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94 lines
3.8 KiB
Markdown
94 lines
3.8 KiB
Markdown
# AppleSystemSpoofing-C2 — Technical Threat Report
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**Report Type:** Technical Threat Report
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**Date:** August 20, 2025
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**Prepared By:** Joseph Goydish II
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---
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## Executive Summary
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This report details the identification of a suspected command-and-control (C2) infrastructure leveraging iOS system services and Apple framework spoofing. The observed activity demonstrates stealthy post-exploitation behavior consistent with advanced threat actors or offensive security tooling. Techniques include obfuscated network indicators, spoofed bundle identifiers, TLS-based encrypted communications, and low-noise persistence.
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Artifacts such as crash logs, spindumps, memory artifacts, and spoofed process identifiers suggest deep system interference and possible kernel-level manipulation.
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---
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## Key Findings
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### 1. Network Observables
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- C2 traffic over TLS 1.3 (port 443)
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- Use of obfuscated hostnames such as `Hostname#5f52027b`
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- Spoofed Apple system Bundle IDs during connection attempts, including:
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- `com.apple.mobileassetd.client.axassetsd`
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- `com.apple.mobileassetd.client.assistantd`
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- `com.apple.mobileassetd.client.geoanalyticsd`
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- Repeated resolver failures and child endpoint creation logs (e.g., `nw_endpoint_resolver_start_next_child`)
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### 2. Process and Memory Artifacts
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- Spoofed process spawning involving `SpringBoard`, `PhotosPosterProvider`, `MediaRemoteUI`
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- Memory maps show corruption and in-memory binaries operating without standard `dyld` linkage (indicative of reflective loading)
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- `taskinfo.txt`, `brctl-dump.txt`, and `netstat.txt` reveal transient socket activity and ephemeral port usage
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- `spindump-nosymbols.txt` shows execution patterns that lack symbol resolution, reinforcing memory-resident behavior
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### 3. Accessory and Bluetooth Key Tampering
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- Automated key rotation observed for multiple accessory UUIDs:
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- `E585147E-A9E5-48E6-9A5B-B63840F84743`
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- `D12CD160-7847-4607-8438-7B445DA74449`
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- `3B894DAD-15FB-4D95-AC77-99AB7F603057`
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- Suspicious pairing ID: `3749A99D-69ED-49FE-9108-AD1AD88DCE0C`
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- Observed public/private key hashes:
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- Public Key: `H<ffcd6a>`
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- Private Key: `H<7aaae3>`
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- Proximity pairing logs show encrypted key exchange using masked hashes:
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- `8lCb6kRxZ/Z/AADqtlRxXg==` → `CVGbgVaXKqQnMA/ht1M/pw==`
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---
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## TTP Mapping
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Behaviors observed are consistent with:
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- Use of native Apple APIs to blend with system components
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- Low-bandwidth, encrypted beaconing via TLS
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- Bundle ID spoofing for access evasion and persistence
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- In-memory binary injection or reflective execution
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- Key rotation in trusted frameworks (HomeKit, Bluetooth)
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Overlap exists with capabilities from:
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- Red team toolkits with iOS support
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- Commercial surveillance frameworks
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- APT-level post-exploitation techniques
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Attribution is not assigned due to shared techniques and lack of unique malware family signatures.
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---
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## Recommendations
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- Conduct full memory forensics on affected endpoints
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- Deploy DNS logging and retro-hunt for `Hostname#5f52027b` or related artifacts
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- Monitor for unauthorized Bundle ID use matching the spoofed format
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- Detonate any suspicious mobileassetd variants in a sandboxed testbed
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- Share infrastructure data with trusted partners for external enrichment
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---
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## IOCs
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| Type | Value |
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|----------------|--------------------------------------------|
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| Host | Hostname#5f52027b |
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| Bundle IDs | com.apple.mobileassetd.client.axassetsd, com.apple.mobileassetd.client.assistantd, com.apple.mobileassetd.client.geoanalyticsd |
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| Accessory UUIDs| E585147E-A9E5-48E6-9A5B-B63840F84743, etc. |
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| Pairing ID | 3749A99D-69ED-49FE-9108-AD1AD88DCE0C |
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| Public Key Hash| H<ffcd6a> |
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| Private Key Hash| H<7aaae3> |
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| Masked Keys | 8lCb6kRxZ/Z/AADqtlRxXg==, CVGbgVaXKqQnMA/ht1M/pw== |
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---
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