Files
ctrld/cmd/cli/firewall.go
T
2026-07-08 15:31:54 +07:00

312 lines
9.8 KiB
Go

package cli
import (
"context"
"net"
"net/netip"
"net/url"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/kardianos/service"
"github.com/miekg/dns"
"github.com/Control-D-Inc/ctrld/internal/firewall"
)
// firewallModeEnabled reports whether firewall mode is active for this prog instance.
func (p *prog) firewallModeEnabled() bool {
return p.allowList != nil
}
// initFirewallAllowList populates the permanent allowlist entries and starts the
// background reaper. Called once during prog.run() when firewall_mode is "on".
//
// Permanent entries include:
// - Loopback (127.0.0.0/8, ::1)
// - RFC1918 private ranges (configurable — enabled by default)
// - Link-local (169.254.0.0/16, fe80::/10)
// - CGNAT range (100.64.0.0/10) — used by Tailscale, carrier NAT
// - ctrld listener IPs
// - DoH/DoT/DoQ upstream resolver IPs
// - ControlD API endpoint IPs
func (p *prog) initFirewallAllowList(ctx context.Context) {
al := p.allowList
// Loopback.
al.AddPermanentPrefix(netip.MustParsePrefix("127.0.0.0/8"))
al.AddPermanent(netip.MustParseAddr("::1"))
// RFC1918 private ranges — needed for LAN access, printers, NAS, etc.
al.AddPermanentPrefix(netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8"))
al.AddPermanentPrefix(netip.MustParsePrefix("172.16.0.0/12"))
al.AddPermanentPrefix(netip.MustParsePrefix("192.168.0.0/16"))
// Link-local.
al.AddPermanentPrefix(netip.MustParsePrefix("169.254.0.0/16"))
al.AddPermanentPrefix(netip.MustParsePrefix("fe80::/10"))
// CGNAT range — used by Tailscale (100.x.x.x), carrier-grade NAT, etc.
al.AddPermanentPrefix(netip.MustParsePrefix("100.64.0.0/10"))
// Multicast.
al.AddPermanentPrefix(netip.MustParsePrefix("224.0.0.0/4"))
al.AddPermanentPrefix(netip.MustParsePrefix("ff00::/8"))
// ctrld listener IPs — traffic to ourselves must always be allowed.
for _, lc := range p.cfg.Listener {
if ip, err := netip.ParseAddr(lc.IP); err == nil {
al.AddPermanent(ip)
}
}
// Upstream resolver IPs — ctrld needs to reach its upstreams.
p.addUpstreamIPsToPermanent(al)
// Platform-specific enforcement (pf on macOS, WFP on Windows) is initialized
// from postRun() after startDNSIntercept() has prepared dnsInterceptState.
p.Info().Msgf("Firewall allowlist initialized with %d permanent entries",
al.Stats().PermanentIPs)
}
// syncFirewallMode applies the current firewall_mode setting for this run.
// Reloads create a new run-scoped context, so background firewall workers must
// be restarted each run even when the allowlist object is reused.
func (p *prog) syncFirewallMode(ctx context.Context) {
if p.cfg.Service.FirewallMode != "on" {
if p.allowList != nil || p.platformFirewallState != nil {
p.Info().Msg("Firewall mode disabled: removing platform enforcement and clearing allowlist")
}
if p.allowList != nil {
p.allowList.SetOnChange(nil)
p.allowList.SetOnBatchChange(nil)
p.allowList = nil
}
if p.platformFirewallState != nil {
p.shutdownPlatformFirewall()
p.platformFirewallState = nil
}
return
}
if p.allowList == nil {
p.allowList = firewall.New()
p.initFirewallAllowList(ctx)
if service.Interactive() {
p.Warn().Msg("Firewall mode has no effect in interactive mode; run ctrld as a service for enforcement")
} else {
p.Info().Msg("Firewall mode enabled: only DNS-resolved IPs will be allowed")
}
} else {
p.addUpstreamIPsToPermanent(p.allowList)
}
// The run context is canceled on each reload. Restart the reaper/stats
// workers for this run so reused allowlists keep expiring entries.
p.allowList.StartReaper(ctx)
go p.logFirewallStats(ctx)
// On reload, postRun() is not called, so initialize platform enforcement here
// if intercept state already exists. Initial startup still defers to postRun()
// because DNS intercept state is prepared there.
if p.dnsInterceptState != nil && p.platformFirewallState == nil {
p.initPlatformFirewall()
}
}
// addUpstreamIPsToPermanent resolves upstream endpoint hostnames and adds their
// IPs to the permanent allowlist. Called at startup and on config reload.
func (p *prog) addUpstreamIPsToPermanent(al *firewall.AllowList) {
for _, uc := range p.cfg.Upstream {
if uc == nil || uc.Endpoint == "" {
continue
}
// Extract host from the endpoint URL.
host := extractHostFromEndpoint(uc.Endpoint)
if host == "" {
continue
}
// If it's already an IP, add directly.
if ip, err := netip.ParseAddr(host); err == nil {
al.AddPermanent(ip)
p.Debug().Msgf("Firewall: added upstream IP %s to permanent allowlist", ip)
continue
}
// Resolve hostname to IPs.
ips, err := net.LookupHost(host)
if err != nil {
p.Warn().Err(err).Msgf("Firewall: could not resolve upstream host %s", host)
continue
}
for _, ipStr := range ips {
if ip, err := netip.ParseAddr(ipStr); err == nil {
al.AddPermanent(ip)
p.Debug().Msgf("Firewall: added upstream IP %s (%s) to permanent allowlist", ip, host)
}
}
}
}
// extractHostFromEndpoint extracts the hostname or IP from a DoH/DoT/DoQ endpoint URL.
// Handles formats like:
// - "https://dns.controld.com/abcdef"
// - "tls://dns.controld.com"
// - "quic://dns.controld.com:784"
// - "1.2.3.4:53"
// - "sdns://..." (DNS stamps — host is encoded inside, skip)
func extractHostFromEndpoint(endpoint string) string {
// DNS stamps encode the server info in base64 — we can't extract the host
// without decoding. The upstream IPs will be resolved by the sdns upstream
// initialization path at runtime.
if strings.HasPrefix(endpoint, "sdns://") {
return ""
}
// Try parsing as URL first (covers https://, tls://, quic://).
if host := extractHostFromURL(endpoint); host != "" {
return host
}
// Try as host:port.
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(endpoint)
if err == nil {
return host
}
// Try as bare IP.
if _, err := netip.ParseAddr(endpoint); err == nil {
return endpoint
}
return ""
}
// extractHostFromURL extracts the host from a URL string.
func extractHostFromURL(s string) string {
u, err := url.Parse(s)
if err != nil || u.Scheme == "" || u.Host == "" {
return ""
}
return u.Hostname()
}
// firewallRecordResolvedIPs extracts A and AAAA records from a DNS response
// and adds them to the firewall allowlist. Called from postProcessStandardQuery()
// after a successful DNS resolution.
//
// This is the primary feed for the allowlist — every IP that ctrld resolves
// gets added here, making it allowed for outbound connections.
func (p *prog) firewallRecordResolvedIPs(answer *dns.Msg, domain string) {
if p.allowList == nil || answer == nil {
return
}
// Only record IPs from successful responses.
if answer.Rcode != dns.RcodeSuccess {
return
}
for _, rr := range answer.Answer {
switch r := rr.(type) {
case *dns.A:
if ip, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(r.A); ok {
ttl := time.Duration(r.Hdr.Ttl) * time.Second
if ttl < 30*time.Second {
// Enforce minimum TTL to prevent constant churn for very short TTLs.
ttl = 30 * time.Second
}
p.allowList.Add(ip, domain, ttl)
}
case *dns.AAAA:
if ip, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(r.AAAA); ok {
ttl := time.Duration(r.Hdr.Ttl) * time.Second
if ttl < 30*time.Second {
ttl = 30 * time.Second
}
p.allowList.Add(ip, domain, ttl)
}
case *dns.CNAME:
// For CNAME chains: the final A/AAAA records will be caught above.
// We don't need to do anything special for the CNAME itself, but we
// log it for debugging CNAME chain issues.
p.Debug().Msgf("Firewall: CNAME %s → %s (IPs from target will be allowlisted)", domain, r.Target)
}
}
}
// firewallOnConfigReload is called when apiConfigReload() detects a config change.
// It flushes the entire allowlist so that DNS queries against the new policy
// repopulate it with the correct set of allowed IPs.
//
// This is the simple approach (vs. selective re-resolution per domain).
// The tradeoff is a brief window where connections may fail until DNS cache
// repopulates. Apps that reconnect directly to a previously resolved IP without
// making a fresh DNS query can remain blocked longer; this is an explicit v1
// limitation to call out in release notes and app-compatibility testing.
func (p *prog) firewallOnConfigReload() {
if p.allowList == nil {
return
}
stats := p.allowList.Stats()
p.Info().Msgf("Firewall: config reload detected, flushing allowlist (%d IPs, %d domains)",
stats.AllowedIPs, stats.TrackedDomains)
// Flush platform-specific state first (pf table / WFP filters),
// then flush the allowlist. The AllowList's batch callbacks will
// also fire, but the platform flush handles the bulk operation more
// efficiently than removing IPs one-by-one.
p.firewallFlushPlatform()
p.allowList.Flush()
}
// firewallOnNetworkChange is called when monitorNetworkChanges() detects a major
// network transition (WiFi↔cellular, interface IP changes). Stale IPs from the
// old network may no longer be valid, so we flush and let DNS repopulate.
func (p *prog) firewallOnNetworkChange() {
if p.allowList == nil {
return
}
stats := p.allowList.Stats()
p.Info().Msgf("Firewall: network change detected, flushing allowlist (%d IPs, %d domains)",
stats.AllowedIPs, stats.TrackedDomains)
p.firewallFlushPlatform()
p.allowList.Flush()
}
// logFirewallStats logs allowlist metrics immediately, then every 5 minutes
// while firewall mode is active.
func (p *prog) logFirewallStats(ctx context.Context) {
if p.allowList == nil {
return
}
p.logFirewallStatsOnce()
ticker := time.NewTicker(5 * time.Minute)
defer ticker.Stop()
for {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case <-ticker.C:
p.logFirewallStatsOnce()
}
}
}
func (p *prog) logFirewallStatsOnce() {
if p.allowList == nil {
return
}
stats := p.allowList.Stats()
p.Info().
Int("allowed_ips", stats.AllowedIPs).
Int("permanent_ips", stats.PermanentIPs).
Int("tracked_domains", stats.TrackedDomains).
Int64("total_hits", stats.TotalHits).
Int64("total_misses", stats.TotalMisses).
Msg("Firewall allowlist stats")
}