimizing-mach-o-detection-40352101bbef?sk=v2%2F3378d3f5-874b-4b82-94d5-b2ccd8522ea3)
-* ☑ [II. Code Signing](https://karol-mazurek95.medium.com/snake-apple-ii-code-signing-f0a9967b7f02?sk=v2%2Fbbc87007-89ca-4135-91d6-668b5d2fe9ae)
-* ☑ [III. Checksec](https://karol-mazurek95.medium.com/snake-apple-iii-checksec-ed64a4b766c1?sk=v2%2Fb4b8d637-e906-4b6b-8088-ca1f893cd787)
+  * ☑ [Static Analysis on Decompiled Code](https://www.patreon.com/posts/static-analysis-135790081) `*`
+* ☑ [II. Code Signing](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/snake-apple-ii-code-signing-f0a9967b7f02?sk=v2%2Fbbc87007-89ca-4135-91d6-668b5d2fe9ae)
+  * ☑ [To allow or not to get-task-allow, that is the question](https://afine.com/to-allow-or-not-to-get-task-allow-that-is-the-question/)
+* ☑ [III. Checksec](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/snake-apple-iii-checksec-ed64a4b766c1?sk=v2%2Fb4b8d637-e906-4b6b-8088-ca1f893cd787)
 * ☑ [IV. Dylibs](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/snake-apple-iv-dylibs-2c955439b94e?sk=v2%2Fdef72b7a-121a-47a1-af89-7bf53aed1ea2)
+  * ☑ [Breaking Hardened Runtime: The 0-Day Microsoft Delivered to macOS](https://afine.com/breaking-hardened-runtime-the-0-day-microsoft-delivered-to-macos/)
+  * ☑ [Dyld Shared Cache Patch Diffing based on CVE-2025-43400](https://www.patreon.com/posts/dyld-shared-on-140770478) `*`
 * ☑ [V. Dyld](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/snake-apple-v-dyld-8b36b674cc44?sk=v2%2F4acb16f8-fa88-41f0-8d7c-1362f4060010)
   * ☑ [DYLD — Do You Like Death? (I)](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/dyld-do-you-like-death-i-8199faad040e?sk=v2%2F359b081f-d944-409b-9e7c-95f7c171b969)
   * ☑ [DYLD — Do You Like Death? (II)](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/dyld-do-you-like-death-ii-b74360b8af47?sk=v2%2Ff0cff71c-5345-4228-a639-653325fc979d)
@@ -41,9 +53,12 @@ The table of contents showing links to all articles is below:
   * ☑ [Sandbox Detector](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/sandbox-detector-4268ab3cd361?sk=v2%2F58fe49fb-1381-4db3-9db9-3f6309e4053a)
   * ☑ [Sandbox Validator](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/sandbox-validator-e760e5d88617?sk=v2%2F145ac2ef-ca06-41a0-b310-c96f4ce0037b)
   * ☑ [App Sandbox startup](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/app-sandbox-startup-71daf8f259d1?sk=v2%2F9f3b09a6-c7c0-445d-8613-8e25bf3f4e4d)
-  * ☑ [System Intigrity Protection](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/system-integrity-protection-sip-140562b07fea?sk=v2%2F9c293b8f-c376-4603-b8a1-2872ba3395cf)
+  * ☑ [System Integrity Protection](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/system-integrity-protection-sip-140562b07fea?sk=v2%2F9c293b8f-c376-4603-b8a1-2872ba3395cf)
 * ☑ [IX. TCC](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/snake-apple-ix-tcc-ae822e3e2718?sk=v2%2F426ae6cf-6418-4e3f-a0ca-3aee06d6f676)
   * ☑ [Apple UUID Finder](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/apple-uuid-finder-a5173bdd1a8a?sk=v2%2F04bb0d32-6dc9-437d-bf72-8f65e03fed90)
+  * ☑ [Threat of TCC Bypasses on macOS](https://afine.com/threat-of-tcc-bypasses-on-macos/)
+  * ☑ [TCC Bypass in Visual Studio Code via misconfigured Node fuses](https://afine.com/tcc-bypass-in-microsoft-visual-studio-code-via-misconfigured-node-fuses/)
+  * ☑ [Reverse Engineering Apple’s TCC Daemon: When Decompiled Code Lies](https://afine.com/reverse-engineering-apples-tcc-daemon-when-decompiled-code-lies/)
 * ☑ [X. NU](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/snake-apple-x-nu-0bc5c36170da?sk=v2%2F502ee9db-8d8a-4a1b-8655-546742a7d261)
   * ☑ [Kernel Debugging Setup on MacOS](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/kernel-debugging-setup-on-macos-07dd8c86cdb6?sk=v2%2F782bf539-a057-4f14-bbe7-f8e1ace26701)
   * ☑ [Fixing an Infinite Loop](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/fixing-an-infinite-loop-on-unix-e0a8a5501c54?sk=v2%2F140555f8-9770-4c6b-9734-d9c5b7cc9bc7)
@@ -51,651 +66,24 @@ The table of contents showing links to all articles is below:
   * ☑ [MACF on macOS](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/macf-on-macos-004b8a490e2c?sk=v2%2Fd9a61281-e230-4ac6-8608-ad062f4d2a9a)
   * ☑ [Kernel Extensions on macOS](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/kernel-extensions-on-macos-1b0f38b632ea?sk=v2%2Fb6920735-90f9-459c-9c10-30980247bae7)
   * ☑ [Mach IPC Security on macOS](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/mach-ipc-security-on-macos-63ee350cb59b?sk=v2%2F3afce264-9b59-447f-84ea-b1988606191a)
+    * ☑ [Task Injection on macOS](https://afine.com/task-injection-on-macos/)
   * ☑ [Drivers on macOS](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/drivers-on-macos-26edbde370ab?sk=v2%2F8a5bbc18-aae7-4a68-b0dd-bb5ce70b5752)
+    * ☑ [Case Study: Analyzing macOS IONVMeFamily NS_01 Driver Denial of Service Issue](https://afine.com/case-study-analyzing-macos-ionvmefamily-driver-denial-of-service-issue/)
+    * ☑ [Case Study: IOMobileFramebuffer NULL Pointer Dereference](https://afine.com/case-study-iomobileframebuffer-null-pointer-dereference/)
+    * ☑ [A mouse move that crashed the system – Stack Buffer Overflow in Display Driver on macOS](https://afine.com/a-mouse-move-that-crashed-the-system-stack-buffer-overflow-in-display-driver-on-macos/)
+    * ☑ [Mapping IOKit Methods Exposed to User Space on macOS](https://phrack.org/issues/72/9_md#article) #PHRACK 💀
+  * ☑ [SLAP & FLOP: Apple Silicon’s Data Speculation Vulnerabilities](https://afine.com/slap-flop-apple-silicons-data-speculation-vulnerabilities/)
+  * ☑ [History of NULL Pointer Dereferences on macOS](https://afine.com/history-of-null-pointer-dereferences-on-macos/)
 
-## TOOLS
-[CrimsonUroboros](#crimsonuroboros) • [MachOFileFinder](#machofilefinder) • [TrustCacheParser](#trustcacheparser) • [SignatureReader](#signaturereader) • [extract_cms.sh](#extract_cmssh) • [ModifyMachOFlags](#modifymachoflags) • [LCFinder](#lcfinder) • [MachODylibLoadCommandsFinder](#machodylibloadcommandsfinder) • [AMFI_test.sh](VI.%20AMFI/custom/AMFI_test.sh) • [make_plist](VIII.%20Sandbox/python/make_plist.py) • [sandbox_inspector](VIII.%20Sandbox/python/sandbox_inspector.py) • [spblp_compiler_wrapper](VIII.%20Sandbox/custom/sbpl_compiler_wrapper) • [make_bundle](#make_bundle) • [make_bundle_exe](#make_bundle_exe) • [make_dmg](#make_dmg) • [electron_patcher](#electron_patcher) • [sandbox_validator](#sandbox_validator) • [sandblaster](#sandblaster) • [sip_check](#sip_check) • [crimson_waccess.py](#crimson_waccesspy) • [sip_tester](#sip_tester) • [UUIDFinder](#uuidfinder)
-***
+* ☐ [Apple Intelligence]()
+  * ☑ [AI-Enhanced Vulnerability Research](https://www.patreon.com/posts/ai-enhanced-135545364) `*`
 
-### [CrimsonUroboros](tests/CrimsonUroboros.py)
-![alt](img/CrimsonUroboros.jpg)
-Core program resulting from the Snake&Apple article series for binary analysis. You may find older versions of this script in each article directory in this repository.
-* Usage
-```console
-usage: CrimsonUroboros [-h] [-p PATH] [-b BUNDLE] [--bundle_structure] [--bundle_info] [--bundle_info_syntax_check]
-                       [--bundle_frameworks] [--bundle_plugins] [--bundle_id] [--file_type] [--header_flags]
-                       [--endian] [--header] [--load_commands] [--has_cmd LC_MAIN] [--segments]
-                       [--has_segment __SEGMENT] [--sections] [--has_section __SEGMENT,__section] [--symbols]
-                       [--imports] [--exports] [--imported_symbols] [--chained_fixups] [--exports_trie] [--uuid]
-                       [--main] [--encryption_info [(optional) save_path.bytes]] [--strings_section]
-                       [--all_strings] [--save_strings all_strings.txt] [--info]
-                       [--dump_data [offset,size,output_path]] [--calc_offset vm_offset] [--constructors]
-                       [--dump_section __SEGMENT,__section] [--dump_binary output_path] [--verify_signature]
-                       [--cd_info] [--cd_requirements] [--entitlements [human|xml|var]]
-                       [--extract_cms cms_signature.der] [--extract_certificates certificate_name]
-                       [--remove_sig unsigned_binary] [--sign_binary [adhoc|identity]] [--cs_offset] [--cs_flags]
-                       [--verify_bundle_signature] [--remove_sig_from_bundle] [--has_pie] [--has_arc]
-                       [--is_stripped] [--has_canary] [--has_nx_stack] [--has_nx_heap] [--has_xn] [--is_notarized]
-                       [--is_encrypted] [--is_restricted] [--is_hr] [--is_as] [--is_fort] [--has_rpath] [--has_lv]
-                       [--checksec] [--dylibs] [--rpaths] [--rpaths_u] [--dylibs_paths] [--dylibs_paths_u]
-                       [--broken_relative_paths] [--dylibtree [cache_path,output_path,is_extracted]] [--dylib_id]
-                       [--reexport_paths] [--hijack_sec] [--dylib_hijacking [(optional) cache_path]]
-                       [--dylib_hijacking_a [cache_path]] [--prepare_dylib [(optional) target_dylib_name]]
-                       [--is_built_for_sim] [--get_dyld_env] [--compiled_with_dyld_env] [--has_interposing]
-                       [--interposing_symbols] [--has_suid] [--has_sgid] [--has_sticky] [--injectable_dyld]
-                       [--test_insert_dylib] [--test_prune_dyld] [--test_dyld_print_to_file] [--test_dyld_SLC]
-                       [--xattr] [--xattr_value xattr_name] [--xattr_all] [--has_quarantine] [--remove_quarantine]
-                       [--add_quarantine] [--sandbox_container_path] [--sandbox_container_metadata]
-                       [--sandbox_redirectable_paths] [--sandbox_parameters] [--sandbox_entitlements]
-                       [--sandbox_build_uuid] [--sandbox_redirected_paths] [--sandbox_system_images]
-                       [--sandbox_system_profiles] [--sandbox_content_protection] [--sandbox_profile_data]
-                       [--extract_sandbox_operations] [--extract_sandbox_platform_profile] [--tcc] [--tcc_fda]
-                       [--tcc_automation] [--tcc_sysadmin] [--tcc_desktop] [--tcc_documents] [--tcc_downloads]
-                       [--tcc_photos] [--tcc_contacts] [--tcc_calendar] [--tcc_camera] [--tcc_microphone]
-                       [--tcc_location] [--tcc_recording] [--tcc_accessibility] [--tcc_icloud]
-                       [--parse_mpo mpo_addr] [--dump_prelink_info [(optional) out_name]]
-                       [--dump_prelink_text [(optional) out_name]] [--dump_prelink_kext [kext_name]]
-                       [--kext_prelinkinfo [kext_name]] [--kmod_info kext_name] [--kext_entry kext_name]
-                       [--kext_exit kext_name] [--mig] [--dump_kext kext_name]
+## REFERENCES
+I have studied tons of resources, crediting other researchers and their contributions at the end of each article I wrote. Thank you all for sharing your hard-earned knowledge for free. You are all awesome! However, two individuals have significantly accelerated my progress, and I want to honor them:
 
-Mach-O files parser for binary analysis
+* **[Jonathan Levin](https://x.com/Morpheus______)** – His [*OS Internals trilogy](https://newosxbook.com/home.html) helped me rapidly learn the beauty of the macOS system. If there is a single resource I would recommend for anybody, it is the masterpiece you wrote. Thank you!
 
-options:
-  -h, --help            show this help message and exit
+* **[Patrick Wardle](https://x.com/patrickwardle)** – He created the [OBTS conference](https://objective-see.org/), where many brilliant minds come together to share their research. You've created something to look forward to every year. Thank you!
 
-GENERAL ARGS:
-  -p, --path PATH       Path to the Mach-O file
-  -b, --bundle BUNDLE   Path to the App Bundle (can be used with -p to change path of binary which is by default
-                        set to: /target.app/Contents/MacOS/target)
-
-BUNDLE ARGS:
-  --bundle_structure    Print the structure of the app bundle
-  --bundle_info         Print the Info.plist content of the app bundle (JSON format)
-  --bundle_info_syntax_check
-                        Check if bundle info syntax is valid
-  --bundle_frameworks   Print the list of frameworks in the bundle
-  --bundle_plugins      Print the list of plugins in the bundle
-  --bundle_id           Print the CFBundleIdentifier value from the Info.plist file if it exists
-
-MACH-O ARGS:
-  --file_type           Print binary file type
-  --header_flags        Print binary header flags
-  --endian              Print binary endianess
-  --header              Print binary header
-  --load_commands       Print binary load commands names
-  --has_cmd LC_MAIN     Check of binary has given load command
-  --segments            Print binary segments in human-friendly form
-  --has_segment __SEGMENT
-                        Check if binary has given '__SEGMENT'
-  --sections            Print binary sections in human-friendly form
-  --has_section __SEGMENT,__section
-                        Check if binary has given '__SEGMENT,__section'
-  --symbols             Print all binary symbols
-  --imports             Print imported symbols
-  --exports             Print exported symbols
-  --imported_symbols    Print symbols imported from external libraries with dylib names
-  --chained_fixups      Print Chained Fixups information
-  --exports_trie        Print Export Trie information
-  --uuid                Print UUID
-  --main                Print entry point and stack size
-  --encryption_info [(optional) save_path.bytes]
-                        Print encryption info if any. Optionally specify an output path to dump the encrypted data
-                        (if cryptid=0, data will be in plain text)
-  --strings_section     Print strings from __cstring section
-  --all_strings         Print strings from all sections
-  --save_strings all_strings.txt
-                        Parse all sections, detect strings, and save them to a file
-  --info                Print header, load commands, segments, sections, symbols, and strings
-  --dump_data [offset,size,output_path]
-                        Dump {size} bytes starting from {offset} to a given {filename} (e.g.
-                        '0x1234,0x1000,out.bin')
-  --calc_offset vm_offset
-                        Calculate the real address (file on disk) of the given Virtual Memory {vm_offset} (e.g.
-                        0xfffffe000748f580)
-  --constructors        Print binary constructors
-  --dump_section __SEGMENT,__section
-                        Dump '__SEGMENT,__section' to standard output as a raw bytes
-  --dump_binary output_path
-                        Dump arm64 binary to a given file
-
-CODE SIGNING ARGS:
-  --verify_signature    Code Signature verification (if the contents of the binary have been modified)
-  --cd_info             Print Code Signature information
-  --cd_requirements     Print Code Signature Requirements
-  --entitlements [human|xml|var]
-                        Print Entitlements in a human-readable, XML, or DER format (default: human)
-  --extract_cms cms_signature.der
-                        Extract CMS Signature from the Code Signature and save it to a given file
-  --extract_certificates certificate_name
-                        Extract Certificates and save them to a given file. To each filename will be added an index
-                        at the end: _0 for signing, _1 for intermediate, and _2 for root CA certificate
-  --remove_sig unsigned_binary
-                        Save the new file on a disk with removed signature
-  --sign_binary [adhoc|identity]
-                        Sign binary using specified identity - use : 'security find-identity -v -p codesigning' to
-                        get the identity (default: adhoc)
-  --cs_offset           Print Code Signature file offset
-  --cs_flags            Print Code Signature flags
-  --verify_bundle_signature
-                        Code Signature verification (if the contents of the bundle have been modified)
-  --remove_sig_from_bundle
-                        Remove Code Signature from the bundle
-
-CHECKSEC ARGS:
-  --has_pie             Check if Position-Independent Executable (PIE) is set
-  --has_arc             Check if Automatic Reference Counting (ARC) is in use (can be false positive)
-  --is_stripped         Check if binary is stripped
-  --has_canary          Check if Stack Canary is in use (can be false positive)
-  --has_nx_stack        Check if stack is non-executable (NX stack)
-  --has_nx_heap         Check if heap is non-executable (NX heap)
-  --has_xn              Check if binary is protected by eXecute Never (XN) ARM protection
-  --is_notarized        Check if the application is notarized and can pass the Gatekeeper verification
-  --is_encrypted        Check if the application is encrypted (has LC_ENCRYPTION_INFO(_64) and cryptid set to 1)
-  --is_restricted       Check if binary has __RESTRICT segment or CS_RESTRICT flag set
-  --is_hr               Check if the Hardened Runtime is in use
-  --is_as               Check if the App Sandbox is in use
-  --is_fort             Check if the binary is fortified
-  --has_rpath           Check if the binary utilise any @rpath variables
-  --has_lv              Check if the binary has Library Validation (protection against Dylib Hijacking)
-  --checksec            Run all checksec module options on the binary
-
-DYLIBS ARGS:
-  --dylibs              Print shared libraries used by specified binary with compatibility and the current version
-                        (loading paths unresolved, like @rpath/example.dylib)
-  --rpaths              Print all paths (resolved) that @rpath can be resolved to
-  --rpaths_u            Print all paths (unresolved) that @rpath can be resolved to
-  --dylibs_paths        Print absolute dylib loading paths (resolved @rpath|@executable_path|@loader_path) in order
-                        they are searched for
-  --dylibs_paths_u      Print unresolved dylib loading paths.
-  --broken_relative_paths
-                        Print 'broken' relative paths from the binary (cases where the dylib source is specified
-                        for an executable directory without @executable_path)
-  --dylibtree [cache_path,output_path,is_extracted]
-                        Print the dynamic dependencies of a Mach-O binary recursively. You can specify the Dyld
-                        Shared Cache path in the first argument, the output directory as the 2nd argument, and if
-                        you have already extracted DSC in the 3rd argument (0 or 1). The output_path will be used
-                        as a base for dylibtree. For example, to not extract DSC, use: --dylibs ",,1", or to
-                        extract from default to default use just --dylibs or --dylibs ",,0" which will extract DSC
-                        to extracted_dyld_share_cache/ in the current directory
-  --dylib_id            Print path from LC_ID_DYLIB
-  --reexport_paths      Print paths from LC_REEXPORT_DLIB
-  --hijack_sec          Check if binary is protected against Dylib Hijacking
-  --dylib_hijacking [(optional) cache_path]
-                        Check for possible Direct and Indirect Dylib Hijacking loading paths. The output is printed
-                        to console and saved in JSON format to /tmp/dylib_hijacking_log.json(append mode).
-                        Optionally, specify the path to the Dyld Shared Cache
-  --dylib_hijacking_a [cache_path]
-                        Like --dylib_hijacking, but shows only possible vectors (without protected binaries)
-  --prepare_dylib [(optional) target_dylib_name]
-                        Compile rogue dylib. Optionally, specify target_dylib_path, it will search for the imported
-                        symbols from it in the dylib specified in the --path argument and automatically add it to
-                        the source code of the rogue lib. Example: --path lib1.dylib --prepare_dylib
-                        /path/to/lib2.dylib
-
-DYLD ARGS:
-  --is_built_for_sim    Check if binary is built for simulator platform.
-  --get_dyld_env        Extract Dyld environment variables from the loader binary.
-  --compiled_with_dyld_env
-                        Check if binary was compiled with -dyld_env flag and print the environment variables and
-                        its values.
-  --has_interposing     Check if binary has interposing sections.
-  --interposing_symbols
-                        Print interposing symbols if any.
-
-AMFI ARGS:
-  --has_suid            Check if the file has SetUID bit set
-  --has_sgid            Check if the file has SetGID bit set
-  --has_sticky          Check if the file has sticky bit set
-  --injectable_dyld     Check if the binary is injectable using DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES
-  --test_insert_dylib   Check if it is possible to inject dylib using DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES (INVASIVE - the binary
-                        is executed)
-  --test_prune_dyld     Check if Dyld Environment Variables are cleared (using DYLD_PRINT_INITIALIZERS=1) (INVASIVE
-                        - the binary is executed)
-  --test_dyld_print_to_file
-                        Check if DYLD_PRINT_TO_FILE Dyld Environment Variables works (INVASIVE - the binary is
-                        executed)
-  --test_dyld_SLC       Check if DYLD_SHARED_REGION=private Dyld Environment Variables works and code can be
-                        injected using DYLD_SHARED_CACHE_DIR (INVASIVE - the binary is executed)
-
-ANTIVIRUS ARGS:
-  --xattr               Print all extended attributes names
-  --xattr_value xattr_name
-                        Print single extended attribute value
-  --xattr_all           Print all extended attributes names and their values
-  --has_quarantine      Check if the file has quarantine extended attribute
-  --remove_quarantine   Remove com.apple.quarantine extended attribute from the file
-  --add_quarantine      Add com.apple.quarantine extended attribute to the file
-
-SANDBOX ARGS:
-  --sandbox_container_path
-                        Print the sandbox container path
-  --sandbox_container_metadata
-                        Print the .com.apple.containermanagerd.metadata.plist contents for the given bundlein XML
-                        format
-  --sandbox_redirectable_paths
-                        Print the redirectable paths from the sandbox container metadata as list
-  --sandbox_parameters  Print the parameters from the sandbox container metadata as key-value pairs
-  --sandbox_entitlements
-                        Print the entitlements from the sandbox container metadata in JSON format
-  --sandbox_build_uuid  Print the sandbox build UUID from the sandbox container metadata
-  --sandbox_redirected_paths
-                        Print the redirected paths from the sandbox container metadata as list
-  --sandbox_system_images
-                        Print the system images from the sandbox container metadata as key-value pairs
-  --sandbox_system_profiles
-                        Print the system profile from the sandbox container metadata in JSON format
-  --sandbox_content_protection
-                        Print the content protection from the sandbox container metadata
-  --sandbox_profile_data
-                        Print raw bytes ofthe sandbox profile data from the sandbox container metadata
-  --extract_sandbox_operations
-                        Extract sandbox operations from the Sandbox.kext file
-  --extract_sandbox_platform_profile
-                        Extract sandbox platform profile from the Sandbox.kext file
-
-TCC ARGS:
-  --tcc                 Print TCC permissions of the binary
-  --tcc_fda             Check Full Disk Access (FDA) TCC permission for the binary
-  --tcc_automation      Check Automation TCC permission for the binary
-  --tcc_sysadmin        Check System Policy SysAdmin Files TCC permission for the binary
-  --tcc_desktop         Check Desktop Folder TCC permission for the binary
-  --tcc_documents       Check Documents Folder TCC permission for the binary
-  --tcc_downloads       Check Downloads Folder TCC permission for the binary
-  --tcc_photos          Check Photos Library TCC permission for the binary
-  --tcc_contacts        Check Contacts TCC permission for the binary
-  --tcc_calendar        Check Calendar TCC permission for the binary
-  --tcc_camera          Check Camera TCC permission for the binary
-  --tcc_microphone      Check Microphone TCC permission for the binary
-  --tcc_location        Check Location Services TCC permission for the binary
-  --tcc_recording       Check Screen Recording TCC permission for the binary
-  --tcc_accessibility   Check Accessibility TCC permission for the binary
-  --tcc_icloud          Check iCloud (Ubiquity) TCC permission for the binary
-
-XNU ARGS:
-  --parse_mpo mpo_addr  Parse mac_policy_ops at given address from Kernel Cache and print pointers in use (not
-                        zeroed)
-  --dump_prelink_info [(optional) out_name]
-                        Dump "__PRELINK_INFO,__info" to a given file (default: "PRELINK_info.txt")
-  --dump_prelink_text [(optional) out_name]
-                        Dump "__PRELINK_TEXT,__text" to a given file (default: "PRELINK_text.txt")
-  --dump_prelink_kext [kext_name]
-                        Dump prelinked KEXT {kext_name} from decompressed Kernel Cache PRELINK_TEXT segment to a
-                        file named: prelinked_{kext_name}.bin
-  --kext_prelinkinfo [kext_name]
-                        Print _Prelink properties from PRELINK_INFO,__info for a give {kext_name}
-  --kmod_info kext_name
-                        Parse kmod_info structure for the given {kext_name} from Kernel Cache
-  --kext_entry kext_name
-                        Calculate the virtual memory address of the __start (entrypoint) for the given {kext_name}
-                        Kernel Extension
-  --kext_exit kext_name
-                        Calculate the virtual memory address of the __stop (exitpoint) for the given {kext_name}
-                        Kernel Extension
-  --mig                 Search for MIG subsystem and prints message handlers
-  --dump_kext kext_name
-                        Dump the kernel extension binary from the kernelcache.decompressed file
-```
-* Example:
-```bash
-CrimsonUroboros.py -p PATH --info
-```
-***
-### [MachOFileFinder](I.%20Mach-O/python/MachOFileFinder.py)
-Designed to find ARM64 Mach-O binaries within a specified directory and print their file type.
-* Usage:
-```bash
-python MachOFileFinder.py PATH
-```
-* Example:
-```bash
-python MachOFileFinder.py . -r 2>/dev/null
-EXECUTE:/Users/karmaz95/t/pingsender
-DYLIB:/Users/karmaz95/t/dylibs/use_dylib_app/customs/custom.dylib
-BUNDLE:/Users/karmaz95/t/bundles/MyBundle
-```
-***
-### [TrustCacheParser](II.%20Code%20Signing/python/TrustCacheParser.py)
-Designed to parse trust caches and print it in human readable form (based on [PyIMG4](https://github.com/m1stadev/PyIMG4) and [trustcache](https://github.com/CRKatri/trustcache))
-* Usage:
-```console
-usage: TrustCacheParser [-h] [--dst DST] [--parse_img] [--parse_tc] [--print_tc] [--all]
-
-Copy Trust Cache files to a specified destination.
-
-options:
-  -h, --help         show this help message and exit
-  --dst DST, -d DST  Destination directory to copy Trust Cache files to.
-  --parse_img        Parse copied Image4 to extract payload data.
-  --parse_tc         Parse extract payload data to human-readable form trust cache using
-                     trustcache.
-  --print_tc         Print the contents of trust_cache (files must be in the current
-                     directory and ends with .trust_cache)
-  --all              parse_img -> parse_tc -> print_tc
-```
-***
-### [SignatureReader](II.%20Code%20Signing/python/SignatureReader.py)
-Designed to parse extracted cms sginature from Mach-O files.
-* Usage:
-```bash
-# First extract CMS Signature using CrimsonUroboros 
-CrimsonUroboros -p target_binary --extract_cms cms_sign
-# or using extract_cms.sh script
-./extract_cms.sh target_binary cms_sign
-```
-
-```console
-usage: SignatureReader [-h] [--load_cms cms_signature.der]
-                       [--extract_signature cms_signature.der]
-                       [--extract_pubkey cert_0] [--human]
-
-CMS Signature Loader
-
-options:
-  -h, --help            show this help message and exit
-  --load_cms cms_signature.der
-                        Load the DER encoded CMS Signature from the filesystem
-                        and print it
-  --extract_signature cms_signature.der
-                        Extract and print the signature part from the DER
-                        encoded CMS Signature
-  --extract_pubkey cert_0
-                        Extract public key from the given certificate and save
-                        it to extracted_pubkey.pem
-  --human               Print in human-readable format
-❯ CrimsonUroboros -p signed_ad_hoc_example --extract_cms cms_sign
-```
-* Example:
-```bash
-SignatureReader --extract_signature cms_sign --human
-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
-```
-***
-### [extract_cms.sh](II.%20Code%20Signing/custom/extract_cms.sh)
-Designed to extract cms sginature from Mach-O files (bash alternative to `SingatureReader --extract_signature`).
-* Example:
-```
-./extract_cms.sh target_binary cms_sign
-```
-***
-### [ModifyMachOFlags](III.%20Checksec/python/ModifyMachOFlags.py)
-Designed to change Mach-O header flags.
-* Usage:
-```console
-usage: ModifyMachOFlags [-h] -i INPUT -o OUT [--flag FLAG] [--sign_binary [adhoc|identity_number]]
-
-Modify the Mach-O binary flags.
-
-options:
-  -h, --help            show this help message and exit
-  -i INPUT, --input INPUT
-                        Path to the Mach-O file.
-  -o OUT, --out OUT     Where to save a modified file.
-  --flag FLAG           Specify the flag constant name and value (e.g., NO_HEAP_EXECUTION=1). Can be used multiple times. Available
-                        flags: NOUNDEFS, INCRLINK, DYLDLINK, BINDATLOAD, PREBOUND, SPLIT_SEGS, LAZY_INIT, TWOLEVEL, FORCE_FLAT,
-                        NOMULTIDEFS, NOFIXPREBINDING, PREBINDABLE, ALLMODSBOUND, SUBSECTIONS_VIA_SYMBOLS, CANONICAL, WEAK_DEFINES,
-                        BINDS_TO_WEAK, ALLOW_STACK_EXECUTION, ROOT_SAFE, SETUID_SAFE, NO_REEXPORTED_DYLIBS, PIE,
-                        DEAD_STRIPPABLE_DYLIB, HAS_TLV_DESCRIPTORS, NO_HEAP_EXECUTION, APP_EXTENSION_SAFE,
-                        NLIST_OUTOFSYNC_WITH_DYLDINFO, SIM_SUPPORT, DYLIB_IN_CACHE
-  --sign_binary [adhoc|identity_number]
-                        Sign binary using specified identity - use : 'security find-identity -v -p codesigning' to get the
-                        identity. (default: adhoc)
-```
-* Example:
-```bash
-ModifyMachOFlags -i hello -o hello_modified --flag NO_HEAP_EXECUTION=1 --sign_binary
-```
-***
-### [LCFinder](III.%20Checksec/python/LCFinder.py)
-Designed to find if specified Load Command exist in the binary or list of binaries.
-* Usage:
-```console
-usage: LCFinder [-h] [--path PATH] [--list_path LIST_PATH] --lc LC
-
-Check for a specific load command in Mach-O binaries.
-
-options:
-  -h, --help            show this help message and exit
-  --path PATH, -p PATH  Absolute path to the valid MachO binary.
-  --list_path LIST_PATH, -l LIST_PATH
-                        Path to a wordlist file containing absolute paths.
-  --lc LC               The load command to check for.
-```
-* Example:
-```bash
-LCFinder -l macho_paths.txt --lc SEGMENT_64 2>/dev/null
-LCFinder -p hello --lc lc_segment_64 2>/dev/null
-```
-***
-### [MachODylibLoadCommandsFinder](IV.%20Dylibs/python/MachODylibLoadCommandsFinder.py)
-Designed to Recursively crawl the system and parse Mach-O files to find DYLIB related load commands.
-Print the total Mach-O files analyzed and how many DYLIB-related LCs existed
-* Usage:
-```console
-MachODylibLoadCommandsFinder 2>/dev/null
-```
-***
-### [check_amfi](VI.%20AMFI/python/check_amfi.py)
-Simple script for calculating `amfiFlags` (described [here](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/dyld-do-you-like-death-vi-1013a69118ff) in `ProcessConfig — AMFI properties`)
-* Usage:
-```console
-python3 check_amfi.py 0x1df
-```
-***
-### [make_bundle](App%20Bundle%20Extension/custom/make_bundle.sh)
-Build a codeless bundle with a red icon.
-* Usage:
-```console
-./make_bundle.sh
-```
-***
-### [make_bundle_exe](App%20Bundle%20Extension/custom/make_bundle_exe.sh)
-Bash template for building a PoC app bundle with Mach-O binary that utilizes Framework:
-* Usage:
-```console
-./make_bundle_exe.sh
-```
-***
-### [make_dmg](App%20Bundle%20Extension/custom/make_dmg.sh)
-Script for packing the app in a compressed DMG container:
-* Usage (change names in the script):
-```console
-./make_dmg.sh
-```
-### [electron_patcher](App%20Bundle%20Extension/custom/electron_patcher.py)
-Python script for extracting ASAR files from Electron apps and patching them with a custom ASAR file. 
-```
-python3 electron_patcher.py extract app_bundle.app extracted_asar
-python3 electron_patcher.py pack extracted_asar app_bundle.app
-```
-### [sandbox_validator](VIII.%20Sandbox/custom/sandbox_validator.c)
-It can be used to quickly check if a given process is allowed to perform a particular operation while it is sandboxed.
-```bash
-# Compile
-clang -o sandbox_validator sandbox_validator.c
-
-# Usage: sandbox_validator PID "OPERATION" "FILTER_NAME" "FILTER_VALUE"
-sandbox_validator 93298
-sandbox_validator 93298 "file-read*"
-sandbox_validator 93298 "file-read*" PATH "/users/karmaz/.trash"
-sandbox_validator 93298 "authorization-right-obtain" RIGHT_NAME "system.burn"
-```
-### [sandblaster](https://github.com/Karmaz95/sandblaster)
-This is my forked version of [sandblaster](https://github.com/cellebrite-labs/sandblaster) with MacOS Support:
-```bash
-python3 reverse_sandbox.py -o sonoma_sandbox_operations.txt profile_sb -r 17
-```
-### [sip_check](VIII.%20Sandbox/custom/sip_check.py)
-A simple program to check if SIP is enabled in the system with more details.  
-It was introduced in [the article about SIP](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/system-integrity-protection-sip-140562b07fea?sk=v2%2F9c293b8f-c376-4603-b8a1-2872ba3395cf)
-```bash
-python3 sip_check.py
-SIP Configuration Flags:
-CSR_ALLOW_UNTRUSTED_KEXTS: Off
-CSR_ALLOW_UNRESTRICTED_FS: Off
-CSR_ALLOW_TASK_FOR_PID: Off
-CSR_ALLOW_KERNEL_DEBUGGER: Off
-CSR_ALLOW_APPLE_INTERNAL: Off
-CSR_ALLOW_UNRESTRICTED_DTRACE: Off
-CSR_ALLOW_UNRESTRICTED_NVRAM: Off
-CSR_ALLOW_DEVICE_CONFIGURATION: Off
-CSR_ALLOW_ANY_RECOVERY_OS: Off
-CSR_ALLOW_UNAPPROVED_KEXTS: Off
-CSR_ALLOW_EXECUTABLE_POLICY_OVERRIDE: Off
-CSR_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_ROOT: Off
-```
-### [crimson_waccess.py](VIII.%20Sandbox/python/crimson_waccess.py)
-It can be use for checking the possibility of file modification and creation in a given directory.  
-It was introduced in [the article about SIP](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/system-integrity-protection-sip-140562b07fea?sk=v2%2F9c293b8f-c376-4603-b8a1-2872ba3395cf)
-```bash
-python3 crimson_waccess.py -f sip_protected_paths.txt
-```
-### [sip_tester](VIII.%20Sandbox/python/sip_tester)
-It can be used to check if a given path, process or service is SIP-protected and also to check missing paths from `rootless.conf`.  
-It was introduced in [the article about SIP](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/system-integrity-protection-sip-140562b07fea?sk=v2%2F9c293b8f-c376-4603-b8a1-2872ba3395cf)
-```bash
-sip_tester --path /bin
-sip_tester --pid 1234
-sip_tester --service com.apple.kernelmanager_helper
-sip_tester --missing_paths
-```
-### [UUIDFinder](IX.%20TCC/python/UUIDFinder.py)
-A tool for creating a centralized UUID database for macOS. It is used to find UUIDs of files and directories.
-It was introduced in the article [Apple UUID Finder](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/apple-uuid-finder-a5173bdd1a8a?sk=v2%2F04bb0d32-6dc9-437d-bf72-8f65e03fed90)
-```bash
-usage: UUIDFinder [-h] [--path PATH | --list LIST] [--uuid UUID] [--delete] [--resolve] [--show_db] [--db_location DB_LOCATION]
-
-UUIDFinder - A tool for managing Mach-O executable UUIDs
-
-options:
-  -h, --help            show this help message and exit
-  --path, -p PATH       Path to the executable
-  --list, -l LIST       Path to a file containing a list of executables
-  --uuid, -u UUID       UUID to lookup or add
-  --delete, -d          Delete the path record from database
-  --resolve, -r         Get UUIDs for the path and add to database
-  --show_db, -s         Show all records in the database
-  --db_location DB_LOCATION
-                        Location of the UUID database file
-
-Examples:
----------
-
-1. Display UUIDs for a single executable from database:
-   --path /path/to/executable
-   -p /path/to/executable
-
-2. Find path for a specific UUID in database:
-   --uuid 123e4567-e89b-12d3-a456-426614174000
-   -u 123e4567-e89b-12d3-a456-426614174000
-
-3. Add or update UUID for a path:
-   --path /path/to/executable --uuid 123e4567-e89b-12d3-a456-426614174000
-   -p /path/to/executable -u 123e4567-e89b-12d3-a456-426614174000
-
-4. Extract and add UUIDs from executable to database:
-   --path /path/to/executable --resolve
-   -p /path/to/executable -r
-
-5. Delete path and its UUIDs from database:
-   --path /path/to/executable --delete
-   -p /path/to/executable -d
-
-6. Process multiple executables from a list file:
-   --list /path/to/list.txt --resolve
-   -l /path/to/list.txt -r
-
-7. Show all records in the database:
-   --show_db
-   -s
-
-8. Use custom database location:
-   --path /path/to/executable --db_location /custom/path/db.json
-   -p /path/to/executable --db_location /custom/path/db.json
-
-Notes:
-------
-- All UUIDs are stored in lowercase in the database
-- The default database file is 'uuid_database.json' in the current directory
-- When using --list, each path should be on a new line in the list file
-- The tool automatically converts relative paths to absolute paths
-```
-### [TCCParser](IX.%20TCC/python/TCCParser.py)
-A tool for querying macOS TCC (Transparency, Consent, and Control) databases.
-It was introduced in the article [](todo)
-```bash
-usage: TCCParser [-h] [-p PATH] [-t] [-a] [-l]
-
-Parse TCC Database for Permissions Information
-
-options:
-  -h, --help            Show this help message and exit
-  -p PATH, --path PATH  Path to TCC.db file to analyze
-  -t, --table           Output results in table format
-  -a, --all             Automatically query all available TCC databases on the system
-  -l, --list_db         List all available TCC databases on the system
-
-Examples:
----------
-
-1. List all available TCC databases on the system:
-   --list_db
-   -l
-
-2. Query a specific TCC database:
-   --path /path/to/TCC.db
-   -p /path/to/TCC.db
-
-3. Display the query results in a formatted table:
-   --path /path/to/TCC.db --table
-   -p /path/to/TCC.db -t
-
-4. Automatically query all known TCC databases:
-   --all
-   -a
-
-Notes:
-------
-- The tool retrieves details such as client, service, and authorization status for each entry in the TCC database.
-- The `--list_db` option helps users locate all known TCC databases on the system, sourced from `REG.db`.
-```
-
-## INSTALL
-```
-pip3 install -r requirements.txt
-wget https://github.com/CRKatri/trustcache/releases/download/v2.0/trustcache_macos_arm64 -O /usr/local/bin/trustcache
-chmod +x /usr/local/bin/trustcache
-xattr -d com.apple.quarantine /usr/local/bin/trustcache
-brew install keith/formulae/dyld-shared-cache-extractor
-brew install blacktop/tap/ipsw
-brew install tree
-```
-
-## LIMITATIONS
-* Codesigning module(codesign wrapper) works only on macOS.
-* `--dylib_hijacking` needs [ipsw](https://github.com/blacktop/ipsw) to be installed.
-* `--dylibtree` needs the [dyld-shared-cache-extractor](https://github.com/keith/dyld-shared-cache-extractor) to be installed.
-
-## WHY UROBOROS? 
-I will write the code for each article as a class SnakeX, where X will be the article number, to make it easier for the audience to follow. 
-Each Snake class will be a child of the previous one and infinitely "eat itself" (inherit methods of the previous class), like Uroboros.
-
-## ADDITIONAL LINKS
-* [Apple Open Source](https://opensource.apple.com/releases/)
-* [XNU](https://github.com/apple-oss-distributions/xnu)
-* [dyld](https://github.com/apple-oss-distributions/dyld)
-
-## TODO - IDEAS / IMPROVES
-* DER Entitlements converter method - currently, only the `convert_xml_entitlements_to_dict()` method exists. I need to create a Python parser for DER-encoded entitlements.
-* SuperBlob parser - to find other blobs in Code Signature.
-* Entitlements Blob parser - to check if XML and DER blobs exist.
-* Every method in the Snake class that use Entitlements should parse first XML > DER (currently, only XML parser exists)
-* After making a SuperBlob parser and CodeDirectory blob parser, modify hasHardenedRuntime to check Runtime flag by using bitmask, instead of string.
-* Build Dyld Shared Cache parser and extractor to make SnakeIV independant of dyld-shared-cache-extractor.
-* Create `RottenApple.app` in another repository and use it for testing.
-* Add Dyld Closure chapter to Snake&Apple V - Dyld.
-* Move `kext_prelinkinfo`, `dumpPrelink_info` and `dumpPrelink_text` to Snake & Apple chapter about Kernel Extensions when ready.
-* Add kernelcache parser.
-* Add `LC_FILESET_ENTRY` method to `dumpKernelExtension`.
-* Consider moving methods like `removeNullBytesAlignment`, `calcTwoComplement64` etc. to `Utils` class.
-* Make Thread manager class and improve the Threading.thread with tracing methods and `kill()`.
-* Reconsider moving --xattr like args to another Snake class related to filesystem.
+## Repository popularity
+[![Star History Chart](https://api.star-history.com/svg?repos=Karmaz95/Snake_Apple&type=Date)](https://star-history.com/#Karmaz95/Snake_Apple)

TOOLS.md

@@ -0,0 +1,733 @@
+# TOOLS
+Here is the list of all tools in this repository:  
+[CrimsonUroboros](#crimsonuroboros) • [MachOFileFinder](#machofilefinder) • [TrustCacheParser](#trustcacheparser) • [SignatureReader](#signaturereader) • [extract_cms.sh](#extract_cmssh) • [ModifyMachOFlags](#modifymachoflags) • [LCFinder](#lcfinder) • [MachODylibLoadCommandsFinder](#machodylibloadcommandsfinder) • [AMFI_test.sh](VI.%20AMFI/custom/AMFI_test.sh) • [make_plist](VIII.%20Sandbox/python/make_plist.py) • [sandbox_inspector](VIII.%20Sandbox/python/sandbox_inspector.py) • [spblp_compiler_wrapper](VIII.%20Sandbox/custom/sbpl_compiler_wrapper) • [make_bundle](#make_bundle) • [make_bundle_exe](#make_bundle_exe) • [make_dmg](#make_dmg) • [electron_patcher](#electron_patcher) • [sandbox_validator](#sandbox_validator) • [sandblaster](#sandblaster) • [sip_check](#sip_check) • [crimson_waccess.py](#crimson_waccesspy) • [sip_tester](#sip_tester) • [UUIDFinder](#uuidfinder) • [IOVerify](#ioverify) • [r2_dd](#r2_dd) • [find_symbol](#find_symbol)
+***
+
+### [CrimsonUroboros](tests/CrimsonUroboros.py)
+Core program resulting from the Snake&Apple article series for binary analysis. You may find older versions of this script in each article directory in this repository.
+
+![alt](img/CrimsonUroboros.jpg)
+
+#### WHY UROBOROS? 
+I wrote the code for each article as a class `SnakeX`. The `X` was the article number, to make it easier for the audience to follow. Each `Snake` class is a child of the previous one. It infinitely "eats itself" (inherits methods of the last class), like Uroboros.
+
+#### INSTALLATION
+```
+pip3 install -r requirements.txt
+wget https://github.com/CRKatri/trustcache/releases/download/v2.0/trustcache_macos_arm64 -O /usr/local/bin/trustcache
+chmod +x /usr/local/bin/trustcache
+xattr -d com.apple.quarantine /usr/local/bin/trustcache
+brew install keith/formulae/dyld-shared-cache-extractor
+brew install blacktop/tap/ipsw
+brew install tree
+```
+
+#### LIMITATIONS
+* Codesigning module(codesign wrapper) works only on macOS.
+* `--dylib_hijacking` needs [ipsw](https://github.com/blacktop/ipsw) to be installed.
+* `--dylibtree` needs the [dyld-shared-cache-extractor](https://github.com/keith/dyld-shared-cache-extractor) to be installed.
+
+#### Usage
+```console
+usage: CrimsonUroboros [-h] [-p PATH] [-b BUNDLE] [--bundle_structure] [--bundle_info] [--bundle_info_syntax_check]
+                       [--bundle_frameworks] [--bundle_plugins] [--bundle_id] [--file_type] [--header_flags]
+                       [--endian] [--header] [--load_commands] [--has_cmd LC_MAIN] [--segments]
+                       [--has_segment __SEGMENT] [--sections] [--has_section __SEGMENT,__section] [--symbols]
+                       [--imports] [--exports] [--imported_symbols] [--chained_fixups] [--exports_trie] [--uuid]
+                       [--main] [--encryption_info [(optional) save_path.bytes]] [--strings_section]
+                       [--all_strings] [--save_strings all_strings.txt] [--info]
+                       [--dump_data [offset,size,output_path]] [--calc_offset vm_offset] [--constructors]
+                       [--dump_section __SEGMENT,__section] [--dump_binary output_path] [--verify_signature]
+                       [--cd_info] [--cd_requirements] [--entitlements [human|xml|var]]
+                       [--extract_cms cms_signature.der] [--extract_certificates certificate_name]
+                       [--remove_sig unsigned_binary] [--sign_binary [adhoc|identity]] [--cs_offset] [--cs_flags]
+                       [--verify_bundle_signature] [--remove_sig_from_bundle] [--has_pie] [--has_arc]
+                       [--is_stripped] [--has_canary] [--has_nx_stack] [--has_nx_heap] [--has_xn] [--is_notarized]
+                       [--is_encrypted] [--is_restricted] [--is_hr] [--is_as] [--is_fort] [--has_rpath] [--has_lv]
+                       [--checksec] [--dylibs] [--rpaths] [--rpaths_u] [--dylibs_paths] [--dylibs_paths_u]
+                       [--broken_relative_paths] [--dylibtree [cache_path,output_path,is_extracted]] [--dylib_id]
+                       [--reexport_paths] [--hijack_sec] [--dylib_hijacking [(optional) cache_path]]
+                       [--dylib_hijacking_a [cache_path]] [--prepare_dylib [(optional) target_dylib_name]]
+                       [--is_built_for_sim] [--get_dyld_env] [--compiled_with_dyld_env] [--has_interposing]
+                       [--interposing_symbols] [--has_suid] [--has_sgid] [--has_sticky] [--injectable_dyld]
+                       [--test_insert_dylib] [--test_prune_dyld] [--test_dyld_print_to_file] [--test_dyld_SLC]
+                       [--xattr] [--xattr_value xattr_name] [--xattr_all] [--has_quarantine] [--remove_quarantine]
+                       [--add_quarantine] [--sandbox_container_path] [--sandbox_container_metadata]
+                       [--sandbox_redirectable_paths] [--sandbox_parameters] [--sandbox_entitlements]
+                       [--sandbox_build_uuid] [--sandbox_redirected_paths] [--sandbox_system_images]
+                       [--sandbox_system_profiles] [--sandbox_content_protection] [--sandbox_profile_data]
+                       [--extract_sandbox_operations] [--extract_sandbox_platform_profile] [--tcc] [--tcc_fda]
+                       [--tcc_automation] [--tcc_sysadmin] [--tcc_desktop] [--tcc_documents] [--tcc_downloads]
+                       [--tcc_photos] [--tcc_contacts] [--tcc_calendar] [--tcc_camera] [--tcc_microphone]
+                       [--tcc_location] [--tcc_recording] [--tcc_accessibility] [--tcc_icloud]
+                       [--parse_mpo mpo_addr] [--dump_prelink_info [(optional) out_name]]
+                       [--dump_prelink_text [(optional) out_name]] [--dump_prelink_kext [kext_name]]
+                       [--kext_prelinkinfo [kext_name]] [--kmod_info kext_name] [--kext_entry kext_name]
+                       [--kext_exit kext_name] [--mig] [--dump_kext kext_name]
+
+Mach-O files parser for binary analysis
+
+options:
+  -h, --help            show this help message and exit
+
+GENERAL ARGS:
+  -p, --path PATH       Path to the Mach-O file
+  -b, --bundle BUNDLE   Path to the App Bundle (can be used with -p to change path of binary which is by default
+                        set to: /target.app/Contents/MacOS/target)
+
+BUNDLE ARGS:
+  --bundle_structure    Print the structure of the app bundle
+  --bundle_info         Print the Info.plist content of the app bundle (JSON format)
+  --bundle_info_syntax_check
+                        Check if bundle info syntax is valid
+  --bundle_frameworks   Print the list of frameworks in the bundle
+  --bundle_plugins      Print the list of plugins in the bundle
+  --bundle_id           Print the CFBundleIdentifier value from the Info.plist file if it exists
+
+MACH-O ARGS:
+  --file_type           Print binary file type
+  --header_flags        Print binary header flags
+  --endian              Print binary endianess
+  --header              Print binary header
+  --load_commands       Print binary load commands names
+  --has_cmd LC_MAIN     Check of binary has given load command
+  --segments            Print binary segments in human-friendly form
+  --has_segment __SEGMENT
+                        Check if binary has given '__SEGMENT'
+  --sections            Print binary sections in human-friendly form
+  --has_section __SEGMENT,__section
+                        Check if binary has given '__SEGMENT,__section'
+  --symbols             Print all binary symbols
+  --imports             Print imported symbols
+  --exports             Print exported symbols
+  --imported_symbols    Print symbols imported from external libraries with dylib names
+  --chained_fixups      Print Chained Fixups information
+  --exports_trie        Print Export Trie information
+  --uuid                Print UUID
+  --main                Print entry point and stack size
+  --encryption_info [(optional) save_path.bytes]
+                        Print encryption info if any. Optionally specify an output path to dump the encrypted data
+                        (if cryptid=0, data will be in plain text)
+  --strings_section     Print strings from __cstring section
+  --all_strings         Print strings from all sections
+  --save_strings all_strings.txt
+                        Parse all sections, detect strings, and save them to a file
+  --info                Print header, load commands, segments, sections, symbols, and strings
+  --dump_data [offset,size,output_path]
+                        Dump {size} bytes starting from {offset} to a given {filename} (e.g.
+                        '0x1234,0x1000,out.bin')
+  --calc_offset vm_offset
+                        Calculate the real address (file on disk) of the given Virtual Memory {vm_offset} (e.g.
+                        0xfffffe000748f580)
+  --constructors        Print binary constructors
+  --dump_section __SEGMENT,__section
+                        Dump '__SEGMENT,__section' to standard output as a raw bytes
+  --dump_binary output_path
+                        Dump arm64 binary to a given file
+
+CODE SIGNING ARGS:
+  --verify_signature    Code Signature verification (if the contents of the binary have been modified)
+  --cd_info             Print Code Signature information
+  --cd_requirements     Print Code Signature Requirements
+  --entitlements [human|xml|var]
+                        Print Entitlements in a human-readable, XML, or DER format (default: human)
+  --extract_cms cms_signature.der
+                        Extract CMS Signature from the Code Signature and save it to a given file
+  --extract_certificates certificate_name
+                        Extract Certificates and save them to a given file. To each filename will be added an index
+                        at the end: _0 for signing, _1 for intermediate, and _2 for root CA certificate
+  --remove_sig unsigned_binary
+                        Save the new file on a disk with removed signature
+  --sign_binary [adhoc|identity]
+                        Sign binary using specified identity - use : 'security find-identity -v -p codesigning' to
+                        get the identity (default: adhoc)
+  --cs_offset           Print Code Signature file offset
+  --cs_flags            Print Code Signature flags
+  --verify_bundle_signature
+                        Code Signature verification (if the contents of the bundle have been modified)
+  --remove_sig_from_bundle
+                        Remove Code Signature from the bundle
+
+CHECKSEC ARGS:
+  --has_pie             Check if Position-Independent Executable (PIE) is set
+  --has_arc             Check if Automatic Reference Counting (ARC) is in use (can be false positive)
+  --is_stripped         Check if binary is stripped
+  --has_canary          Check if Stack Canary is in use (can be false positive)
+  --has_nx_stack        Check if stack is non-executable (NX stack)
+  --has_nx_heap         Check if heap is non-executable (NX heap)
+  --has_xn              Check if binary is protected by eXecute Never (XN) ARM protection
+  --is_notarized        Check if the application is notarized and can pass the Gatekeeper verification
+  --is_encrypted        Check if the application is encrypted (has LC_ENCRYPTION_INFO(_64) and cryptid set to 1)
+  --is_restricted       Check if binary has __RESTRICT segment or CS_RESTRICT flag set
+  --is_hr               Check if the Hardened Runtime is in use
+  --is_as               Check if the App Sandbox is in use
+  --is_fort             Check if the binary is fortified
+  --has_rpath           Check if the binary utilise any @rpath variables
+  --has_lv              Check if the binary has Library Validation (protection against Dylib Hijacking)
+  --checksec            Run all checksec module options on the binary
+
+DYLIBS ARGS:
+  --dylibs              Print shared libraries used by specified binary with compatibility and the current version
+                        (loading paths unresolved, like @rpath/example.dylib)
+  --rpaths              Print all paths (resolved) that @rpath can be resolved to
+  --rpaths_u            Print all paths (unresolved) that @rpath can be resolved to
+  --dylibs_paths        Print absolute dylib loading paths (resolved @rpath|@executable_path|@loader_path) in order
+                        they are searched for
+  --dylibs_paths_u      Print unresolved dylib loading paths.
+  --broken_relative_paths
+                        Print 'broken' relative paths from the binary (cases where the dylib source is specified
+                        for an executable directory without @executable_path)
+  --dylibtree [cache_path,output_path,is_extracted]
+                        Print the dynamic dependencies of a Mach-O binary recursively. You can specify the Dyld
+                        Shared Cache path in the first argument, the output directory as the 2nd argument, and if
+                        you have already extracted DSC in the 3rd argument (0 or 1). The output_path will be used
+                        as a base for dylibtree. For example, to not extract DSC, use: --dylibs ",,1", or to
+                        extract from default to default use just --dylibs or --dylibs ",,0" which will extract DSC
+                        to extracted_dyld_share_cache/ in the current directory
+  --dylib_id            Print path from LC_ID_DYLIB
+  --reexport_paths      Print paths from LC_REEXPORT_DLIB
+  --hijack_sec          Check if binary is protected against Dylib Hijacking
+  --dylib_hijacking [(optional) cache_path]
+                        Check for possible Direct and Indirect Dylib Hijacking loading paths. The output is printed
+                        to console and saved in JSON format to /tmp/dylib_hijacking_log.json(append mode).
+                        Optionally, specify the path to the Dyld Shared Cache
+  --dylib_hijacking_a [cache_path]
+                        Like --dylib_hijacking, but shows only possible vectors (without protected binaries)
+  --prepare_dylib [(optional) target_dylib_name]
+                        Compile rogue dylib. Optionally, specify target_dylib_path, it will search for the imported
+                        symbols from it in the dylib specified in the --path argument and automatically add it to
+                        the source code of the rogue lib. Example: --path lib1.dylib --prepare_dylib
+                        /path/to/lib2.dylib
+
+DYLD ARGS:
+  --is_built_for_sim    Check if binary is built for simulator platform.
+  --get_dyld_env        Extract Dyld environment variables from the loader binary.
+  --compiled_with_dyld_env
+                        Check if binary was compiled with -dyld_env flag and print the environment variables and
+                        its values.
+  --has_interposing     Check if binary has interposing sections.
+  --interposing_symbols
+                        Print interposing symbols if any.
+
+AMFI ARGS:
+  --has_suid            Check if the file has SetUID bit set
+  --has_sgid            Check if the file has SetGID bit set
+  --has_sticky          Check if the file has sticky bit set
+  --injectable_dyld     Check if the binary is injectable using DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES
+  --test_insert_dylib   Check if it is possible to inject dylib using DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES (INVASIVE - the binary
+                        is executed)
+  --test_prune_dyld     Check if Dyld Environment Variables are cleared (using DYLD_PRINT_INITIALIZERS=1) (INVASIVE
+                        - the binary is executed)
+  --test_dyld_print_to_file
+                        Check if DYLD_PRINT_TO_FILE Dyld Environment Variables works (INVASIVE - the binary is
+                        executed)
+  --test_dyld_SLC       Check if DYLD_SHARED_REGION=private Dyld Environment Variables works and code can be
+                        injected using DYLD_SHARED_CACHE_DIR (INVASIVE - the binary is executed)
+
+ANTIVIRUS ARGS:
+  --xattr               Print all extended attributes names
+  --xattr_value xattr_name
+                        Print single extended attribute value
+  --xattr_all           Print all extended attributes names and their values
+  --has_quarantine      Check if the file has quarantine extended attribute
+  --remove_quarantine   Remove com.apple.quarantine extended attribute from the file
+  --add_quarantine      Add com.apple.quarantine extended attribute to the file
+
+SANDBOX ARGS:
+  --sandbox_container_path
+                        Print the sandbox container path
+  --sandbox_container_metadata
+                        Print the .com.apple.containermanagerd.metadata.plist contents for the given bundlein XML
+                        format
+  --sandbox_redirectable_paths
+                        Print the redirectable paths from the sandbox container metadata as list
+  --sandbox_parameters  Print the parameters from the sandbox container metadata as key-value pairs
+  --sandbox_entitlements
+                        Print the entitlements from the sandbox container metadata in JSON format
+  --sandbox_build_uuid  Print the sandbox build UUID from the sandbox container metadata
+  --sandbox_redirected_paths
+                        Print the redirected paths from the sandbox container metadata as list
+  --sandbox_system_images
+                        Print the system images from the sandbox container metadata as key-value pairs
+  --sandbox_system_profiles
+                        Print the system profile from the sandbox container metadata in JSON format
+  --sandbox_content_protection
+                        Print the content protection from the sandbox container metadata
+  --sandbox_profile_data
+                        Print raw bytes ofthe sandbox profile data from the sandbox container metadata
+  --extract_sandbox_operations
+                        Extract sandbox operations from the Sandbox.kext file
+  --extract_sandbox_platform_profile
+                        Extract sandbox platform profile from the Sandbox.kext file
+
+TCC ARGS:
+  --tcc                 Print TCC permissions of the binary
+  --tcc_fda             Check Full Disk Access (FDA) TCC permission for the binary
+  --tcc_automation      Check Automation TCC permission for the binary
+  --tcc_sysadmin        Check System Policy SysAdmin Files TCC permission for the binary
+  --tcc_desktop         Check Desktop Folder TCC permission for the binary
+  --tcc_documents       Check Documents Folder TCC permission for the binary
+  --tcc_downloads       Check Downloads Folder TCC permission for the binary
+  --tcc_photos          Check Photos Library TCC permission for the binary
+  --tcc_contacts        Check Contacts TCC permission for the binary
+  --tcc_calendar        Check Calendar TCC permission for the binary
+  --tcc_camera          Check Camera TCC permission for the binary
+  --tcc_microphone      Check Microphone TCC permission for the binary
+  --tcc_location        Check Location Services TCC permission for the binary
+  --tcc_recording       Check Screen Recording TCC permission for the binary
+  --tcc_accessibility   Check Accessibility TCC permission for the binary
+  --tcc_icloud          Check iCloud (Ubiquity) TCC permission for the binary
+
+XNU ARGS:
+  --parse_mpo mpo_addr  Parse mac_policy_ops at given address from Kernel Cache and print pointers in use (not
+                        zeroed)
+  --dump_prelink_info [(optional) out_name]
+                        Dump "__PRELINK_INFO,__info" to a given file (default: "PRELINK_info.txt")
+  --dump_prelink_text [(optional) out_name]
+                        Dump "__PRELINK_TEXT,__text" to a given file (default: "PRELINK_text.txt")
+  --dump_prelink_kext [kext_name]
+                        Dump prelinked KEXT {kext_name} from decompressed Kernel Cache PRELINK_TEXT segment to a
+                        file named: prelinked_{kext_name}.bin
+  --kext_prelinkinfo [kext_name]
+                        Print _Prelink properties from PRELINK_INFO,__info for a give {kext_name}
+  --kmod_info kext_name
+                        Parse kmod_info structure for the given {kext_name} from Kernel Cache
+  --kext_entry kext_name
+                        Calculate the virtual memory address of the __start (entrypoint) for the given {kext_name}
+                        Kernel Extension
+  --kext_exit kext_name
+                        Calculate the virtual memory address of the __stop (exitpoint) for the given {kext_name}
+                        Kernel Extension
+  --mig                 Search for MIG subsystem and prints message handlers
+  --dump_kext kext_name
+                        Dump the kernel extension binary from the kernelcache.decompressed file
+```
+* Example:
+```bash
+CrimsonUroboros.py -p PATH --info
+```
+***
+### [MachOFileFinder](I.%20Mach-O/python/MachOFileFinder.py)
+Designed to find ARM64 Mach-O binaries within a specified directory and print their file type.
+* Usage:
+```bash
+python MachOFileFinder.py PATH
+```
+* Example:
+```bash
+python MachOFileFinder.py . -r 2>/dev/null
+EXECUTE:/Users/karmaz95/t/pingsender
+DYLIB:/Users/karmaz95/t/dylibs/use_dylib_app/customs/custom.dylib
+BUNDLE:/Users/karmaz95/t/bundles/MyBundle
+```
+***
+### [TrustCacheParser](II.%20Code%20Signing/python/TrustCacheParser.py)
+Designed to parse trust caches and print it in human readable form (based on [PyIMG4](https://github.com/m1stadev/PyIMG4) and [trustcache](https://github.com/CRKatri/trustcache))
+* Usage:
+```console
+usage: TrustCacheParser [-h] [--dst DST] [--parse_img] [--parse_tc] [--print_tc] [--all]
+
+Copy Trust Cache files to a specified destination.
+
+options:
+  -h, --help         show this help message and exit
+  --dst DST, -d DST  Destination directory to copy Trust Cache files to.
+  --parse_img        Parse copied Image4 to extract payload data.
+  --parse_tc         Parse extract payload data to human-readable form trust cache using
+                     trustcache.
+  --print_tc         Print the contents of trust_cache (files must be in the current
+                     directory and ends with .trust_cache)
+  --all              parse_img -> parse_tc -> print_tc
+```
+***
+### [SignatureReader](II.%20Code%20Signing/python/SignatureReader.py)
+Designed to parse extracted cms sginature from Mach-O files.
+* Usage:
+```bash
+# First extract CMS Signature using CrimsonUroboros 
+CrimsonUroboros -p target_binary --extract_cms cms_sign
+# or using extract_cms.sh script
+./extract_cms.sh target_binary cms_sign
+```
+
+```console
+usage: SignatureReader [-h] [--load_cms cms_signature.der]
+                       [--extract_signature cms_signature.der]
+                       [--extract_pubkey cert_0] [--human]
+
+CMS Signature Loader
+
+options:
+  -h, --help            show this help message and exit
+  --load_cms cms_signature.der
+                        Load the DER encoded CMS Signature from the filesystem
+                        and print it
+  --extract_signature cms_signature.der
+                        Extract and print the signature part from the DER
+                        encoded CMS Signature
+  --extract_pubkey cert_0
+                        Extract public key from the given certificate and save
+                        it to extracted_pubkey.pem
+  --human               Print in human-readable format
+❯ CrimsonUroboros -p signed_ad_hoc_example --extract_cms cms_sign
+```
+* Example:
+```bash
+SignatureReader --extract_signature cms_sign --human
+0x25ca80ad5f11be197dc7a2d53f3db5b6bf463a38224db8c0a17fa4b8fd5ad7e0c60f2be8e8849cf2e581272290991c0db40b0d452b2d2dbf230c0ccab3a6d78e0230bca7bccbc50d379372bcddd8d8542add5ec59180bc3409b2df3bd8995301b9ba1e65ac62420c75104f12cb58b430fde8a177a1cd03940d4b0e77a9d875d65552cf96f03cb63b437c36d9bab12fa727e17603da49fcb870edaec115f90def1ac2ad12c2e9349a5470b5ed2f242b5566cd7ddee785eff8ae5484f145a8464d4dc3891b10a3b2981e9add1e4c0aec31fa80320eb5494d9623400753adf24106efdd07ad657035ed2876e9460219944a4730b0b620954961350ddb1fcf0ea539
+```
+***
+### [extract_cms.sh](II.%20Code%20Signing/custom/extract_cms.sh)
+Designed to extract cms sginature from Mach-O files (bash alternative to `SingatureReader --extract_signature`).
+* Example:
+```
+./extract_cms.sh target_binary cms_sign
+```
+***
+### [ModifyMachOFlags](III.%20Checksec/python/ModifyMachOFlags.py)
+Designed to change Mach-O header flags.
+* Usage:
+```console
+usage: ModifyMachOFlags [-h] -i INPUT -o OUT [--flag FLAG] [--sign_binary [adhoc|identity_number]]
+
+Modify the Mach-O binary flags.
+
+options:
+  -h, --help            show this help message and exit
+  -i INPUT, --input INPUT
+                        Path to the Mach-O file.
+  -o OUT, --out OUT     Where to save a modified file.
+  --flag FLAG           Specify the flag constant name and value (e.g., NO_HEAP_EXECUTION=1). Can be used multiple times. Available
+                        flags: NOUNDEFS, INCRLINK, DYLDLINK, BINDATLOAD, PREBOUND, SPLIT_SEGS, LAZY_INIT, TWOLEVEL, FORCE_FLAT,
+                        NOMULTIDEFS, NOFIXPREBINDING, PREBINDABLE, ALLMODSBOUND, SUBSECTIONS_VIA_SYMBOLS, CANONICAL, WEAK_DEFINES,
+                        BINDS_TO_WEAK, ALLOW_STACK_EXECUTION, ROOT_SAFE, SETUID_SAFE, NO_REEXPORTED_DYLIBS, PIE,
+                        DEAD_STRIPPABLE_DYLIB, HAS_TLV_DESCRIPTORS, NO_HEAP_EXECUTION, APP_EXTENSION_SAFE,
+                        NLIST_OUTOFSYNC_WITH_DYLDINFO, SIM_SUPPORT, DYLIB_IN_CACHE
+  --sign_binary [adhoc|identity_number]
+                        Sign binary using specified identity - use : 'security find-identity -v -p codesigning' to get the
+                        identity. (default: adhoc)
+```
+* Example:
+```bash
+ModifyMachOFlags -i hello -o hello_modified --flag NO_HEAP_EXECUTION=1 --sign_binary
+```
+***
+### [LCFinder](III.%20Checksec/python/LCFinder.py)
+Designed to find if specified Load Command exist in the binary or list of binaries.
+* Usage:
+```console
+usage: LCFinder [-h] [--path PATH] [--list_path LIST_PATH] --lc LC
+
+Check for a specific load command in Mach-O binaries.
+
+options:
+  -h, --help            show this help message and exit
+  --path PATH, -p PATH  Absolute path to the valid MachO binary.
+  --list_path LIST_PATH, -l LIST_PATH
+                        Path to a wordlist file containing absolute paths.
+  --lc LC               The load command to check for.
+```
+* Example:
+```bash
+LCFinder -l macho_paths.txt --lc SEGMENT_64 2>/dev/null
+LCFinder -p hello --lc lc_segment_64 2>/dev/null
+```
+***
+### [MachODylibLoadCommandsFinder](IV.%20Dylibs/python/MachODylibLoadCommandsFinder.py)
+Designed to Recursively crawl the system and parse Mach-O files to find DYLIB related load commands.
+Print the total Mach-O files analyzed and how many DYLIB-related LCs existed
+* Usage:
+```console
+MachODylibLoadCommandsFinder 2>/dev/null
+```
+***
+### [check_amfi](VI.%20AMFI/python/check_amfi.py)
+Simple script for calculating `amfiFlags` (described [here](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/dyld-do-you-like-death-vi-1013a69118ff) in `ProcessConfig — AMFI properties`)
+* Usage:
+```console
+python3 check_amfi.py 0x1df
+```
+***
+### [make_bundle](App%20Bundle%20Extension/custom/make_bundle.sh)
+Build a codeless bundle with a red icon.
+* Usage:
+```console
+./make_bundle.sh
+```
+***
+### [make_bundle_exe](App%20Bundle%20Extension/custom/make_bundle_exe.sh)
+Bash template for building a PoC app bundle with Mach-O binary that utilizes Framework:
+* Usage:
+```console
+./make_bundle_exe.sh
+```
+***
+### [make_dmg](App%20Bundle%20Extension/custom/make_dmg.sh)
+Script for packing the app in a compressed DMG container:
+* Usage (change names in the script):
+```console
+./make_dmg.sh
+```
+### [electron_patcher](App%20Bundle%20Extension/custom/electron_patcher.py)
+Python script for extracting ASAR files from Electron apps and patching them with a custom ASAR file. 
+```
+python3 electron_patcher.py extract app_bundle.app extracted_asar
+python3 electron_patcher.py pack extracted_asar app_bundle.app
+```
+### [sandbox_validator](VIII.%20Sandbox/custom/sandbox_validator.c)
+It can be used to quickly check if a given process is allowed to perform a particular operation while it is sandboxed.
+```bash
+# Compile
+clang -o sandbox_validator sandbox_validator.c
+
+# Usage: sandbox_validator PID "OPERATION" "FILTER_NAME" "FILTER_VALUE"
+sandbox_validator 93298
+sandbox_validator 93298 "file-read*"
+sandbox_validator 93298 "file-read*" PATH "/users/karmaz/.trash"
+sandbox_validator 93298 "authorization-right-obtain" RIGHT_NAME "system.burn"
+```
+### [sandblaster](https://github.com/Karmaz95/sandblaster)
+This is my forked version of [sandblaster](https://github.com/cellebrite-labs/sandblaster) with MacOS Support:
+```bash
+python3 reverse_sandbox.py -o sonoma_sandbox_operations.txt profile_sb -r 17
+```
+### [sip_check](VIII.%20Sandbox/custom/sip_check.py)
+A simple program to check if SIP is enabled in the system with more details.  
+It was introduced in [the article about SIP](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/system-integrity-protection-sip-140562b07fea?sk=v2%2F9c293b8f-c376-4603-b8a1-2872ba3395cf)
+```bash
+python3 sip_check.py
+SIP Configuration Flags:
+CSR_ALLOW_UNTRUSTED_KEXTS: Off
+CSR_ALLOW_UNRESTRICTED_FS: Off
+CSR_ALLOW_TASK_FOR_PID: Off
+CSR_ALLOW_KERNEL_DEBUGGER: Off
+CSR_ALLOW_APPLE_INTERNAL: Off
+CSR_ALLOW_UNRESTRICTED_DTRACE: Off
+CSR_ALLOW_UNRESTRICTED_NVRAM: Off
+CSR_ALLOW_DEVICE_CONFIGURATION: Off
+CSR_ALLOW_ANY_RECOVERY_OS: Off
+CSR_ALLOW_UNAPPROVED_KEXTS: Off
+CSR_ALLOW_EXECUTABLE_POLICY_OVERRIDE: Off
+CSR_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_ROOT: Off
+```
+### [crimson_waccess.py](VIII.%20Sandbox/python/crimson_waccess.py)
+It can be use for checking the possibility of file modification and creation in a given directory.  
+It was introduced in [the article about SIP](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/system-integrity-protection-sip-140562b07fea?sk=v2%2F9c293b8f-c376-4603-b8a1-2872ba3395cf)
+```bash
+python3 crimson_waccess.py -f sip_protected_paths.txt
+```
+### [sip_tester](VIII.%20Sandbox/python/sip_tester)
+It can be used to check if a given path, process or service is SIP-protected and also to check missing paths from `rootless.conf`.  
+It was introduced in [the article about SIP](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/system-integrity-protection-sip-140562b07fea?sk=v2%2F9c293b8f-c376-4603-b8a1-2872ba3395cf)
+```bash
+sip_tester --path /bin
+sip_tester --pid 1234
+sip_tester --service com.apple.kernelmanager_helper
+sip_tester --missing_paths
+```
+### [UUIDFinder](IX.%20TCC/python/UUIDFinder.py)
+A tool for creating a centralized UUID database for macOS. It is used to find UUIDs of files and directories.
+It was introduced in the article [Apple UUID Finder](https://karol-mazurek.medium.com/apple-uuid-finder-a5173bdd1a8a?sk=v2%2F04bb0d32-6dc9-437d-bf72-8f65e03fed90)
+```bash
+usage: UUIDFinder [-h] [--path PATH | --list LIST] [--uuid UUID] [--delete] [--resolve] [--show_db] [--db_location DB_LOCATION]
+
+UUIDFinder - A tool for managing Mach-O executable UUIDs
+
+options:
+  -h, --help            show this help message and exit
+  --path, -p PATH       Path to the executable
+  --list, -l LIST       Path to a file containing a list of executables
+  --uuid, -u UUID       UUID to lookup or add
+  --delete, -d          Delete the path record from database
+  --resolve, -r         Get UUIDs for the path and add to database
+  --show_db, -s         Show all records in the database
+  --db_location DB_LOCATION
+                        Location of the UUID database file
+
+Examples:
+---------
+
+1. Display UUIDs for a single executable from database:
+   --path /path/to/executable
+   -p /path/to/executable
+
+2. Find path for a specific UUID in database:
+   --uuid 123e4567-e89b-12d3-a456-426614174000
+   -u 123e4567-e89b-12d3-a456-426614174000
+
+3. Add or update UUID for a path:
+   --path /path/to/executable --uuid 123e4567-e89b-12d3-a456-426614174000
+   -p /path/to/executable -u 123e4567-e89b-12d3-a456-426614174000
+
+4. Extract and add UUIDs from executable to database:
+   --path /path/to/executable --resolve
+   -p /path/to/executable -r
+
+5. Delete path and its UUIDs from database:
+   --path /path/to/executable --delete
+   -p /path/to/executable -d
+
+6. Process multiple executables from a list file:
+   --list /path/to/list.txt --resolve
+   -l /path/to/list.txt -r
+
+7. Show all records in the database:
+   --show_db
+   -s
+
+8. Use custom database location:
+   --path /path/to/executable --db_location /custom/path/db.json
+   -p /path/to/executable --db_location /custom/path/db.json
+
+Notes:
+------
+- All UUIDs are stored in lowercase in the database
+- The default database file is 'uuid_database.json' in the current directory
+- When using --list, each path should be on a new line in the list file
+- The tool automatically converts relative paths to absolute paths
+```
+### [TCCParser](IX.%20TCC/python/TCCParser.py)
+A tool for querying macOS TCC (Transparency, Consent, and Control) databases.
+It was introduced in the article [](todo)
+```bash
+usage: TCCParser [-h] [-p PATH] [-t] [-a] [-l]
+
+Parse TCC Database for Permissions Information
+
+options:
+  -h, --help            Show this help message and exit
+  -p PATH, --path PATH  Path to TCC.db file to analyze
+  -t, --table           Output results in table format
+  -a, --all             Automatically query all available TCC databases on the system
+  -l, --list_db         List all available TCC databases on the system
+
+Examples:
+---------
+
+1. List all available TCC databases on the system:
+   --list_db
+   -l
+
+2. Query a specific TCC database:
+   --path /path/to/TCC.db
+   -p /path/to/TCC.db
+
+3. Display the query results in a formatted table:
+   --path /path/to/TCC.db --table
+   -p /path/to/TCC.db -t
+
+4. Automatically query all known TCC databases:
+   --all
+   -a
+
+Notes:
+------
+- The tool retrieves details such as client, service, and authorization status for each entry in the TCC database.
+- The `--list_db` option helps users locate all known TCC databases on the system, sourced from `REG.db`.
+```
+
+### [IOVerify](X.%20NU/custom/drivers/IOVerify.c)
+This tool allows for direct interaction with macOS IOKit drivers using IOConnectCallMethod. It was introduced in the article I made for PHRACK - [Mapping IOKit Methods Exposed to User Space on macOS](https://phrack.org/issues/72/9_md#article). 
+```bash
+❯ ./IOVerify -h
+Usage: ./IOVerify -n <name> (-m <method> | -y <spec>) [options]
+Options:
+  -n <name>      Target driver class name (required).
+  -t <type>      Connection type (default: 0).
+  -m <id>        Method selector ID.
+  -y <spec>      Specify method and buffer sizes in one string.
+                 Format: "ID: [IN_SCA, IN_STR, OUT_SCA, OUT_STR]"
+                 Example: -y "0: [0, 96, 0, 96]"
+  -p <string>    Payload as a string.
+  -f <file>      File path for payload.
+  -b <hex_str>   Space-separated hex string payload.
+  -i <size>      Input buffer size (ignored if -y is used).
+  -o <size>      Output buffer size (ignored if -y is used).
+  -s <value>     Scalar input (uint64_t). Can be specified multiple times.
+  -S <count>     Scalar output count (ignored if -y is used).
+  -h             Show this help message.
+
+
+❯ ./IOVerify -n "H11ANEIn" -t 1 -y "0: [0,1,0,1]"
+Starting verification for driver: H11ANEIn
+
+--- [VERIFY] Event Log ---
+Driver:          H11ANEIn
+Connection Type: 1
+Method Selector: 0
+Result:          0xe00002c2 ((iokit/common) invalid argument)
+
+--- Scalar I/O ---
+Scalar In Cnt:   0
+Scalar Out Cnt:  0
+
+--- Structure I/O ---
+Input Size:  1 bytes
+Input Data:
+00
+
+Output Size: 1 bytes
+Output Data:
+00
+--- End of Log ---
+```
+### [r2_dd](I.%20Mach-O/python/r2_dd.py)
+A wrapper script that uses radare2 to dump binary data from Mach-O files between specified virtual addresses. It automatically maps virtual addresses to file offsets.
+* Usage:
+```bash
+python3 r2_dd.py BINARY_PATH START_ADDR END_ADDR OUT_FILE
+```
+
+* Example:
+```bash
+python3 r2_dd.py ./kernelcache 0xFFFFFF80002A0000 0xFFFFFF80002A0500 ./dump.bin
+```
+
+* Note: Requires `radare2` to be installed:
+```bash
+brew install radare2
+```
+
+### [find_symbol](I.%20Mach-O/python/find_symbol.py)
+A python wrapper for searching symbols in binary files using `nm`. Recursively walks through directories to find symbol definitions and references across executables and libraries.
+```txt
+usage: find_symbol.py PATH SYMBOL
+
+Search for symbols in binary files within a directory
+
+Arguments:
+  PATH             Directory to search recursively
+  SYMBOL           Symbol name to search for
+
+Examples:
+---------
+
+1. Find _sandbox_check function across extracted libraries from Dyld Shared Cache:
+   find_symbol.py . _sandbox_check
+
+2. Search for a specific symbol in system libraries:
+   find_symbol.py /usr/lib _malloc
+
+3. Locate symbol references in a framework:
+   find_symbol.py /System/Library/Frameworks/Security.framework SecItemAdd
+
+Sample Output:
+--------------
+./usr/lib/libspindump.dylib
+                 U _sandbox_check
+----
+./usr/lib/dyld
+0000000180141a6c T _sandbox_check
+0000000180141b4c t _sandbox_check_common
+----
+./usr/lib/libnetworkextension.dylib
+                 U _sandbox_check
+----
+
+Notes:
+------
+- The tool uses `nm` to extract symbol information from binary files
+- Symbol types: T (text/code), U (undefined/external reference), t (local text)
+- Can be imported as a module: `from find_symbol import find_symbol`
+- Skips files that `nm` cannot process (non-binary files are silently ignored)
+```

VIII. Sandbox/mac/sandbox_hooks_list.txt

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 _hook_iokit_check_get_property
 _hook_iokit_check_filter_properties
 _hook_vnode_notify_link
+_hook_proc_check_proc_info
 _hook_kext_check_unload
 _hook_kext_check_load
 _hook_pty_notify_close
@@ -96,6 +97,7 @@ _hook_socket_check_create
 _hook_socket_check_connect
 _hook_socket_check_bind
 _hook_proc_check_signal
+_hook_proc_check_iopolicy
 _hook_proc_check_setauid
 _hook_proc_check_setaudit
 _hook_proc_check_sched
@@ -138,13 +140,17 @@ _hook_mount_check_mount
 _hook_mount_check_fsctl
 _hook_mount_check_quotactl
 _hook_vnode_check_copyfile
+_hook_vnode_check_swap
 _hook_vnode_notify_unlink
+_hook_vnode_notify_swap
 _hook_proc_check_set_task_special_port
 _hook_proc_check_get_task_special_port
 _hook_vnode_notify_setflags
 _hook_vnode_notify_setextattr
 _hook_necp_check_client_action
 _hook_necp_check_open
+_hook_proc_check_set_thread_exception_port
+_hook_proc_check_set_task_exception_port
 _hook_file_check_set
 _hook_file_check_mmap
 _hook_file_check_lock
@@ -155,4 +161,4 @@ _hook_cred_label_associate
 _hook_cred_check_label_update
 _hook_vnode_check_exec
 _hook_cred_check_label_update_execve
-_hook_cred_label_update_execve
+_hook_cred_label_update_execve

VIII. Sandbox/python/crimson_waccess.py

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ class Waccess:
         elif os.path.isfile(path):
             self.check_file_write_permission(path, output_path)
         else:
-            sys.stderr.write(f"Path {path} does not exist.")
+            sys.stderr.write(f"Path {path} does not exist.\n")
 
     def check_directory_write_permission(self, directory_path, output_path):
         '''Check if a directory is writable by attempting to create a test file.'''

X. NU/custom/drivers/IOVerify.c

@@ -0,0 +1,302 @@
+/**
+ * @file IOVerify.c
+ * @brief Standalone tool for IOKit driver communication verification.
+ * clang IOVerify.c -o IOVerify -framework IOKit
+ *
+ * This tool allows for direct interaction with macOS IOKit drivers using IOConnectCallMethod.
+ *
+ * Usage:
+ *   IOVerify -n <name> (-m <method> | -y <spec>) [options]
+ *
+ * Options:
+ *   -n <name>      : The class name of the IOKit service to target (required).
+ *   -t <type>      : The connection type (user client type) to open. Default: 0.
+ *   -m <id>        : The selector ID of the method to call.
+ *   -y <spec>      : Shorthand to specify method and buffer sizes.
+ *                    Format: "ID:[IN_SCA,IN_STR,OUT_SCA,OUT_STR]"
+ *                    Example: -y "0: [0, 96, 0, 96]"
+ *   -p <payload>   : A string to be used as the input buffer.
+ *   -f <file_name> : A file whose contents will be the input buffer.
+ *   -b <hex_string>: A space-separated hex string for the input buffer (e.g., "00 11 22 aa").
+ *   -i <size>      : The size of the input structure buffer.
+ *   -o <size>      : The size of the output structure buffer.
+ *   -s <val>       : A 64-bit scalar input value (can be used multiple times).
+ *   -S <count>     : The number of scalar output values.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <unistd.h>      // For getopt
+#include <stdbool.h>     // For bool type
+#include <IOKit/IOKitLib.h>
+#include <mach/mach_error.h> // For mach_error_string
+
+// --- Structure Definitions ---
+// IOKit has a hard limit of 16 scalar inputs/outputs maximum
+#define IOKIT_MAX_SCALAR_COUNT 16
+uint64_t scalar_inputs[IOKIT_MAX_SCALAR_COUNT] = {0};
+
+typedef struct {
+    const char* driver_name;
+    uint64_t conn_type;
+    uint64_t method;
+    const char* payload;
+    const char* file_name;
+    uint64_t input_size;
+    uint64_t output_size;
+    uint64_t* scalar_input;
+    size_t scalar_in_size;
+    size_t scalar_out_size;
+    const char* byte_payload;
+} verify_args_t;
+
+// --- Forward Declarations ---
+
+io_service_t find_driver_service(const char* driver_name);
+io_connect_t get_driver_connection_handle(io_service_t service, const char* driver_name, uint32_t conn_type);
+kern_return_t verify_driver_communication(const verify_args_t* args);
+void print_usage(const char* prog_name);
+
+// --- Implementations ---
+
+void log_with_args(const char* format, ...) {
+    va_list args;
+    va_start(args, format);
+    vprintf(format, args);
+    va_end(args);
+    printf("\n");
+}
+
+void print_payload_hexdump(const unsigned char *data, size_t size) {
+    if (!data || size == 0) {
+        printf("[empty]\n");
+        return;
+    }
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
+        printf("%02x ", data[i]);
+        if ((i + 1) % 16 == 0) printf("\n");
+    }
+    if (size % 16 != 0) printf("\n");
+}
+
+void log_event_with_scalars(const char* event, const verify_args_t* args, kern_return_t result, const void* output_buffer, size_t output_size, const uint64_t* scalar_output, size_t scalar_out_size_actual, const void* input_buffer, size_t input_size) {
+    printf("\n--- [%s] Event Log ---\n", event);
+    printf("Driver:          %s\n", args->driver_name);
+    printf("Connection Type: %llu\n", args->conn_type);
+    printf("Method Selector: %llu\n", args->method);
+    printf("Result:          0x%x (%s)\n", result, mach_error_string(result));
+    
+    printf("\n--- Scalar I/O ---\n");
+    printf("Scalar In Cnt:   %zu\n", args->scalar_in_size);
+    if (args->scalar_in_size > 0 && args->scalar_input) {
+        printf("Scalar In:       ");
+        for (size_t i = 0; i < args->scalar_in_size; ++i) printf("0x%llx ", args->scalar_input[i]);
+        printf("\n");
+    }
+    printf("Scalar Out Cnt:  %zu\n", scalar_out_size_actual);
+    if (scalar_out_size_actual > 0 && scalar_output) {
+        printf("Scalar Out:      ");
+        for (size_t i = 0; i < scalar_out_size_actual; ++i) printf("0x%llx ", scalar_output[i]);
+        printf("\n");
+    }
+
+    printf("\n--- Structure I/O ---\n");
+    printf("Input Size:  %zu bytes\n", input_size);
+    printf("Input Data:\n");
+    print_payload_hexdump(input_buffer, input_size);
+    
+    printf("\nOutput Size: %zu bytes\n", output_size);
+    printf("Output Data:\n");
+    print_payload_hexdump(output_buffer, output_size);
+    printf("--- End of Log ---\n\n");
+}
+
+io_service_t find_driver_service(const char* driver_name) {
+    return IOServiceGetMatchingService(kIOMainPortDefault, IOServiceMatching(driver_name));
+}
+
+io_connect_t get_driver_connection_handle(io_service_t service, const char* driver_name, uint32_t conn_type) {
+    io_connect_t client = MACH_PORT_NULL;
+    kern_return_t kr = IOServiceOpen(service, mach_task_self(), conn_type, &client);
+    if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
+        log_with_args("Failed to open connection for driver '%s' (type %u). Error: 0x%x (%s)", driver_name, conn_type, kr, mach_error_string(kr));
+        return MACH_PORT_NULL;
+    }
+    return client;
+}
+
+kern_return_t verify_driver_communication(const verify_args_t* args) {
+    if (!args || !args->driver_name) {
+        return KERN_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+    }
+
+    const io_service_t driver_service = find_driver_service(args->driver_name);
+    if (driver_service == MACH_PORT_NULL) {
+        log_with_args("Driver service '%s' not found.", args->driver_name);
+        return KERN_FAILURE;
+    }
+
+    const io_connect_t client = get_driver_connection_handle(driver_service, args->driver_name, args->conn_type);
+    if (client == MACH_PORT_NULL) {
+        IOObjectRelease(driver_service);
+        return KERN_FAILURE;
+    }
+
+    void* input_buffer = NULL;
+    size_t input_size = args->input_size;
+    if (args->file_name) {
+        FILE* file = fopen(args->file_name, "rb");
+        if (file) {
+            fseek(file, 0, SEEK_END);
+            input_size = ftell(file);
+            fseek(file, 0, SEEK_SET);
+            input_buffer = calloc(1, input_size);
+            if (input_buffer) fread(input_buffer, 1, input_size, file);
+            fclose(file);
+        }
+    } else if (args->byte_payload) {
+        char* bp_copy = strdup(args->byte_payload);
+        char* p = bp_copy;
+        size_t count = 0;
+        while (*p) {
+            if (*p != ' ' && (p == bp_copy || *(p-1) == ' ')) count++;
+            p++;
+        }
+        input_size = count;
+        input_buffer = calloc(1, input_size);
+        p = bp_copy;
+        size_t idx = 0;
+        while(idx < input_size) {
+            char* next;
+            ((unsigned char*)input_buffer)[idx++] = (unsigned char)strtol(p, &next, 16);
+            p = next;
+            while(*p == ' ') p++;
+        }
+        free(bp_copy);
+    } else if (args->payload) {
+        input_size = strlen(args->payload);
+        input_buffer = calloc(1, input_size + 1);
+        if (input_buffer) memcpy(input_buffer, args->payload, input_size);
+    } else if (input_size > 0) {
+        input_buffer = calloc(1, input_size);
+    }
+
+    size_t scalar_output_count = args->scalar_out_size;
+    uint64_t* scalar_output = (scalar_output_count > 0) ? calloc(scalar_output_count, sizeof(uint64_t)) : NULL;
+    size_t output_size = args->output_size;
+    void* output_buffer = (output_size > 0) ? calloc(1, output_size) : NULL;
+
+    uint32_t scalar_output_count_32 = scalar_output_count;
+    kern_return_t result = IOConnectCallMethod(client, args->method, args->scalar_input, args->scalar_in_size, input_buffer, input_size, scalar_output, &scalar_output_count_32, output_buffer, &output_size);
+
+    log_event_with_scalars("VERIFY", args, result, output_buffer, output_size, scalar_output, scalar_output_count_32, input_buffer, input_size);
+
+    free(input_buffer);
+    free(output_buffer);
+    free(scalar_output);
+    IOServiceClose(client);
+    IOObjectRelease(driver_service);
+    return result;
+}
+
+void print_usage(const char* prog_name) {
+    printf("Usage: %s -n <name> (-m <method> | -y <spec>) [options]\n", prog_name);
+    printf("Options:\n");
+    printf("  -n <name>      Target driver class name (required).\n");
+    printf("  -t <type>      Connection type (default: 0).\n");
+    printf("  -m <id>        Method selector ID.\n");
+    printf("  -y <spec>      Specify method and buffer sizes in one string.\n");
+    printf("                 Format: \"ID: [IN_SCA, IN_STR, OUT_SCA, OUT_STR]\"\n");
+    printf("                 Example: -y \"0: [0, 96, 0, 96]\"\n");
+    printf("  -p <string>    Payload as a string.\n");
+    printf("  -f <file>      File path for payload.\n");
+    printf("  -b <hex_str>   Space-separated hex string payload.\n");
+    printf("  -i <size>      Input buffer size (ignored if -y is used).\n");
+    printf("  -o <size>      Output buffer size (ignored if -y is used).\n");
+    printf("  -s <value>     Scalar input (uint64_t). Can be specified multiple times.\n");
+    printf("  -S <count>     Scalar output count (ignored if -y is used).\n");
+    printf("  -h             Show this help message.\n");
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
+    verify_args_t args = {0};
+    int opt;
+    uint64_t scalar_inputs[16] = {0};
+    size_t scalar_input_idx = 0;
+    bool method_is_set = false;
+    bool y_flag_used = false;
+
+    while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "hn:t:m:p:f:b:i:o:s:S:y:")) != -1) {
+        switch (opt) {
+            case 'h': print_usage(argv[0]); return 0;
+            case 'n': args.driver_name = optarg; break;
+            case 't': args.conn_type = strtoull(optarg, NULL, 0); break;
+            case 'm': args.method = strtoull(optarg, NULL, 0); method_is_set = true; break;
+            case 'y': {
+                y_flag_used = true;
+                unsigned long long m, si, is, so, os;
+                int items = sscanf(optarg, "%llu : [ %llu , %llu , %llu , %llu ]", &m, &si, &is, &so, &os);
+                if (items == 5) { // Adding Scalar In/Out count checks - can't be more than 16
+                    if (si > IOKIT_MAX_SCALAR_COUNT) {
+                        fprintf(stderr, "Error: Scalar input count %llu exceeds IOKit maximum of %d.\n", si, IOKIT_MAX_SCALAR_COUNT);
+                        return 1;
+                    }
+                    if (so > IOKIT_MAX_SCALAR_COUNT) {
+                        fprintf(stderr, "Error: Scalar output count %llu exceeds IOKit maximum of %d.\n", so, IOKIT_MAX_SCALAR_COUNT);
+                        return 1;
+                    }
+                    args.method = m;
+                    args.scalar_in_size = si;
+                    args.input_size = is;
+                    args.scalar_out_size = so;
+                    args.output_size = os;
+                    method_is_set = true;
+                } else {
+                    fprintf(stderr, "Error: Invalid format for -y. Use 'ID: [sc_in, st_in, sc_out, st_out]'.\n");
+                    return 1;
+                }
+                break;
+            }
+            case 'p': args.payload = optarg; break;
+            case 'f': args.file_name = optarg; break;
+            case 'b': args.byte_payload = optarg; break;
+            case 'i': if (!y_flag_used) args.input_size = strtoull(optarg, NULL, 0); break;
+            case 'o': if (!y_flag_used) args.output_size = strtoull(optarg, NULL, 0); break;
+            case 's': // Adding Scalar In count checks - can't be more than 16
+                if (scalar_input_idx < IOKIT_MAX_SCALAR_COUNT) {
+                    scalar_inputs[scalar_input_idx++] = strtoull(optarg, NULL, 0);
+                } else {
+                    fprintf(stderr, "Exceeded IOKit maximum of %d scalar inputs.\n", IOKIT_MAX_SCALAR_COUNT);
+                }
+                break;
+            case 'S': if (!y_flag_used) args.scalar_out_size = strtoull(optarg, NULL, 0); break;
+            default: print_usage(argv[0]); return 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!args.driver_name || !method_is_set) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error: Driver name (-n) and method ID (-m or -y) are required.\n");
+        print_usage(argv[0]);
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    if (y_flag_used) {
+        if (scalar_input_idx > args.scalar_in_size) {
+             fprintf(stderr, "Warning: More scalars via -s (%zu) than in -y (%zu). Extra values ignored.\n", scalar_input_idx, args.scalar_in_size);
+        } else if (scalar_input_idx < args.scalar_in_size) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Fewer scalars via -s (%zu) than in -y (%zu). Remaining values zeroed.\n", scalar_input_idx, args.scalar_in_size);
+        }
+    } else {
+        args.scalar_in_size = scalar_input_idx;
+    }
+    
+    args.scalar_input = scalar_inputs;
+
+    printf("Starting verification for driver: %s\n", args.driver_name);
+    verify_driver_communication(&args);
+
+    return 0;
+}

X. NU/custom/drivers/dtrace_NewUserClient.py

@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""
+dtrace_NewUserClient.py
+
+A script to trace all kernel newUserClient calls using DTrace on macOS.
+Prints the PID, full executable path, demangled kernel function name, and user call stack for each event.
+
+Requirements:
+    - Must be run as root (sudo).
+    - System Integrity Protection (SIP) must be disabled for DTrace to work on macOS.
+    - Tested on macOS with DTrace and c++filt available.
+
+Usage:
+    1. Make the script executable:
+        chmod +x dtrace_NewUserClient.py
+    2. Run with sudo:
+        sudo ./dtrace_NewUserClient.py
+    3. Press CTRL+C to stop tracing gracefully.
+
+Output:
+    For each newUserClient call, prints:
+        - PID
+        - Executable path
+        - Demangled kernel function name
+        - User call stack
+
+Graceful termination is handled via signal (SIGINT/SIGTERM).
+"""
+
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import signal
+import os
+import threading
+
+def main():
+    """
+    Runs dtrace to find newUserClient calls, captures the user stack,
+    and formats the output to include PID, full path, the demangled
+    kernel function name, and the call stack. Includes a robust signal
+    handler for graceful termination.
+    """
+    if os.getuid() != 0:
+        print("This script requires root privileges. Please run with sudo.", file=sys.stderr)
+        sys.exit(1)
+
+    dtrace_script = (
+        "fbt::*NewUserClient*:entry, "
+        "fbt::*newUserClient*:entry"
+        "{"
+        "    printf(\"DTRACE_EVENT|%d|%s|%s\\n\", pid, execname, probefunc);"
+        "    ustack();"
+        "    printf(\"DTRACE_END_EVENT\\n\");"
+        "}"
+    )
+
+    dtrace_command = ["sudo", "dtrace", "-x", "switchrate=10hz", "-qn", dtrace_script]
+    
+    # Use preexec_fn=os.setsid to run dtrace in its own process group.
+    # This prevents signals sent to the script from being forwarded to dtrace,
+    # and vice-versa, providing better isolation.
+    proc = subprocess.Popen(
+        dtrace_command,
+        stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
+        text=True,
+        bufsize=1,
+        preexec_fn=os.setsid,
+        errors="replace"  # <-- Add this argument to handle decode errors
+    )
+
+    # Use a thread-safe event to ensure the signal handler logic runs only once.
+    stop_event = threading.Event()
+
+    def signal_handler(sig, frame):
+        if stop_event.is_set():
+            return # Already handling signal
+        stop_event.set()
+
+        print("\nStopping dtrace...", file=sys.stderr)
+        try:
+            # Terminate the process group started by setsid
+            os.killpg(os.getpgid(proc.pid), signal.SIGTERM)
+            proc.wait(timeout=5)
+        except (ProcessLookupError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
+            try:
+                proc.kill() # Force kill if terminate fails
+            except ProcessLookupError:
+                pass # Process already gone
+        sys.exit(0)
+
+    signal.signal(signal.SIGINT, signal_handler)
+    signal.signal(signal.SIGTERM, signal_handler)
+
+    try:
+        output_iterator = iter(proc.stdout.readline, '')
+        for line in output_iterator:
+            # Exit loop if the signal handler has been triggered
+            if stop_event.is_set():
+                break
+
+            if not line.startswith("DTRACE_EVENT|"):
+                continue
+            
+            parts = line.split('|', 3)
+            if len(parts) != 4:
+                continue
+            _, pid_str, execname, func_raw = parts
+
+            stack_trace = []
+            for stack_line in output_iterator:
+                if stop_event.is_set(): break
+                stack_line = stack_line.strip()
+                if stack_line == "DTRACE_END_EVENT": break
+                stack_trace.append(stack_line)
+            
+            if stop_event.is_set(): break
+
+            path = f"{execname} (process terminated before path lookup)"
+            if pid_str.isdigit():
+                ps_proc = subprocess.run(
+                    ["/bin/ps", "-p", pid_str, "-o", "command="],
+                    capture_output=True, text=True, check=False
+                )
+                if ps_proc.stdout.strip():
+                    path = ps_proc.stdout.strip()
+            
+            func_clean = func_raw.split(':')[0]
+            symbol_to_demangle = "_" + func_clean
+            demangled_proc = subprocess.run(
+                ["/usr/bin/c++filt"],
+                input=symbol_to_demangle, capture_output=True, text=True, check=False
+            )
+            demangled_func = demangled_proc.stdout.strip()
+
+            print(f"\nPID: {pid_str}")
+            print(f"Path: {path}")
+            print(f"Function: {demangled_func}")
+            print("--- Call Stack---")
+            for stack_line in stack_trace:
+                print(stack_line)
+            print("-" * 40)
+            sys.stdout.flush()
+
+    finally:
+        if proc.poll() is None and not stop_event.is_set():
+            os.killpg(os.getpgid(proc.pid), signal.SIGKILL)
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()

X. NU/custom/drivers/dtrace_externalMethod.py

@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""
+dtrace_externalMethod.py
+
+A script to trace kernel functions related to IOConnectCallMethod using DTrace.
+Prints the PID, full executable path, demangled kernel function name, and user
+call stack for each event.
+
+Requirements:
+    - Must be run as root (sudo).
+    - System Integrity Protection (SIP) may need to be disabled for full
+      DTrace functionality on macOS.
+
+Usage:
+    1. Make the script executable:
+        chmod +x dtrace_externalMethod.py
+    2. Run with sudo:
+        sudo ./dtrace_externalMethod.py
+    3. Press CTRL+C to stop tracing gracefully.
+
+Output:
+    For each relevant kernel call, prints:
+        - PID
+        - Executable path
+        - Demangled kernel function name
+        - User call stack
+
+Graceful termination is handled via signal (SIGINT/SIGTERM).
+"""
+
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import signal
+import os
+import threading
+
+def main():
+    """
+    Runs dtrace to find IOConnectCallMethod related calls, captures the user stack,
+    and formats the output to include PID, full path, the demangled
+    kernel function name, and the call stack. Includes a robust signal
+    handler for graceful termination.
+    """
+    if os.getuid() != 0:
+        print("This script requires root privileges. Please run with sudo.", file=sys.stderr)
+        sys.exit(1)
+
+    # DTrace script to trace kernel functions that are part of the
+    # IOConnectCallMethod call chain.
+    dtrace_script = (
+        "fbt::*getTargetAndMethodForIndex*:entry, "
+        "fbt::*externalMethod*:entry, "
+        "fbt::*ExternalMethod*:entry"
+        "{"
+        "    printf(\"DTRACE_EVENT|%d|%s|%s\\n\", pid, execname, probefunc);"
+        "    ustack();"
+        "    printf(\"DTRACE_END_EVENT\\n\");"
+        "}"
+    )
+
+    dtrace_command = ["sudo", "dtrace", "-x", "switchrate=10hz", "-qn", dtrace_script]
+    
+    # Use preexec_fn=os.setsid to run dtrace in its own process group.
+    # This prevents signals sent to the script from being forwarded to dtrace,
+    # and vice-versa, providing better isolation.
+    proc = subprocess.Popen(
+        dtrace_command,
+        stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
+        text=True,
+        bufsize=1,
+        preexec_fn=os.setsid,
+        errors="replace"  # Handle decode errors gracefully
+    )
+
+    # Use a thread-safe event to ensure the signal handler logic runs only once.
+    stop_event = threading.Event()
+
+    def signal_handler(sig, frame):
+        if stop_event.is_set():
+            return # Already handling signal
+        stop_event.set()
+
+        print("\nStopping dtrace...", file=sys.stderr)
+        try:
+            # Terminate the process group started by setsid
+            os.killpg(os.getpgid(proc.pid), signal.SIGTERM)
+            proc.wait(timeout=5)
+        except (ProcessLookupError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
+            try:
+                proc.kill() # Force kill if terminate fails
+            except ProcessLookupError:
+                pass # Process already gone
+        sys.exit(0)
+
+    signal.signal(signal.SIGINT, signal_handler)
+    signal.signal(signal.SIGTERM, signal_handler)
+
+    try:
+        output_iterator = iter(proc.stdout.readline, '')
+        for line in output_iterator:
+            # Exit loop if the signal handler has been triggered
+            if stop_event.is_set():
+                break
+
+            if not line.startswith("DTRACE_EVENT|"):
+                continue
+            
+            parts = line.split('|', 3)
+            if len(parts) != 4:
+                continue
+            _, pid_str, execname, func_raw = parts
+
+            stack_trace = []
+            for stack_line in output_iterator:
+                if stop_event.is_set(): break
+                stack_line = stack_line.strip()
+                if stack_line == "DTRACE_END_EVENT": break
+                stack_trace.append(stack_line)
+            
+            if stop_event.is_set(): break
+
+            path = f"{execname} (process terminated before path lookup)"
+            if pid_str.isdigit():
+                ps_proc = subprocess.run(
+                    ["/bin/ps", "-p", pid_str, "-o", "command="],
+                    capture_output=True, text=True, check=False
+                )
+                if ps_proc.stdout.strip():
+                    path = ps_proc.stdout.strip()
+            
+            func_clean = func_raw.split(':')[0]
+            symbol_to_demangle = "_" + func_clean
+            demangled_proc = subprocess.run(
+                ["/usr/bin/c++filt"],
+                input=symbol_to_demangle, capture_output=True, text=True, check=False
+            )
+            demangled_func = demangled_proc.stdout.strip() if demangled_proc.returncode == 0 else func_clean
+
+            print(f"\nPID: {pid_str}")
+            print(f"Path: {path}")
+            print(f"Function: {demangled_func}")
+            print("--- Call Stack---")
+            for stack_line in stack_trace:
+                print(stack_line)
+            print("-" * 40)
+            sys.stdout.flush()
+
+    finally:
+        if proc.poll() is None and not stop_event.is_set():
+            os.killpg(os.getpgid(proc.pid), signal.SIGKILL)
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()

X. NU/custom/drivers/format_externalmethods.py

@@ -1,46 +1,87 @@
+"""
+IDA script to format and analyze IOExternalMethodDispatch structures in iOS kernelcache.
+Supports both IOExternalMethodDispatch (0x18 bytes) and IOExternalMethodDispatch2022 (0x28 bytes) formats.
+
+Usage in IDA Python console:
+    format_external_method_array(0xFFFFFE0007DCDBD8, 16, 1)  # For old format
+    format_external_method_array(0xFFFFFE0007DCDBD8, 16)     # For 2022 format
+
+Structure formats:
+    IOExternalMethodDispatch (0x18):
+        0x00 - function (ptr)
+        0x08 - checkScalarInputCount
+        0x0C - checkStructureInputSize
+        0x10 - checkScalarOutputCount
+        0x14 - checkStructureOutputSize
+
+    IOExternalMethodDispatch2022 (0x28):
+        [all fields from IOExternalMethodDispatch]
+        0x18 - allowAsync
+        0x20 - checkEntitlement (ptr)
+"""
+
 from idaapi import *
 import ida_bytes
 import idc
 import ida_name
 
-def create_external_method_dispatch_struct():
-    sid = idc.get_struc_id("IOExternalMethodDispatch2022")
+def create_external_method_dispatch_struct(struct_type=0):
+    """
+    Creates IDA structure for IOExternalMethodDispatch.
+    
+    Args:
+        struct_type: 0 for IOExternalMethodDispatch2022 (0x28 bytes)
+                    1 for IOExternalMethodDispatch (0x18 bytes)
+    Returns:
+        Structure ID or -1 on failure
+    """
+    struct_name = f"IOExternalMethodDispatch{2022 if struct_type == 0 else ''}"
+    sid = idc.get_struc_id(struct_name)
     if sid != -1:
-        # Structure already exists
         return sid
     
-    sid = idc.add_struc(-1, "IOExternalMethodDispatch2022", 0)
+    sid = idc.add_struc(-1, struct_name, 0)
     if sid == -1:
         print("Failed to create structure")
         return -1
 
-    # Define structure members
+    # Common fields for both types
     idc.add_struc_member(sid, "function", 0, ida_bytes.qword_flag(), -1, 8)
     idc.add_struc_member(sid, "checkScalarInputCount", 8, ida_bytes.dword_flag(), -1, 4)
     idc.add_struc_member(sid, "checkStructureInputSize", 0xC, ida_bytes.dword_flag(), -1, 4)
     idc.add_struc_member(sid, "checkScalarOutputCount", 0x10, ida_bytes.dword_flag(), -1, 4)
     idc.add_struc_member(sid, "checkStructureOutputSize", 0x14, ida_bytes.dword_flag(), -1, 4)
-    idc.add_struc_member(sid, "allowAsync", 0x18, ida_bytes.byte_flag(), -1, 1)
-    # Align to pointer size for checkEntitlement
-    idc.add_struc_member(sid, "checkEntitlement", 0x20, ida_bytes.qword_flag(), -1, 8)
+
+    if struct_type == 0:
+        # Type 0 (2022) specific fields
+        idc.add_struc_member(sid, "allowAsync", 0x18, ida_bytes.byte_flag(), -1, 1)
+        # Align to pointer size for checkEntitlement
+        idc.add_struc_member(sid, "checkEntitlement", 0x20, ida_bytes.qword_flag(), -1, 8)
     
     return sid
 
-def format_external_method_array(start_addr, count):
-    # Create structure if it doesn't exist
-    sid = create_external_method_dispatch_struct()
+def format_external_method_array(start_addr, count, struct_type=0):
+    """
+    Formats and analyzes an array of IOExternalMethodDispatch structures.
+    
+    Args:
+        start_addr: Start address of the methods array
+        count: Number of entries to process
+        struct_type: 0 for IOExternalMethodDispatch2022 (default)
+                    1 for IOExternalMethodDispatch
+    """
+    sid = create_external_method_dispatch_struct(struct_type)
     if sid == -1:
         return
     
-    struct_size = 0x28  # Size of IOExternalMethodDispatch2022
+    struct_size = 0x28 if struct_type == 0 else 0x18
     
-    # Create array
     for i in range(count):
         current_addr = start_addr + (i * struct_size)
         
         # Create structure instance
-        idc.create_struct(current_addr, struct_size, "IOExternalMethodDispatch2022")
-        
+        idc.create_struct(current_addr, struct_size, f"IOExternalMethodDispatch{2022 if struct_type == 0 else ''}")
+
         # Get function pointer and try to get its name
         func_ptr = idc.get_qword(current_addr)
         if func_ptr != 0:
@@ -50,35 +91,46 @@ def format_external_method_array(start_addr, count):
             else:
                 print(f"Entry {i}: Function = 0x{func_ptr:x}")
         
-        # Get other fields
+        # Get common fields
         scalar_input = idc.get_wide_dword(current_addr + 8)
         struct_input = idc.get_wide_dword(current_addr + 0xC)
         scalar_output = idc.get_wide_dword(current_addr + 0x10)
         struct_output = idc.get_wide_dword(current_addr + 0x14)
-        allow_async = idc.get_wide_byte(current_addr + 0x18)
-        entitlement = idc.get_qword(current_addr + 0x20)
         
         print(f"  ScalarInput: {scalar_input}")
         print(f"  StructInput: {struct_input}")
         print(f"  ScalarOutput: {scalar_output}")
         print(f"  StructOutput: {struct_output}")
-        print(f"  AllowAsync: {allow_async}")
-        if entitlement != 0:
-            ent_str = idc.get_strlit_contents(entitlement, -1, STRTYPE_C)
-            if ent_str:
-                print(f"  Entitlement: {ent_str.decode('utf-8')}")
+        
+        if struct_type == 0:
+            # Type 0 (2022) specific fields
+            allow_async = idc.get_wide_byte(current_addr + 0x18)
+            entitlement = idc.get_qword(current_addr + 0x20)
+            
+            print(f"  AllowAsync: {allow_async}")
+            if entitlement != 0:
+                ent_str = idc.get_strlit_contents(entitlement, -1, STRTYPE_C)
+                if ent_str:
+                    print(f"  Entitlement: {ent_str.decode('utf-8')}")
         print("")
 
 def main():
-    if len(idc.ARGV) != 3:
-        print("Usage: format_externalmethods.py <start_address> <count>")
-        print("Example: format_externalmethods.py 0xFFFFFE0007E1B118 10")
+    if len(idc.ARGV) < 3:
+        print("Usage: format_externalmethods.py <start_address> <count> [type]")
+        print("In IDA: format_external_method_array(0xFFFFFE0007DCDBD8, 16, 1)")
+        print("Type: 0 = IOExternalMethodDispatch2022 (0x28 bytes)")
+        print("      1 = IOExternalMethodDispatch (0x18 bytes)")
         return
     
     start_addr = int(idc.ARGV[1], 16)
     count = int(idc.ARGV[2])
+    struct_type = int(idc.ARGV[3]) if len(idc.ARGV) > 3 else 0
     
-    format_external_method_array(start_addr, count)
+    format_external_method_array(start_addr, count, struct_type)
 
 if __name__ == '__main__':
     main()
+
+
+# format_external_method_array(0xFFFFFE0007F647A0, 10)
+# format_external_method_array(0xFFFFFE0007DCDBD8, 15, 1)

X. NU/custom/drivers/iokit_dump.py

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python
+import lldb
+import shlex
+
+def hexdump(process, address, count):
+    """
+    Generates a formatted hexdump of a memory region.
+    """
+    err = lldb.SBError()
+    data = process.ReadMemory(address, count, err)
+    if not err.Success():
+        return "error reading memory"
+    
+    lines = []
+    for i in range(0, len(data), 16):
+        chunk = data[i:i+16]
+        left = " ".join(f"{b:02x}" for b in chunk[0:8])
+        right = " ".join(f"{b:02x}" for b in chunk[8:]) if len(chunk) > 8 else ""
+        hex_str = left + ("  " + right if right else "")
+        ascii_str = "".join(chr(b) if 32 <= b < 127 else "." for b in chunk)
+        lines.append(f"{address + i:08x}  {hex_str:<48s}  |{ascii_str:<16s}|")
+    return "\n".join(lines)
+
+def format_row(typ, name, value):
+    """
+    Formats a single row for the argument summary table.
+    """
+    return f"{typ:<26}{name:<40}{value:>20}"
+
+def iokit_dump(debugger, command, result, internal_dict):
+    """
+    Main function for the 'iokit_dump' LLDB command.
+    """
+    # --- Argument Parsing ---
+    try:
+        args = shlex.split(command)
+        dump_filename = args[0] if args else None
+    except Exception as e:
+        result.PutCString(f"Error parsing arguments: {e}")
+        result.SetStatus(1) # Use 1 for lldb.eReturnStatusFailed
+        return
+
+    # --- LLDB Object Setup with validation ---
+    target = debugger.GetSelectedTarget()
+    if not target or not target.IsValid():
+        result.PutCString("Error: No valid target selected.")
+        result.SetStatus(1) # Use 1 for lldb.eReturnStatusFailed
+        return
+        
+    process = target.GetProcess()
+    if not process or not process.IsValid():
+        result.PutCString("Error: No valid process running.")
+        result.SetStatus(1) # Use 1 for lldb.eReturnStatusFailed
+        return
+        
+    thread = process.GetSelectedThread()
+    if not thread or not thread.IsValid():
+        result.PutCString("Error: No valid thread selected.")
+        result.SetStatus(1) # Use 1 for lldb.eReturnStatusFailed
+        return
+        
+    frame = thread.GetFrameAtIndex(0)
+    if not frame or not frame.IsValid():
+        result.PutCString("Error: Could not get the current stack frame.")
+        result.SetStatus(1) # Use 1 for lldb.eReturnStatusFailed
+        return
+
+    # --- Read Registers for inputStruct ---
+    inputStruct_ptr = frame.FindRegister("x4").GetValueAsUnsigned()
+    inputStructCnt = frame.FindRegister("x5").GetValueAsUnsigned()
+
+    # --- New: Dump inputStruct to a file ---
+    if dump_filename:
+        if not inputStruct_ptr or inputStructCnt == 0:
+            result.PutCString("No inputStruct data to dump (pointer is null or size is zero).")
+            result.SetStatus(0) # Use 0 for lldb.eReturnStatusSuccess
+            return
+
+        err = lldb.SBError()
+        data = process.ReadMemory(inputStruct_ptr, inputStructCnt, err)
+
+        if not err.Success():
+            result.PutCString(f"Error reading memory for inputStruct at {hex(inputStruct_ptr)}: {err}")
+            result.SetStatus(1) # Use 1 for lldb.eReturnStatusFailed
+            return
+
+        try:
+            with open(dump_filename, 'wb') as f:
+                f.write(data)
+            result.PutCString(f"Successfully dumped {inputStructCnt} bytes of inputStruct to '{dump_filename}'")
+            result.SetStatus(0) # Use 0 for lldb.eReturnStatusSuccess
+        except IOError as e:
+            result.PutCString(f"Error writing to file '{dump_filename}': {e}")
+            result.SetStatus(1) # Use 1 for lldb.eReturnStatusFailed
+        return
+
+    # --- Original: Print formatted argument summary ---
+    # Read remaining registers
+    connection          = frame.FindRegister("x0").GetValueAsUnsigned()
+    selector            = frame.FindRegister("x1").GetValueAsUnsigned()
+    input_ptr           = frame.FindRegister("x2").GetValueAsUnsigned()
+    inputCnt            = frame.FindRegister("x3").GetValueAsUnsigned()
+    output_ptr          = frame.FindRegister("x6").GetValueAsUnsigned()
+    outputCnt_ptr       = frame.FindRegister("x7").GetValueAsUnsigned()
+    outputStruct_ptr    = frame.FindRegister("x8").GetValueAsUnsigned()
+    outputStructCnt_ptr = frame.FindRegister("x9").GetValueAsUnsigned()
+
+    lines = ["kern_return_t IOConnectCallMethod", "-------------------------------------"]
+    rows = [
+        format_row("mach_port_t", "connection:", f"{hex(connection)}"),
+        format_row("uint32_t", "selector:", f"{hex(selector)}"),
+        format_row("const uint64_t *", "input:", f"{hex(input_ptr)}"),
+        format_row("uint32_t", "inputCnt:", f"{hex(inputCnt)}"),
+        format_row("const void *", "inputStruct:", f"{hex(inputStruct_ptr)}"),
+        format_row("size_t", "inputStructCnt:", f"{hex(inputStructCnt)}"),
+        format_row("uint64_t *", "output:", f"{hex(output_ptr)}"),
+        format_row("uint32_t *", "outputCnt:", f"{hex(outputCnt_ptr)}"),
+        format_row("void *", "outputStruct:", f"{hex(outputStruct_ptr)}"),
+        format_row("size_t *", "outputStructCnt:", f"{hex(outputStructCnt_ptr)}"),
+    ]
+    lines.extend(rows)
+
+    # Input/Output scalars and struct hexdumps...
+    if inputStruct_ptr and inputStructCnt > 0:
+        lines.append("\nInput Struct Hexdump (first 32 bytes):")
+        dump = hexdump(process, inputStruct_ptr, min(inputStructCnt, 32))
+        lines.append(dump)
+    
+    # (Additional logic for other pointers as in previous script)
+
+    result.PutCString("\n".join(lines))
+    result.SetStatus(0) # Use 0 for lldb.eReturnStatusSuccess
+
+def __lldb_init_module(debugger, internal_dict):
+    """
+    Registers the 'iokit_dump' command when the script is loaded in LLDB.
+    """
+    debugger.HandleCommand('command script add -f iokitargs.iokit_dump iokit_dump')
+    print("Loaded 'iokit_dump' command.")
+    print("Usage: iokit_dump [FILENAME]")

X. NU/custom/drivers/iokit_tracer.py

@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python
+# iokit_tracer.py (v5 - Complete Data Inspection)
+
+import lldb
+import shlex
+import threading
+import os
+import re
+
+# --- Shared State & Locking ---
+g_lock = threading.Lock()
+connection_info_map = {}
+pending_connections = {}
+
+# --- Helper Functions ---
+def hexdump(process, address, count):
+    """Returns a formatted hexdump string for a memory region."""
+    err = lldb.SBError()
+    # Limit the dump to a reasonable size to avoid flooding the console
+    count = min(count, 256)
+    if count == 0:
+        return "<empty>"
+    data = process.ReadMemory(address, count, err)
+    if not err.Success():
+        return f"<error reading memory at {hex(address)}: {err.GetCString()}>"
+    
+    lines = []
+    for i in range(0, len(data), 16):
+        chunk = data[i:i+16]
+        hex_str = " ".join(f"{b:02x}" for b in chunk)
+        ascii_str = "".join(chr(b) if 32 <= b < 127 else "." for b in chunk)
+        lines.append(f"  {i:04x}: {hex_str:<48} |{ascii_str}|")
+    return "\n".join(lines)
+
+def resolve_service_name(frame, service_ptr):
+    """Evaluates IORegistryEntryGetName to get the service name from a service object."""
+    if not service_ptr: return "null_service"
+    expr = (f'char n[128]={{0}}; extern int IORegistryEntryGetName(void*,char*); IORegistryEntryGetName((void*){service_ptr},n); n')
+    val = frame.EvaluateExpression(expr)
+    if val.IsValid() and val.GetSummary():
+        s = val.GetSummary().strip('"')
+        if s and not s.startswith('0x'): return s
+    return f"0x{service_ptr:x}"
+
+def sanitize_filename(s):
+    return re.sub(r'[^A-Za-z0-9._-]', '_', s)
+
+# --- LLDB Hook Functions ---
+def ioserviceopen_hook(frame, bp_loc, internal_dict):
+    """Hook at IOServiceOpen. Stores args in a pending dictionary for the thread."""
+    thread = frame.GetThread()
+    target = thread.GetProcess().GetTarget()
+    service_ptr = frame.FindRegister("x0").GetValueAsUnsigned()
+    connect_ptr_addr = frame.FindRegister("x3").GetValueAsUnsigned()
+    if service_ptr and connect_ptr_addr:
+        with g_lock:
+            pending_connections[thread.GetThreadID()] = {
+                "service_name": resolve_service_name(frame, service_ptr),
+                "connect_ptr_addr": connect_ptr_addr,
+                "pid": thread.GetProcess().GetProcessID(),
+                "exe_path": target.GetModuleAtIndex(0).GetFileSpec().fullpath or "unknown",
+                "type": frame.FindRegister("x2").GetValueAsUnsigned()
+            }
+    return False
+
+corpus_dir = None
+corpus_counter = 0
+
+def ioconnectcallmethod_hook(frame, bp_loc, internal_dict):
+    global corpus_counter
+    thread = frame.GetThread()
+    process = thread.GetProcess()
+    connection = frame.FindRegister("x0").GetValueAsUnsigned()
+    thread_id = thread.GetThreadID()
+    
+    with g_lock:
+        info = connection_info_map.get(connection)
+        if not info and thread_id in pending_connections:
+            pending_info = pending_connections.pop(thread_id)
+            err = lldb.SBError()
+            handle = process.ReadUnsignedFromMemory(pending_info["connect_ptr_addr"], 4, err)
+            if err.Success() and handle != 0:
+                connection_info_map[handle] = pending_info
+                if handle == connection: info = pending_info
+    
+    if info:
+        # Read all argument registers
+        selector = frame.FindRegister("x1").GetValueAsUnsigned()
+        input_ptr = frame.FindRegister("x2").GetValueAsUnsigned()
+        inputCnt = frame.FindRegister("x3").GetValueAsUnsigned()
+        inputStruct_ptr = frame.FindRegister("x4").GetValueAsUnsigned()
+        inputStructCnt = frame.FindRegister("x5").GetValueAsUnsigned()
+        output_ptr = frame.FindRegister("x6").GetValueAsUnsigned()
+        outputCnt_ptr = frame.FindRegister("x7").GetValueAsUnsigned()
+        outputStruct_ptr = frame.FindRegister("x8").GetValueAsUnsigned()
+        outputStructCnt_ptr = frame.FindRegister("x9").GetValueAsUnsigned()
+        err = lldb.SBError()
+
+        # --- Read output scalar count and output struct count for filename ---
+        outputCnt_val = process.ReadUnsignedFromMemory(outputCnt_ptr, 4, err) if outputCnt_ptr else 0
+        outputCnt_str = str(outputCnt_val) if err.Success() else "err"
+        outputStructCnt_val = process.ReadUnsignedFromMemory(outputStructCnt_ptr, 8, err) if outputStructCnt_ptr else 0
+        outputStructCnt_str = str(outputStructCnt_val) if err.Success() else "err"
+
+        # --- Dump inputStruct to corpus directory if requested ---
+        if corpus_dir and inputStruct_ptr and inputStructCnt > 0:
+            try:
+                data = process.ReadMemory(inputStruct_ptr, inputStructCnt, err)
+                if err.Success():
+                    service_name = sanitize_filename(info['service_name'])
+                    type_val = info['type']
+                    # Find the next available n for the filename
+                    n = 0
+                    while True:
+                        fname = (
+                            f"corpus_{service_name}_{type_val}_{selector}_"
+                            f"{inputCnt}_{inputStructCnt}_{outputCnt_str}_{outputStructCnt_str}_{n}.bin"
+                        )
+                        full_path = os.path.join(corpus_dir, fname)
+                        if not os.path.exists(full_path):
+                            break
+                        n += 1
+                    with open(full_path, "wb") as f:
+                        f.write(data)
+                    print(f"[iokit_tracer] Dumped inputStruct ({inputStructCnt} bytes) to {full_path}")
+            except Exception as e:
+                print(f"[iokit_tracer] Error dumping inputStruct: {e}")
+
+        # Read input scalars from memory
+        input_scalars = []
+        if input_ptr and inputCnt > 0:
+            for i in range(inputCnt):
+                val = process.ReadUnsignedFromMemory(input_ptr + i*8, 8, err)
+                input_scalars.append(f"{hex(val)}" if err.Success() else "<read_err>")
+        
+        # Read output scalars (Note: This is post-call, data may not be valid yet on entry)
+        # We read the *capacity* of the output buffer from the pointer.
+        outputCnt_val = process.ReadUnsignedFromMemory(outputCnt_ptr, 4, err) if outputCnt_ptr else 0
+        outputCnt_str = str(outputCnt_val) if err.Success() else "<read_err>"
+        
+        outputStructCnt_val = process.ReadUnsignedFromMemory(outputStructCnt_ptr, 8, err) if outputStructCnt_ptr else 0
+        outputStructCnt_str = str(outputStructCnt_val) if err.Success() else "<read_err>"
+
+        # Build output
+        lines = [
+            "----------------------------------------------------------------",
+            f"PID: {info['pid']} | EXE: {info['exe_path']}",
+            f"SERVICE: {info['service_name']} (Connection: {hex(connection)}) | TYPE: {info['type']}",
+            f"SELECTOR: {selector} (0x{selector:x})",
+            "--- INPUT ---",
+            f"input Scalars ({inputCnt} values at {hex(input_ptr)}): [{', '.join(input_scalars)}]",
+            f"inputStruct ({inputStructCnt} bytes at {hex(inputStruct_ptr)}):"
+        ]
+        lines.append(hexdump(process, inputStruct_ptr, inputStructCnt))
+        lines.append("--- OUTPUT ---")
+        lines.append(f"outputCnt: {outputCnt_str} (capacity pointer: {hex(outputCnt_ptr)})")
+        lines.append(f"outputStructCnt: {outputStructCnt_str} (capacity pointer: {hex(outputStructCnt_ptr)})")
+        lines.append("----------------------------------------------------------------\n")
+        print("\n".join(lines))
+        # After printing all trace info, try to get the return value from the previous frame (caller)
+        result_code = None
+        caller_frame = thread.GetFrameAtIndex(1) if thread.GetNumFrames() > 1 else None
+        if caller_frame:
+            # On macOS/ARM64, return value is in x0; on x86_64, it's rax
+            reg = caller_frame.FindRegister("x0") if caller_frame.FindRegister("x0").IsValid() else caller_frame.FindRegister("rax")
+            if reg and reg.IsValid():
+                result_code = reg.GetValueAsUnsigned()
+        # Print result code if available
+        if result_code is not None:
+            print(f"[iokit_tracer] IOConnectCallMethod return code: 0x{result_code:x} ({result_code})")
+        else:
+            print("[iokit_tracer] IOConnectCallMethod return code: <unavailable>")
+    return False
+
+def trace_iokit(debugger, command, result, internal_dict):
+    """Command to attach or launch and set up the IOKit tracer."""
+    global corpus_dir, corpus_counter
+    args = shlex.split(command)
+    pid, path, prog_args = None, None, []
+    corpus_dir = None
+    corpus_counter = 0
+    # --- Parse -o/--out flag ---
+    if "-o" in args:
+        idx = args.index("-o")
+        if idx + 1 < len(args):
+            corpus_dir = args[idx + 1]
+            del args[idx:idx+2]
+    elif "--out" in args:
+        idx = args.index("--out")
+        if idx + 1 < len(args):
+            corpus_dir = args[idx + 1]
+            del args[idx:idx+2]
+    if corpus_dir:
+        os.makedirs(corpus_dir, exist_ok=True)
+        print(f"[iokit_tracer] Will dump inputStructs to: {corpus_dir}")
+
+    if "--pid" in args: pid = args[args.index("--pid") + 1]
+    if "--executable_path" in args: path = args[args.index("--executable_path") + 1]
+    if "--" in args: prog_args = args[args.index("--") + 1:]
+    with g_lock: connection_info_map.clear(); pending_connections.clear()
+    
+    def setup_breakpoints(target):
+        bp_open = target.BreakpointCreateByName("IOServiceOpen")
+        bp_open.SetScriptCallbackFunction(f"{__name__}.ioserviceopen_hook")
+        bp_open.SetAutoContinue(True)
+        bp_call = target.BreakpointCreateByName("IOConnectCallMethod")
+        bp_call.SetScriptCallbackFunction(f"{__name__}.ioconnectcallmethod_hook")
+        bp_call.SetAutoContinue(True)
+
+    if path:
+        target = debugger.CreateTargetWithFileAndArch(path, lldb.LLDB_ARCH_DEFAULT)
+        setup_breakpoints(target)
+        err = lldb.SBError()
+        target.Launch(debugger.GetListener(), prog_args, None, None, None, None, ".", 0, False, err)
+        if err.Success(): print(f"Launched '{path}'. IOKit tracer is active.")
+        else: result.PutCString(f"Error launching: {err.GetCString()}")
+    elif pid:
+        debugger.HandleCommand(f'process attach --pid {pid}')
+        target = debugger.GetSelectedTarget()
+        if target and target.GetProcess().IsValid():
+            setup_breakpoints(target)
+            print(f"Attached to PID {pid}. IOKit tracer is active.")
+            debugger.HandleCommand('continue')
+        else: result.PutCString(f"Error: Failed to attach to PID {pid}")
+    else:
+        # Try to use the currently selected target and process
+        target = debugger.GetSelectedTarget()
+        process = target.GetProcess() if target else None
+        if target and process and process.IsValid() and process.GetState() in [lldb.eStateStopped, lldb.eStateRunning]:
+            setup_breakpoints(target)
+            print("Using current LLDB target/process. IOKit tracer is active.")
+        else:
+            result.PutCString("Error: Specify --pid <PID> or --executable_path <path>, or attach to a process first.")
+
+def __lldb_init_module(debugger, internal_dict):
+    """Registers the 'trace_iokit' command with LLDB."""
+    debugger.HandleCommand(f'command script add -f {__name__}.trace_iokit trace_iokit')
+    print("Loaded IOKit tracer. Use 'trace_iokit --pid <PID>' or 'trace_iokit --executable_path <path>'")

X. NU/custom/drivers/print_externalmethods.py

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+import ida_bytes
+import ida_name
+import idc
+
+def print_methods(start_addr, count, struct_type=0):
+    """
+    Print details of external methods or method templates.
+
+    Args:
+        start_addr: Start address of methods array
+        count: Number of entries to process
+        struct_type: 0 for IOExternalMethodDispatch2022
+                     1 for IOExternalMethodDispatch
+                     2 for getTargetAndMethodForIndex methodTemplate
+    """
+    if struct_type == 0:
+        struct_size = 0x28
+    elif struct_type == 1:
+        struct_size = 0x18
+    elif struct_type == 2:
+        struct_size = 0x30
+    else:
+        print("Unsupported struct_type.")
+        return
+
+    all_methods = []
+
+    print("Methods:")
+    print("-" * 40)
+
+    for i in range(count):
+        current_addr = start_addr + (i * struct_size)
+
+        func_ptr = idc.get_qword(current_addr)
+        func_name = ida_name.get_name(func_ptr) if func_ptr else "Unknown"
+
+        if struct_type == 2:
+            allow_async = idc.get_wide_byte(current_addr + 0x8)
+            scalar_input = idc.get_wide_dword(current_addr + 0x10)
+            struct_input = idc.get_wide_dword(current_addr + 0x14)
+            scalar_output = idc.get_wide_dword(current_addr + 0x18)
+            struct_output = idc.get_wide_dword(current_addr + 0x1C)
+            print(f"Method {i}: {func_name}")
+            print(f"  Async: {bool(allow_async)}")
+        else:
+            print(f"Method {i}: {func_name}")
+            scalar_input = idc.get_wide_dword(current_addr + 8)
+            struct_input = idc.get_wide_dword(current_addr + 0xC)
+            scalar_output = idc.get_wide_dword(current_addr + 0x10)
+            struct_output = idc.get_wide_dword(current_addr + 0x14)
+
+            if struct_type == 0:
+                allow_async = idc.get_wide_byte(current_addr + 0x18)
+                entitlement_ptr = idc.get_qword(current_addr + 0x20)
+                if entitlement_ptr:
+                    ent_str = idc.get_strlit_contents(entitlement_ptr, -1, idc.STRTYPE_C)
+                    if ent_str:
+                        print(f"  Entitlement: {ent_str.decode('utf-8')}")
+
+        all_methods.append(f"{i}: [{scalar_input}, {struct_input}, {scalar_output}, {struct_output}]")
+
+    print("\nMethod summary (ID: [SCALAR_IN, IN_SIZE, SCALAR_OUT, OUT_SIZE]):")
+    for m in all_methods:
+        print(m)
+
+# Usage in IDA:
+# print_methods(0xFFFFFE000835F490, 20, 2)  # For getTargetAndMethodForIndex
+# print_methods(0xFFFFFE0007DCDBD8, 15, 1)  # For old format
+# print_methods(0xFFFFFE0007F647A0, 10)     # For 2022 format

X. NU/custom/drivers/trace_ioserviceopen.py

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+"""
+trace_ioserviceopen.py
+
+Trace IOServiceOpen calls in a target process using LLDB Python scripting to get Service Names and User Client types.
+
+How to use:
+    1. In LLDB, import this script:
+        (lldb) command script import trace_ioserviceopen.py
+
+    2. Start tracing with:
+        (lldb) setup_ioserviceopen --executable_path EXE_PATH -- [args...]
+       or
+        (lldb) setup_ioserviceopen --pid PID
+
+What it does:
+    - Sets a breakpoint on IOServiceOpen.
+    - On every call, prints:
+        - PID
+        - Executable path
+        - IOService name
+        - Type
+    - Does not stop or break execution; output is continuous and non-intrusive.
+
+"""
+
+import lldb
+import shlex
+
+def ioserviceopen_trace_hook(frame, bp_loc, dict):
+    # Get target and process objects from the current frame
+    target = frame.GetThread().GetProcess().GetTarget()
+    process = frame.GetThread().GetProcess()
+    pid = process.GetProcessID()
+    # Get the main module (executable) path
+    module = target.GetModuleAtIndex(0)
+    exe_path = module.GetFileSpec().fullpath or "unknown"
+    # x0 holds the IOService pointer, x2 holds the type argument
+    service = frame.FindRegister("x0").GetValueAsUnsigned()
+    type_val = frame.FindRegister("x2").GetValueAsUnsigned()
+
+    # Try to resolve the IOService name using IORegistryEntryGetName.
+    # This only works if the symbol is available and the process is not restricted.
+    name_str = f"0x{service:x}"
+    try:
+        # Evaluate an expression in the target to call IORegistryEntryGetName.
+        # This is safe if the symbol is present and the process allows it.
+        expr = (
+            'char name[128] = {0}; '
+            'extern int IORegistryEntryGetName(void*, char*); '
+            f'IORegistryEntryGetName((void*){service}, name); '
+            'name'
+        )
+        val = frame.EvaluateExpression(expr)
+        if val.IsValid() and val.GetSummary():
+            s = val.GetSummary().strip('"')
+            if s and not s.startswith('0x'):
+                name_str = s
+    except Exception:
+        # If anything fails, just show the pointer value
+        pass
+
+    print(f"\nPID: {pid}\nEXE PATH: {exe_path}\nSERVICE: {name_str}\nTYPE: {type_val}\n")
+    # Returning False tells LLDB to auto-continue without stopping at the breakpoint
+    return False
+
+def setup_ioserviceopen(debugger, command, result, internal_dict):
+    args = shlex.split(command)
+    executable_path = None
+    pid = None
+    program_args = []
+    i = 0
+    # Parse command-line arguments for executable path, pid, and any program arguments
+    while i < len(args):
+        if args[i] == "--executable_path" and i + 1 < len(args):
+            executable_path = args[i + 1]
+            i += 2
+        elif args[i] == "--pid" and i + 1 < len(args):
+            pid = args[i + 1]
+            i += 2
+        elif args[i] == "--" and i + 1 < len(args):
+            program_args = args[i + 1:]
+            break
+        else:
+            i += 1
+
+    if executable_path and pid:
+        print("Error: Specify either --executable_path or --pid", file=result)
+        return
+    if not executable_path and not pid:
+        print("Error: Specify --executable_path or --pid", file=result)
+        return
+
+    # Set up the target and breakpoint, and ensure auto-continue is enabled
+    if executable_path:
+        debugger.HandleCommand(f'target create "{executable_path}"')
+        bp = debugger.GetSelectedTarget().BreakpointCreateByName("IOServiceOpen")
+        bp.SetScriptCallbackFunction("trace_ioserviceopen.ioserviceopen_trace_hook")
+        bp.SetAutoContinue(True)
+        debugger.HandleCommand(f'process launch -- {" ".join(shlex.quote(arg) for arg in program_args)}')
+    elif pid:
+        debugger.HandleCommand(f'process attach --pid {pid}')
+        bp = debugger.GetSelectedTarget().BreakpointCreateByName("IOServiceOpen")
+        bp.SetScriptCallbackFunction("trace_ioserviceopen.ioserviceopen_trace_hook")
+        bp.SetAutoContinue(True)
+    debugger.HandleCommand('continue')
+
+def __lldb_init_module(debugger, internal_dict):
+    # Register the setup command with LLDB
+    debugger.HandleCommand('command script add -f trace_ioserviceopen.setup_ioserviceopen setup_ioserviceopen')

X. NU/custom/mach_ipc/ida_mig_subsystem_scanner.py

@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+"""
+IDA Pro MIG Subsystem Scanner
+Automatically identifies and labels Mach Interface Generator (MIG) subsystems
+in XNU kernelcache, kext binaries and other Mach-based binaries.
+
+Author: Karol Mazurek @karmaz95
+Based on: https://github.com/knightsc/hopper/blob/master/scripts/MIG%20Detect.py
+Usage: Run from IDA Pro's script console or via File > Script file
+"""
+
+import idc
+import idautils
+import idaapi
+import ida_bytes
+import ida_name
+import ida_segment
+import ida_funcs
+
+
+class MIGSubsystemScanner:
+    """Scanner for MIG subsystem structures in Mach kernel binaries."""
+    
+    # Target segments where MIG subsystems are typically stored
+    TARGET_SEGMENTS = [
+        "__DATA:__const",
+        "__CONST:__constdata", 
+        "__DATA_CONST:__const",
+        "__const"
+    ]
+    
+    # MIG subsystem structure offsets (arm64)
+    OFFSET_START = 0x08      # subsystem start ID (u32)
+    OFFSET_END = 0x0C        # subsystem end ID (u32)
+    OFFSET_RESERVED = 0x18   # reserved field (u64)
+    OFFSET_ROUTINES = 0x20   # routine array start (u64)
+    
+    # MIG routine descriptor size
+    ROUTINE_SIZE = 0x28      # 40 bytes per routine
+    ROUTINE_STUB_OFFSET = 0x08  # stub_routine pointer offset
+    
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.found_count = 0
+        self.total_messages = 0
+        
+    def is_valid_subsystem(self, addr):
+        """
+        Validate potential MIG subsystem structure using heuristics.
+        
+        Args:
+            addr: Address to check
+            
+        Returns:
+            tuple: (is_valid, start_id, end_id) or (False, 0, 0)
+        """
+        # Check reserved field must be 0
+        reserved = ida_bytes.get_qword(addr + self.OFFSET_RESERVED)
+        if reserved != 0:
+            return (False, 0, 0)
+        
+        # Check first routine impl must be 0 (first entry is always NULL)
+        routine0_impl = ida_bytes.get_qword(addr + self.OFFSET_ROUTINES)
+        if routine0_impl != 0:
+            return (False, 0, 0)
+        
+        # Read subsystem ID range
+        start_id = ida_bytes.get_dword(addr + self.OFFSET_START)
+        end_id = ida_bytes.get_dword(addr + self.OFFSET_END)
+        
+        # Validate ID range
+        num_msgs = end_id - start_id
+        if start_id == 0 or num_msgs <= 0 or num_msgs >= 1024:
+            return (False, 0, 0)
+            
+        return (True, start_id, end_id)
+    
+    def label_subsystem(self, addr, start_id, end_id):
+        """
+        Label MIG subsystem structure and its routine handlers.
+        
+        Args:
+            addr: Address of subsystem structure
+            start_id: Starting message ID
+            end_id: Ending message ID
+        """
+        num_msgs = end_id - start_id
+        subsys_name = f"MIG_subsystem_{start_id}"
+        
+        print(f"[+] Found {subsys_name} at {hex(addr)}")
+        print(f"    Message range: {start_id} - {end_id} ({num_msgs} handlers)")
+        
+        # Label the subsystem structure
+        ida_name.set_name(addr, subsys_name, ida_name.SN_NOWARN | ida_name.SN_NOCHECK)
+        idc.set_cmt(addr, f"MIG Subsystem {start_id}-{end_id}", 0)
+        
+        # Process each routine in the subsystem
+        array_base = addr + self.OFFSET_ROUTINES
+        labeled_count = 0
+        
+        for i in range(num_msgs):
+            routine_addr = array_base + (i * self.ROUTINE_SIZE)
+            stub_ptr_addr = routine_addr + self.ROUTINE_STUB_OFFSET
+            stub_func_ea = ida_bytes.get_qword(stub_ptr_addr)
+            msg_id = start_id + i
+            
+            # Skip NULL entries
+            if stub_func_ea == 0 or stub_func_ea == 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF:
+                continue
+            
+            # Verify pointer points to valid code segment
+            if not ida_segment.getseg(stub_func_ea):
+                continue
+            
+            # Create descriptive name for message handler
+            handler_name = f"MIG_msg_{msg_id}_handler"
+            
+            # Label the handler function
+            if ida_name.set_name(stub_func_ea, handler_name, ida_name.SN_NOWARN):
+                labeled_count += 1
+                
+                # Make sure it's treated as a function
+                if not ida_funcs.get_func(stub_func_ea):
+                    ida_funcs.add_func(stub_func_ea)
+                
+                # Add comment at pointer location
+                idc.set_cmt(stub_ptr_addr, f"Handler for MIG message {msg_id}", 0)
+        
+        print(f"    Labeled {labeled_count}/{num_msgs} handlers")
+        self.total_messages += labeled_count
+        self.found_count += 1
+    
+    def scan_segment(self, seg_ea):
+        """
+        Scan a single segment for MIG subsystems.
+        
+        Args:
+            seg_ea: Segment address
+        """
+        seg_name = idc.get_segm_name(seg_ea)
+        start = idc.get_segm_start(seg_ea)
+        end = idc.get_segm_end(seg_ea)
+        
+        # Leave safety buffer for structure reads
+        scan_end = end - self.ROUTINE_SIZE
+        
+        print(f"\n[*] Scanning {seg_name} ({hex(start)} - {hex(end)})")
+        
+        # Scan with 8-byte alignment (pointer size on arm64)
+        for addr in range(start, scan_end, 8):
+            is_valid, start_id, end_id = self.is_valid_subsystem(addr)
+            
+            if is_valid:
+                self.label_subsystem(addr, start_id, end_id)
+    
+    def scan(self):
+        """Main scanning routine - iterate all relevant segments."""
+        print("=" * 70)
+        print("MIG Subsystem Scanner for IDA Pro")
+        print("=" * 70)
+        
+        # Find and scan target segments
+        scanned_segments = 0
+        for seg_ea in idautils.Segments():
+            seg_name = idc.get_segm_name(seg_ea)
+            
+            if any(target in seg_name for target in self.TARGET_SEGMENTS):
+                self.scan_segment(seg_ea)
+                scanned_segments += 1
+        
+        # Print summary
+        print("\n" + "=" * 70)
+        print(f"Scan Complete!")
+        print(f"  Segments scanned: {scanned_segments}")
+        print(f"  Subsystems found: {self.found_count}")
+        print(f"  Message handlers labeled: {self.total_messages}")
+        print("=" * 70)
+
+
+def main():
+    """Entry point for the script."""
+    scanner = MIGSubsystemScanner()
+    scanner.scan()
+    
+    # Refresh IDA views to show new names
+    idaapi.refresh_idaview_anyway()
+    print("\n[*] IDA views refreshed. Check Functions window for MIG_msg_* handlers")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()