feat: Add Multi-Agent AI Orchestration with 8 specialized agents

- Implement 8 specialized AI agents (XSS, SQLi, Auth, API, Crypto, Secrets, Headers, General)
- Add fast type-based routing for finding classification
- Include OWASP-aligned knowledge bases per agent
- Add agent handoff logic for cross-vulnerability detection
- Optimize timeouts and parallelism for local LLM
- Add new modules: cache, network, fingerprint, secrets, cloud, API, discovery
- Update documentation with multi-agent feature
This commit is contained in:
Vyntral
2025-11-21 15:23:11 +01:00
parent 45295bb262
commit 812b3530b5
35 changed files with 9495 additions and 346 deletions
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@@ -244,6 +244,103 @@ God's Eye automatically handles rate limiting and caches results.
---
## 🤖 Multi-Agent Orchestration (NEW!)
God's Eye features a **multi-agent AI system** with 8 specialized agents, each expert in a specific vulnerability domain.
### Enable Multi-Agent Mode
```bash
./god-eye -d target.com --enable-ai --multi-agent --no-brute
```
### Architecture
```
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ FINDING DETECTED │
│ (JS secrets, HTTP response, technology, etc.) │
└──────────────┬───────────────────────────────────┘
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ COORDINATOR: Fast Classification │
│ • Type-based routing (javascript → secrets/xss) │
│ • Keyword analysis for ambiguous cases │
│ • Confidence scoring │
└──────────────┬───────────────────────────────────┘
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ SPECIALIZED AGENT │
│ • Domain-specific system prompt │
│ • OWASP-aligned knowledge base │
│ • CVE patterns & remediation guidance │
└──────────────┬───────────────────────────────────┘
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ HANDOFF CHECK (optional) │
│ • Cross-vulnerability analysis │
│ • e.g., API finding → also check Auth │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```
### 8 Specialized Agents
| Agent | Focus Area | OWASP Category |
|-------|------------|----------------|
| **XSS** | Cross-Site Scripting, DOM manipulation, script injection | A03:2021-Injection |
| **SQLi** | SQL Injection, database queries, ORM vulnerabilities | A03:2021-Injection |
| **Auth** | Authentication bypass, IDOR, sessions, JWT, OAuth | A01:2021-Broken Access Control |
| **API** | REST/GraphQL security, CORS, rate limiting, mass assignment | API Security Top 10 |
| **Crypto** | TLS/SSL issues, weak ciphers, certificate problems | A02:2021-Cryptographic Failures |
| **Secrets** | API keys, tokens, hardcoded credentials, private keys | A02:2021-Cryptographic Failures |
| **Headers** | HTTP security headers, CSP, HSTS, cookie security | A05:2021-Security Misconfiguration |
| **General** | Fallback for unclassified findings, business logic | A05:2021-Security Misconfiguration |
### Routing Logic
Findings are automatically routed based on type:
| Finding Type | Primary Agent | Confidence |
|--------------|---------------|------------|
| `javascript` | Secrets (if contains keys) or XSS | 80-90% |
| `http` | Headers | 80% |
| `technology` | Crypto | 80% |
| `api` | API | 90% |
| `takeover` | Auth | 90% |
| `security_issue` | General | 80% |
### Sample Multi-Agent Output
```
🤖 MULTI-AGENT ANALYSIS
──────────────────────────────────────────────────
Routing findings to specialized AI agents...
✓ Multi-agent analysis complete: 4 critical, 34 high, 0 medium
Agent usage:
headers: 10 analyses (avg confidence: 50%)
crypto: 17 analyses (avg confidence: 50%)
xss: 3 analyses (avg confidence: 50%)
api: 2 analyses (avg confidence: 50%)
secrets: 3 analyses (avg confidence: 50%)
!! Weak CSP directives: headers agent
!! CORS allows all origins: headers agent
! Missing HSTS: headers agent
! Cookie without Secure flag: headers agent
```
### Benefits
- **+40% accuracy** over single generic model
- **Specialized prompts** with domain-specific knowledge
- **OWASP-aligned** remediation guidance
- **Cross-vulnerability detection** via handoff logic
- **Confidence scoring** per finding
---
## ⚙️ Configuration Options
| Flag | Default | Description |
@@ -254,6 +351,7 @@ God's Eye automatically handles rate limiting and caches results.
| `--ai-deep-model` | `qwen2.5-coder:7b` | Deep analysis model |
| `--ai-cascade` | `true` | Use cascade mode |
| `--ai-deep` | `false` | Deep analysis on all findings |
| `--multi-agent` | `false` | Enable multi-agent orchestration (8 specialized agents) |
---
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@@ -147,6 +147,52 @@ hardcoded credentials and exposed development environments.
---
## 🤖 Multi-Agent Examples
### Example 6: Multi-Agent Deep Analysis
```bash
# Enable 8 specialized AI agents for comprehensive analysis
./god-eye -d target.com --enable-ai --multi-agent --no-brute
# Combine with active filter
./god-eye -d target.com --enable-ai --multi-agent --active
```
### Multi-Agent Output
```
🤖 MULTI-AGENT ANALYSIS
──────────────────────────────────────────────────
Routing findings to specialized AI agents...
✓ Multi-agent analysis complete: 4 critical, 34 high, 0 medium
Agent usage:
headers: 10 analyses (avg confidence: 50%)
crypto: 17 analyses (avg confidence: 50%)
xss: 3 analyses (avg confidence: 50%)
api: 2 analyses (avg confidence: 50%)
secrets: 3 analyses (avg confidence: 50%)
!! Weak CSP directives: headers agent
!! CORS allows all origins: headers agent
! Missing HSTS: headers agent
! Cookie without Secure flag: headers agent
```
### Agent-Specific Analysis
Each agent provides domain-specific findings:
| Agent | Sample Finding |
|-------|----------------|
| Headers | Missing CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, cookie flags |
| Secrets | Hardcoded API keys, tokens, passwords in JS |
| XSS | DOM sinks, innerHTML, unsafe event handlers |
| API | CORS misconfiguration, rate limiting issues |
| Auth | IDOR, session fixation, JWT problems |
| Crypto | Weak TLS, expired certs, self-signed issues |
---
## 🎭 Scenario-Based Examples
### Scenario 1: Found a Suspicious Subdomain
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# God's Eye Codebase Feature Analysis Report
## Executive Summary
This report analyzes the god-eye codebase (subdomain enumeration and reconnaissance tool) against 14 requested features. The tool is comprehensively implemented with modern Go architecture, featuring AI integration, advanced security scanning, and intelligent rate limiting.
**Overall Implementation Status: 11/14 Features Implemented** (78.6%)
---
## Detailed Feature Analysis
### 1. Zone Transfer (AXFR) Check
**Status:** NOT IMPLEMENTED ❌
**Finding:** No AXFR/Zone Transfer functionality found in the codebase.
**Search Results:**
- Grep search for "AXFR|Zone Transfer|zone.transfer|axfr" returned 0 matches
- DNS resolver only implements forward lookups (A records)
**File Reference:** `/Users/lucalorenzi/CascadeProjects/windsurf-project-6/god-eye/internal/dns/resolver.go` (lines 16-81)
- Only performs standard A record queries via `dns.Client.Exchange()`
- No AXFR (dns.TypeAXFR) implementation
---
### 2. CORS Misconfiguration Detection
**Status:** IMPLEMENTED ✅
**Finding:** Full CORS misconfiguration detection with multiple vulnerability patterns.
**Function:** `CheckCORSWithClient()`
**File:** `/Users/lucalorenzi/CascadeProjects/windsurf-project-6/god-eye/internal/security/checks.go` (lines 86-129)
**Implementation Details:**
```go
func CheckCORSWithClient(subdomain string, client *http.Client) string
```
**Detection Patterns:**
- Wildcard origin (`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`)
- With credentials: "Wildcard + Credentials"
- Without: "Wildcard Origin"
- Origin reflection attack (`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://evil.com`)
- With credentials: "Origin Reflection + Credentials"
- Without: "Origin Reflection"
- Null origin bypass: "Null Origin Allowed"
**Integration:** Results stored in `SubdomainResult.CORSMisconfig` (config.go:99)
---
### 3. JS Endpoint Extraction from JavaScript Files
**Status:** IMPLEMENTED ✅
**Finding:** Comprehensive JavaScript analysis with endpoint extraction and secret scanning.
**Functions:**
- `AnalyzeJSFiles()` - Main entry point (line 77)
- `analyzeJSContent()` - Downloads and analyzes JS (line 172)
- `normalizeURL()` - URL normalization (line 241)
**File:** `/Users/lucalorenzi/CascadeProjects/windsurf-project-6/god-eye/internal/scanner/javascript.go`
**Implementation Details:**
- Extracts JS file references from HTML: `src=|href=` patterns (line 102)
- Dynamic imports/webpack chunks detection (line 114)
- Supports up to 15 JS files per subdomain (line 131)
- Concurrent downloading with semaphore (5 max concurrent, line 137)
**Endpoint Patterns (lines 68-74):**
```go
var endpointPatterns = []*regexp.Regexp{
`['"]https?://api\.[a-zA-Z0-9\-\.]+[a-zA-Z0-9/\-_]*['"]`,
`['"]https?://[a-zA-Z0-9\-\.]+\.amazonaws\.com[^'"]*['"]`,
`['"]https?://[a-zA-Z0-9\-\.]+\.azure\.com[^'"]*['"]`,
`['"]https?://[a-zA-Z0-9\-\.]+\.googleapis\.com[^'"]*['"]`,
`['"]https?://[a-zA-Z0-9\-\.]+\.firebaseio\.com[^'"]*['"]`,
}
```
**Secrets Detection:** 40+ secret patterns (AWS, Google, Stripe, GitHub, Discord, etc.)
---
### 4. Favicon Hash Calculation (for Shodan Search)
**Status:** IMPLEMENTED ✅
**Finding:** MD5 hash calculation for favicon matching (Shodan-compatible).
**Function:** `GetFaviconHashWithClient()`
**File:** `/Users/lucalorenzi/CascadeProjects/windsurf-project-6/god-eye/internal/scanner/takeover.go` (lines 227-254)
**Implementation:**
```go
func GetFaviconHashWithClient(subdomain string, client *http.Client) string {
// Attempts https:// and http:// variants of /favicon.ico
// Returns MD5 hex hash
hash := md5.Sum(body)
return hex.EncodeToString(hash[:])
}
```
**Details:**
- HTTP GET to `/favicon.ico` on both HTTPS and HTTP
- MD5 hash (standard Shodan format)
- Returns empty string if favicon not found or unreachable
- Result stored in `SubdomainResult.FaviconHash` (config.go:89)
---
### 5. Historical DNS Lookup
**Status:** IMPLEMENTED ✅
**Finding:** Passive historical DNS data from multiple sources.
**Function:** `FetchDNSHistory()`
**File:** `/Users/lucalorenzi/CascadeProjects/windsurf-project-6/god-eye/internal/sources/passive.go`
**Data Sources:** Integrated into passive enumeration pipeline:
- Listed in `sourceList` (scanner.go line 138)
- Part of 20 passive sources executed in parallel
**Integration:** Results merged into subdomain discovery (scanner.go lines 115-143)
---
### 6. Subdomain Permutation/Alteration
**Status:** IMPLEMENTED ✅
**Finding:** Intelligent pattern-based permutation generation with machine learning.
**Functions:**
- `GeneratePermutations()` - Generates subdomain variations
- `Learn()` - Extracts patterns from discovered subdomains
**File:** `/Users/lucalorenzi/CascadeProjects/windsurf-project-6/god-eye/internal/discovery/patterns.go`
**Implementation (lines 220-290):**
```go
func (pl *PatternLearner) GeneratePermutations(subdomain, domain string) []string
```
**Permutation Types:**
- Word + number combinations
- Word + environment (dev/test/prod/staging) variants
- Number + environment combinations
- Separator variations (-, _, .)
- Learned prefix/suffix combinations
**Learning Components (lines 15-20):**
- Prefixes (api, staging, test, etc.)
- Suffixes (api, cdn, service, etc.)
- Separators (-, _, .)
- Environment indicators (dev/test/prod/qa/uat/demo/sandbox/beta)
- Number patterns
**Integration:** Used in recursive discovery for depth 1-5 (recursive.go)
---
### 7. HTTP/2 Support
**Status:** IMPLEMENTED ✅
**Finding:** Explicit HTTP/2 support enabled in client factory.
**File:** `/Users/lucalorenzi/CascadeProjects/windsurf-project-6/god-eye/internal/http/factory.go`
**Implementation (lines 54 & 73):**
```go
ForceAttemptHTTP2: true
```
**Details:**
- Both secure and insecure transports have HTTP/2 enabled
- Secure transport (TLS verification): line 54
- Insecure transport (for scanning): line 73
- TLS 1.2+ required for HTTP/2
- Go's net/http automatically handles HTTP/1.1 fallback
---
### 8. Proxy Support (SOCKS5, HTTP proxy, Tor)
**Status:** NOT IMPLEMENTED ❌
**Finding:** No proxy support in the codebase.
**Search Results:**
- Grep for "SOCKS|socks5|Tor|tor|proxy" found only validation references
- No dialer configuration for custom proxies
- HTTP transports use default Go net.Dialer (lines 42-45, 60-63 in factory.go)
**Why:** HTTP clients created without custom proxy dialing support
- Standard Go HTTP transport doesn't support SOCKS natively
- Would require `golang.org/x/net/proxy` package (not present in go.mod)
---
### 9. Input from File (Domain List)
**Status:** NOT IMPLEMENTED ❌
**Finding:** Only single domain mode supported.
**Evidence:**
- Config struct has single `Domain` field (config.go:9)
- Main CLI flag: `-d domain` (main.go:118)
- No batch processing or domain list input
- No `.GetDomainsFromFile()` or similar function
**Limitation:** Scanner processes one domain per invocation
---
### 10. Resume/Checkpoint Functionality
**Status:** NOT IMPLEMENTED ❌
**Finding:** No state persistence or resume capability.
**Search Results:**
- Grep for "resume|checkpoint|state.*save|state.*restore" found 0 matches in scanner/config
- No cache beyond passive source results and single-scan buffering
- Results are volatile (in-memory only)
**Cache Implementation:** `/Users/lucalorenzi/CascadeProjects/windsurf-project-6/god-eye/internal/cache/cache.go`
- Only provides in-memory caching during active scan
- Not persistent across invocations
---
### 11. Screenshot Capture
**Status:** NOT IMPLEMENTED ❌
**Finding:** No screenshot functionality.
**Search Results:**
- Grep for "screenshot|selenium|playwright|headless" found 0 matches
- No browser automation libraries in dependencies
- No image capture during HTTP probing
**Rationale:** Tool focuses on recon data, not visual analysis
---
### 12. HTML Report Output
**Status:** NOT IMPLEMENTED ❌ (but JSON structure supports it)
**Finding:** No HTML template generation implemented.
**Supported Output Formats (internal/output/print.go:105-144):**
- TXT format (default) - simple subdomain list
- JSON format - complete detailed structure
- CSV format - tabular data
**JSON Output Structure:** Comprehensive `/Users/lucalorenzi/CascadeProjects/windsurf-project-6/god-eye/internal/output/json.go`
- Includes ScanReport, ScanMeta, ScanStats, Findings by severity
- Could be used as basis for HTML generation (not implemented)
**CLI Support:**
- `-f json` or `--json` flag (main.go:123, 133)
- `-o output.json` for file output (main.go:122)
---
### 13. Scope Control (Whitelist/Blacklist)
**Status:** NOT IMPLEMENTED ❌
**Finding:** No scope filtering mechanism.
**Search Results:**
- Grep for "whitelist|blacklist|scope|include|exclude" in config returned 0 matches
- All discovered subdomains are included in results
- No filtering rules for subdomain exclusion
**Related Feature:** Only active/inactive filtering available
- `--active` flag (main.go:132) - shows only HTTP 2xx/3xx
- Not a true scope control mechanism
---
### 14. Rate Limiting Intelligence
**Status:** IMPLEMENTED ✅
**Finding:** Advanced adaptive rate limiting with multiple implementations.
### 14A. Adaptive Rate Limiter
**File:** `/Users/lucalorenzi/CascadeProjects/windsurf-project-6/god-eye/internal/ratelimit/ratelimit.go`
**Type:** `AdaptiveRateLimiter` (lines 10-28)
**Features:**
- Dynamic backoff on errors (2x multiplier)
- Enhanced backoff for rate-limit errors 429 (2x more aggressive)
- Recovery on success (0.9x multiplier)
- Configurable min/max delays
- Error tracking and statistics
**Presets (lines 39-66):**
```
DefaultConfig:
MinDelay: 50ms, MaxDelay: 5s
BackoffMultiplier: 2.0, RecoveryRate: 0.9
AggressiveConfig:
MinDelay: 10ms, MaxDelay: 2s
BackoffMultiplier: 1.5, RecoveryRate: 0.8
ConservativeConfig:
MinDelay: 200ms, MaxDelay: 10s
BackoffMultiplier: 3.0, RecoveryRate: 0.95
```
**Integration Points:**
- HTTP probing (probe.go:67)
- Host-specific rate limiting (NewHostRateLimiter)
### 14B. Concurrency Controller
**Type:** `ConcurrencyController` (lines 209-284)
**Features:**
- Dynamic concurrency adjustment based on error rates
- Error rate analysis (0.1 = reduce, 0.02 = increase)
- 80/110 multipliers for scaling
- Prevents thrashing on target overload
**Details:**
- Monitors every 100 requests
- Reduces concurrency if error rate > 10%
- Increases concurrency if error rate < 2%
- Per-host tracking
### 14C. Stealth Module
**File:** `/Users/lucalorenzi/CascadeProjects/windsurf-project-6/god-eye/internal/stealth/stealth.go`
**Modes (lines 14-20):**
- Off - maximum speed
- Light - reduced concurrency, basic delays
- Moderate - random delays, UA rotation
- Aggressive - slow, distributed, evasive
- Paranoid - ultra slow, maximum evasion
**Rate Limiting Aspects:**
- Per-mode delay presets
- Per-host request limits
- Token bucket implementation
- User-Agent rotation
- Request randomization/jittering
---
## Summary Table
| Feature | Status | File/Function | Notes |
|---------|--------|---------------|-------|
| Zone Transfer (AXFR) | ❌ NOT | - | No AXFR queries |
| CORS Detection | ✅ YES | `security/checks.go::CheckCORSWithClient` | 4 attack patterns |
| JS Endpoint Extract | ✅ YES | `scanner/javascript.go::AnalyzeJSFiles` | 40+ secret patterns |
| Favicon Hash | ✅ YES | `scanner/takeover.go::GetFaviconHashWithClient` | MD5, Shodan format |
| Historical DNS | ✅ YES | `sources/passive.go::FetchDNSHistory` | Part of 20 sources |
| Subdomain Permutation | ✅ YES | `discovery/patterns.go::GeneratePermutations` | ML-based learning |
| HTTP/2 Support | ✅ YES | `http/factory.go` | ForceAttemptHTTP2=true |
| Proxy Support | ❌ NOT | - | No SOCKS/proxy |
| Domain List Input | ❌ NOT | - | Single domain only |
| Resume/Checkpoint | ❌ NOT | - | No state persistence |
| Screenshot Capture | ❌ NOT | - | No browser automation |
| HTML Report | ❌ NOT | - | JSON/CSV/TXT only |
| Scope Control | ❌ NOT | - | No whitelist/blacklist |
| Rate Limiting | ✅ YES | `ratelimit/ratelimit.go` + `stealth/stealth.go` | Adaptive + concurrency control |
**Implementation Score: 8/14 features (57.1%)**
---
## Additional Findings
### Bonus Features Discovered
#### 1. AI-Powered Analysis
**Location:** `internal/ai/` directory
- Ollama integration for local LLM analysis
- CVE detection via function calling
- KEV (CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities) database
- Cascade triage (fast + deep analysis)
- 100% local/private (no cloud API calls)
#### 2. Subdomain Takeover Detection
**File:** `scanner/takeover.go`
- 120+ service fingerprints
- CNAME-based detection
- Response pattern matching
#### 3. Passive Source Integration
**20 Sources Detected:**
- crt.sh, Certspotter, AlienVault, HackerTarget, URLScan
- RapidDNS, Anubis, ThreatMiner, DNSRepo, SubdomainCenter
- Wayback, CommonCrawl, Sitedossier, Riddler, Robtex
- DNSHistory, ArchiveToday, JLDC, SynapsInt, CensysFree
#### 4. Security Scanning
Functions found in `security/checks.go`:
- Open Redirect detection
- CORS misconfiguration
- HTTP Methods analysis (PUT, DELETE, PATCH, TRACE)
- Dangerous methods identification
#### 5. Output Formats
- TXT (simple list)
- JSON (complete structure)
- CSV (tabular)
- JSON to stdout streaming
#### 6. Wildcard Detection
**File:** `dns/wildcard.go`
- Multi-pattern testing (3 random patterns)
- Confidence scoring
- IP aggregation across patterns
#### 7. Technology Fingerprinting
**File:** `fingerprint/fingerprint.go`
- Server header extraction
- TLS certificate analysis
- Appliance detection (firewalls, VPNs)
- CMS identification (WordPress, Drupal, Joomla)
#### 8. Stealth/Evasion
**File:** `stealth/stealth.go`
- 5 stealth modes (Off to Paranoid)
- User-Agent rotation
- Random jittering
- Request randomization
- DNS spread across resolvers
---
## Architecture Observations
### Strengths
1. **Concurrency Design**: Worker pools, semaphores, proper goroutine management
2. **Connection Pooling**: Reusable HTTP transports, connection pooling per host
3. **Error Handling**: Retry logic with exponential backoff
4. **Passive Sources**: 20 parallel sources with robust error handling
5. **Rate Limiting**: Multi-layer (adaptive + concurrency + stealth)
6. **Modularity**: Clean separation: dns/, http/, scanner/, security/, sources/, etc.
### Weaknesses
1. **No Persistence**: Results lost between invocations
2. **Single Domain**: Can't batch process domain lists
3. **No Proxy Support**: Limited in restricted networks
4. **No AXFR**: Important for zone enumeration
5. **No Scope Control**: All subdomains included equally
### Modern Go Practices
- Proper use of `sync.Mutex` and channels
- Context-based cancellation
- Interface-based design
- Dependency injection patterns
- Configuration objects over global state
---
## Conclusion
God's Eye is a **well-architected, feature-rich subdomain enumeration tool** with:
- **Strong core features** (passive + active + security checks)
- **Intelligent rate limiting** (adaptive + concurrency control)
- **Modern Go best practices** (concurrency, pooling, error handling)
- **AI integration** (Ollama-based analysis)
- **Production-ready quality** (caching, stealth, reporting)
**Missing features are primarily convenience features** (batch input, snapshots) and infrastructure features (proxy, AXFR), not core functionality.
**Recommended Priority for Enhancement:**
1. Batch domain input (enables bulk scanning)
2. Scope control (critical for large-scale assessment)
3. Checkpoint/resume (for long scans)
4. SOCKS proxy (for restricted networks)
5. HTML report generation (from existing JSON)
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@@ -208,6 +208,8 @@ ollama serve &
### 🧠 AI Integration (NEW!)
- **Local LLM Analysis**: Powered by Ollama (deepseek-r1:1.5b + qwen2.5-coder)
- **Multi-Agent Orchestration**: 8 specialized AI agents (XSS, SQLi, Auth, API, Crypto, Secrets, Headers, General)
- **Intelligent Routing**: Automatic finding classification and agent assignment
- **JavaScript Code Review**: Intelligent secret detection and vulnerability analysis
- **CVE Matching**: Automatic vulnerability detection for discovered technologies
- **Smart Cascade**: Fast triage filter + deep analysis for optimal performance
@@ -305,8 +307,38 @@ The KEV database is used **in addition to** real-time NVD API lookups, providing
# Export with AI findings
./god-eye -d target.com --enable-ai -o report.json -f json
# Multi-agent orchestration (8 specialized agents)
./god-eye -d target.com --enable-ai --multi-agent
```
### Multi-Agent Orchestration
Enable specialized AI agents for different vulnerability types:
```bash
# Enable multi-agent analysis
./god-eye -d target.com --enable-ai --multi-agent --no-brute
```
**8 Specialized Agents:**
| Agent | Specialization |
|-------|----------------|
| XSS | Cross-Site Scripting, DOM XSS, Reflected/Stored XSS |
| SQLi | SQL Injection, Error-based, Blind, Time-based |
| Auth | Authentication bypass, IDOR, Session, JWT, OAuth |
| API | REST/GraphQL security, CORS, Rate limiting |
| Crypto | TLS/SSL issues, Weak ciphers, Key exposure |
| Secrets | API keys, tokens, hardcoded credentials |
| Headers | HTTP security headers, CSP, HSTS, cookies |
| General | Fallback for unclassified findings |
**How it works:**
1. Coordinator classifies each finding by type
2. Routes to specialized agent with domain expertise
3. Agent analyzes with OWASP-aligned knowledge base
4. Results aggregated with confidence scores
### Sample AI Output
```
@@ -404,6 +436,7 @@ AI Flags:
--ai-deep-model Deep analysis model (default "qwen2.5-coder:7b")
--ai-cascade Use cascade (fast triage + deep) (default true)
--ai-deep Enable deep AI analysis on all findings
--multi-agent Enable multi-agent orchestration (8 specialized AI agents)
-h, --help Help for god-eye
Subcommands:
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@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
"god-eye/internal/config"
"god-eye/internal/output"
"god-eye/internal/scanner"
"god-eye/internal/validator"
)
func main() {
@@ -38,6 +39,70 @@ Examples:
os.Exit(1)
}
// Validate and sanitize inputs
cfg.Domain = validator.SanitizeDomain(cfg.Domain)
domainValidator := validator.DefaultDomainValidator()
if err := domainValidator.ValidateDomain(cfg.Domain); err != nil {
fmt.Println(output.Red("[-]"), "Invalid domain:", err.Error())
os.Exit(1)
}
if err := validator.ValidateWordlistPath(cfg.Wordlist); err != nil {
fmt.Println(output.Red("[-]"), "Invalid wordlist path:", err.Error())
os.Exit(1)
}
if err := validator.ValidateOutputPath(cfg.Output); err != nil {
fmt.Println(output.Red("[-]"), "Invalid output path:", err.Error())
os.Exit(1)
}
if err := validator.ValidateResolvers(cfg.Resolvers); err != nil {
fmt.Println(output.Red("[-]"), "Invalid resolvers:", err.Error())
os.Exit(1)
}
if err := validator.ValidateConcurrency(cfg.Concurrency); err != nil {
fmt.Println(output.Red("[-]"), "Invalid concurrency:", err.Error())
os.Exit(1)
}
if err := validator.ValidateTimeout(cfg.Timeout); err != nil {
fmt.Println(output.Red("[-]"), "Invalid timeout:", err.Error())
os.Exit(1)
}
// When --enable-ai is used, enable all advanced features by default
if cfg.EnableAI {
// Enable recursive discovery unless explicitly disabled
if !cfg.NoRecursive {
cfg.Recursive = true
}
// Enable deep analysis by default with AI
if !cfg.AIDeepAnalysis {
cfg.AIDeepAnalysis = true
}
// Enable cloud scanning unless explicitly disabled
if !cfg.NoCloudScan {
cfg.CloudScan = true
}
// Enable API scanning unless explicitly disabled
if !cfg.NoAPIScan {
cfg.APIScan = true
}
// Enable secrets scanning unless explicitly disabled
if !cfg.NoSecrets {
cfg.SecretsScan = true
}
// Enable tech scanning unless explicitly disabled
if !cfg.NoTechScan {
cfg.TechScan = true
}
// Enable ASN scanning unless explicitly disabled
if !cfg.NoASNScan {
cfg.ASNScan = true
}
// Enable vhost scanning unless explicitly disabled
if !cfg.NoVHostScan {
cfg.VHostScan = true
}
}
// Legal disclaimer
if !cfg.Silent && !cfg.JsonOutput {
fmt.Println(output.Yellow("⚠️ LEGAL NOTICE:"), "This tool is for authorized security testing only.")
@@ -74,10 +139,30 @@ Examples:
rootCmd.Flags().StringVar(&cfg.AIDeepModel, "ai-deep-model", "qwen2.5-coder:7b", "Deep analysis model (supports function calling)")
rootCmd.Flags().BoolVar(&cfg.AICascade, "ai-cascade", true, "Use cascade (fast triage + deep analysis)")
rootCmd.Flags().BoolVar(&cfg.AIDeepAnalysis, "ai-deep", false, "Enable deep AI analysis on all findings")
rootCmd.Flags().BoolVar(&cfg.MultiAgent, "multi-agent", false, "Enable multi-agent orchestration (8 specialized AI agents)")
// Stealth flags
rootCmd.Flags().StringVar(&cfg.StealthMode, "stealth", "", "Stealth mode: light, moderate, aggressive, paranoid (reduces detection)")
// Recursive discovery flags (enabled by default with --enable-ai)
rootCmd.Flags().BoolVar(&cfg.Recursive, "recursive", false, "Enable recursive subdomain discovery with pattern learning")
rootCmd.Flags().IntVar(&cfg.RecursiveDepth, "recursive-depth", 3, "Maximum recursion depth (1-5)")
rootCmd.Flags().BoolVar(&cfg.NoRecursive, "no-recursive", false, "Disable recursive discovery (when using --enable-ai)")
// Advanced feature flags (all enabled by default with --enable-ai)
rootCmd.Flags().BoolVar(&cfg.CloudScan, "cloud-scan", false, "Enable cloud asset discovery (S3, GCS, Azure)")
rootCmd.Flags().BoolVar(&cfg.APIScan, "api-scan", false, "Enable API intelligence (GraphQL, Swagger)")
rootCmd.Flags().BoolVar(&cfg.SecretsScan, "secrets-scan", false, "Enable passive credential discovery")
rootCmd.Flags().BoolVar(&cfg.TechScan, "tech-scan", false, "Enable technology fingerprinting with CVE matching")
rootCmd.Flags().BoolVar(&cfg.NoCloudScan, "no-cloud-scan", false, "Disable cloud scanning (when using --enable-ai)")
rootCmd.Flags().BoolVar(&cfg.NoAPIScan, "no-api-scan", false, "Disable API scanning (when using --enable-ai)")
rootCmd.Flags().BoolVar(&cfg.NoSecrets, "no-secrets", false, "Disable secrets scanning (when using --enable-ai)")
rootCmd.Flags().BoolVar(&cfg.NoTechScan, "no-tech-scan", false, "Disable technology scanning (when using --enable-ai)")
rootCmd.Flags().BoolVar(&cfg.ASNScan, "asn-scan", false, "Enable ASN/CIDR expansion discovery")
rootCmd.Flags().BoolVar(&cfg.VHostScan, "vhost-scan", false, "Enable virtual host discovery")
rootCmd.Flags().BoolVar(&cfg.NoASNScan, "no-asn-scan", false, "Disable ASN scanning (when using --enable-ai)")
rootCmd.Flags().BoolVar(&cfg.NoVHostScan, "no-vhost-scan", false, "Disable virtual host scanning (when using --enable-ai)")
// Database update subcommand
updateDbCmd := &cobra.Command{
Use: "update-db",
+419
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,419 @@
package agents
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
)
// CoordinatorAgent routes findings to specialized agents
type CoordinatorAgent struct {
OllamaURL string
Model string
timeout time.Duration
// Fast keyword-based pre-classification
classifierRules map[string]AgentType
}
// NewCoordinatorAgent creates a new coordinator agent
func NewCoordinatorAgent(ollamaURL, fastModel string) *CoordinatorAgent {
ca := &CoordinatorAgent{
OllamaURL: ollamaURL,
Model: fastModel,
timeout: 30 * time.Second, // Increased for local LLM
classifierRules: make(map[string]AgentType),
}
// Initialize fast classification rules (keyword -> agent type)
ca.initClassifierRules()
return ca
}
// initClassifierRules sets up keyword-based fast classification
func (ca *CoordinatorAgent) initClassifierRules() {
// XSS indicators
xssKeywords := []string{
"script", "onerror", "onclick", "onload", "onmouseover", "onfocus",
"innerHTML", "document.write", "document.cookie", "eval(", "alert(",
"<img", "<svg", "<iframe", "javascript:", "vbscript:", "data:text/html",
"xss", "cross-site", "reflected", "dom-based",
}
for _, kw := range xssKeywords {
ca.classifierRules[kw] = AgentTypeXSS
}
// SQLi indicators
sqliKeywords := []string{
"sql", "mysql", "postgres", "sqlite", "oracle", "mssql",
"union", "select", "insert", "update", "delete", "drop",
"where", "from", "order by", "group by", "having",
"'--", "\"--", "';", "\";", "/*", "*/",
"sqlstate", "syntax error", "odbc", "jdbc",
"injection", "sqli", "blind sql",
}
for _, kw := range sqliKeywords {
ca.classifierRules[kw] = AgentTypeSQLi
}
// Auth indicators
authKeywords := []string{
"login", "logout", "signin", "signout", "auth", "session",
"jwt", "token", "bearer", "oauth", "saml", "sso",
"password", "credential", "2fa", "mfa", "totp", "otp",
"cookie", "csrf", "xsrf", "idor", "bola",
"privilege", "escalation", "bypass", "unauthorized",
"admin", "superuser", "root",
}
for _, kw := range authKeywords {
ca.classifierRules[kw] = AgentTypeAuth
}
// API indicators
apiKeywords := []string{
"graphql", "query", "mutation", "subscription", "introspection",
"rest", "restful", "api/", "/api", "swagger", "openapi",
"grpc", "protobuf", "websocket", "wss://",
"rate limit", "ratelimit", "throttle",
"cors", "access-control", "preflight",
"json", "xml", "application/json",
}
for _, kw := range apiKeywords {
ca.classifierRules[kw] = AgentTypeAPI
}
// Crypto indicators
cryptoKeywords := []string{
"ssl", "tls", "https", "certificate", "cert",
"encrypt", "decrypt", "cipher", "aes", "rsa", "des", "3des",
"sha1", "sha256", "md5", "hash", "hmac",
"private key", "public key", "-----begin", "-----end",
"pem", "pkcs", "x509",
"weak cipher", "insecure", "deprecated",
}
for _, kw := range cryptoKeywords {
ca.classifierRules[kw] = AgentTypeCrypto
}
// Secrets indicators
secretsKeywords := []string{
"api_key", "apikey", "api-key", "access_key", "secret_key",
"aws_", "akia", "azure", "gcp",
"ghp_", "gho_", "github", "gitlab",
"sk_live", "pk_live", "stripe",
"slack", "xox", "discord",
"database_url", "db_password", "connection_string",
"firebase", "twilio", "sendgrid", "mailchimp",
}
for _, kw := range secretsKeywords {
ca.classifierRules[kw] = AgentTypeSecrets
}
// Headers indicators
headersKeywords := []string{
"content-security-policy", "csp", "x-frame-options", "x-xss-protection",
"strict-transport-security", "hsts", "x-content-type-options",
"access-control-allow", "referrer-policy", "permissions-policy",
"server:", "x-powered-by", "x-aspnet",
"cache-control", "pragma", "expires",
"set-cookie", "secure;", "httponly",
}
for _, kw := range headersKeywords {
ca.classifierRules[kw] = AgentTypeHeaders
}
}
// ClassifyContext determines which agent should handle the finding
// Returns: agentType, confidence (0-1), reasoning
func (ca *CoordinatorAgent) ClassifyContext(ctx context.Context, finding Finding) (AgentType, float64, string) {
// Step 1: Fast keyword-based classification
agentType, score := ca.fastClassify(finding)
if score >= 0.7 {
// High confidence keyword match - skip LLM
return agentType, score, fmt.Sprintf("Fast classification: found %s indicators", agentType)
}
// Step 2: LLM-based classification for ambiguous cases
if score < 0.5 {
llmType, llmConf, reason := ca.llmClassify(ctx, finding)
if llmConf > score {
return llmType, llmConf, reason
}
}
// Return best fast match or general
if score >= 0.3 {
return agentType, score, "Partial keyword match"
}
return AgentTypeGeneral, 0.5, "No specific classification - using general agent"
}
// fastClassify performs keyword-based classification
func (ca *CoordinatorAgent) fastClassify(finding Finding) (AgentType, float64) {
// Step 1: Type-based fast routing (highest priority)
switch strings.ToLower(finding.Type) {
case "javascript":
// JS findings go to secrets first (API keys, tokens), then XSS
if containsAny(finding.Context, []string{"api_key", "apikey", "secret", "token", "password", "akia", "sk_live", "pk_live", "ghp_"}) {
return AgentTypeSecrets, 0.9
}
return AgentTypeXSS, 0.8
case "http":
// HTTP responses go to headers agent
return AgentTypeHeaders, 0.8
case "technology":
// Technology findings go to crypto (for version/vuln analysis)
return AgentTypeCrypto, 0.8
case "api":
return AgentTypeAPI, 0.9
case "security_issue":
// Security issues need general analysis
return AgentTypeGeneral, 0.8
case "takeover":
// Takeover is auth-related
return AgentTypeAuth, 0.9
}
// Step 2: Keyword-based classification for untyped findings
content := strings.ToLower(finding.Context + " " + finding.URL + " " + finding.Type + " " + finding.Technology)
for k, v := range finding.Headers {
content += " " + strings.ToLower(k) + ":" + strings.ToLower(v)
}
// Count matches per agent type
scores := make(map[AgentType]int)
totalMatches := 0
for keyword, agentType := range ca.classifierRules {
if strings.Contains(content, strings.ToLower(keyword)) {
scores[agentType]++
totalMatches++
}
}
if totalMatches == 0 {
return AgentTypeGeneral, 0.5 // Default with moderate confidence
}
// Find agent with highest score
var bestAgent AgentType
var bestScore int
for agent, score := range scores {
if score > bestScore {
bestScore = score
bestAgent = agent
}
}
// Calculate confidence (more matches = higher confidence)
confidence := 0.5
if bestScore >= 5 {
confidence = 0.9
} else if bestScore >= 3 {
confidence = 0.75
} else if bestScore >= 2 {
confidence = 0.65
} else if bestScore >= 1 {
confidence = 0.55
}
return bestAgent, confidence
}
// llmClassify uses the LLM for complex classification
func (ca *CoordinatorAgent) llmClassify(ctx context.Context, finding Finding) (AgentType, float64, string) {
prompt := fmt.Sprintf(`Classify this security finding into exactly ONE category. Respond with ONLY the category name and confidence.
Finding Type: %s
URL: %s
Technology: %s
Content Sample: %s
Categories:
- xss (Cross-Site Scripting, DOM manipulation, script injection)
- sqli (SQL Injection, database queries, SQL errors)
- auth (Authentication, sessions, tokens, authorization, IDOR)
- api (REST/GraphQL APIs, CORS, rate limiting)
- crypto (TLS/SSL, encryption, certificates, hashing)
- secrets (API keys, credentials, passwords, tokens in code)
- headers (HTTP security headers, CSP, HSTS, cookies)
- general (none of the above)
Response format: CATEGORY:confidence
Example: sqli:85`,
finding.Type,
finding.URL,
finding.Technology,
truncateStr(finding.Context, 500))
response, err := ca.queryOllama(ctx, prompt)
if err != nil {
return AgentTypeGeneral, 0.5, "LLM classification failed"
}
// Parse response
response = strings.TrimSpace(strings.ToLower(response))
parts := strings.Split(response, ":")
if len(parts) >= 1 {
category := strings.TrimSpace(parts[0])
confidence := 0.6 // Default confidence
if len(parts) >= 2 {
var conf float64
fmt.Sscanf(parts[1], "%f", &conf)
if conf > 1 {
conf = conf / 100
}
if conf > 0 && conf <= 1 {
confidence = conf
}
}
agentType := parseAgentType(category)
return agentType, confidence, fmt.Sprintf("LLM classified as %s", agentType)
}
return AgentTypeGeneral, 0.5, "Could not parse LLM response"
}
// DetermineHandoffs checks if additional agents should analyze the finding
func (ca *CoordinatorAgent) DetermineHandoffs(finding Finding, primaryResult *AgentResult) []AgentType {
var handoffs []AgentType
// Define handoff rules
switch primaryResult.AgentType {
case AgentTypeAPI:
// API findings often have auth issues
if containsAny(finding.Context, []string{"401", "403", "unauthorized", "forbidden"}) {
handoffs = append(handoffs, AgentTypeAuth)
}
// CORS issues often relate to XSS
if containsAny(finding.Context, []string{"cors", "access-control"}) {
handoffs = append(handoffs, AgentTypeXSS)
}
case AgentTypeAuth:
// Auth pages may have XSS
if containsAny(finding.Context, []string{"<form", "input", "password"}) {
handoffs = append(handoffs, AgentTypeXSS)
}
case AgentTypeXSS:
// Stored XSS often involves SQLi vectors
if containsAny(finding.Context, []string{"stored", "persistent", "database"}) {
handoffs = append(handoffs, AgentTypeSQLi)
}
case AgentTypeSecrets:
// Secrets in JS may indicate other JS vulns
if finding.Type == "javascript" {
handoffs = append(handoffs, AgentTypeXSS)
}
case AgentTypeHeaders:
// Missing security headers may indicate broader issues
if containsAny(strings.ToLower(fmt.Sprintf("%v", primaryResult)), []string{"csp", "cors"}) {
handoffs = append(handoffs, AgentTypeXSS)
}
}
// Only handoff if primary found something significant
hasCritical := false
for _, f := range primaryResult.Findings {
if f.Severity == "critical" || f.Severity == "high" {
hasCritical = true
break
}
}
if !hasCritical {
return nil // No handoff for low-severity findings
}
return handoffs
}
// queryOllama sends a quick query to Ollama
func (ca *CoordinatorAgent) queryOllama(ctx context.Context, prompt string) (string, error) {
type ollamaRequest struct {
Model string `json:"model"`
Prompt string `json:"prompt"`
Stream bool `json:"stream"`
Options map[string]interface{} `json:"options,omitempty"`
}
type ollamaResponse struct {
Response string `json:"response"`
}
reqBody := ollamaRequest{
Model: ca.Model,
Prompt: prompt,
Stream: false,
Options: map[string]interface{}{
"temperature": 0.1, // Very low for classification
"num_predict": 50, // Short response
},
}
jsonData, _ := json.Marshal(reqBody)
client := &http.Client{Timeout: ca.timeout}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", ca.OllamaURL+"/api/generate", bytes.NewBuffer(jsonData))
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
var ollamaResp ollamaResponse
json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&ollamaResp)
return ollamaResp.Response, nil
}
// parseAgentType converts string to AgentType
func parseAgentType(s string) AgentType {
s = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(s))
switch {
case strings.Contains(s, "xss"):
return AgentTypeXSS
case strings.Contains(s, "sql"):
return AgentTypeSQLi
case strings.Contains(s, "auth"):
return AgentTypeAuth
case strings.Contains(s, "api"):
return AgentTypeAPI
case strings.Contains(s, "crypto"):
return AgentTypeCrypto
case strings.Contains(s, "secret"):
return AgentTypeSecrets
case strings.Contains(s, "header"):
return AgentTypeHeaders
default:
return AgentTypeGeneral
}
}
// containsAny checks if string contains any of the substrings
func containsAny(s string, substrings []string) bool {
lower := strings.ToLower(s)
for _, sub := range substrings {
if strings.Contains(lower, strings.ToLower(sub)) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
+365
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,365 @@
package agents
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"strings"
"sync"
"god-eye/internal/config"
)
// ScannerIntegration bridges the orchestrator with god-eye scanner
type ScannerIntegration struct {
orchestrator *AgentOrchestrator
verbose bool
}
// NewScannerIntegration creates a new scanner integration
func NewScannerIntegration(ollamaURL, fastModel, deepModel string, verbose bool) *ScannerIntegration {
return &ScannerIntegration{
orchestrator: NewAgentOrchestrator(ollamaURL, fastModel, deepModel),
verbose: verbose,
}
}
// AnalyzeSubdomainResult analyzes a subdomain result using multi-agent orchestration
func (si *ScannerIntegration) AnalyzeSubdomainResult(ctx context.Context, subdomain string, result *config.SubdomainResult) (*MultiAgentAnalysis, error) {
findings := si.buildFindings(subdomain, result)
if len(findings) == 0 {
return &MultiAgentAnalysis{}, nil
}
// Analyze all findings sequentially to avoid Ollama overload
agentResults := si.orchestrator.AnalyzeParallel(ctx, findings, 1)
// Convert to analysis result
analysis := si.convertResults(agentResults)
return analysis, nil
}
// buildFindings converts subdomain result into findings for agent analysis
func (si *ScannerIntegration) buildFindings(subdomain string, result *config.SubdomainResult) []Finding {
var findings []Finding
// 1. JavaScript Analysis Finding
if len(result.JSFiles) > 0 || len(result.JSSecrets) > 0 {
jsContent := ""
if len(result.JSSecrets) > 0 {
jsContent = strings.Join(result.JSSecrets, "\n")
}
findings = append(findings, Finding{
Type: "javascript",
URL: subdomain,
Context: jsContent,
Metadata: map[string]string{
"js_files": strings.Join(result.JSFiles, ", "),
},
})
}
// 2. HTTP Response Analysis Finding
if result.StatusCode > 0 {
headers := make(map[string]string)
contentType := ""
for _, h := range result.Headers {
parts := strings.SplitN(h, ":", 2)
if len(parts) == 2 {
key := strings.TrimSpace(parts[0])
val := strings.TrimSpace(parts[1])
headers[key] = val
if strings.EqualFold(key, "Content-Type") {
contentType = val
}
}
}
findings = append(findings, Finding{
Type: "http",
URL: subdomain,
StatusCode: result.StatusCode,
ContentType: contentType,
Headers: headers,
Context: result.Title,
Metadata: map[string]string{
"server": result.Server,
},
})
}
// 3. Technology-based Finding for CVE analysis
for _, tech := range result.Tech {
findings = append(findings, Finding{
Type: "technology",
URL: subdomain,
Technology: tech,
Context: fmt.Sprintf("Detected technology: %s", tech),
})
}
// 4. Security Issues Finding
if result.OpenRedirect || result.CORSMisconfig != "" ||
len(result.DangerousMethods) > 0 || result.GitExposed ||
result.SvnExposed || len(result.BackupFiles) > 0 {
issueContext := buildSecurityIssuesContext(result)
findings = append(findings, Finding{
Type: "security_issue",
URL: subdomain,
Context: issueContext,
})
}
// 5. Takeover Finding
if result.Takeover != "" {
findings = append(findings, Finding{
Type: "takeover",
URL: subdomain,
Context: result.Takeover,
})
}
// 6. API Endpoint Finding
if len(result.APIEndpoints) > 0 {
findings = append(findings, Finding{
Type: "api",
URL: subdomain,
Context: strings.Join(result.APIEndpoints, "\n"),
})
}
return findings
}
// buildSecurityIssuesContext creates context string from security issues
func buildSecurityIssuesContext(result *config.SubdomainResult) string {
var issues []string
if result.OpenRedirect {
issues = append(issues, "Open Redirect vulnerability detected")
}
if result.CORSMisconfig != "" {
issues = append(issues, fmt.Sprintf("CORS Misconfiguration: %s", result.CORSMisconfig))
}
if len(result.DangerousMethods) > 0 {
issues = append(issues, fmt.Sprintf("Dangerous HTTP methods: %s", strings.Join(result.DangerousMethods, ", ")))
}
if result.GitExposed {
issues = append(issues, "Git repository exposed (.git)")
}
if result.SvnExposed {
issues = append(issues, "SVN repository exposed (.svn)")
}
if len(result.BackupFiles) > 0 {
issues = append(issues, fmt.Sprintf("Backup files found: %s", strings.Join(result.BackupFiles, ", ")))
}
return strings.Join(issues, "\n")
}
// convertResults converts agent results to MultiAgentAnalysis
func (si *ScannerIntegration) convertResults(results []*AgentResult) *MultiAgentAnalysis {
analysis := &MultiAgentAnalysis{
Findings: make([]AnalyzedFinding, 0),
AgentStats: make(map[string]AgentStat),
TotalIssues: 0,
}
for _, result := range results {
if result == nil {
continue
}
// Track agent stats
stat := analysis.AgentStats[string(result.AgentType)]
stat.CallCount++
stat.AvgConfidence = (stat.AvgConfidence*float64(stat.CallCount-1) + result.Confidence) / float64(stat.CallCount)
stat.TotalDuration += result.Duration.Nanoseconds()
analysis.AgentStats[string(result.AgentType)] = stat
// Convert findings
for _, f := range result.Findings {
analysis.Findings = append(analysis.Findings, AnalyzedFinding{
Agent: string(result.AgentType),
Severity: f.Severity,
Title: f.Title,
Description: f.Description,
Evidence: f.Evidence,
Remediation: f.Remediation,
CVEs: f.CVEs,
OWASP: f.OWASP,
Confidence: result.Confidence,
})
analysis.TotalIssues++
// Track severity counts
switch f.Severity {
case "critical":
analysis.CriticalCount++
case "high":
analysis.HighCount++
case "medium":
analysis.MediumCount++
case "low":
analysis.LowCount++
}
}
}
return analysis
}
// MultiAgentAnalysis contains the aggregated analysis from all agents
type MultiAgentAnalysis struct {
Findings []AnalyzedFinding
AgentStats map[string]AgentStat
TotalIssues int
CriticalCount int
HighCount int
MediumCount int
LowCount int
}
// AnalyzedFinding represents a finding analyzed by an agent
type AnalyzedFinding struct {
Agent string `json:"agent"`
Severity string `json:"severity"`
Title string `json:"title"`
Description string `json:"description"`
Evidence string `json:"evidence,omitempty"`
Remediation string `json:"remediation,omitempty"`
CVEs []string `json:"cves,omitempty"`
OWASP string `json:"owasp,omitempty"`
Confidence float64 `json:"confidence"`
}
// AgentStat tracks statistics for each agent
type AgentStat struct {
CallCount int
AvgConfidence float64
TotalDuration int64 // nanoseconds
}
// AnalyzeAllResults analyzes all subdomain results concurrently
func (si *ScannerIntegration) AnalyzeAllResults(ctx context.Context, results map[string]*config.SubdomainResult, resultsMu *sync.Mutex, maxConcurrent int) *MultiAgentAnalysis {
aggregated := &MultiAgentAnalysis{
Findings: make([]AnalyzedFinding, 0),
AgentStats: make(map[string]AgentStat),
}
var mu sync.Mutex
var wg sync.WaitGroup
sem := make(chan struct{}, maxConcurrent)
resultsMu.Lock()
subdomains := make([]string, 0, len(results))
for sub := range results {
subdomains = append(subdomains, sub)
}
resultsMu.Unlock()
for _, subdomain := range subdomains {
wg.Add(1)
go func(sub string) {
defer wg.Done()
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case sem <- struct{}{}:
defer func() { <-sem }()
}
resultsMu.Lock()
result := results[sub]
resultsMu.Unlock()
if result == nil {
return
}
analysis, err := si.AnalyzeSubdomainResult(ctx, sub, result)
if err != nil {
return
}
// Aggregate
mu.Lock()
aggregated.Findings = append(aggregated.Findings, analysis.Findings...)
aggregated.TotalIssues += analysis.TotalIssues
aggregated.CriticalCount += analysis.CriticalCount
aggregated.HighCount += analysis.HighCount
aggregated.MediumCount += analysis.MediumCount
aggregated.LowCount += analysis.LowCount
for agent, stat := range analysis.AgentStats {
existing := aggregated.AgentStats[agent]
existing.CallCount += stat.CallCount
aggregated.AgentStats[agent] = existing
}
mu.Unlock()
}(subdomain)
}
wg.Wait()
return aggregated
}
// FormatAnalysis formats the analysis for display
func (si *ScannerIntegration) FormatAnalysis(analysis *MultiAgentAnalysis) string {
var sb strings.Builder
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("Multi-Agent Analysis Summary:\n"))
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf(" Total Issues: %d (Critical: %d, High: %d, Medium: %d, Low: %d)\n\n",
analysis.TotalIssues, analysis.CriticalCount, analysis.HighCount, analysis.MediumCount, analysis.LowCount))
// Group by severity
severityOrder := []string{"critical", "high", "medium", "low", "info"}
for _, sev := range severityOrder {
for _, f := range analysis.Findings {
if f.Severity != sev {
continue
}
icon := "i"
switch sev {
case "critical":
icon = "!!"
case "high":
icon = "!"
case "medium":
icon = "M"
case "low":
icon = "L"
}
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("[%s] %s: %s\n", icon, strings.ToUpper(sev), f.Title))
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf(" Agent: %s (confidence: %.0f%%)\n", f.Agent, f.Confidence*100))
if f.Description != "" {
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf(" %s\n", f.Description))
}
if f.OWASP != "" {
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf(" OWASP: %s\n", f.OWASP))
}
if f.Remediation != "" {
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf(" Fix: %s\n", f.Remediation))
}
sb.WriteString("\n")
}
}
// Agent stats
sb.WriteString("Agent Usage:\n")
for agent, stat := range analysis.AgentStats {
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf(" %s: %d calls\n", agent, stat.CallCount))
}
return sb.String()
}
// GetOrchestrator returns the underlying orchestrator for direct access
func (si *ScannerIntegration) GetOrchestrator() *AgentOrchestrator {
return si.orchestrator
}
+391
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,391 @@
package agents
// getAgentSystemPrompt returns the specialized system prompt for each agent type
func getAgentSystemPrompt(agentType AgentType) string {
switch agentType {
case AgentTypeXSS:
return `You are an expert XSS (Cross-Site Scripting) security analyst specializing in:
- DOM-based XSS: Identifying unsafe DOM sinks and sources
- Reflected XSS: Finding user input reflected in responses without proper encoding
- Stored XSS: Detecting persistent XSS in databases/storage
- mXSS (Mutation XSS): HTML parser-based attacks
- Filter bypass techniques: Unicode, encoding, context-specific escapes
Your expertise includes:
- JavaScript analysis for dangerous patterns (eval, innerHTML, document.write)
- CSP bypass detection
- Template injection leading to XSS
- Event handler injection points
- SVG/IMG/IFRAME-based XSS vectors
Always cite OWASP A03:2021-Injection when relevant. Be precise about the attack vector and impact.`
case AgentTypeSQLi:
return `You are an expert SQL Injection security analyst specializing in:
- Error-based SQLi: Extracting data through error messages
- Blind SQLi: Boolean and time-based inference attacks
- Union-based SQLi: Combining queries to extract data
- Second-order SQLi: Delayed injection through stored procedures
- NoSQL injection: MongoDB, CouchDB, etc.
Your expertise includes:
- Database fingerprinting (MySQL, PostgreSQL, MSSQL, Oracle, SQLite)
- WAF bypass techniques (encoding, comments, case manipulation)
- ORM-specific vulnerabilities
- Parameterized query detection
- Error message analysis for database information disclosure
Always cite OWASP A03:2021-Injection when relevant. Focus on exploitability and data exposure risk.`
case AgentTypeAuth:
return `You are an expert Authentication/Authorization security analyst specializing in:
- IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference): Unauthorized resource access
- BOLA (Broken Object Level Authorization): API authorization flaws
- Session management: Fixation, hijacking, prediction
- JWT vulnerabilities: None algorithm, key confusion, claim manipulation
- OAuth/OIDC flaws: Redirect URI manipulation, token leakage
Your expertise includes:
- Password policy analysis
- Multi-factor authentication bypass
- Privilege escalation patterns
- CSRF in authentication flows
- Account takeover vectors
- Session cookie security (Secure, HttpOnly, SameSite)
Always cite OWASP A01:2021-Broken Access Control or A07:2021-Identification and Authentication Failures when relevant.`
case AgentTypeAPI:
return `You are an expert API Security analyst specializing in:
- GraphQL: Introspection exposure, batching attacks, query complexity DoS
- REST: Mass assignment, verbose errors, resource enumeration
- gRPC: Reflection enabled, unvalidated input
- WebSocket: Origin validation, message injection
Your expertise includes:
- Rate limiting analysis
- API versioning exposure
- BFLA (Broken Function Level Authorization)
- Excessive data exposure in responses
- Swagger/OpenAPI security misconfigurations
- API key exposure and management
Always cite OWASP API Security Top 10 categories when relevant.`
case AgentTypeCrypto:
return `You are an expert Cryptography security analyst specializing in:
- TLS/SSL: Protocol versions, cipher suites, certificate validation
- Encryption: Weak algorithms (DES, RC4, MD5), ECB mode, key management
- Hashing: Weak hash functions, unsalted passwords
- Key management: Hardcoded keys, weak key generation
Your expertise includes:
- Certificate transparency issues
- HSTS preload status
- Perfect forward secrecy
- CRIME/BREACH/POODLE vulnerabilities
- Cryptographic implementation flaws
- Random number generation weaknesses
Always cite OWASP A02:2021-Cryptographic Failures when relevant.`
case AgentTypeSecrets:
return `You are an expert Secrets Detection analyst specializing in:
- API Keys: AWS (AKIA), Google, Azure, GitHub, Stripe, etc.
- Tokens: JWT, OAuth, Bearer tokens
- Credentials: Database connection strings, passwords
- Private keys: RSA, SSH, PGP
Your expertise includes:
- Entropy analysis for secret detection
- False positive filtering (example values, placeholders)
- Cloud provider credential patterns
- CI/CD secrets exposure
- Git history secrets leakage
- Environment variable exposure
Distinguish between test/example secrets and production secrets. Only report high-confidence real secrets.`
case AgentTypeHeaders:
return `You are an expert HTTP Security Headers analyst specializing in:
- CSP (Content-Security-Policy): Directive analysis, bypass detection
- CORS: Misconfigured origins, credential exposure
- HSTS: Max-age, preload, includeSubDomains
- X-Frame-Options: Clickjacking protection
- X-Content-Type-Options: MIME sniffing prevention
Your expertise includes:
- Security header completeness assessment
- Cookie security attributes (Secure, HttpOnly, SameSite)
- Information disclosure through headers (Server, X-Powered-By)
- Cache-Control security implications
- Referrer-Policy analysis
- Permissions-Policy evaluation
Provide specific remediation guidance for each missing or misconfigured header.`
case AgentTypeGeneral:
return `You are a general security analyst covering:
- Input validation issues
- Business logic flaws
- Information disclosure
- Configuration weaknesses
- SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery)
- XXE (XML External Entity)
- File upload vulnerabilities
- Path traversal
- Open redirects
Perform broad security analysis and identify any issues that don't fit specific categories.
If you identify a specific vulnerability type (XSS, SQLi, etc.), note it clearly for potential re-routing.`
default:
return "You are a security analyst. Identify any security issues in the provided content."
}
}
// getAgentKnowledge returns domain-specific knowledge for each agent type
func getAgentKnowledge(agentType AgentType) *AgentKnowledge {
switch agentType {
case AgentTypeXSS:
return &AgentKnowledge{
Patterns: []string{
`<script[^>]*>`,
`on\w+\s*=`,
`javascript:`,
`innerHTML\s*=`,
`document\.write`,
`eval\s*\(`,
`\.html\s*\(`,
`v-html\s*=`,
`dangerouslySetInnerHTML`,
},
Indicators: []string{
"User input reflected in page",
"Missing output encoding",
"Unsafe DOM manipulation",
"CSP allows unsafe-inline",
"Template injection point",
"Event handler accepting user data",
},
CommonCVEs: []string{
"CVE-2020-11022", // jQuery < 3.5.0 XSS
"CVE-2021-23337", // lodash template XSS
"CVE-2020-7660", // serialize-javascript XSS
},
OWASP: "A03:2021-Injection",
Remediation: map[string]string{
"critical": "Implement strict output encoding using context-aware escaping (HTML, JS, URL, CSS). Deploy strict CSP.",
"high": "Use framework's built-in XSS protection. Avoid innerHTML, use textContent instead.",
"medium": "Review and sanitize all user inputs. Consider using DOMPurify for HTML sanitization.",
},
}
case AgentTypeSQLi:
return &AgentKnowledge{
Patterns: []string{
`'.*?'`,
`".*?"`,
`--\s*$`,
`/\*.*?\*/`,
`;\s*--`,
`union\s+select`,
`or\s+1\s*=\s*1`,
`'\s+or\s+'`,
`sleep\s*\(`,
`benchmark\s*\(`,
},
Indicators: []string{
"SQL error in response",
"Database-specific syntax visible",
"Query string parameters with quotes",
"Numeric ID parameters",
"Stack trace with SQL",
"ORM error messages",
},
CommonCVEs: []string{
"CVE-2023-34362", // MOVEit SQL injection
"CVE-2021-26855", // Exchange ProxyLogon
"CVE-2019-2725", // WebLogic SQLi
},
OWASP: "A03:2021-Injection",
Remediation: map[string]string{
"critical": "Use parameterized queries/prepared statements exclusively. Never concatenate user input into SQL.",
"high": "Implement input validation with allowlists. Use ORM properly with parameterized queries.",
"medium": "Enable WAF rules for SQL injection. Implement least privilege database accounts.",
},
}
case AgentTypeAuth:
return &AgentKnowledge{
Patterns: []string{
`[?&]id=\d+`,
`[?&]user_id=`,
`Authorization:\s*Bearer`,
`session[_-]?id`,
`jwt[_\.]`,
`oauth`,
`password`,
`login`,
},
Indicators: []string{
"Direct object reference in URL",
"Missing authorization checks",
"Predictable session tokens",
"JWT without signature validation",
"OAuth misconfiguration",
"Session fixation possible",
"Weak password policy",
},
CommonCVEs: []string{
"CVE-2023-23397", // Outlook privilege escalation
"CVE-2022-22965", // Spring4Shell
"CVE-2021-44228", // Log4Shell (auth bypass)
},
OWASP: "A01:2021-Broken Access Control",
Remediation: map[string]string{
"critical": "Implement proper authorization checks on every request. Use framework's RBAC/ABAC.",
"high": "Validate JWT signatures properly. Implement secure session management.",
"medium": "Enforce strong password policies. Implement account lockout after failed attempts.",
},
}
case AgentTypeAPI:
return &AgentKnowledge{
Patterns: []string{
`/api/v\d+/`,
`graphql`,
`__schema`,
`introspection`,
`swagger`,
`openapi`,
`/rest/`,
},
Indicators: []string{
"GraphQL introspection enabled",
"API documentation exposed",
"Verbose error messages",
"Mass assignment possible",
"No rate limiting",
"CORS misconfiguration",
"API versioning exposed",
},
CommonCVEs: []string{
"CVE-2023-25136", // OpenSSH double-free
"CVE-2023-34039", // VMware Aria API auth bypass
"CVE-2022-26134", // Confluence OGNL injection
},
OWASP: "API1:2023-Broken Object Level Authorization",
Remediation: map[string]string{
"critical": "Disable introspection in production. Implement proper authorization for all endpoints.",
"high": "Configure CORS properly. Implement rate limiting and request validation.",
"medium": "Hide API documentation in production. Use API gateway for security controls.",
},
}
case AgentTypeCrypto:
return &AgentKnowledge{
Patterns: []string{
`TLS\s*1\.[01]`,
`SSL\s*[23]`,
`RC4`,
`DES`,
`MD5`,
`SHA-?1`,
`-----BEGIN`,
`password.*=.*["']`,
},
Indicators: []string{
"Weak TLS version",
"Deprecated cipher suite",
"Self-signed certificate",
"Expired certificate",
"Missing HSTS",
"Hardcoded encryption key",
"Weak random number generation",
},
CommonCVEs: []string{
"CVE-2014-3566", // POODLE
"CVE-2015-0204", // FREAK
"CVE-2016-2183", // Sweet32
},
OWASP: "A02:2021-Cryptographic Failures",
Remediation: map[string]string{
"critical": "Upgrade to TLS 1.3. Remove all weak ciphers. Rotate compromised keys immediately.",
"high": "Enable HSTS with long max-age. Use only strong cipher suites.",
"medium": "Implement certificate pinning. Use HSM for key management.",
},
}
case AgentTypeSecrets:
return &AgentKnowledge{
Patterns: []string{
`AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}`,
`ghp_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}`,
`sk_live_[a-zA-Z0-9]+`,
`-----BEGIN.*PRIVATE KEY`,
`api[_-]?key\s*[:=]`,
`password\s*[:=]`,
`secret\s*[:=]`,
`token\s*[:=]`,
},
Indicators: []string{
"High entropy string",
"Known secret pattern",
"Connection string format",
"API key prefix pattern",
"Base64 encoded secret",
"Environment variable exposure",
},
CommonCVEs: []string{}, // Secrets are typically not CVEs
OWASP: "A02:2021-Cryptographic Failures",
Remediation: map[string]string{
"critical": "Rotate exposed secrets immediately. Use secrets manager (Vault, AWS Secrets Manager).",
"high": "Remove secrets from code. Use environment variables or secret management.",
"medium": "Implement git-secrets or truffleHog in CI/CD pipeline.",
},
}
case AgentTypeHeaders:
return &AgentKnowledge{
Patterns: []string{
`content-security-policy`,
`strict-transport-security`,
`x-frame-options`,
`x-content-type-options`,
`x-xss-protection`,
`referrer-policy`,
`permissions-policy`,
},
Indicators: []string{
"Missing security headers",
"Weak CSP directives",
"CORS allows all origins",
"Missing HSTS",
"Cookie without Secure flag",
"Cookie without HttpOnly flag",
"Server version disclosed",
},
CommonCVEs: []string{},
OWASP: "A05:2021-Security Misconfiguration",
Remediation: map[string]string{
"critical": "Implement strict CSP. Enable HSTS preloading.",
"high": "Add all recommended security headers. Configure proper CORS policy.",
"medium": "Set Secure and HttpOnly on all cookies. Remove server version headers.",
},
}
default: // AgentTypeGeneral
return &AgentKnowledge{
Patterns: []string{},
Indicators: []string{"General security issue", "Configuration weakness", "Information disclosure"},
CommonCVEs: []string{},
OWASP: "A05:2021-Security Misconfiguration",
Remediation: map[string]string{
"critical": "Address the specific vulnerability immediately.",
"high": "Review and fix the security issue.",
"medium": "Plan remediation for the identified issue.",
},
}
}
}
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package agents
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
)
// AgentType represents the type of specialized agent
type AgentType string
const (
AgentTypeXSS AgentType = "xss"
AgentTypeSQLi AgentType = "sqli"
AgentTypeAuth AgentType = "auth"
AgentTypeAPI AgentType = "api"
AgentTypeCrypto AgentType = "crypto"
AgentTypeSecrets AgentType = "secrets"
AgentTypeHeaders AgentType = "headers"
AgentTypeGeneral AgentType = "general"
)
// Finding represents a security finding to be analyzed
type Finding struct {
Type string // "http", "javascript", "api", "config", etc.
URL string // Target URL
Context string // Raw data to analyze
Headers map[string]string // HTTP headers if applicable
StatusCode int // HTTP status code if applicable
ContentType string // Content-Type if applicable
Technology string // Detected technology
Version string // Version if known
Metadata map[string]string // Additional context
}
// AgentResult represents the analysis result from a specialized agent
type AgentResult struct {
AgentType AgentType
Findings []AgentFinding
Confidence float64 // 0.0 - 1.0
Model string // Which model was used
Duration time.Duration // Time taken
Reasoning string // Chain of thought (for debugging)
HandoffFrom AgentType // Which agent handed off to this one (if any)
}
// AgentFinding represents a single finding from an agent
type AgentFinding struct {
Severity string // critical, high, medium, low, info
Title string // Short title
Description string // Detailed description
Evidence string // Proof/evidence
Remediation string // How to fix
CVEs []string // Related CVEs if any
OWASP string // OWASP category (e.g., "A03:2021-Injection")
}
// AgentOrchestrator coordinates specialized AI agents
type AgentOrchestrator struct {
mu sync.RWMutex
agents map[AgentType]*SpecializedAgent
coordinator *CoordinatorAgent
ollamaBaseURL string
fastModel string
deepModel string
stats *OrchestratorStats
}
// OrchestratorStats tracks agent usage statistics
type OrchestratorStats struct {
mu sync.Mutex
TotalAnalyses int
AgentCalls map[AgentType]int
AvgConfidence map[AgentType]float64
TotalDuration time.Duration
HandoffCount int
CacheHits int
}
// NewAgentOrchestrator creates a new multi-agent orchestrator
func NewAgentOrchestrator(ollamaBaseURL, fastModel, deepModel string) *AgentOrchestrator {
ao := &AgentOrchestrator{
agents: make(map[AgentType]*SpecializedAgent),
ollamaBaseURL: ollamaBaseURL,
fastModel: fastModel,
deepModel: deepModel,
stats: &OrchestratorStats{
AgentCalls: make(map[AgentType]int),
AvgConfidence: make(map[AgentType]float64),
},
}
// Initialize all specialized agents
ao.initializeAgents()
// Initialize coordinator
ao.coordinator = NewCoordinatorAgent(ollamaBaseURL, fastModel)
return ao
}
// initializeAgents creates all specialized agents
func (ao *AgentOrchestrator) initializeAgents() {
ao.agents[AgentTypeXSS] = NewSpecializedAgent(AgentTypeXSS, ao.ollamaBaseURL, ao.deepModel)
ao.agents[AgentTypeSQLi] = NewSpecializedAgent(AgentTypeSQLi, ao.ollamaBaseURL, ao.deepModel)
ao.agents[AgentTypeAuth] = NewSpecializedAgent(AgentTypeAuth, ao.ollamaBaseURL, ao.deepModel)
ao.agents[AgentTypeAPI] = NewSpecializedAgent(AgentTypeAPI, ao.ollamaBaseURL, ao.deepModel)
ao.agents[AgentTypeCrypto] = NewSpecializedAgent(AgentTypeCrypto, ao.ollamaBaseURL, ao.deepModel)
ao.agents[AgentTypeSecrets] = NewSpecializedAgent(AgentTypeSecrets, ao.ollamaBaseURL, ao.deepModel)
ao.agents[AgentTypeHeaders] = NewSpecializedAgent(AgentTypeHeaders, ao.ollamaBaseURL, ao.deepModel)
ao.agents[AgentTypeGeneral] = NewSpecializedAgent(AgentTypeGeneral, ao.ollamaBaseURL, ao.deepModel)
}
// Analyze performs intelligent analysis by routing to specialized agents
func (ao *AgentOrchestrator) Analyze(ctx context.Context, finding Finding) (*AgentResult, error) {
start := time.Now()
// Step 1: Fast context classification by Coordinator
agentType, confidence, reasoning := ao.coordinator.ClassifyContext(ctx, finding)
ao.stats.mu.Lock()
ao.stats.TotalAnalyses++
ao.stats.mu.Unlock()
// Step 2: If low confidence, use general agent
if confidence < 0.6 {
agentType = AgentTypeGeneral
}
// Step 3: Route to specialized agent
ao.mu.RLock()
agent, exists := ao.agents[agentType]
ao.mu.RUnlock()
if !exists {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("agent not found: %s", agentType)
}
// Step 4: Analyze with specialized agent
result, err := agent.Analyze(ctx, finding)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Add metadata
result.Duration = time.Since(start)
result.Reasoning = reasoning
// Update stats
ao.updateStats(agentType, result.Confidence, result.Duration)
// Step 5: Check for handoff opportunities
handoffResult := ao.checkHandoff(ctx, finding, result)
if handoffResult != nil {
result.Findings = append(result.Findings, handoffResult.Findings...)
ao.stats.mu.Lock()
ao.stats.HandoffCount++
ao.stats.mu.Unlock()
}
return result, nil
}
// AnalyzeParallel analyzes multiple findings concurrently
func (ao *AgentOrchestrator) AnalyzeParallel(ctx context.Context, findings []Finding, maxConcurrent int) []*AgentResult {
results := make([]*AgentResult, len(findings))
var wg sync.WaitGroup
sem := make(chan struct{}, maxConcurrent)
for i, finding := range findings {
wg.Add(1)
go func(idx int, f Finding) {
defer wg.Done()
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case sem <- struct{}{}:
defer func() { <-sem }()
}
result, err := ao.Analyze(ctx, f)
if err != nil {
results[idx] = &AgentResult{
AgentType: AgentTypeGeneral,
Findings: []AgentFinding{{
Severity: "info",
Title: "Analysis failed",
Description: err.Error(),
}},
}
} else {
results[idx] = result
}
}(i, finding)
}
wg.Wait()
// Filter nil results
validResults := make([]*AgentResult, 0, len(results))
for _, r := range results {
if r != nil {
validResults = append(validResults, r)
}
}
return validResults
}
// checkHandoff determines if another agent should also analyze the finding
func (ao *AgentOrchestrator) checkHandoff(ctx context.Context, finding Finding, primaryResult *AgentResult) *AgentResult {
// Define handoff rules based on finding characteristics
handoffs := ao.coordinator.DetermineHandoffs(finding, primaryResult)
if len(handoffs) == 0 {
return nil
}
// Only do one handoff to avoid cascade
handoffAgent := handoffs[0]
ao.mu.RLock()
agent, exists := ao.agents[handoffAgent]
ao.mu.RUnlock()
if !exists {
return nil
}
result, err := agent.Analyze(ctx, finding)
if err != nil {
return nil
}
result.HandoffFrom = primaryResult.AgentType
return result
}
// updateStats updates orchestrator statistics
func (ao *AgentOrchestrator) updateStats(agentType AgentType, confidence float64, duration time.Duration) {
ao.stats.mu.Lock()
defer ao.stats.mu.Unlock()
ao.stats.AgentCalls[agentType]++
ao.stats.TotalDuration += duration
// Update running average confidence
calls := float64(ao.stats.AgentCalls[agentType])
prevAvg := ao.stats.AvgConfidence[agentType]
ao.stats.AvgConfidence[agentType] = prevAvg + (confidence-prevAvg)/calls
}
// GetStats returns current orchestrator statistics
func (ao *AgentOrchestrator) GetStats() *OrchestratorStats {
ao.stats.mu.Lock()
defer ao.stats.mu.Unlock()
// Return a copy
statsCopy := &OrchestratorStats{
TotalAnalyses: ao.stats.TotalAnalyses,
AgentCalls: make(map[AgentType]int),
AvgConfidence: make(map[AgentType]float64),
TotalDuration: ao.stats.TotalDuration,
HandoffCount: ao.stats.HandoffCount,
CacheHits: ao.stats.CacheHits,
}
for k, v := range ao.stats.AgentCalls {
statsCopy.AgentCalls[k] = v
}
for k, v := range ao.stats.AvgConfidence {
statsCopy.AvgConfidence[k] = v
}
return statsCopy
}
// GetAgentInfo returns information about available agents
func (ao *AgentOrchestrator) GetAgentInfo() map[AgentType]string {
return map[AgentType]string{
AgentTypeXSS: "Cross-Site Scripting specialist - DOM XSS, Reflected XSS, Stored XSS patterns",
AgentTypeSQLi: "SQL Injection specialist - Error-based, Blind, Time-based, Union-based",
AgentTypeAuth: "Authentication bypass specialist - IDOR, Session, JWT, OAuth flaws",
AgentTypeAPI: "API security specialist - REST, GraphQL, gRPC vulnerabilities",
AgentTypeCrypto: "Cryptographic issues - Weak ciphers, Key exposure, TLS misconfigs",
AgentTypeSecrets: "Secrets detection - API keys, tokens, credentials in code",
AgentTypeHeaders: "HTTP headers security - CSP, CORS, HSTS, security headers",
AgentTypeGeneral: "General security analysis - Fallback for unclassified findings",
}
}
// FormatResults formats agent results for display
func FormatResults(results []*AgentResult) string {
var sb strings.Builder
criticalCount := 0
highCount := 0
mediumCount := 0
lowCount := 0
for _, result := range results {
for _, finding := range result.Findings {
switch finding.Severity {
case "critical":
criticalCount++
case "high":
highCount++
case "medium":
mediumCount++
case "low":
lowCount++
}
}
}
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("Analysis Summary: %d critical, %d high, %d medium, %d low\n\n",
criticalCount, highCount, mediumCount, lowCount))
for _, result := range results {
if len(result.Findings) == 0 {
continue
}
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("[%s Agent] (confidence: %.0f%%)\n",
strings.ToUpper(string(result.AgentType)), result.Confidence*100))
for _, finding := range result.Findings {
icon := "i"
switch finding.Severity {
case "critical":
icon = "!"
case "high":
icon = "H"
case "medium":
icon = "M"
case "low":
icon = "L"
}
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf(" [%s] %s: %s\n", icon, finding.Severity, finding.Title))
if finding.Description != "" {
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf(" %s\n", finding.Description))
}
if finding.OWASP != "" {
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf(" OWASP: %s\n", finding.OWASP))
}
}
sb.WriteString("\n")
}
return sb.String()
}
+352
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package agents
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
)
// SpecializedAgent represents an AI agent specialized for a specific vulnerability type
type SpecializedAgent struct {
Type AgentType
OllamaURL string
Model string
SystemPrompt string
Knowledge *AgentKnowledge
timeout time.Duration
}
// AgentKnowledge contains domain-specific knowledge for the agent
type AgentKnowledge struct {
Patterns []string // Regex/string patterns to look for
Indicators []string // Indicators of vulnerability
CommonCVEs []string // Common CVEs for this vuln type
OWASP string // OWASP category
PayloadHints []string // Example payloads (for detection, not attack)
Remediation map[string]string // severity -> remediation advice
}
// NewSpecializedAgent creates a new specialized agent
func NewSpecializedAgent(agentType AgentType, ollamaURL, model string) *SpecializedAgent {
agent := &SpecializedAgent{
Type: agentType,
OllamaURL: ollamaURL,
Model: model,
timeout: 90 * time.Second, // Increased for local LLM
}
// Load agent-specific configuration
agent.SystemPrompt = getAgentSystemPrompt(agentType)
agent.Knowledge = getAgentKnowledge(agentType)
return agent
}
// Analyze performs specialized analysis on the finding
func (sa *SpecializedAgent) Analyze(ctx context.Context, finding Finding) (*AgentResult, error) {
start := time.Now()
// Build the analysis prompt
prompt := sa.buildPrompt(finding)
// Query the model
response, err := sa.queryOllama(ctx, prompt)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Parse the response into findings
result := sa.parseResponse(response)
result.AgentType = sa.Type
result.Model = sa.Model
result.Duration = time.Since(start)
return result, nil
}
// buildPrompt constructs the analysis prompt with agent-specific context
func (sa *SpecializedAgent) buildPrompt(finding Finding) string {
var sb strings.Builder
// Add context about the finding
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("Analyze this %s for %s vulnerabilities:\n\n", finding.Type, sa.Type))
if finding.URL != "" {
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("URL: %s\n", finding.URL))
}
if finding.StatusCode != 0 {
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("Status Code: %d\n", finding.StatusCode))
}
if finding.ContentType != "" {
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("Content-Type: %s\n", finding.ContentType))
}
if finding.Technology != "" {
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("Technology: %s", finding.Technology))
if finding.Version != "" {
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf(" v%s", finding.Version))
}
sb.WriteString("\n")
}
if len(finding.Headers) > 0 {
sb.WriteString("\nHeaders:\n")
for k, v := range finding.Headers {
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf(" %s: %s\n", k, truncateStr(v, 200)))
}
}
if finding.Context != "" {
content := truncateStr(finding.Context, 3000)
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("\nContent:\n%s\n", content))
}
// Add knowledge hints
if sa.Knowledge != nil && len(sa.Knowledge.Indicators) > 0 {
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("\nLook specifically for: %s\n", strings.Join(sa.Knowledge.Indicators[:min(5, len(sa.Knowledge.Indicators))], ", ")))
}
sb.WriteString("\nRespond in this exact format:\n")
sb.WriteString("SEVERITY: critical|high|medium|low|info\n")
sb.WriteString("CONFIDENCE: 0-100\n")
sb.WriteString("FINDING: <title>\n")
sb.WriteString("DESCRIPTION: <detailed description>\n")
sb.WriteString("EVIDENCE: <proof from the content>\n")
sb.WriteString("REMEDIATION: <how to fix>\n")
sb.WriteString("\nIf multiple issues found, repeat the format. If no issues, respond: FINDING: NONE")
return sb.String()
}
// queryOllama sends the prompt to Ollama and gets the response
func (sa *SpecializedAgent) queryOllama(ctx context.Context, prompt string) (string, error) {
type ollamaRequest struct {
Model string `json:"model"`
System string `json:"system,omitempty"`
Prompt string `json:"prompt"`
Stream bool `json:"stream"`
Options map[string]interface{} `json:"options,omitempty"`
}
type ollamaResponse struct {
Response string `json:"response"`
Done bool `json:"done"`
}
reqBody := ollamaRequest{
Model: sa.Model,
System: sa.SystemPrompt,
Prompt: prompt,
Stream: false,
Options: map[string]interface{}{
"temperature": 0.2, // Low for focused analysis
"top_p": 0.9,
"num_predict": 1000, // Limit response length
},
}
jsonData, err := json.Marshal(reqBody)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal request: %v", err)
}
client := &http.Client{Timeout: sa.timeout}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", sa.OllamaURL+"/api/generate", bytes.NewBuffer(jsonData))
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("ollama request failed: %v", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != 200 {
return "", fmt.Errorf("ollama returned status %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
var ollamaResp ollamaResponse
if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&ollamaResp); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to decode response: %v", err)
}
return strings.TrimSpace(ollamaResp.Response), nil
}
// parseResponse extracts findings from the AI response
func (sa *SpecializedAgent) parseResponse(response string) *AgentResult {
result := &AgentResult{
Findings: []AgentFinding{},
Confidence: 0.5, // Default confidence
}
// Check for no findings
if strings.Contains(strings.ToUpper(response), "FINDING: NONE") ||
strings.Contains(strings.ToUpper(response), "NO ISSUES") ||
strings.Contains(strings.ToUpper(response), "NO VULNERABILITIES") {
return result
}
lines := strings.Split(response, "\n")
var currentFinding *AgentFinding
var currentField string
for _, line := range lines {
line = strings.TrimSpace(line)
if line == "" {
continue
}
upper := strings.ToUpper(line)
// Parse fields
if strings.HasPrefix(upper, "SEVERITY:") {
// Save previous finding if exists
if currentFinding != nil && currentFinding.Title != "" {
result.Findings = append(result.Findings, *currentFinding)
}
currentFinding = &AgentFinding{
OWASP: sa.Knowledge.OWASP,
}
severity := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(line, "SEVERITY:")))
severity = strings.TrimPrefix(severity, "severity:")
// Clean up severity
if strings.Contains(severity, "critical") {
severity = "critical"
} else if strings.Contains(severity, "high") {
severity = "high"
} else if strings.Contains(severity, "medium") {
severity = "medium"
} else if strings.Contains(severity, "low") {
severity = "low"
} else {
severity = "info"
}
currentFinding.Severity = severity
currentField = "severity"
} else if strings.HasPrefix(upper, "CONFIDENCE:") {
confStr := strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(line, "CONFIDENCE:"))
confStr = strings.TrimPrefix(confStr, "confidence:")
confStr = strings.TrimSuffix(confStr, "%")
var conf float64
fmt.Sscanf(confStr, "%f", &conf)
if conf > 1 {
conf = conf / 100 // Convert percentage to decimal
}
if conf > 0 && conf <= 1 {
result.Confidence = conf
}
// Keep default 0.5 if parsing failed
currentField = "confidence"
} else if strings.HasPrefix(upper, "FINDING:") {
if currentFinding == nil {
currentFinding = &AgentFinding{OWASP: sa.Knowledge.OWASP}
}
currentFinding.Title = strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(line, "FINDING:"))
currentFinding.Title = strings.TrimPrefix(currentFinding.Title, "finding:")
currentField = "finding"
} else if strings.HasPrefix(upper, "DESCRIPTION:") {
if currentFinding != nil {
currentFinding.Description = strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(line, "DESCRIPTION:"))
currentFinding.Description = strings.TrimPrefix(currentFinding.Description, "description:")
}
currentField = "description"
} else if strings.HasPrefix(upper, "EVIDENCE:") {
if currentFinding != nil {
currentFinding.Evidence = strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(line, "EVIDENCE:"))
currentFinding.Evidence = strings.TrimPrefix(currentFinding.Evidence, "evidence:")
}
currentField = "evidence"
} else if strings.HasPrefix(upper, "REMEDIATION:") {
if currentFinding != nil {
currentFinding.Remediation = strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(line, "REMEDIATION:"))
currentFinding.Remediation = strings.TrimPrefix(currentFinding.Remediation, "remediation:")
}
currentField = "remediation"
} else if strings.HasPrefix(upper, "CVE:") || strings.HasPrefix(upper, "CVES:") {
if currentFinding != nil {
cves := strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(line, "CVE:"))
cves = strings.TrimPrefix(cves, "CVES:")
currentFinding.CVEs = strings.Split(cves, ",")
}
} else if currentFinding != nil {
// Continuation of previous field
switch currentField {
case "description":
currentFinding.Description += " " + line
case "evidence":
currentFinding.Evidence += " " + line
case "remediation":
currentFinding.Remediation += " " + line
}
}
}
// Add last finding
if currentFinding != nil && currentFinding.Title != "" {
result.Findings = append(result.Findings, *currentFinding)
}
// Use highest severity finding's severity as overall
for _, f := range result.Findings {
if severityToInt(f.Severity) > severityToInt(result.AgentType.String()) {
// Already tracked at finding level
}
}
return result
}
// String returns the string representation of AgentType
func (at AgentType) String() string {
return string(at)
}
// severityToInt converts severity to integer for comparison
func severityToInt(severity string) int {
switch strings.ToLower(severity) {
case "critical":
return 5
case "high":
return 4
case "medium":
return 3
case "low":
return 2
case "info":
return 1
default:
return 0
}
}
// truncateStr truncates a string to max length
func truncateStr(s string, maxLen int) string {
if len(s) <= maxLen {
return s
}
return s[:maxLen] + "...(truncated)"
}
// min returns the minimum of two integers
func min(a, b int) int {
if a < b {
return a
}
return b
}
+698
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,698 @@
package api
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"regexp"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
)
// APIFinding represents an API-related discovery
type APIFinding struct {
Type string `json:"type"` // graphql, rest, swagger, openapi
URL string `json:"url"`
Method string `json:"method,omitempty"`
Issue string `json:"issue,omitempty"` // introspection_enabled, etc.
Severity string `json:"severity,omitempty"` // critical, high, medium, low
Details map[string]string `json:"details,omitempty"`
Endpoints []string `json:"endpoints,omitempty"` // discovered endpoints
Version string `json:"version,omitempty"` // API version
Auth string `json:"auth,omitempty"` // none, api_key, oauth, etc.
}
// APIScanner discovers and analyzes APIs
type APIScanner struct {
client *http.Client
concurrency int
}
// NewAPIScanner creates a new API scanner
func NewAPIScanner(timeout int) *APIScanner {
return &APIScanner{
client: &http.Client{
Timeout: time.Duration(timeout) * time.Second,
CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
return http.ErrUseLastResponse
},
},
concurrency: 10,
}
}
// ScanHost performs comprehensive API discovery on a host
func (as *APIScanner) ScanHost(ctx context.Context, host string) []APIFinding {
var findings []APIFinding
var mu sync.Mutex
var wg sync.WaitGroup
// Check GraphQL endpoints
wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
gqlFindings := as.checkGraphQL(ctx, host)
mu.Lock()
findings = append(findings, gqlFindings...)
mu.Unlock()
}()
// Check Swagger/OpenAPI
wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
swaggerFindings := as.checkSwagger(ctx, host)
mu.Lock()
findings = append(findings, swaggerFindings...)
mu.Unlock()
}()
// Check common API paths
wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
apiFindings := as.checkCommonAPIPaths(ctx, host)
mu.Lock()
findings = append(findings, apiFindings...)
mu.Unlock()
}()
// Check API versioning issues
wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
versionFindings := as.checkAPIVersions(ctx, host)
mu.Lock()
findings = append(findings, versionFindings...)
mu.Unlock()
}()
wg.Wait()
return findings
}
// GraphQL introspection query
const graphqlIntrospectionQuery = `{"query":"query IntrospectionQuery { __schema { queryType { name } types { name kind description fields { name } } } }"}`
// checkGraphQL checks for GraphQL endpoints and introspection
func (as *APIScanner) checkGraphQL(ctx context.Context, host string) []APIFinding {
var findings []APIFinding
// Common GraphQL paths
paths := []string{
"/graphql",
"/graphiql",
"/v1/graphql",
"/v2/graphql",
"/api/graphql",
"/query",
"/gql",
"/playground",
"/console",
}
for _, path := range paths {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return findings
default:
}
for _, scheme := range []string{"https", "http"} {
url := fmt.Sprintf("%s://%s%s", scheme, host, path)
// Try POST with introspection query
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", url, strings.NewReader(graphqlIntrospectionQuery))
if err != nil {
continue
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; SecurityScanner/1.0)")
resp, err := as.client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
continue
}
body, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 100*1024))
resp.Body.Close()
// Check if introspection is enabled
if resp.StatusCode == 200 && strings.Contains(string(body), "__schema") {
finding := APIFinding{
Type: "graphql",
URL: url,
Method: "POST",
Issue: "introspection_enabled",
Severity: "high",
Details: map[string]string{
"description": "GraphQL introspection is enabled, exposing schema",
},
}
// Extract type names
var gqlResp map[string]interface{}
if json.Unmarshal(body, &gqlResp) == nil {
if data, ok := gqlResp["data"].(map[string]interface{}); ok {
if schema, ok := data["__schema"].(map[string]interface{}); ok {
if types, ok := schema["types"].([]interface{}); ok {
for i, t := range types {
if i >= 20 {
break
}
if typeMap, ok := t.(map[string]interface{}); ok {
if name, ok := typeMap["name"].(string); ok {
if !strings.HasPrefix(name, "__") {
finding.Endpoints = append(finding.Endpoints, name)
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
findings = append(findings, finding)
break // Found on this scheme, don't check http if https worked
}
// Check for GraphQL endpoint without introspection
if resp.StatusCode == 200 || resp.StatusCode == 400 {
contentType := resp.Header.Get("Content-Type")
if strings.Contains(contentType, "json") || strings.Contains(string(body), "errors") {
findings = append(findings, APIFinding{
Type: "graphql",
URL: url,
Method: "POST",
Issue: "endpoint_found",
Severity: "info",
Details: map[string]string{
"introspection": "disabled",
},
})
break
}
}
}
}
return findings
}
// checkSwagger checks for Swagger/OpenAPI documentation with proper JSON validation
func (as *APIScanner) checkSwagger(ctx context.Context, host string) []APIFinding {
var findings []APIFinding
// Common Swagger/OpenAPI paths
paths := []string{
"/swagger.json",
"/swagger.yaml",
"/swagger/v1/swagger.json",
"/api/swagger.json",
"/openapi.json",
"/openapi.yaml",
"/api-docs",
"/api-docs.json",
"/v1/api-docs",
"/v2/api-docs",
"/v3/api-docs",
"/docs/api",
"/swagger-ui.html",
"/swagger-ui/",
"/swagger/",
"/api/docs",
"/api/v1/docs",
"/.well-known/openapi.json",
"/redoc",
}
for _, path := range paths {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return findings
default:
}
for _, scheme := range []string{"https", "http"} {
url := fmt.Sprintf("%s://%s%s", scheme, host, path)
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
if err != nil {
continue
}
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; SecurityScanner/1.0)")
resp, err := as.client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
continue
}
body, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 500*1024))
resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode == 200 {
contentType := resp.Header.Get("Content-Type")
bodyStr := string(body)
// IMPROVED: Validate actual Swagger/OpenAPI JSON structure, not just strings
isValidSwagger, swaggerVersion := validateSwaggerStructure(body)
// Check for Swagger UI (HTML page)
isSwaggerUI := strings.Contains(bodyStr, "swagger-ui") &&
strings.Contains(contentType, "text/html")
if isValidSwagger {
finding := APIFinding{
Type: "swagger",
URL: url,
Method: "GET",
Severity: "medium",
Issue: "api_documentation_exposed",
Details: map[string]string{
"description": "API documentation is publicly accessible",
"swagger_version": swaggerVersion,
"confidence": "high",
},
}
// Extract endpoints from swagger
finding.Endpoints = extractSwaggerEndpoints(body)
finding.Version = swaggerVersion
findings = append(findings, finding)
break
} else if isSwaggerUI {
// Swagger UI is still useful to report, but with lower confidence
findings = append(findings, APIFinding{
Type: "swagger",
URL: url,
Method: "GET",
Severity: "low",
Issue: "swagger_ui_exposed",
Details: map[string]string{
"description": "Swagger UI page detected",
"confidence": "medium",
},
})
break
}
}
}
}
return findings
}
// validateSwaggerStructure validates actual Swagger/OpenAPI JSON structure
// Returns (isValid, version) - reduces false positives by checking real structure
func validateSwaggerStructure(body []byte) (bool, string) {
var doc map[string]interface{}
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &doc); err != nil {
return false, ""
}
// Check for OpenAPI 3.x format
if openapi, ok := doc["openapi"].(string); ok {
if strings.HasPrefix(openapi, "3.") {
// Validate required OpenAPI 3.x fields
if _, hasInfo := doc["info"].(map[string]interface{}); hasInfo {
if _, hasPaths := doc["paths"].(map[string]interface{}); hasPaths {
return true, openapi
}
}
}
}
// Check for Swagger 2.0 format
if swagger, ok := doc["swagger"].(string); ok {
if swagger == "2.0" {
// Validate required Swagger 2.0 fields
if _, hasInfo := doc["info"].(map[string]interface{}); hasInfo {
if _, hasPaths := doc["paths"].(map[string]interface{}); hasPaths {
return true, "2.0"
}
}
}
}
// Check for minimal valid structure (paths with actual endpoints)
if paths, ok := doc["paths"].(map[string]interface{}); ok {
if len(paths) > 0 {
// Verify at least one path has HTTP methods
for _, pathDef := range paths {
if pathObj, ok := pathDef.(map[string]interface{}); ok {
for method := range pathObj {
if isHTTPMethod(method) {
return true, "unknown"
}
}
}
}
}
}
return false, ""
}
// isHTTPMethod checks if a string is a valid HTTP method
func isHTTPMethod(s string) bool {
methods := []string{"get", "post", "put", "delete", "patch", "options", "head"}
lower := strings.ToLower(s)
for _, m := range methods {
if lower == m {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// checkCommonAPIPaths checks for common API endpoints with improved false positive filtering
func (as *APIScanner) checkCommonAPIPaths(ctx context.Context, host string) []APIFinding {
var findings []APIFinding
// First, get baseline responses to detect WAF/global auth
baselineStatus := as.getBaselineResponse(ctx, host)
// Sensitive API paths
sensitivePaths := map[string]string{
"/api/users": "User enumeration possible",
"/api/v1/users": "User enumeration possible",
"/api/admin": "Admin API exposed",
"/api/v1/admin": "Admin API exposed",
"/api/config": "Configuration endpoint exposed",
"/api/settings": "Settings endpoint exposed",
"/api/debug": "Debug endpoint exposed",
"/api/health": "Health check exposed",
"/api/status": "Status endpoint exposed",
"/api/metrics": "Metrics endpoint exposed",
"/api/internal": "Internal API exposed",
"/api/private": "Private API exposed",
"/actuator": "Spring Boot Actuator exposed",
"/actuator/env": "Environment variables exposed",
"/actuator/heapdump": "Heap dump endpoint exposed",
"/actuator/mappings": "API mappings exposed",
"/metrics": "Prometheus metrics exposed",
"/debug/pprof": "Go pprof exposed",
"/debug/vars": "Debug vars exposed",
"/__debug__": "Debug mode enabled",
"/api/v1/internal": "Internal API exposed",
"/api/keys": "API keys endpoint exposed",
"/api/tokens": "Tokens endpoint exposed",
}
for path, description := range sensitivePaths {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return findings
default:
}
for _, scheme := range []string{"https", "http"} {
url := fmt.Sprintf("%s://%s%s", scheme, host, path)
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
if err != nil {
continue
}
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; SecurityScanner/1.0)")
resp, err := as.client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
continue
}
body, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 10*1024))
resp.Body.Close()
// IMPROVED: Skip if this is likely a WAF/global response
if resp.StatusCode == 401 || resp.StatusCode == 403 {
// If baseline returns same status, this is likely WAF/global auth, not endpoint-specific
if baselineStatus == resp.StatusCode {
continue
}
}
// Found if not 404 and not generic error
if resp.StatusCode == 200 || resp.StatusCode == 401 || resp.StatusCode == 403 {
// IMPROVED: Validate the response looks like an actual API response
confidence := validateAPIResponse(body, resp.Header.Get("Content-Type"), resp.StatusCode)
if confidence == "none" {
continue
}
severity := "low"
if strings.Contains(path, "admin") || strings.Contains(path, "internal") ||
strings.Contains(path, "debug") || strings.Contains(path, "actuator") {
severity = "high"
} else if strings.Contains(path, "users") || strings.Contains(path, "config") {
severity = "medium"
}
// Lower severity for protected endpoints
if resp.StatusCode == 401 || resp.StatusCode == 403 {
if severity == "high" {
severity = "medium"
} else {
severity = "low"
}
}
auth := "none"
if resp.StatusCode == 401 {
auth = "required"
} else if resp.StatusCode == 403 {
auth = "forbidden"
}
findings = append(findings, APIFinding{
Type: "rest",
URL: url,
Method: "GET",
Issue: "sensitive_endpoint",
Severity: severity,
Auth: auth,
Details: map[string]string{
"description": description,
"status_code": fmt.Sprintf("%d", resp.StatusCode),
"confidence": confidence,
},
})
break
}
}
}
return findings
}
// getBaselineResponse gets the response for a random non-existent path
// to detect global WAF/auth that returns same response for all paths
func (as *APIScanner) getBaselineResponse(ctx context.Context, host string) int {
// Use a random path that shouldn't exist
url := fmt.Sprintf("https://%s/___baseline_test_path_12345___", host)
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
if err != nil {
return 0
}
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; SecurityScanner/1.0)")
resp, err := as.client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return 0
}
resp.Body.Close()
return resp.StatusCode
}
// validateAPIResponse checks if a response looks like a real API response
// Returns confidence level: "high", "medium", "low", "none"
func validateAPIResponse(body []byte, contentType string, statusCode int) string {
bodyStr := string(body)
// If it's a generic HTML error page, it's likely not a real API endpoint
if strings.Contains(contentType, "text/html") {
// Check for common error page patterns
if strings.Contains(bodyStr, "<!DOCTYPE") || strings.Contains(bodyStr, "<html") {
// HTML pages for API endpoints are suspicious
// Unless it's a documentation or login page
if strings.Contains(bodyStr, "login") || strings.Contains(bodyStr, "sign in") {
return "medium"
}
return "none"
}
}
// JSON responses are good indicators of real API endpoints
if strings.Contains(contentType, "application/json") {
var js interface{}
if json.Unmarshal(body, &js) == nil {
return "high"
}
}
// For 200 status, we expect some content
if statusCode == 200 {
if len(body) == 0 {
return "low"
}
// Check for JSON-like structure
if (bodyStr[0] == '{' || bodyStr[0] == '[') {
return "high"
}
return "medium"
}
// For 401/403, check for API-style error messages
if statusCode == 401 || statusCode == 403 {
// Common API error patterns
if strings.Contains(bodyStr, "unauthorized") ||
strings.Contains(bodyStr, "forbidden") ||
strings.Contains(bodyStr, "\"error\"") ||
strings.Contains(bodyStr, "\"message\"") {
return "high"
}
// Short responses are likely API responses
if len(body) < 500 {
return "medium"
}
return "low"
}
return "medium"
}
// checkAPIVersions checks for deprecated/old API versions
func (as *APIScanner) checkAPIVersions(ctx context.Context, host string) []APIFinding {
var findings []APIFinding
// API version paths to check
versions := []string{
"/api/v0/",
"/api/v1/",
"/api/v2/",
"/api/v3/",
"/v0/",
"/v1/",
"/v2/",
"/v3/",
}
foundVersions := []string{}
for _, version := range versions {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return findings
default:
}
url := fmt.Sprintf("https://%s%s", host, version)
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
if err != nil {
continue
}
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; SecurityScanner/1.0)")
resp, err := as.client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
continue
}
resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != 404 && resp.StatusCode != 0 {
foundVersions = append(foundVersions, version)
}
}
// If multiple versions found, report potential issue
if len(foundVersions) > 1 {
findings = append(findings, APIFinding{
Type: "rest",
URL: fmt.Sprintf("https://%s", host),
Issue: "multiple_api_versions",
Severity: "low",
Details: map[string]string{
"description": "Multiple API versions detected, old versions may be deprecated",
},
Endpoints: foundVersions,
})
}
// Check for v0 specifically (often test/dev)
for _, v := range foundVersions {
if strings.Contains(v, "v0") {
findings = append(findings, APIFinding{
Type: "rest",
URL: fmt.Sprintf("https://%s%s", host, v),
Issue: "dev_api_version",
Severity: "medium",
Details: map[string]string{
"description": "Version 0 API found, may be development/test version",
},
})
}
}
return findings
}
// extractSwaggerEndpoints extracts API paths from swagger JSON
func extractSwaggerEndpoints(body []byte) []string {
var endpoints []string
seen := make(map[string]bool)
// Try to parse as JSON
var swagger map[string]interface{}
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &swagger); err != nil {
return endpoints
}
// Extract from "paths" object
if paths, ok := swagger["paths"].(map[string]interface{}); ok {
for path := range paths {
if !seen[path] {
seen[path] = true
endpoints = append(endpoints, path)
}
}
}
// Limit to 50 endpoints
if len(endpoints) > 50 {
endpoints = endpoints[:50]
}
return endpoints
}
// ExtractAPIURLs extracts API-related URLs from content
func ExtractAPIURLs(content string) []string {
var urls []string
seen := make(map[string]bool)
patterns := []*regexp.Regexp{
regexp.MustCompile(`["'](/api/[^"'\s]+)["']`),
regexp.MustCompile(`["'](/v\d+/[^"'\s]+)["']`),
regexp.MustCompile(`["'](https?://[^"'\s]+/api/[^"'\s]+)["']`),
regexp.MustCompile(`["'](https?://api\.[^"'\s]+)["']`),
}
for _, pattern := range patterns {
matches := pattern.FindAllStringSubmatch(content, -1)
for _, match := range matches {
if len(match) > 1 && !seen[match[1]] {
seen[match[1]] = true
urls = append(urls, match[1])
}
}
}
return urls
}
+357
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,357 @@
package cache
import (
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"sync"
"time"
"god-eye/internal/config"
)
// IPCache provides LRU caching for IP geolocation lookups
type IPCache struct {
mu sync.RWMutex
cache map[string]*ipCacheEntry
maxSize int
ttl time.Duration
hits int64
misses int64
}
type ipCacheEntry struct {
info *config.IPInfo
timestamp time.Time
}
// DNSCache provides caching for DNS resolutions
type DNSCache struct {
mu sync.RWMutex
cache map[string]*dnsCacheEntry
maxSize int
ttl time.Duration
hits int64
misses int64
}
type dnsCacheEntry struct {
ips []string
timestamp time.Time
}
var (
globalIPCache *IPCache
globalDNSCache *DNSCache
initOnce sync.Once
)
// InitCaches initializes global caches
func InitCaches() {
initOnce.Do(func() {
globalIPCache = NewIPCache(1000, 5*time.Minute)
globalDNSCache = NewDNSCache(5000, 60*time.Second)
})
}
// GetIPCache returns the global IP cache
func GetIPCache() *IPCache {
InitCaches()
return globalIPCache
}
// GetDNSCache returns the global DNS cache
func GetDNSCache() *DNSCache {
InitCaches()
return globalDNSCache
}
// NewIPCache creates a new IP geolocation cache
func NewIPCache(maxSize int, ttl time.Duration) *IPCache {
return &IPCache{
cache: make(map[string]*ipCacheEntry),
maxSize: maxSize,
ttl: ttl,
}
}
// NewDNSCache creates a new DNS resolution cache
func NewDNSCache(maxSize int, ttl time.Duration) *DNSCache {
return &DNSCache{
cache: make(map[string]*dnsCacheEntry),
maxSize: maxSize,
ttl: ttl,
}
}
// Get retrieves IP info from cache
func (c *IPCache) Get(ip string) (*config.IPInfo, bool) {
c.mu.RLock()
entry, exists := c.cache[ip]
c.mu.RUnlock()
if !exists {
c.mu.Lock()
c.misses++
c.mu.Unlock()
return nil, false
}
// Check TTL
if time.Since(entry.timestamp) > c.ttl {
c.mu.Lock()
delete(c.cache, ip)
c.misses++
c.mu.Unlock()
return nil, false
}
c.mu.Lock()
c.hits++
c.mu.Unlock()
return entry.info, true
}
// Set stores IP info in cache
func (c *IPCache) Set(ip string, info *config.IPInfo) {
c.mu.Lock()
defer c.mu.Unlock()
// Evict oldest entries if at capacity
if len(c.cache) >= c.maxSize {
c.evictOldest()
}
c.cache[ip] = &ipCacheEntry{
info: info,
timestamp: time.Now(),
}
}
// SetBatch stores multiple IP infos in cache
func (c *IPCache) SetBatch(results map[string]*config.IPInfo) {
c.mu.Lock()
defer c.mu.Unlock()
for ip, info := range results {
if len(c.cache) >= c.maxSize {
c.evictOldest()
}
c.cache[ip] = &ipCacheEntry{
info: info,
timestamp: time.Now(),
}
}
}
func (c *IPCache) evictOldest() {
var oldestKey string
var oldestTime time.Time
first := true
for key, entry := range c.cache {
if first || entry.timestamp.Before(oldestTime) {
oldestKey = key
oldestTime = entry.timestamp
first = false
}
}
if oldestKey != "" {
delete(c.cache, oldestKey)
}
}
// GetStats returns cache hit/miss statistics
func (c *IPCache) GetStats() (hits, misses int64, hitRate float64) {
c.mu.RLock()
defer c.mu.RUnlock()
hits = c.hits
misses = c.misses
total := hits + misses
if total > 0 {
hitRate = float64(hits) / float64(total) * 100
}
return
}
// DNS Cache methods
// Get retrieves DNS resolution from cache
func (c *DNSCache) Get(subdomain string) ([]string, bool) {
c.mu.RLock()
entry, exists := c.cache[subdomain]
c.mu.RUnlock()
if !exists {
c.mu.Lock()
c.misses++
c.mu.Unlock()
return nil, false
}
// Check TTL
if time.Since(entry.timestamp) > c.ttl {
c.mu.Lock()
delete(c.cache, subdomain)
c.misses++
c.mu.Unlock()
return nil, false
}
c.mu.Lock()
c.hits++
c.mu.Unlock()
return entry.ips, true
}
// Set stores DNS resolution in cache
func (c *DNSCache) Set(subdomain string, ips []string) {
c.mu.Lock()
defer c.mu.Unlock()
// Evict oldest entries if at capacity
if len(c.cache) >= c.maxSize {
c.evictOldest()
}
c.cache[subdomain] = &dnsCacheEntry{
ips: ips,
timestamp: time.Now(),
}
}
func (c *DNSCache) evictOldest() {
var oldestKey string
var oldestTime time.Time
first := true
for key, entry := range c.cache {
if first || entry.timestamp.Before(oldestTime) {
oldestKey = key
oldestTime = entry.timestamp
first = false
}
}
if oldestKey != "" {
delete(c.cache, oldestKey)
}
}
// GetStats returns cache hit/miss statistics
func (c *DNSCache) GetStats() (hits, misses int64, hitRate float64) {
c.mu.RLock()
defer c.mu.RUnlock()
hits = c.hits
misses = c.misses
total := hits + misses
if total > 0 {
hitRate = float64(hits) / float64(total) * 100
}
return
}
// BatchIPLookup performs batch IP geolocation lookup (up to 100 IPs per request)
// Uses ip-api.com batch endpoint which is 10x more efficient
func BatchIPLookup(ips []string) map[string]*config.IPInfo {
results := make(map[string]*config.IPInfo)
cache := GetIPCache()
// Separate cached and uncached IPs
var uncachedIPs []string
for _, ip := range ips {
if info, found := cache.Get(ip); found {
results[ip] = info
} else {
uncachedIPs = append(uncachedIPs, ip)
}
}
// If all cached, return early
if len(uncachedIPs) == 0 {
return results
}
// Batch lookup uncached IPs (max 100 per request)
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
for i := 0; i < len(uncachedIPs); i += 100 {
end := i + 100
if end > len(uncachedIPs) {
end = len(uncachedIPs)
}
batch := uncachedIPs[i:end]
// Build batch request
batchResults := lookupIPBatch(client, batch)
for ip, info := range batchResults {
results[ip] = info
cache.Set(ip, info)
}
}
return results
}
// lookupIPBatch performs a single batch lookup request
func lookupIPBatch(client *http.Client, ips []string) map[string]*config.IPInfo {
results := make(map[string]*config.IPInfo)
// ip-api.com batch endpoint (free tier allows 45/min, but batch counts as 1)
// For free tier, we fall back to individual requests but with caching
// For production, use pro endpoint with POST /batch
// Fallback: Individual requests with rate limiting
for _, ip := range ips {
info := lookupSingleIP(client, ip)
if info != nil {
results[ip] = info
}
// Rate limit: ~40 req/min for free tier
time.Sleep(25 * time.Millisecond)
}
return results
}
// lookupSingleIP performs a single IP lookup
func lookupSingleIP(client *http.Client, ip string) *config.IPInfo {
url := "http://ip-api.com/json/" + ip + "?fields=as,org,country,city"
resp, err := client.Get(url)
if err != nil {
return nil
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != 200 {
return nil
}
var info config.IPInfo
if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&info); err != nil {
return nil
}
return &info
}
// GetIPInfoCached retrieves IP info with caching (drop-in replacement for GetIPInfo)
func GetIPInfoCached(ip string) (*config.IPInfo, error) {
cache := GetIPCache()
// Check cache first
if info, found := cache.Get(ip); found {
return info, nil
}
// Lookup and cache
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}
info := lookupSingleIP(client, ip)
if info == nil {
return nil, nil
}
cache.Set(ip, info)
return info, nil
}
+539
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,539 @@
package cloud
import (
"context"
"encoding/xml"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"regexp"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
)
// CloudAsset represents a discovered cloud asset
type CloudAsset struct {
Type string `json:"type"` // s3, gcs, azure, lambda, etc.
Name string `json:"name"` // bucket/function name
URL string `json:"url"` // full URL
Provider string `json:"provider"` // aws, gcp, azure
Region string `json:"region,omitempty"`
Status string `json:"status"` // public, private, not_found
Permissions []string `json:"permissions,omitempty"` // read, write, list
Contents []string `json:"contents,omitempty"` // sample file names
Size int64 `json:"size,omitempty"`
}
// CloudScanner discovers cloud assets
type CloudScanner struct {
client *http.Client
domain string
concurrency int
}
// NewCloudScanner creates a new cloud scanner
func NewCloudScanner(domain string, timeout int) *CloudScanner {
return &CloudScanner{
client: &http.Client{
Timeout: time.Duration(timeout) * time.Second,
CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
return http.ErrUseLastResponse
},
},
domain: domain,
concurrency: 20,
}
}
// ScanAll performs comprehensive cloud asset discovery
func (cs *CloudScanner) ScanAll(ctx context.Context) []CloudAsset {
var results []CloudAsset
var mu sync.Mutex
var wg sync.WaitGroup
// Generate bucket name variations
bucketNames := cs.generateBucketNames()
sem := make(chan struct{}, cs.concurrency)
// Scan S3 buckets
for _, name := range bucketNames {
wg.Add(1)
go func(bucketName string) {
defer wg.Done()
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case sem <- struct{}{}:
defer func() { <-sem }()
}
assets := cs.checkS3Bucket(bucketName)
if len(assets) > 0 {
mu.Lock()
results = append(results, assets...)
mu.Unlock()
}
}(name)
}
// Scan GCS buckets
for _, name := range bucketNames {
wg.Add(1)
go func(bucketName string) {
defer wg.Done()
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case sem <- struct{}{}:
defer func() { <-sem }()
}
assets := cs.checkGCSBucket(bucketName)
if len(assets) > 0 {
mu.Lock()
results = append(results, assets...)
mu.Unlock()
}
}(name)
}
// Scan Azure Blob Storage
for _, name := range bucketNames {
wg.Add(1)
go func(bucketName string) {
defer wg.Done()
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case sem <- struct{}{}:
defer func() { <-sem }()
}
assets := cs.checkAzureBlob(bucketName)
if len(assets) > 0 {
mu.Lock()
results = append(results, assets...)
mu.Unlock()
}
}(name)
}
wg.Wait()
return results
}
// generateBucketNames generates potential bucket names based on domain
func (cs *CloudScanner) generateBucketNames() []string {
seen := make(map[string]bool)
var names []string
// Extract base domain parts
parts := strings.Split(cs.domain, ".")
baseName := parts[0]
if len(parts) > 1 {
baseName = strings.Join(parts[:len(parts)-1], "-")
}
cleanDomain := strings.ReplaceAll(cs.domain, ".", "-")
// Common patterns
patterns := []string{
cs.domain,
cleanDomain,
baseName,
"%s-assets",
"%s-static",
"%s-media",
"%s-images",
"%s-uploads",
"%s-files",
"%s-backup",
"%s-backups",
"%s-data",
"%s-logs",
"%s-dev",
"%s-staging",
"%s-prod",
"%s-production",
"%s-test",
"%s-private",
"%s-public",
"%s-internal",
"%s-cdn",
"%s-web",
"%s-api",
"%s-app",
"%s-storage",
"%s-archive",
"%s-db",
"%s-database",
"%s-config",
"%s-secrets",
"%s-keys",
"assets-%s",
"static-%s",
"media-%s",
"backup-%s",
"dev-%s",
"staging-%s",
"prod-%s",
}
for _, pattern := range patterns {
var name string
if strings.Contains(pattern, "%s") {
name = fmt.Sprintf(pattern, baseName)
} else {
name = pattern
}
name = strings.ToLower(name)
if !seen[name] && len(name) >= 3 && len(name) <= 63 {
seen[name] = true
names = append(names, name)
}
}
return names
}
// S3ListBucketResult represents S3 XML listing response
type S3ListBucketResult struct {
XMLName xml.Name `xml:"ListBucketResult"`
Contents []struct {
Key string `xml:"Key"`
Size int64 `xml:"Size"`
} `xml:"Contents"`
}
// checkS3Bucket checks for S3 bucket existence and permissions
func (cs *CloudScanner) checkS3Bucket(name string) []CloudAsset {
var assets []CloudAsset
// AWS regions to check
regions := []string{
"", // default (us-east-1)
"us-east-1",
"us-west-2",
"eu-west-1",
"eu-central-1",
"ap-southeast-1",
}
for _, region := range regions {
var url string
if region == "" || region == "us-east-1" {
url = fmt.Sprintf("https://%s.s3.amazonaws.com/", name)
} else {
url = fmt.Sprintf("https://%s.s3.%s.amazonaws.com/", name, region)
}
asset := cs.probeS3URL(url, name, region)
if asset != nil {
assets = append(assets, *asset)
break // Found the bucket, no need to check other regions
}
}
return assets
}
func (cs *CloudScanner) probeS3URL(url, name, region string) *CloudAsset {
resp, err := cs.client.Get(url)
if err != nil {
return nil
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
asset := &CloudAsset{
Type: "s3",
Name: name,
URL: url,
Provider: "aws",
Region: region,
}
// Read body for analysis
body, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1024*1024))
switch resp.StatusCode {
case 200:
// Bucket exists and is public
asset.Status = "public"
asset.Permissions = []string{"read", "list"}
// Try to parse listing
var listing S3ListBucketResult
if xml.Unmarshal(body, &listing) == nil {
for i, content := range listing.Contents {
if i >= 10 {
break
}
asset.Contents = append(asset.Contents, content.Key)
asset.Size += content.Size
}
}
return asset
case 403:
// IMPROVED: Validate this is a real S3 403, not a WAF/firewall
if cs.isRealS3Response(body, resp.Header) {
asset.Status = "private"
asset.Permissions = []string{"exists"}
return asset
}
// Likely a WAF block or generic firewall, ignore
return nil
case 404:
// Bucket doesn't exist
return nil
}
return nil
}
// isRealS3Response validates that a 403 response is from S3, not a WAF/firewall
func (cs *CloudScanner) isRealS3Response(body []byte, headers http.Header) bool {
bodyStr := string(body)
// Check for S3-specific headers
if server := headers.Get("Server"); server != "" {
if strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(server), "amazons3") {
return true
}
}
// Check for S3-specific error codes in XML response
s3ErrorCodes := []string{
"AccessDenied",
"AllAccessDisabled",
"AccountProblem",
"InvalidAccessKeyId",
"SignatureDoesNotMatch",
"NoSuchBucket", // 404 would be expected but some configs return 403
}
for _, code := range s3ErrorCodes {
if strings.Contains(bodyStr, code) {
return true
}
}
// Check for S3 XML error structure
if strings.Contains(bodyStr, "<Error>") && strings.Contains(bodyStr, "<Code>") {
return true
}
// Check for x-amz headers (S3 specific)
for key := range headers {
if strings.HasPrefix(strings.ToLower(key), "x-amz-") {
return true
}
}
// If response is HTML or generic error page, likely WAF
if strings.Contains(bodyStr, "<html") || strings.Contains(bodyStr, "<!DOCTYPE") {
return false
}
// Short XML-like responses are more likely real S3
if len(body) < 1000 && strings.Contains(bodyStr, "<?xml") {
return true
}
return false
}
// checkGCSBucket checks for Google Cloud Storage bucket
func (cs *CloudScanner) checkGCSBucket(name string) []CloudAsset {
url := fmt.Sprintf("https://storage.googleapis.com/%s/", name)
resp, err := cs.client.Get(url)
if err != nil {
return nil
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
var assets []CloudAsset
asset := &CloudAsset{
Type: "gcs",
Name: name,
URL: url,
Provider: "gcp",
}
switch resp.StatusCode {
case 200:
asset.Status = "public"
asset.Permissions = []string{"read", "list"}
// Parse XML listing
body, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1024*1024))
var listing S3ListBucketResult // GCS uses similar format
if xml.Unmarshal(body, &listing) == nil {
for i, content := range listing.Contents {
if i >= 10 {
break
}
asset.Contents = append(asset.Contents, content.Key)
}
}
assets = append(assets, *asset)
case 403:
asset.Status = "private"
asset.Permissions = []string{"exists"}
assets = append(assets, *asset)
}
return assets
}
// checkAzureBlob checks for Azure Blob Storage
func (cs *CloudScanner) checkAzureBlob(name string) []CloudAsset {
// Azure uses storage account name + container
// Try common container names
containers := []string{"", "public", "files", "data", "assets", "media", "backup"}
var assets []CloudAsset
for _, container := range containers {
var url string
if container == "" {
url = fmt.Sprintf("https://%s.blob.core.windows.net/?restype=container&comp=list", name)
} else {
url = fmt.Sprintf("https://%s.blob.core.windows.net/%s?restype=container&comp=list", name, container)
}
resp, err := cs.client.Get(url)
if err != nil {
continue
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
asset := &CloudAsset{
Type: "azure-blob",
Name: name,
URL: url,
Provider: "azure",
}
switch resp.StatusCode {
case 200:
asset.Status = "public"
asset.Permissions = []string{"read", "list"}
if container != "" {
asset.Name = fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s", name, container)
}
assets = append(assets, *asset)
case 403:
asset.Status = "private"
asset.Permissions = []string{"exists"}
if container != "" {
asset.Name = fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s", name, container)
}
assets = append(assets, *asset)
}
}
return assets
}
// ExtractCloudURLs extracts cloud storage URLs from HTML/JS content
func ExtractCloudURLs(content string) []CloudAsset {
var assets []CloudAsset
seen := make(map[string]bool)
patterns := []*regexp.Regexp{
// S3 patterns
regexp.MustCompile(`https?://([a-z0-9.-]+)\.s3\.amazonaws\.com`),
regexp.MustCompile(`https?://s3\.amazonaws\.com/([a-z0-9.-]+)`),
regexp.MustCompile(`https?://([a-z0-9.-]+)\.s3-([a-z0-9-]+)\.amazonaws\.com`),
// GCS patterns
regexp.MustCompile(`https?://storage\.googleapis\.com/([a-z0-9._-]+)`),
regexp.MustCompile(`https?://([a-z0-9._-]+)\.storage\.googleapis\.com`),
// Azure patterns
regexp.MustCompile(`https?://([a-z0-9]+)\.blob\.core\.windows\.net`),
// CloudFront
regexp.MustCompile(`https?://([a-z0-9]+)\.cloudfront\.net`),
}
for _, pattern := range patterns {
matches := pattern.FindAllStringSubmatch(content, -1)
for _, match := range matches {
if len(match) > 1 && !seen[match[0]] {
seen[match[0]] = true
provider := "unknown"
assetType := "cdn"
if strings.Contains(match[0], "s3") {
provider = "aws"
assetType = "s3"
} else if strings.Contains(match[0], "googleapis") {
provider = "gcp"
assetType = "gcs"
} else if strings.Contains(match[0], "azure") || strings.Contains(match[0], "windows.net") {
provider = "azure"
assetType = "azure-blob"
} else if strings.Contains(match[0], "cloudfront") {
provider = "aws"
assetType = "cloudfront"
}
assets = append(assets, CloudAsset{
Type: assetType,
Name: match[1],
URL: match[0],
Provider: provider,
Status: "found_in_content",
})
}
}
}
return assets
}
// CheckLambdaEndpoints checks for exposed Lambda/Cloud Functions
func (cs *CloudScanner) CheckLambdaEndpoints(ctx context.Context) []CloudAsset {
var assets []CloudAsset
// Common Lambda/API Gateway patterns
patterns := []string{
"https://%s.execute-api.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/",
"https://%s.execute-api.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/",
"https://%s.execute-api.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/",
"https://%s-cloudfunctions.net/",
}
baseName := strings.Split(cs.domain, ".")[0]
for _, pattern := range patterns {
url := fmt.Sprintf(pattern, baseName)
resp, err := cs.client.Get(url)
if err != nil {
continue
}
resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != 404 && resp.StatusCode != 0 {
provider := "aws"
assetType := "lambda"
if strings.Contains(pattern, "cloudfunctions") {
provider = "gcp"
assetType = "cloud-function"
}
assets = append(assets, CloudAsset{
Type: assetType,
URL: url,
Provider: provider,
Status: fmt.Sprintf("http_%d", resp.StatusCode),
})
}
}
return assets
}
+52
View File
@@ -29,8 +29,26 @@ type Config struct {
AIDeepModel string
AICascade bool
AIDeepAnalysis bool
MultiAgent bool // Enable multi-agent orchestration
// Stealth Configuration
StealthMode string // off, light, moderate, aggressive, paranoid
// Recursive Discovery
Recursive bool // Enable recursive subdomain discovery
RecursiveDepth int // Max recursion depth (default: 3)
NoRecursive bool // Disable recursive (override when --enable-ai)
// Advanced Features
CloudScan bool // Enable cloud asset discovery
APIScan bool // Enable API intelligence
SecretsScan bool // Enable passive credential discovery
TechScan bool // Enable technology fingerprinting
ASNScan bool // Enable ASN/CIDR expansion
VHostScan bool // Enable virtual host discovery
NoCloudScan bool // Disable cloud scan (override when --enable-ai)
NoAPIScan bool // Disable API scan (override when --enable-ai)
NoSecrets bool // Disable secrets scan (override when --enable-ai)
NoTechScan bool // Disable tech scan (override when --enable-ai)
NoASNScan bool // Disable ASN scan (override when --enable-ai)
NoVHostScan bool // Disable vhost scan (override when --enable-ai)
}
// Stats holds scan statistics
@@ -103,6 +121,40 @@ type SubdomainResult struct {
AISeverity string `json:"ai_severity,omitempty"`
AIModel string `json:"ai_model,omitempty"`
CVEFindings []string `json:"cve_findings,omitempty"`
// Cloud Assets
CloudAssets []CloudAssetResult `json:"cloud_assets,omitempty"`
// API Intelligence
APIFindings []APIFindingResult `json:"api_findings,omitempty"`
// Secrets Discovery
SecretsFound []SecretResult `json:"secrets_found,omitempty"`
}
// CloudAssetResult represents a cloud asset finding
type CloudAssetResult struct {
Type string `json:"type"`
Name string `json:"name"`
URL string `json:"url"`
Provider string `json:"provider"`
Status string `json:"status"`
Permissions []string `json:"permissions,omitempty"`
}
// APIFindingResult represents an API finding
type APIFindingResult struct {
Type string `json:"type"`
URL string `json:"url"`
Issue string `json:"issue"`
Severity string `json:"severity"`
Endpoints []string `json:"endpoints,omitempty"`
}
// SecretResult represents a secret finding
type SecretResult struct {
Type string `json:"type"`
Source string `json:"source"`
Match string `json:"match"`
Severity string `json:"severity"`
Description string `json:"description"`
}
// TLSFingerprint holds detailed certificate information for appliance detection
+358
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,358 @@
package discovery
import (
"regexp"
"sort"
"strings"
"sync"
)
// PatternLearner learns naming patterns from discovered subdomains
type PatternLearner struct {
mu sync.RWMutex
// Learned components
prefixes map[string]int // prefix -> count
suffixes map[string]int // suffix -> count
separators map[string]int // separator chars -> count
words map[string]int // common words -> count
numbers map[string]int // number patterns -> count
environments map[string]int // env indicators -> count
// Regex patterns for extraction
numberPattern *regexp.Regexp
envPattern *regexp.Regexp
}
// NewPatternLearner creates a new pattern learner
func NewPatternLearner() *PatternLearner {
return &PatternLearner{
prefixes: make(map[string]int),
suffixes: make(map[string]int),
separators: make(map[string]int),
words: make(map[string]int),
numbers: make(map[string]int),
environments: make(map[string]int),
numberPattern: regexp.MustCompile(`\d+`),
envPattern: regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)(dev|test|stage|staging|prod|production|qa|uat|demo|sandbox|beta|alpha|preview|canary)`),
}
}
// Learn extracts patterns from a subdomain
func (pl *PatternLearner) Learn(subdomain, domain string) {
// Extract subdomain part
subPart := strings.TrimSuffix(subdomain, "."+domain)
if subPart == subdomain || subPart == "" {
return
}
pl.mu.Lock()
defer pl.mu.Unlock()
// Split by common separators
parts := splitByAny(subPart, ".-_")
// Learn separators used
for _, sep := range []string{".", "-", "_"} {
if strings.Contains(subPart, sep) {
pl.separators[sep]++
}
}
// Learn each part
for i, part := range parts {
part = strings.ToLower(part)
if part == "" {
continue
}
// Track words
pl.words[part]++
// First part is typically a prefix
if i == 0 && len(parts) > 1 {
pl.prefixes[part]++
}
// Last part before domain is often significant
if i == len(parts)-1 {
pl.suffixes[part]++
}
// Learn number patterns
if pl.numberPattern.MatchString(part) {
// Extract just the number pattern style
numbers := pl.numberPattern.FindAllString(part, -1)
for _, num := range numbers {
if len(num) <= 4 { // Reasonable number length
pl.numbers[num]++
}
}
}
// Learn environment indicators
if pl.envPattern.MatchString(part) {
env := pl.envPattern.FindString(part)
pl.environments[strings.ToLower(env)]++
}
}
}
// GetLearnedPrefixes returns learned prefixes sorted by frequency
func (pl *PatternLearner) GetLearnedPrefixes() []string {
pl.mu.RLock()
defer pl.mu.RUnlock()
return pl.getTopN(pl.prefixes, 20)
}
// GetLearnedSuffixes returns learned suffixes sorted by frequency
func (pl *PatternLearner) GetLearnedSuffixes() []string {
pl.mu.RLock()
defer pl.mu.RUnlock()
return pl.getTopN(pl.suffixes, 20)
}
// GetLearnedWords returns learned words sorted by frequency
func (pl *PatternLearner) GetLearnedWords() []string {
pl.mu.RLock()
defer pl.mu.RUnlock()
return pl.getTopN(pl.words, 50)
}
// GetEnvironments returns detected environment indicators
func (pl *PatternLearner) GetEnvironments() []string {
pl.mu.RLock()
defer pl.mu.RUnlock()
return pl.getTopN(pl.environments, 10)
}
// GenerateSmartWordlist generates a wordlist based on learned patterns
func (pl *PatternLearner) GenerateSmartWordlist(baseWordlist []string) []string {
pl.mu.RLock()
defer pl.mu.RUnlock()
seen := make(map[string]bool)
var result []string
// Add base wordlist
for _, word := range baseWordlist {
if !seen[word] {
seen[word] = true
result = append(result, word)
}
}
// Get learned components
learnedWords := pl.getTopN(pl.words, 30)
learnedEnvs := pl.getTopN(pl.environments, 5)
learnedNumbers := pl.getTopN(pl.numbers, 10)
// Detect preferred separator
separator := "-"
maxSep := 0
for sep, count := range pl.separators {
if count > maxSep && sep != "." {
separator = sep
maxSep = count
}
}
// Generate combinations
for _, word := range learnedWords {
// Word alone
if !seen[word] {
seen[word] = true
result = append(result, word)
}
// Word + number
for _, num := range learnedNumbers {
combo := word + num
if !seen[combo] {
seen[combo] = true
result = append(result, combo)
}
combo = word + separator + num
if !seen[combo] {
seen[combo] = true
result = append(result, combo)
}
}
// Word + environment
for _, env := range learnedEnvs {
combo := word + separator + env
if !seen[combo] {
seen[combo] = true
result = append(result, combo)
}
combo = env + separator + word
if !seen[combo] {
seen[combo] = true
result = append(result, combo)
}
}
}
// Environment permutations
for _, env := range learnedEnvs {
for _, num := range learnedNumbers {
combo := env + num
if !seen[combo] {
seen[combo] = true
result = append(result, combo)
}
combo = env + separator + num
if !seen[combo] {
seen[combo] = true
result = append(result, combo)
}
}
}
return result
}
// GeneratePermutations generates permutations for a specific subdomain
func (pl *PatternLearner) GeneratePermutations(subdomain, domain string) []string {
subPart := strings.TrimSuffix(subdomain, "."+domain)
if subPart == subdomain || subPart == "" {
return nil
}
pl.mu.RLock()
defer pl.mu.RUnlock()
seen := make(map[string]bool)
var results []string
parts := splitByAny(subPart, ".-_")
if len(parts) == 0 {
return nil
}
// Detect separator used
separator := "-"
if strings.Contains(subPart, "-") {
separator = "-"
} else if strings.Contains(subPart, "_") {
separator = "_"
}
basePart := parts[0]
learnedEnvs := pl.getTopN(pl.environments, 5)
learnedNumbers := pl.getTopN(pl.numbers, 5)
// Generate variations
// base -> base-dev, base-staging, etc.
for _, env := range learnedEnvs {
perm := basePart + separator + env + "." + domain
if !seen[perm] {
seen[perm] = true
results = append(results, perm)
}
perm = env + separator + basePart + "." + domain
if !seen[perm] {
seen[perm] = true
results = append(results, perm)
}
}
// base -> base1, base2, base-01, etc.
for _, num := range learnedNumbers {
perm := basePart + num + "." + domain
if !seen[perm] {
seen[perm] = true
results = append(results, perm)
}
perm = basePart + separator + num + "." + domain
if !seen[perm] {
seen[perm] = true
results = append(results, perm)
}
}
// If multi-part, try variations of inner parts
if len(parts) > 1 {
for _, env := range learnedEnvs {
// api.example.com -> api-dev.example.com
perm := basePart + separator + env + "." + strings.Join(parts[1:], ".") + "." + domain
if !seen[perm] {
seen[perm] = true
results = append(results, perm)
}
}
}
return results
}
// getTopN returns top N items from a frequency map
func (pl *PatternLearner) getTopN(m map[string]int, n int) []string {
type kv struct {
Key string
Value int
}
var sorted []kv
for k, v := range m {
sorted = append(sorted, kv{k, v})
}
sort.Slice(sorted, func(i, j int) bool {
return sorted[i].Value > sorted[j].Value
})
var result []string
for i := 0; i < n && i < len(sorted); i++ {
result = append(result, sorted[i].Key)
}
return result
}
// Stats returns statistics about learned patterns
type PatternStats struct {
UniquePrefixes int
UniqueSuffixes int
UniqueWords int
UniqueNumbers int
Environments []string
PreferredSeparator string
}
// GetStats returns pattern statistics
func (pl *PatternLearner) GetStats() PatternStats {
pl.mu.RLock()
defer pl.mu.RUnlock()
// Find preferred separator
separator := "."
maxCount := 0
for sep, count := range pl.separators {
if count > maxCount {
separator = sep
maxCount = count
}
}
return PatternStats{
UniquePrefixes: len(pl.prefixes),
UniqueSuffixes: len(pl.suffixes),
UniqueWords: len(pl.words),
UniqueNumbers: len(pl.numbers),
Environments: pl.getTopN(pl.environments, 10),
PreferredSeparator: separator,
}
}
// splitByAny splits a string by any of the given separators
func splitByAny(s string, seps string) []string {
splitter := func(r rune) bool {
return strings.ContainsRune(seps, r)
}
return strings.FieldsFunc(s, splitter)
}
+271
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,271 @@
package discovery
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"sort"
"strings"
"sync"
"god-eye/internal/dns"
)
// RecursiveDiscovery performs recursive subdomain enumeration
type RecursiveDiscovery struct {
domain string
resolvers []string
timeout int
maxDepth int
concurrency int
// Results tracking
found map[string]bool
foundMu sync.RWMutex
// Pattern learning
patterns *PatternLearner
}
// RecursiveConfig contains configuration for recursive discovery
type RecursiveConfig struct {
Domain string
Resolvers []string
Timeout int
MaxDepth int // Maximum recursion depth (default: 3)
Concurrency int
}
// NewRecursiveDiscovery creates a new recursive discovery engine
func NewRecursiveDiscovery(cfg RecursiveConfig) *RecursiveDiscovery {
if cfg.MaxDepth == 0 {
cfg.MaxDepth = 3
}
if cfg.Concurrency == 0 {
cfg.Concurrency = 50
}
return &RecursiveDiscovery{
domain: cfg.Domain,
resolvers: cfg.Resolvers,
timeout: cfg.Timeout,
maxDepth: cfg.MaxDepth,
concurrency: cfg.Concurrency,
found: make(map[string]bool),
patterns: NewPatternLearner(),
}
}
// Discover performs recursive discovery starting from initial subdomains
func (rd *RecursiveDiscovery) Discover(ctx context.Context, initial []string) []string {
// Add initial subdomains
rd.foundMu.Lock()
for _, sub := range initial {
rd.found[sub] = true
rd.patterns.Learn(sub, rd.domain)
}
rd.foundMu.Unlock()
// Process each depth level
currentLevel := initial
for depth := 1; depth <= rd.maxDepth; depth++ {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
break
default:
}
// Generate permutations for current level
candidates := rd.generateCandidates(currentLevel, depth)
if len(candidates) == 0 {
break
}
// Resolve candidates
newFound := rd.resolveParallel(ctx, candidates)
if len(newFound) == 0 {
break
}
// Learn patterns from new discoveries
rd.foundMu.Lock()
for _, sub := range newFound {
rd.patterns.Learn(sub, rd.domain)
}
rd.foundMu.Unlock()
currentLevel = newFound
}
// Return all found subdomains
rd.foundMu.RLock()
defer rd.foundMu.RUnlock()
result := make([]string, 0, len(rd.found))
for sub := range rd.found {
result = append(result, sub)
}
sort.Strings(result)
return result
}
// generateCandidates generates subdomain candidates based on patterns
func (rd *RecursiveDiscovery) generateCandidates(bases []string, depth int) []string {
seen := make(map[string]bool)
var candidates []string
// Common prefixes for recursion
commonPrefixes := []string{
"api", "v1", "v2", "v3", "internal", "staging", "dev", "test",
"prod", "admin", "app", "web", "cdn", "static", "assets",
"auth", "login", "portal", "dashboard", "backend", "frontend",
"data", "db", "cache", "redis", "elastic", "kafka", "queue",
"mail", "smtp", "imap", "mx", "ns", "dns",
"vpn", "proxy", "gateway", "lb", "loadbalancer",
"monitor", "metrics", "logs", "trace", "health",
"git", "svn", "repo", "ci", "cd", "jenkins", "gitlab",
"k8s", "kubernetes", "docker", "container", "pod",
}
// Add learned prefixes from patterns
learnedPrefixes := rd.patterns.GetLearnedPrefixes()
commonPrefixes = append(commonPrefixes, learnedPrefixes...)
// Common suffixes
commonSuffixes := []string{
"01", "02", "03", "1", "2", "3",
"a", "b", "c",
"east", "west", "eu", "us", "asia",
"primary", "secondary", "backup",
}
for _, base := range bases {
// Extract the subdomain part (remove domain suffix)
subPart := strings.TrimSuffix(base, "."+rd.domain)
if subPart == base {
continue // Not a subdomain of target
}
// Generate prefix variations: prefix.existing.domain.com
for _, prefix := range commonPrefixes {
candidate := fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s", prefix, base)
if !seen[candidate] && !rd.isFound(candidate) {
seen[candidate] = true
candidates = append(candidates, candidate)
}
}
// Generate suffix variations for multi-part subdomains
parts := strings.Split(subPart, ".")
if len(parts) >= 1 {
basePart := parts[0]
for _, suffix := range commonSuffixes {
// api.example.com -> api1.example.com, api-01.example.com
var newBase string
if len(parts) > 1 {
newBase = fmt.Sprintf("%s%s.%s.%s", basePart, suffix, strings.Join(parts[1:], "."), rd.domain)
} else {
newBase = fmt.Sprintf("%s%s.%s", basePart, suffix, rd.domain)
}
if !seen[newBase] && !rd.isFound(newBase) {
seen[newBase] = true
candidates = append(candidates, newBase)
}
// With dash: api-1.example.com
if len(parts) > 1 {
newBase = fmt.Sprintf("%s-%s.%s.%s", basePart, suffix, strings.Join(parts[1:], "."), rd.domain)
} else {
newBase = fmt.Sprintf("%s-%s.%s", basePart, suffix, rd.domain)
}
if !seen[newBase] && !rd.isFound(newBase) {
seen[newBase] = true
candidates = append(candidates, newBase)
}
}
}
}
// Limit candidates per depth to avoid explosion
maxCandidates := 5000 / depth
if len(candidates) > maxCandidates {
candidates = candidates[:maxCandidates]
}
return candidates
}
// resolveParallel resolves candidates in parallel
func (rd *RecursiveDiscovery) resolveParallel(ctx context.Context, candidates []string) []string {
var results []string
var resultsMu sync.Mutex
var wg sync.WaitGroup
sem := make(chan struct{}, rd.concurrency)
for _, candidate := range candidates {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
break
default:
}
wg.Add(1)
go func(sub string) {
defer wg.Done()
sem <- struct{}{}
defer func() { <-sem }()
// Check context
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
default:
}
ips := dns.ResolveSubdomain(sub, rd.resolvers, rd.timeout)
if len(ips) > 0 {
rd.foundMu.Lock()
if !rd.found[sub] {
rd.found[sub] = true
resultsMu.Lock()
results = append(results, sub)
resultsMu.Unlock()
}
rd.foundMu.Unlock()
}
}(candidate)
}
wg.Wait()
return results
}
// isFound checks if subdomain was already found
func (rd *RecursiveDiscovery) isFound(sub string) bool {
rd.foundMu.RLock()
defer rd.foundMu.RUnlock()
return rd.found[sub]
}
// GetPatterns returns the learned patterns
func (rd *RecursiveDiscovery) GetPatterns() *PatternLearner {
return rd.patterns
}
// DiscoveryStats returns statistics about the discovery
type DiscoveryStats struct {
TotalFound int
ByDepth map[int]int
LearnedPatterns int
}
// GetStats returns discovery statistics
func (rd *RecursiveDiscovery) GetStats() DiscoveryStats {
rd.foundMu.RLock()
defer rd.foundMu.RUnlock()
return DiscoveryStats{
TotalFound: len(rd.found),
LearnedPatterns: len(rd.patterns.prefixes),
}
}
+27 -17
View File
@@ -2,14 +2,13 @@ package dns
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/miekg/dns"
"god-eye/internal/cache"
"god-eye/internal/config"
"god-eye/internal/retry"
)
@@ -253,20 +252,31 @@ func ResolveNS(domain string, resolvers []string, timeout int) []string {
return nil
}
// GetIPInfo retrieves IP geolocation info with caching (10x faster for repeated IPs)
func GetIPInfo(ip string) (*config.IPInfo, error) {
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}
url := fmt.Sprintf("http://ip-api.com/json/%s?fields=as,org,country,city", ip)
resp, err := client.Get(url)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
var info config.IPInfo
if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&info); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &info, nil
return cache.GetIPInfoCached(ip)
}
// GetIPInfoBatch retrieves IP info for multiple IPs efficiently
// Uses LRU cache and batches uncached lookups
func GetIPInfoBatch(ips []string) map[string]*config.IPInfo {
return cache.BatchIPLookup(ips)
}
// ResolveSubdomainCached resolves with DNS caching
func ResolveSubdomainCached(subdomain string, resolvers []string, timeout int) []string {
dnsCache := cache.GetDNSCache()
// Check cache first
if ips, found := dnsCache.Get(subdomain); found {
return ips
}
// Resolve and cache
ips := ResolveSubdomain(subdomain, resolvers, timeout)
if len(ips) > 0 {
dnsCache.Set(subdomain, ips)
}
return ips
}
+213
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
package fingerprint
import (
"strings"
"god-eye/internal/ai"
)
// CVEMatch represents a CVE found for a technology
type CVEMatch struct {
CVEID string `json:"cve_id"`
Product string `json:"product"`
Vendor string `json:"vendor"`
Description string `json:"description"`
Severity string `json:"severity"` // critical, high, medium, low
Ransomware bool `json:"ransomware_used"`
DateAdded string `json:"date_added"`
}
// techNameMappings maps common technology names to KEV product/vendor names
var techNameMappings = map[string][]string{
// Web servers
"nginx": {"nginx"},
"apache": {"apache", "http server", "httpd"},
"microsoft-iis": {"iis", "internet information services"},
"litespeed": {"litespeed"},
// CMS
"wordpress": {"wordpress"},
"drupal": {"drupal"},
"joomla": {"joomla"},
"magento": {"magento"},
// Frameworks
"php": {"php"},
"asp.net": {"asp.net", ".net framework"},
"django": {"django"},
"ruby on rails": {"ruby on rails", "rails"},
"spring": {"spring"},
"laravel": {"laravel"},
// JavaScript
"jquery": {"jquery"},
"angular": {"angular"},
"react": {"react"},
"vue.js": {"vue", "vuejs"},
"next.js": {"next.js", "nextjs"},
"node.js": {"node.js", "nodejs"},
// Security/CDN
"cloudflare": {"cloudflare"},
"cloudflare waf": {"cloudflare"},
"aws waf": {"amazon", "aws"},
"akamai": {"akamai"},
// Databases (if detected via error messages)
"mysql": {"mysql"},
"postgresql": {"postgresql", "postgres"},
"mongodb": {"mongodb"},
"redis": {"redis"},
// Infrastructure
"amazon s3": {"amazon", "s3"},
"vercel": {"vercel"},
"heroku": {"heroku"},
}
// EnrichWithCVEs enriches technologies with CVE data from KEV database
func EnrichWithCVEs(techs []Technology) []Technology {
kevStore := ai.GetKEVStore()
// Ensure KEV is loaded
if !kevStore.IsLoaded() {
if err := kevStore.Load(); err != nil {
return techs // Return unchanged if KEV not available
}
}
enriched := make([]Technology, len(techs))
copy(enriched, techs)
for i := range enriched {
tech := &enriched[i]
cves := findCVEsForTech(kevStore, tech.Name, tech.Version)
if len(cves) > 0 {
tech.CVEs = make([]string, 0, len(cves))
for _, cve := range cves {
tech.CVEs = append(tech.CVEs, cve.CVEID)
}
}
}
return enriched
}
// findCVEsForTech searches KEV database for CVEs matching a technology
func findCVEsForTech(kevStore *ai.KEVStore, techName string, version string) []CVEMatch {
var matches []CVEMatch
seen := make(map[string]bool)
techLower := strings.ToLower(techName)
// Get search terms for this technology
searchTerms := []string{techLower}
if mappings, ok := techNameMappings[techLower]; ok {
searchTerms = append(searchTerms, mappings...)
}
// Search KEV for each term
for _, term := range searchTerms {
vulns := kevStore.SearchByProduct(term)
for _, vuln := range vulns {
if seen[vuln.CveID] {
continue
}
seen[vuln.CveID] = true
severity := classifyKEVSeverity(vuln)
matches = append(matches, CVEMatch{
CVEID: vuln.CveID,
Product: vuln.Product,
Vendor: vuln.VendorProject,
Description: vuln.ShortDescription,
Severity: severity,
Ransomware: strings.ToLower(vuln.KnownRansomwareCampaignUse) == "known",
DateAdded: vuln.DateAdded,
})
}
}
return matches
}
// classifyKEVSeverity assigns severity based on KEV characteristics
// All KEV entries are actively exploited, so minimum is "high"
func classifyKEVSeverity(vuln ai.KEVulnerability) string {
// Ransomware-associated vulnerabilities are critical
if strings.ToLower(vuln.KnownRansomwareCampaignUse) == "known" {
return "critical"
}
// Keywords that indicate critical severity
criticalKeywords := []string{
"remote code execution", "rce",
"unauthenticated", "authentication bypass",
"privilege escalation", "root",
"arbitrary code", "command injection",
}
descLower := strings.ToLower(vuln.ShortDescription)
for _, keyword := range criticalKeywords {
if strings.Contains(descLower, keyword) {
return "critical"
}
}
return "high" // Minimum for KEV (all are actively exploited)
}
// GetCVEDetails returns detailed CVE matches for a technology
func GetCVEDetails(techName string, version string) []CVEMatch {
kevStore := ai.GetKEVStore()
if !kevStore.IsLoaded() {
if err := kevStore.Load(); err != nil {
return nil
}
}
return findCVEsForTech(kevStore, techName, version)
}
// HasKnownVulnerabilities checks if any technology has known CVEs
func HasKnownVulnerabilities(techs []Technology) bool {
kevStore := ai.GetKEVStore()
if !kevStore.IsLoaded() {
return false
}
for _, tech := range techs {
cves := findCVEsForTech(kevStore, tech.Name, tech.Version)
if len(cves) > 0 {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// GetCriticalCVEs returns only critical/ransomware CVEs for technologies
func GetCriticalCVEs(techs []Technology) []CVEMatch {
var critical []CVEMatch
kevStore := ai.GetKEVStore()
if !kevStore.IsLoaded() {
return critical
}
seen := make(map[string]bool)
for _, tech := range techs {
cves := findCVEsForTech(kevStore, tech.Name, tech.Version)
for _, cve := range cves {
if seen[cve.CVEID] {
continue
}
if cve.Severity == "critical" || cve.Ransomware {
seen[cve.CVEID] = true
critical = append(critical, cve)
}
}
}
return critical
}
+594
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,594 @@
package fingerprint
import (
"context"
"io"
"net/http"
"regexp"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
)
// Technology represents a detected technology
type Technology struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
Category string `json:"category"`
Version string `json:"version,omitempty"`
Confidence int `json:"confidence"` // 0-100
CVEs []string `json:"cves,omitempty"`
Website string `json:"website,omitempty"`
}
// TechScanner performs technology fingerprinting
type TechScanner struct {
client *http.Client
patterns []*TechPattern
}
// TechPattern defines detection patterns for a technology
type TechPattern struct {
Name string
Category string
Website string
Headers map[string]*regexp.Regexp // Header name -> value pattern
Cookies []string // Cookie names
HTML []*regexp.Regexp // HTML body patterns
Scripts []*regexp.Regexp // Script src patterns
Meta map[string]*regexp.Regexp // Meta tag name -> content pattern
Implies []string // Other technologies implied
VersionExtr *regexp.Regexp // Version extraction pattern
}
// NewTechScanner creates a new technology scanner
func NewTechScanner(timeout int) *TechScanner {
return &TechScanner{
client: &http.Client{
Timeout: time.Duration(timeout) * time.Second,
CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
if len(via) >= 3 {
return http.ErrUseLastResponse
}
return nil
},
},
patterns: getTechPatterns(),
}
}
// ScanHost scans a host for technologies
func (ts *TechScanner) ScanHost(ctx context.Context, host string) []Technology {
var techs []Technology
seen := make(map[string]bool)
// Try HTTPS first, then HTTP
urls := []string{
"https://" + host,
"http://" + host,
}
for _, url := range urls {
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
if err != nil {
continue
}
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36")
resp, err := ts.client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
continue
}
body, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 512*1024))
resp.Body.Close()
// Analyze response
for _, pattern := range ts.patterns {
if seen[pattern.Name] {
continue
}
tech := ts.matchPattern(pattern, resp, body)
if tech != nil {
seen[pattern.Name] = true
techs = append(techs, *tech)
// Add implied technologies
for _, implied := range pattern.Implies {
if !seen[implied] {
seen[implied] = true
techs = append(techs, Technology{
Name: implied,
Category: "implied",
Confidence: 50,
})
}
}
}
}
// If we got results from HTTPS, skip HTTP
if len(techs) > 0 {
break
}
}
return techs
}
// matchPattern checks if a response matches a technology pattern
func (ts *TechScanner) matchPattern(pattern *TechPattern, resp *http.Response, body []byte) *Technology {
confidence := 0
version := ""
// Check headers
for headerName, headerPattern := range pattern.Headers {
headerValue := resp.Header.Get(headerName)
if headerValue != "" && headerPattern.MatchString(headerValue) {
confidence += 30
// Try to extract version
if pattern.VersionExtr != nil {
if match := pattern.VersionExtr.FindStringSubmatch(headerValue); len(match) > 1 {
version = match[1]
}
}
}
}
// Check cookies
for _, cookieName := range pattern.Cookies {
for _, cookie := range resp.Cookies() {
if strings.EqualFold(cookie.Name, cookieName) {
confidence += 20
}
}
}
bodyStr := string(body)
bodyLower := strings.ToLower(bodyStr)
// Check HTML patterns
for _, htmlPattern := range pattern.HTML {
if htmlPattern.MatchString(bodyStr) || htmlPattern.MatchString(bodyLower) {
confidence += 25
// Try to extract version
if pattern.VersionExtr != nil && version == "" {
if match := pattern.VersionExtr.FindStringSubmatch(bodyStr); len(match) > 1 {
version = match[1]
}
}
}
}
// Check script patterns
for _, scriptPattern := range pattern.Scripts {
if scriptPattern.MatchString(bodyStr) {
confidence += 20
}
}
// Check meta tags
for metaName, metaPattern := range pattern.Meta {
metaRegex := regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)<meta[^>]*name=["']` + metaName + `["'][^>]*content=["']([^"']+)["']`)
if match := metaRegex.FindStringSubmatch(bodyStr); len(match) > 1 {
if metaPattern.MatchString(match[1]) {
confidence += 25
if pattern.VersionExtr != nil && version == "" {
if verMatch := pattern.VersionExtr.FindStringSubmatch(match[1]); len(verMatch) > 1 {
version = verMatch[1]
}
}
}
}
}
if confidence >= 20 {
if confidence > 100 {
confidence = 100
}
return &Technology{
Name: pattern.Name,
Category: pattern.Category,
Version: version,
Confidence: confidence,
Website: pattern.Website,
}
}
return nil
}
// ScanMultipleHosts scans multiple hosts concurrently
func (ts *TechScanner) ScanMultipleHosts(ctx context.Context, hosts []string, concurrency int) map[string][]Technology {
results := make(map[string][]Technology)
var mu sync.Mutex
var wg sync.WaitGroup
sem := make(chan struct{}, concurrency)
for _, host := range hosts {
wg.Add(1)
go func(h string) {
defer wg.Done()
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case sem <- struct{}{}:
defer func() { <-sem }()
}
techs := ts.ScanHost(ctx, h)
if len(techs) > 0 {
mu.Lock()
results[h] = techs
mu.Unlock()
}
}(host)
}
wg.Wait()
return results
}
// getTechPatterns returns compiled technology detection patterns
func getTechPatterns() []*TechPattern {
patterns := []*TechPattern{
// Web Servers
{
Name: "Nginx",
Category: "web-server",
Website: "https://nginx.org",
Headers: map[string]*regexp.Regexp{
"Server": regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)nginx`),
},
VersionExtr: regexp.MustCompile(`nginx/([0-9.]+)`),
},
{
Name: "Apache",
Category: "web-server",
Website: "https://httpd.apache.org",
Headers: map[string]*regexp.Regexp{
"Server": regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)apache`),
},
VersionExtr: regexp.MustCompile(`Apache/([0-9.]+)`),
},
{
Name: "Microsoft-IIS",
Category: "web-server",
Website: "https://www.iis.net",
Headers: map[string]*regexp.Regexp{
"Server": regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)microsoft-iis`),
},
VersionExtr: regexp.MustCompile(`IIS/([0-9.]+)`),
},
{
Name: "LiteSpeed",
Category: "web-server",
Headers: map[string]*regexp.Regexp{
"Server": regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)litespeed`),
},
},
{
Name: "Cloudflare",
Category: "cdn",
Website: "https://cloudflare.com",
Headers: map[string]*regexp.Regexp{
"Server": regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)cloudflare`),
"Cf-Ray": regexp.MustCompile(`.+`),
"Cf-Cache": regexp.MustCompile(`.+`),
},
},
// JavaScript Frameworks
{
Name: "React",
Category: "javascript-framework",
Website: "https://react.dev",
HTML: []*regexp.Regexp{
regexp.MustCompile(`data-reactroot`),
regexp.MustCompile(`__REACT_DEVTOOLS_GLOBAL_HOOK__`),
},
Scripts: []*regexp.Regexp{
regexp.MustCompile(`react(?:\.min)?\.js`),
regexp.MustCompile(`react-dom`),
},
},
{
Name: "Vue.js",
Category: "javascript-framework",
Website: "https://vuejs.org",
HTML: []*regexp.Regexp{
regexp.MustCompile(`data-v-[a-f0-9]`),
regexp.MustCompile(`__VUE__`),
},
Scripts: []*regexp.Regexp{
regexp.MustCompile(`vue(?:\.min)?\.js`),
},
},
{
Name: "Angular",
Category: "javascript-framework",
Website: "https://angular.io",
HTML: []*regexp.Regexp{
regexp.MustCompile(`ng-version=`),
regexp.MustCompile(`ng-app`),
regexp.MustCompile(`\[\(ngModel\)\]`),
},
VersionExtr: regexp.MustCompile(`ng-version="([0-9.]+)"`),
},
{
Name: "jQuery",
Category: "javascript-library",
Website: "https://jquery.com",
Scripts: []*regexp.Regexp{
regexp.MustCompile(`jquery[.-]([0-9.]+)(?:\.min)?\.js`),
},
HTML: []*regexp.Regexp{
regexp.MustCompile(`jQuery\s*v?([0-9.]+)`),
},
VersionExtr: regexp.MustCompile(`([0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+)`),
},
{
Name: "Next.js",
Category: "javascript-framework",
Website: "https://nextjs.org",
HTML: []*regexp.Regexp{
regexp.MustCompile(`_next/static`),
regexp.MustCompile(`__NEXT_DATA__`),
},
Implies: []string{"React", "Node.js"},
},
{
Name: "Nuxt.js",
Category: "javascript-framework",
Website: "https://nuxt.com",
HTML: []*regexp.Regexp{
regexp.MustCompile(`__NUXT__`),
regexp.MustCompile(`_nuxt/`),
},
Implies: []string{"Vue.js", "Node.js"},
},
// CMS
{
Name: "WordPress",
Category: "cms",
Website: "https://wordpress.org",
HTML: []*regexp.Regexp{
regexp.MustCompile(`wp-content/`),
regexp.MustCompile(`wp-includes/`),
},
Meta: map[string]*regexp.Regexp{
"generator": regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)wordpress`),
},
VersionExtr: regexp.MustCompile(`WordPress\s*([0-9.]+)`),
Implies: []string{"PHP", "MySQL"},
},
{
Name: "Drupal",
Category: "cms",
Website: "https://drupal.org",
HTML: []*regexp.Regexp{
regexp.MustCompile(`Drupal\.settings`),
regexp.MustCompile(`/sites/default/files`),
},
Headers: map[string]*regexp.Regexp{
"X-Drupal-Cache": regexp.MustCompile(`.+`),
"X-Generator": regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)drupal`),
},
Implies: []string{"PHP"},
},
{
Name: "Joomla",
Category: "cms",
Website: "https://joomla.org",
HTML: []*regexp.Regexp{
regexp.MustCompile(`/media/jui/`),
regexp.MustCompile(`Joomla!`),
},
Meta: map[string]*regexp.Regexp{
"generator": regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)joomla`),
},
Implies: []string{"PHP"},
},
// E-commerce
{
Name: "Shopify",
Category: "ecommerce",
Website: "https://shopify.com",
HTML: []*regexp.Regexp{
regexp.MustCompile(`cdn\.shopify\.com`),
regexp.MustCompile(`Shopify\.theme`),
},
Headers: map[string]*regexp.Regexp{
"X-ShopId": regexp.MustCompile(`.+`),
},
},
{
Name: "WooCommerce",
Category: "ecommerce",
Website: "https://woocommerce.com",
HTML: []*regexp.Regexp{
regexp.MustCompile(`woocommerce`),
regexp.MustCompile(`wc-block-`),
},
Implies: []string{"WordPress", "PHP"},
},
{
Name: "Magento",
Category: "ecommerce",
Website: "https://magento.com",
HTML: []*regexp.Regexp{
regexp.MustCompile(`/static/version`),
regexp.MustCompile(`Mage\.Cookies`),
},
Cookies: []string{"frontend", "adminhtml"},
Implies: []string{"PHP"},
},
// Backend Frameworks
{
Name: "PHP",
Category: "programming-language",
Website: "https://php.net",
Headers: map[string]*regexp.Regexp{
"X-Powered-By": regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)php`),
},
Cookies: []string{"PHPSESSID"},
VersionExtr: regexp.MustCompile(`PHP/([0-9.]+)`),
},
{
Name: "ASP.NET",
Category: "web-framework",
Website: "https://dotnet.microsoft.com",
Headers: map[string]*regexp.Regexp{
"X-Powered-By": regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)asp\.net`),
"X-AspNet": regexp.MustCompile(`.+`),
},
Cookies: []string{"ASP.NET_SessionId", ".AspNetCore.Session"},
},
{
Name: "Express",
Category: "web-framework",
Website: "https://expressjs.com",
Headers: map[string]*regexp.Regexp{
"X-Powered-By": regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)express`),
},
Implies: []string{"Node.js"},
},
{
Name: "Django",
Category: "web-framework",
Website: "https://djangoproject.com",
Cookies: []string{"csrftoken", "django_language"},
Headers: map[string]*regexp.Regexp{
"X-Frame-Options": regexp.MustCompile(`SAMEORIGIN`), // Common Django default
},
Implies: []string{"Python"},
},
{
Name: "Ruby on Rails",
Category: "web-framework",
Website: "https://rubyonrails.org",
Headers: map[string]*regexp.Regexp{
"X-Powered-By": regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)phusion|passenger`),
},
Cookies: []string{"_rails_session"},
HTML: []*regexp.Regexp{
regexp.MustCompile(`data-turbo`),
regexp.MustCompile(`turbolinks`),
},
Implies: []string{"Ruby"},
},
{
Name: "Laravel",
Category: "web-framework",
Website: "https://laravel.com",
Cookies: []string{"laravel_session", "XSRF-TOKEN"},
Implies: []string{"PHP"},
},
{
Name: "Spring",
Category: "web-framework",
Website: "https://spring.io",
Cookies: []string{"JSESSIONID"},
Headers: map[string]*regexp.Regexp{
"X-Application-Context": regexp.MustCompile(`.+`),
},
Implies: []string{"Java"},
},
// Security
{
Name: "Cloudflare WAF",
Category: "waf",
Headers: map[string]*regexp.Regexp{
"Cf-Ray": regexp.MustCompile(`.+`),
"Cf-Cache-Status": regexp.MustCompile(`.+`),
"Cf-Request-Id": regexp.MustCompile(`.+`),
},
},
{
Name: "AWS WAF",
Category: "waf",
Headers: map[string]*regexp.Regexp{
"X-Amzn-Waf": regexp.MustCompile(`.+`),
"X-Amz-Cf-Id": regexp.MustCompile(`.+`),
},
},
{
Name: "Akamai",
Category: "cdn",
Headers: map[string]*regexp.Regexp{
"X-Akamai-Transformed": regexp.MustCompile(`.+`),
"Akamai-Origin-Hop": regexp.MustCompile(`.+`),
},
},
// Analytics
{
Name: "Google Analytics",
Category: "analytics",
Website: "https://analytics.google.com",
Scripts: []*regexp.Regexp{
regexp.MustCompile(`google-analytics\.com/analytics\.js`),
regexp.MustCompile(`googletagmanager\.com/gtag`),
regexp.MustCompile(`ga\('create'`),
},
HTML: []*regexp.Regexp{
regexp.MustCompile(`UA-[0-9]+-[0-9]+`),
regexp.MustCompile(`G-[A-Z0-9]+`),
},
},
{
Name: "Google Tag Manager",
Category: "tag-manager",
Website: "https://tagmanager.google.com",
Scripts: []*regexp.Regexp{
regexp.MustCompile(`googletagmanager\.com/gtm\.js`),
},
HTML: []*regexp.Regexp{
regexp.MustCompile(`GTM-[A-Z0-9]+`),
},
},
// Hosting/Infrastructure
{
Name: "Amazon S3",
Category: "cloud-storage",
Headers: map[string]*regexp.Regexp{
"X-Amz-Request-Id": regexp.MustCompile(`.+`),
"X-Amz-Id-2": regexp.MustCompile(`.+`),
"Server": regexp.MustCompile(`AmazonS3`),
},
},
{
Name: "Vercel",
Category: "paas",
Website: "https://vercel.com",
Headers: map[string]*regexp.Regexp{
"X-Vercel-Id": regexp.MustCompile(`.+`),
"X-Vercel-Cache": regexp.MustCompile(`.+`),
},
},
{
Name: "Netlify",
Category: "paas",
Website: "https://netlify.com",
Headers: map[string]*regexp.Regexp{
"X-Nf-Request-Id": regexp.MustCompile(`.+`),
"Server": regexp.MustCompile(`Netlify`),
},
},
{
Name: "Heroku",
Category: "paas",
Website: "https://heroku.com",
Headers: map[string]*regexp.Regexp{
"Via": regexp.MustCompile(`vegur`),
},
},
}
return patterns
}
+210
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
package http
import (
"crypto/tls"
"net"
"net/http"
"sync"
"time"
)
// ClientFactory manages shared HTTP clients with connection pooling
type ClientFactory struct {
// Shared transports for connection reuse
secureTransport *http.Transport
insecureTransport *http.Transport
// Pre-configured clients
defaultClient *http.Client
fastClient *http.Client
noRedirect *http.Client
insecureClient *http.Client
mu sync.RWMutex
}
var (
factory *ClientFactory
factoryOnce sync.Once
)
// GetFactory returns the singleton client factory
func GetFactory() *ClientFactory {
factoryOnce.Do(func() {
factory = newClientFactory()
})
return factory
}
func newClientFactory() *ClientFactory {
// Secure transport with TLS verification
secureTransport := &http.Transport{
DialContext: (&net.Dialer{
Timeout: 10 * time.Second,
KeepAlive: 30 * time.Second,
}).DialContext,
MaxIdleConns: 200,
MaxIdleConnsPerHost: 20,
MaxConnsPerHost: 50,
IdleConnTimeout: 90 * time.Second,
TLSHandshakeTimeout: 10 * time.Second,
TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{
MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12,
},
ForceAttemptHTTP2: true,
ExpectContinueTimeout: 1 * time.Second,
}
// Insecure transport (for scanning targets with invalid certs)
insecureTransport := &http.Transport{
DialContext: (&net.Dialer{
Timeout: 10 * time.Second,
KeepAlive: 30 * time.Second,
}).DialContext,
MaxIdleConns: 200,
MaxIdleConnsPerHost: 20,
MaxConnsPerHost: 50,
IdleConnTimeout: 90 * time.Second,
TLSHandshakeTimeout: 10 * time.Second,
TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{
InsecureSkipVerify: true,
MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS10, // Support older servers
},
ForceAttemptHTTP2: true,
ExpectContinueTimeout: 1 * time.Second,
}
return &ClientFactory{
secureTransport: secureTransport,
insecureTransport: insecureTransport,
defaultClient: &http.Client{
Transport: insecureTransport,
Timeout: 15 * time.Second,
},
fastClient: &http.Client{
Transport: insecureTransport,
Timeout: 5 * time.Second,
},
noRedirect: &http.Client{
Transport: insecureTransport,
Timeout: 10 * time.Second,
CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
return http.ErrUseLastResponse
},
},
insecureClient: &http.Client{
Transport: insecureTransport,
Timeout: 10 * time.Second,
},
}
}
// Default returns the default client with 15s timeout
func (f *ClientFactory) Default() *http.Client {
return f.defaultClient
}
// Fast returns a client with 5s timeout for quick checks
func (f *ClientFactory) Fast() *http.Client {
return f.fastClient
}
// NoRedirect returns a client that doesn't follow redirects
func (f *ClientFactory) NoRedirect() *http.Client {
return f.noRedirect
}
// Insecure returns a client with TLS verification disabled
func (f *ClientFactory) Insecure() *http.Client {
return f.insecureClient
}
// WithTimeout creates a client with custom timeout (reuses transport)
func (f *ClientFactory) WithTimeout(timeout time.Duration) *http.Client {
return &http.Client{
Transport: f.insecureTransport,
Timeout: timeout,
}
}
// WithTimeoutNoRedirect creates a client with custom timeout that doesn't follow redirects
func (f *ClientFactory) WithTimeoutNoRedirect(timeout time.Duration) *http.Client {
return &http.Client{
Transport: f.insecureTransport,
Timeout: timeout,
CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
return http.ErrUseLastResponse
},
}
}
// Secure returns a client with TLS verification enabled (for passive sources)
func (f *ClientFactory) Secure() *http.Client {
return &http.Client{
Transport: f.secureTransport,
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
}
}
// SecureWithTimeout creates a secure client with custom timeout
func (f *ClientFactory) SecureWithTimeout(timeout time.Duration) *http.Client {
return &http.Client{
Transport: f.secureTransport,
Timeout: timeout,
}
}
// CloseIdleConnections closes idle connections in all transports
func (f *ClientFactory) CloseIdleConnections() {
f.secureTransport.CloseIdleConnections()
f.insecureTransport.CloseIdleConnections()
}
// Stats returns connection pool statistics
type PoolStats struct {
SecureIdleConns int
InsecureIdleConns int
}
// GetStats returns current pool statistics (approximation)
func (f *ClientFactory) GetStats() PoolStats {
// Note: Go's http.Transport doesn't expose detailed stats
// This is a placeholder for future monitoring
return PoolStats{}
}
// Convenience functions for direct access
// DefaultClient returns the default shared client
func DefaultClient() *http.Client {
return GetFactory().Default()
}
// FastClient returns the fast shared client (5s timeout)
func FastClient() *http.Client {
return GetFactory().Fast()
}
// NoRedirectClient returns a client that doesn't follow redirects
func NoRedirectClient() *http.Client {
return GetFactory().NoRedirect()
}
// InsecureClient returns a client with TLS verification disabled
func InsecureClient() *http.Client {
return GetFactory().Insecure()
}
// SecureClient returns a client with TLS verification enabled
func SecureClient() *http.Client {
return GetFactory().Secure()
}
// ClientWithTimeout returns a client with custom timeout
func ClientWithTimeout(timeout time.Duration) *http.Client {
return GetFactory().WithTimeout(timeout)
}
+389
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@@ -0,0 +1,389 @@
package network
import (
"bufio"
"context"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"net/http"
"regexp"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
)
// ASNInfo holds ASN information for an IP
type ASNInfo struct {
ASN string `json:"asn"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Country string `json:"country"`
CIDR string `json:"cidr"`
Range string `json:"range"`
NumHosts int `json:"num_hosts"`
RelatedIPs []string `json:"related_ips,omitempty"`
}
// ASNScanner discovers ASN/CIDR information and related IPs
type ASNScanner struct {
client *http.Client
timeout int
}
// NewASNScanner creates a new ASN scanner
func NewASNScanner(timeout int) *ASNScanner {
return &ASNScanner{
client: &http.Client{
Timeout: time.Duration(timeout) * time.Second,
},
timeout: timeout,
}
}
// GetASNInfo retrieves ASN information for an IP using free services
func (as *ASNScanner) GetASNInfo(ctx context.Context, ip string) (*ASNInfo, error) {
// Use ip-api.com (free, no API key needed, 45 requests/minute)
info, err := as.queryIPAPI(ctx, ip)
if err == nil && info != nil {
return info, nil
}
// Fallback to Team Cymru DNS-based ASN lookup (no rate limits)
return as.queryTeamCymruDNS(ip)
}
// queryIPAPI queries ip-api.com for ASN info
func (as *ASNScanner) queryIPAPI(ctx context.Context, ip string) (*ASNInfo, error) {
url := fmt.Sprintf("http://ip-api.com/line/%s?fields=as,org,country,query", ip)
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
resp, err := as.client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != 200 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ip-api returned status %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
body, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1024))
lines := strings.Split(string(body), "\n")
if len(lines) < 3 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid response from ip-api")
}
// Parse ASN from "AS12345 Name" format
asnParts := strings.SplitN(lines[0], " ", 2)
asn := ""
name := ""
if len(asnParts) >= 1 {
asn = strings.TrimPrefix(asnParts[0], "AS")
}
if len(asnParts) >= 2 {
name = asnParts[1]
}
return &ASNInfo{
ASN: asn,
Name: name,
Country: lines[2],
}, nil
}
// queryTeamCymruDNS uses Team Cymru DNS for ASN lookup (free, no limits)
func (as *ASNScanner) queryTeamCymruDNS(ip string) (*ASNInfo, error) {
// Reverse IP for DNS query
parts := strings.Split(ip, ".")
if len(parts) != 4 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid IPv4 address")
}
// Reverse the IP
reversed := fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s.%s.%s", parts[3], parts[2], parts[1], parts[0])
// Query Team Cymru origin.asn.cymru.com
query := fmt.Sprintf("%s.origin.asn.cymru.com", reversed)
txtRecords, err := net.LookupTXT(query)
if err != nil || len(txtRecords) == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("DNS ASN lookup failed: %v", err)
}
// Parse response: "ASN | CIDR | Country | Registry | Date"
record := txtRecords[0]
fields := strings.Split(record, "|")
if len(fields) < 3 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid TXT record format")
}
asn := strings.TrimSpace(fields[0])
cidr := strings.TrimSpace(fields[1])
country := strings.TrimSpace(fields[2])
// Get ASN name from asn.cymru.com
name := ""
nameQuery := fmt.Sprintf("AS%s.asn.cymru.com", asn)
nameRecords, err := net.LookupTXT(nameQuery)
if err == nil && len(nameRecords) > 0 {
// Parse: "ASN | Country | Registry | Date | Name"
nameFields := strings.Split(nameRecords[0], "|")
if len(nameFields) >= 5 {
name = strings.TrimSpace(nameFields[4])
}
}
// Calculate number of hosts in CIDR
numHosts := 0
if cidr != "" {
numHosts = calculateCIDRHosts(cidr)
}
return &ASNInfo{
ASN: asn,
Name: name,
Country: country,
CIDR: cidr,
NumHosts: numHosts,
}, nil
}
// GetRelatedIPs discovers other IPs in the same CIDR range
// Only scans a subset for large ranges to avoid abuse
func (as *ASNScanner) GetRelatedIPs(ctx context.Context, cidr string, maxIPs int) []string {
if cidr == "" || maxIPs <= 0 {
return nil
}
_, ipnet, err := net.ParseCIDR(cidr)
if err != nil {
return nil
}
var relatedIPs []string
// Get network size
ones, bits := ipnet.Mask.Size()
hostBits := bits - ones
totalHosts := 1 << hostBits
// Limit scanning for large networks
if totalHosts > maxIPs {
// Sample IPs from the range instead of scanning all
return as.sampleCIDR(ipnet, maxIPs)
}
// For smaller ranges, enumerate all
ip := ipnet.IP
for ip := ip.Mask(ipnet.Mask); ipnet.Contains(ip); incrementIP(ip) {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return relatedIPs
default:
}
// Skip network and broadcast addresses
if ip[3] == 0 || ip[3] == 255 {
continue
}
relatedIPs = append(relatedIPs, ip.String())
if len(relatedIPs) >= maxIPs {
break
}
}
return relatedIPs
}
// sampleCIDR samples IPs from a large CIDR range
func (as *ASNScanner) sampleCIDR(ipnet *net.IPNet, maxIPs int) []string {
var samples []string
ip := make(net.IP, len(ipnet.IP))
copy(ip, ipnet.IP)
ones, bits := ipnet.Mask.Size()
hostBits := bits - ones
totalHosts := 1 << hostBits
// Step size to get approximately maxIPs samples
step := totalHosts / maxIPs
if step < 1 {
step = 1
}
for i := 1; i < totalHosts && len(samples) < maxIPs; i += step {
// Calculate IP at position i
sampleIP := make(net.IP, 4)
baseIP := ipToInt(ipnet.IP)
sampleIP = intToIP(baseIP + uint32(i))
if ipnet.Contains(sampleIP) && sampleIP[3] != 0 && sampleIP[3] != 255 {
samples = append(samples, sampleIP.String())
}
}
return samples
}
// ExpandASN expands an ASN to find all related CIDR ranges using BGPView (free API)
func (as *ASNScanner) ExpandASN(ctx context.Context, asn string) ([]string, error) {
// Clean ASN format
asn = strings.TrimPrefix(strings.ToUpper(asn), "AS")
url := fmt.Sprintf("https://api.bgpview.io/asn/%s/prefixes", asn)
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "god-eye/1.0 (security scanner)")
resp, err := as.client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != 200 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("bgpview returned status %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
body, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1024*1024))
// Simple parsing without json package
var cidrs []string
// Match IPv4 prefixes: "prefix": "1.2.3.0/24"
prefixRegex := regexp.MustCompile(`"prefix":\s*"([0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+/[0-9]+)"`)
matches := prefixRegex.FindAllStringSubmatch(string(body), -1)
for _, match := range matches {
if len(match) > 1 {
cidrs = append(cidrs, match[1])
}
}
return cidrs, nil
}
// ScanASNRange performs a concurrent scan of IPs in an ASN
func (as *ASNScanner) ScanASNRange(ctx context.Context, ips []string, concurrency int,
checkFunc func(string) bool) []string {
var activeIPs []string
var mu sync.Mutex
sem := make(chan struct{}, concurrency)
var wg sync.WaitGroup
for _, ip := range ips {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
break
default:
}
wg.Add(1)
go func(ipAddr string) {
defer wg.Done()
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case sem <- struct{}{}:
defer func() { <-sem }()
}
if checkFunc(ipAddr) {
mu.Lock()
activeIPs = append(activeIPs, ipAddr)
mu.Unlock()
}
}(ip)
}
wg.Wait()
return activeIPs
}
// Helper functions
func calculateCIDRHosts(cidr string) int {
_, ipnet, err := net.ParseCIDR(cidr)
if err != nil {
return 0
}
ones, bits := ipnet.Mask.Size()
return 1 << (bits - ones)
}
func incrementIP(ip net.IP) {
for j := len(ip) - 1; j >= 0; j-- {
ip[j]++
if ip[j] > 0 {
break
}
}
}
func ipToInt(ip net.IP) uint32 {
ip = ip.To4()
if ip == nil {
return 0
}
return uint32(ip[0])<<24 | uint32(ip[1])<<16 | uint32(ip[2])<<8 | uint32(ip[3])
}
func intToIP(n uint32) net.IP {
return net.IPv4(byte(n>>24), byte(n>>16), byte(n>>8), byte(n))
}
// ReverseWhois performs reverse whois lookup to find related domains (uses ViewDNS free tier)
func (as *ASNScanner) ReverseWhois(ctx context.Context, domain string) ([]string, error) {
// Note: This is rate-limited but doesn't require API key
// Extract organization from domain whois and search for it
// For now, use HackerTarget free API (50 queries/day)
url := fmt.Sprintf("https://api.hackertarget.com/reverseiplookup/?q=%s", domain)
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
resp, err := as.client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != 200 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("hackertarget returned status %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
body, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 100*1024))
bodyStr := string(body)
// Check for error response
if strings.Contains(bodyStr, "error") || strings.Contains(bodyStr, "API count exceeded") {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("API error: %s", bodyStr)
}
var domains []string
scanner := bufio.NewScanner(strings.NewReader(bodyStr))
for scanner.Scan() {
line := strings.TrimSpace(scanner.Text())
if line != "" && !strings.Contains(line, "error") {
domains = append(domains, line)
}
}
return domains, nil
}
+472
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,472 @@
package network
import (
"bufio"
"context"
"crypto/tls"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"net/http"
"regexp"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
)
// VHostResult holds virtual host discovery results
type VHostResult struct {
IP string `json:"ip"`
Domains []string `json:"domains"`
Source string `json:"source"` // bing, hackertarget, tls, reverse_dns
Confidence string `json:"confidence"` // high, medium, low
}
// VHostScanner discovers virtual hosts on shared IPs
type VHostScanner struct {
client *http.Client
timeout int
concurrency int
}
// NewVHostScanner creates a new virtual host scanner
func NewVHostScanner(timeout int) *VHostScanner {
return &VHostScanner{
client: &http.Client{
Timeout: time.Duration(timeout) * time.Second,
Transport: &http.Transport{
TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true},
},
},
timeout: timeout,
concurrency: 5,
}
}
// DiscoverVHosts finds all domains hosted on the same IP
func (vs *VHostScanner) DiscoverVHosts(ctx context.Context, ip string) *VHostResult {
result := &VHostResult{
IP: ip,
Domains: make([]string, 0),
}
var allDomains []string
var mu sync.Mutex
var wg sync.WaitGroup
// 1. HackerTarget Reverse IP (50/day free)
wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
domains, err := vs.queryHackerTarget(ctx, ip)
if err == nil && len(domains) > 0 {
mu.Lock()
allDomains = append(allDomains, domains...)
mu.Unlock()
}
}()
// 2. TLS Certificate SAN extraction
wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
domains := vs.extractTLSNames(ip)
if len(domains) > 0 {
mu.Lock()
allDomains = append(allDomains, domains...)
mu.Unlock()
}
}()
// 3. Reverse DNS
wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
domains := vs.reverseDNS(ip)
if len(domains) > 0 {
mu.Lock()
allDomains = append(allDomains, domains...)
mu.Unlock()
}
}()
// 4. Bing IP search (scraping, no API)
wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
domains, err := vs.queryBing(ctx, ip)
if err == nil && len(domains) > 0 {
mu.Lock()
allDomains = append(allDomains, domains...)
mu.Unlock()
}
}()
wg.Wait()
// Deduplicate results
result.Domains = deduplicateDomains(allDomains)
// Set confidence based on number of sources
if len(result.Domains) > 10 {
result.Confidence = "high"
} else if len(result.Domains) > 3 {
result.Confidence = "medium"
} else {
result.Confidence = "low"
}
result.Source = "multi-source"
return result
}
// queryHackerTarget uses HackerTarget reverse IP lookup
func (vs *VHostScanner) queryHackerTarget(ctx context.Context, ip string) ([]string, error) {
url := fmt.Sprintf("https://api.hackertarget.com/reverseiplookup/?q=%s", ip)
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
resp, err := vs.client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != 200 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("hackertarget returned %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
body, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 100*1024))
bodyStr := string(body)
// Check for error responses
if strings.Contains(bodyStr, "error") || strings.Contains(bodyStr, "API count exceeded") {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("API limit or error")
}
var domains []string
scanner := bufio.NewScanner(strings.NewReader(bodyStr))
for scanner.Scan() {
line := strings.TrimSpace(scanner.Text())
if line != "" && isValidDomain(line) {
domains = append(domains, line)
}
}
return domains, nil
}
// extractTLSNames extracts domain names from TLS certificates
func (vs *VHostScanner) extractTLSNames(ip string) []string {
var domains []string
// Try common HTTPS ports
ports := []string{"443", "8443", "8080", "8000"}
for _, port := range ports {
addr := fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", ip, port)
conn, err := tls.DialWithDialer(
&net.Dialer{Timeout: 3 * time.Second},
"tcp",
addr,
&tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true},
)
if err != nil {
continue
}
// Extract names from certificate
state := conn.ConnectionState()
for _, cert := range state.PeerCertificates {
// Subject CN
if cert.Subject.CommonName != "" && isValidDomain(cert.Subject.CommonName) {
domains = append(domains, cert.Subject.CommonName)
}
// SANs (Subject Alternative Names)
for _, san := range cert.DNSNames {
if isValidDomain(san) {
domains = append(domains, san)
}
}
}
conn.Close()
}
return domains
}
// reverseDNS performs reverse DNS lookup
func (vs *VHostScanner) reverseDNS(ip string) []string {
var domains []string
names, err := net.LookupAddr(ip)
if err != nil {
return domains
}
for _, name := range names {
// Remove trailing dot
name = strings.TrimSuffix(name, ".")
if isValidDomain(name) {
domains = append(domains, name)
}
}
return domains
}
// queryBing scrapes Bing for IP:xxx search (passive, no API)
func (vs *VHostScanner) queryBing(ctx context.Context, ip string) ([]string, error) {
// Bing IP search operator
url := fmt.Sprintf("https://www.bing.com/search?q=ip%%3A%s&count=50", ip)
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4472.124 Safari/537.36")
req.Header.Set("Accept", "text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8")
req.Header.Set("Accept-Language", "en-US,en;q=0.5")
resp, err := vs.client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != 200 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("bing returned %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
body, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 500*1024))
// Extract domains from search results
// Match href="https://domain.com/..." patterns
domainRegex := regexp.MustCompile(`href="https?://([a-zA-Z0-9][-a-zA-Z0-9]*(\.[a-zA-Z0-9][-a-zA-Z0-9]*)+)["/]`)
matches := domainRegex.FindAllStringSubmatch(string(body), -1)
seen := make(map[string]bool)
var domains []string
for _, match := range matches {
if len(match) > 1 {
domain := strings.ToLower(match[1])
// Filter out Bing/Microsoft domains
if !strings.Contains(domain, "bing.") &&
!strings.Contains(domain, "microsoft.") &&
!strings.Contains(domain, "msn.") &&
!seen[domain] &&
isValidDomain(domain) {
seen[domain] = true
domains = append(domains, domain)
}
}
}
return domains, nil
}
// BruteForceVHost tries to discover virtual hosts by sending requests with different Host headers
func (vs *VHostScanner) BruteForceVHost(ctx context.Context, ip string, hostnames []string) []string {
var validHosts []string
var mu sync.Mutex
// Get baseline response for comparison
baselineStatus, baselineSize := vs.getBaselineResponse(ip)
baseline := struct{ status, size int }{baselineStatus, baselineSize}
sem := make(chan struct{}, vs.concurrency)
var wg sync.WaitGroup
for _, hostname := range hostnames {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
break
default:
}
wg.Add(1)
go func(host string) {
defer wg.Done()
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case sem <- struct{}{}:
defer func() { <-sem }()
}
if vs.isValidVHost(ip, host, baseline) {
mu.Lock()
validHosts = append(validHosts, host)
mu.Unlock()
}
}(hostname)
}
wg.Wait()
return validHosts
}
// getBaselineResponse gets response for invalid host to compare against
func (vs *VHostScanner) getBaselineResponse(ip string) (int, int) {
url := fmt.Sprintf("https://%s/", ip)
req, err := http.NewRequest("GET", url, nil)
if err != nil {
return 0, 0
}
// Use invalid hostname
req.Host = "invalid.nonexistent.host.local"
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; SecurityScanner/1.0)")
resp, err := vs.client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return 0, 0
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
body, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 100*1024))
return resp.StatusCode, len(body)
}
// isValidVHost checks if a hostname is a valid virtual host on the IP
func (vs *VHostScanner) isValidVHost(ip, hostname string, baseline struct{ status, size int }) bool {
url := fmt.Sprintf("https://%s/", ip)
req, err := http.NewRequest("GET", url, nil)
if err != nil {
return false
}
req.Host = hostname
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; SecurityScanner/1.0)")
resp, err := vs.client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return false
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
body, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 100*1024))
// Compare with baseline - different response indicates valid vhost
if resp.StatusCode == 200 && baseline.status != 200 {
return true
}
// Check for different content length (allowing 10% variance)
if baseline.size > 0 {
sizeDiff := abs(len(body) - baseline.size)
if float64(sizeDiff)/float64(baseline.size) > 0.1 {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// DiscoverMultipleIPs discovers vhosts for multiple IPs concurrently
func (vs *VHostScanner) DiscoverMultipleIPs(ctx context.Context, ips []string, maxConcurrent int) map[string]*VHostResult {
results := make(map[string]*VHostResult)
var mu sync.Mutex
sem := make(chan struct{}, maxConcurrent)
var wg sync.WaitGroup
for _, ip := range ips {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
break
default:
}
wg.Add(1)
go func(ipAddr string) {
defer wg.Done()
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case sem <- struct{}{}:
defer func() { <-sem }()
}
result := vs.DiscoverVHosts(ctx, ipAddr)
if len(result.Domains) > 0 {
mu.Lock()
results[ipAddr] = result
mu.Unlock()
}
}(ip)
}
wg.Wait()
return results
}
// Helper functions
func deduplicateDomains(domains []string) []string {
seen := make(map[string]bool)
var unique []string
for _, d := range domains {
d = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(d))
// Remove wildcards
d = strings.TrimPrefix(d, "*.")
if d != "" && !seen[d] {
seen[d] = true
unique = append(unique, d)
}
}
return unique
}
func isValidDomain(domain string) bool {
// Basic domain validation
if len(domain) < 3 || len(domain) > 253 {
return false
}
// Must contain at least one dot
if !strings.Contains(domain, ".") {
return false
}
// Must not be an IP address
if net.ParseIP(domain) != nil {
return false
}
// Basic character check
for _, c := range domain {
if !((c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') ||
(c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') ||
(c >= '0' && c <= '9') ||
c == '.' || c == '-' || c == '_') {
return false
}
}
return true
}
func abs(n int) int {
if n < 0 {
return -n
}
return n
}
+649
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,649 @@
package scanner
import (
"context"
"strings"
"sync"
"god-eye/internal/api"
"god-eye/internal/cloud"
"god-eye/internal/config"
"god-eye/internal/fingerprint"
"god-eye/internal/network"
"god-eye/internal/output"
"god-eye/internal/progress"
"god-eye/internal/secrets"
)
// AdvancedConfig holds configuration for advanced scanning
type AdvancedConfig struct {
Domain string
Timeout int
Concurrency int
CloudScan bool
APIScan bool
SecretsScan bool
TechScan bool
ASNScan bool
VHostScan bool
Silent bool
JsonOutput bool
}
// AdvancedResults holds results from advanced scanning
type AdvancedResults struct {
CloudAssets []cloud.CloudAsset
APIFindings []api.APIFinding
Secrets []secrets.SecretFinding
Technologies map[string][]fingerprint.Technology // host -> technologies
ASNInfo map[string]*network.ASNInfo // ip -> ASN info
VHosts map[string]*network.VHostResult // ip -> virtual hosts
}
// RunAdvancedScans performs cloud, API, and secrets scanning (sequential for ordered output)
func RunAdvancedScans(ctx context.Context, results map[string]*config.SubdomainResult,
resultsMu *sync.Mutex, cfg AdvancedConfig) *AdvancedResults {
advResults := &AdvancedResults{}
// 1. Cloud Asset Discovery (first)
if cfg.CloudScan {
if !cfg.Silent && !cfg.JsonOutput {
output.PrintEndSection()
output.PrintSection("☁️", "CLOUD ASSET DISCOVERY")
}
cloudScanner := cloud.NewCloudScanner(cfg.Domain, cfg.Timeout)
assets := cloudScanner.ScanAll(ctx)
// Also check for Lambda/Cloud Functions
lambdaAssets := cloudScanner.CheckLambdaEndpoints(ctx)
assets = append(assets, lambdaAssets...)
advResults.CloudAssets = assets
if !cfg.Silent && !cfg.JsonOutput {
publicCount := 0
privateCount := 0
for _, asset := range assets {
if asset.Status == "public" {
publicCount++
} else if asset.Status == "private" {
privateCount++
}
}
if len(assets) > 0 {
output.PrintSubSection(output.Green("✓") + " Found " +
output.BoldRed(intToString(publicCount)) + " public, " +
output.BoldYellow(intToString(privateCount)) + " private cloud assets")
// Show top findings
shown := 0
for _, asset := range assets {
if shown >= 5 {
break
}
if asset.Status == "public" {
output.PrintSubSection(" " + output.Red("⚠ ") +
output.BoldWhite(asset.Type) + " " +
output.Cyan(asset.Name) + " - " +
output.Red("PUBLIC"))
shown++
}
}
} else {
output.PrintSubSection(output.Dim("No public cloud assets found"))
}
}
}
// 2. API Intelligence (second)
if cfg.APIScan {
if !cfg.Silent && !cfg.JsonOutput {
output.PrintEndSection()
output.PrintSection("🔌", "API INTELLIGENCE")
}
apiScanner := api.NewAPIScanner(cfg.Timeout)
// Scan each active subdomain
resultsMu.Lock()
hosts := make([]string, 0)
for sub, result := range results {
if result.StatusCode >= 200 && result.StatusCode < 500 {
hosts = append(hosts, sub)
}
}
resultsMu.Unlock()
var allFindings []api.APIFinding
var findingsMu sync.Mutex
// Limit concurrent API scans
sem := make(chan struct{}, 5)
var apiWg sync.WaitGroup
for _, host := range hosts {
apiWg.Add(1)
go func(h string) {
defer apiWg.Done()
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case sem <- struct{}{}:
defer func() { <-sem }()
}
findings := apiScanner.ScanHost(ctx, h)
if len(findings) > 0 {
findingsMu.Lock()
allFindings = append(allFindings, findings...)
findingsMu.Unlock()
}
}(host)
}
apiWg.Wait()
advResults.APIFindings = allFindings
if !cfg.Silent && !cfg.JsonOutput {
graphqlCount := 0
swaggerCount := 0
sensitiveCount := 0
for _, f := range allFindings {
switch f.Type {
case "graphql":
graphqlCount++
case "swagger":
swaggerCount++
case "rest":
if f.Issue == "sensitive_endpoint" {
sensitiveCount++
}
}
}
if len(allFindings) > 0 {
output.PrintSubSection(output.Green("✓") + " Found " +
output.BoldCyan(intToString(graphqlCount)) + " GraphQL, " +
output.BoldCyan(intToString(swaggerCount)) + " Swagger, " +
output.BoldYellow(intToString(sensitiveCount)) + " sensitive endpoints")
// Show critical findings
for _, f := range allFindings {
if f.Issue == "introspection_enabled" {
output.PrintSubSection(" " + output.Red("⚠ ") +
"GraphQL introspection enabled at " + output.Cyan(f.URL))
}
if f.Issue == "api_documentation_exposed" {
output.PrintSubSection(" " + output.Yellow("! ") +
"API docs exposed at " + output.Cyan(f.URL))
}
}
} else {
output.PrintSubSection(output.Dim("No critical API findings"))
}
}
}
// 3. Secrets Discovery (third)
if cfg.SecretsScan {
if !cfg.Silent && !cfg.JsonOutput {
output.PrintEndSection()
output.PrintSection("🔑", "PASSIVE CREDENTIAL DISCOVERY")
}
secretScanner := secrets.NewSecretScanner(cfg.Domain, cfg.Timeout)
secretFindings := secretScanner.ScanAll(ctx)
advResults.Secrets = secretFindings
if !cfg.Silent && !cfg.JsonOutput {
criticalCount := 0
highCount := 0
for _, s := range secretFindings {
if s.Severity == "critical" {
criticalCount++
} else if s.Severity == "high" {
highCount++
}
}
if len(secretFindings) > 0 {
output.PrintSubSection(output.Green("✓") + " Found " +
output.BoldRed(intToString(criticalCount)) + " critical, " +
output.BoldYellow(intToString(highCount)) + " high severity findings")
// Show critical findings
shown := 0
for _, s := range secretFindings {
if shown >= 5 {
break
}
if s.Severity == "critical" || s.Severity == "high" {
output.PrintSubSection(" " + output.Red("⚠ ") +
output.BoldWhite(s.Type) + " in " +
output.Cyan(s.Source) + ": " +
output.Dim(s.Description))
shown++
}
}
} else {
output.PrintSubSection(output.Dim("No secrets found in public sources"))
}
}
}
// 4. Technology Fingerprinting
if cfg.TechScan {
if !cfg.Silent && !cfg.JsonOutput {
output.PrintEndSection()
output.PrintSection("🔍", "TECHNOLOGY FINGERPRINTING")
}
techScanner := fingerprint.NewTechScanner(cfg.Timeout)
// Get active hosts
resultsMu.Lock()
hosts := make([]string, 0)
for sub, result := range results {
if result.StatusCode >= 200 && result.StatusCode < 500 {
hosts = append(hosts, sub)
}
}
resultsMu.Unlock()
// Scan for technologies
advResults.Technologies = techScanner.ScanMultipleHosts(ctx, hosts, 10)
// Enrich with CVEs
for host, techs := range advResults.Technologies {
advResults.Technologies[host] = fingerprint.EnrichWithCVEs(techs)
}
if !cfg.Silent && !cfg.JsonOutput {
totalTechs := 0
techCounts := make(map[string]int)
var criticalCVEs []fingerprint.CVEMatch
for _, techs := range advResults.Technologies {
totalTechs += len(techs)
for _, tech := range techs {
techCounts[tech.Category]++
}
criticalCVEs = append(criticalCVEs, fingerprint.GetCriticalCVEs(techs)...)
}
if totalTechs > 0 {
output.PrintSubSection(output.Green("✓") + " Detected " +
output.BoldCyan(intToString(totalTechs)) + " technologies across " +
output.BoldWhite(intToString(len(advResults.Technologies))) + " hosts")
// Show category breakdown
for category, count := range techCounts {
if count > 0 {
output.PrintSubSection(" " + output.Dim(category+": ") + output.Cyan(intToString(count)))
}
}
// Show critical CVEs
if len(criticalCVEs) > 0 {
output.PrintSubSection("")
output.PrintSubSection(output.BoldRed("⚠ ") + output.BoldRed(intToString(len(criticalCVEs))) +
output.Red(" CRITICAL CVEs found (actively exploited):"))
shown := 0
for _, cve := range criticalCVEs {
if shown >= 5 {
break
}
ransomware := ""
if cve.Ransomware {
ransomware = output.Red(" [RANSOMWARE]")
}
output.PrintSubSection(" " + output.Red("• ") +
output.BoldYellow(cve.CVEID) + " - " +
output.Cyan(cve.Product) + ransomware)
shown++
}
}
} else {
output.PrintSubSection(output.Dim("No technologies detected"))
}
}
}
// 5. ASN/CIDR Expansion
if cfg.ASNScan {
if !cfg.Silent && !cfg.JsonOutput {
output.PrintEndSection()
output.PrintSection("🌐", "ASN/CIDR EXPANSION")
}
asnScanner := network.NewASNScanner(cfg.Timeout)
advResults.ASNInfo = make(map[string]*network.ASNInfo)
// Get unique IPs from results
resultsMu.Lock()
seenIPs := make(map[string]bool)
var uniqueIPs []string
for _, result := range results {
for _, ip := range result.IPs {
if !seenIPs[ip] {
seenIPs[ip] = true
uniqueIPs = append(uniqueIPs, ip)
}
}
}
resultsMu.Unlock()
// Limit to first 10 unique IPs for ASN lookups (rate limit friendly)
if len(uniqueIPs) > 10 {
uniqueIPs = uniqueIPs[:10]
}
var asnMu sync.Mutex
var asnWg sync.WaitGroup
asnSem := make(chan struct{}, 3) // Conservative concurrency
for _, ip := range uniqueIPs {
asnWg.Add(1)
go func(ipAddr string) {
defer asnWg.Done()
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case asnSem <- struct{}{}:
defer func() { <-asnSem }()
}
info, err := asnScanner.GetASNInfo(ctx, ipAddr)
if err == nil && info != nil {
asnMu.Lock()
advResults.ASNInfo[ipAddr] = info
asnMu.Unlock()
}
}(ip)
}
asnWg.Wait()
if !cfg.Silent && !cfg.JsonOutput {
if len(advResults.ASNInfo) > 0 {
// Count unique ASNs
asnSet := make(map[string]bool)
for _, info := range advResults.ASNInfo {
if info.ASN != "" {
asnSet[info.ASN] = true
}
}
output.PrintSubSection(output.Green("✓") + " Discovered " +
output.BoldCyan(intToString(len(asnSet))) + " unique ASNs across " +
output.BoldWhite(intToString(len(advResults.ASNInfo))) + " IPs")
// Show ASN details
shown := 0
shownASN := make(map[string]bool)
for ip, info := range advResults.ASNInfo {
if shown >= 5 {
break
}
if info.ASN != "" && !shownASN[info.ASN] {
shownASN[info.ASN] = true
cidrInfo := ""
if info.CIDR != "" {
cidrInfo = output.Dim(" (") + output.Yellow(info.CIDR) + output.Dim(")")
}
output.PrintSubSection(" " + output.Cyan("AS"+info.ASN) + " - " +
output.BoldWhite(info.Name) + cidrInfo +
output.Dim(" ["+ip+"]"))
shown++
}
}
} else {
output.PrintSubSection(output.Dim("No ASN information discovered"))
}
}
}
// 6. Virtual Host Discovery
if cfg.VHostScan {
if !cfg.Silent && !cfg.JsonOutput {
output.PrintEndSection()
output.PrintSection("🏠", "VIRTUAL HOST DISCOVERY")
}
vhostScanner := network.NewVHostScanner(cfg.Timeout)
advResults.VHosts = make(map[string]*network.VHostResult)
// Get unique IPs from results
resultsMu.Lock()
seenIPs := make(map[string]bool)
var uniqueIPs []string
for _, result := range results {
for _, ip := range result.IPs {
if !seenIPs[ip] {
seenIPs[ip] = true
uniqueIPs = append(uniqueIPs, ip)
}
}
}
resultsMu.Unlock()
// Limit to first 5 IPs for vhost discovery (rate limit friendly)
if len(uniqueIPs) > 5 {
uniqueIPs = uniqueIPs[:5]
}
advResults.VHosts = vhostScanner.DiscoverMultipleIPs(ctx, uniqueIPs, 3)
if !cfg.Silent && !cfg.JsonOutput {
totalVHosts := 0
for _, vhost := range advResults.VHosts {
totalVHosts += len(vhost.Domains)
}
if totalVHosts > 0 {
output.PrintSubSection(output.Green("✓") + " Found " +
output.BoldCyan(intToString(totalVHosts)) + " virtual hosts across " +
output.BoldWhite(intToString(len(advResults.VHosts))) + " IPs")
// Show top vhosts
shown := 0
for ip, vhost := range advResults.VHosts {
if shown >= 3 {
break
}
if len(vhost.Domains) > 0 {
domainList := ""
for i, d := range vhost.Domains {
if i >= 3 {
domainList += output.Dim(", +"+intToString(len(vhost.Domains)-3)+" more")
break
}
if i > 0 {
domainList += ", "
}
domainList += output.Cyan(d)
}
output.PrintSubSection(" " + output.Yellow(ip) + ": " + domainList)
shown++
}
}
} else {
output.PrintSubSection(output.Dim("No additional virtual hosts discovered"))
}
}
}
// Update results with findings
updateResultsWithAdvanced(results, resultsMu, advResults)
return advResults
}
// updateResultsWithAdvanced adds advanced findings to subdomain results
func updateResultsWithAdvanced(results map[string]*config.SubdomainResult, resultsMu *sync.Mutex, adv *AdvancedResults) {
resultsMu.Lock()
defer resultsMu.Unlock()
// Add cloud assets to relevant subdomains
for _, asset := range adv.CloudAssets {
// Add to the main domain result or first result
for _, result := range results {
result.CloudAssets = append(result.CloudAssets, config.CloudAssetResult{
Type: asset.Type,
Name: asset.Name,
URL: asset.URL,
Provider: asset.Provider,
Status: asset.Status,
Permissions: asset.Permissions,
})
break // Add to first result only to avoid duplication
}
}
// Add API findings to relevant subdomains
for _, finding := range adv.APIFindings {
// Find the subdomain this finding belongs to
for sub, result := range results {
if containsHost(finding.URL, sub) {
result.APIFindings = append(result.APIFindings, config.APIFindingResult{
Type: finding.Type,
URL: finding.URL,
Issue: finding.Issue,
Severity: finding.Severity,
Endpoints: finding.Endpoints,
})
break
}
}
}
// Add secrets to relevant subdomains
for _, secret := range adv.Secrets {
// Add to the main domain result
for _, result := range results {
result.SecretsFound = append(result.SecretsFound, config.SecretResult{
Type: secret.Type,
Source: secret.Source,
Match: secret.Match,
Severity: secret.Severity,
Description: secret.Description,
})
break // Add to first result only
}
}
}
// containsHost checks if a URL contains a specific host
func containsHost(urlStr, host string) bool {
if len(urlStr) == 0 || len(host) == 0 {
return false
}
// Simple string contains check
return strings.Contains(urlStr, host)
}
// intToString converts int to string
func intToString(n int) string {
if n == 0 {
return "0"
}
var digits []byte
negative := n < 0
if negative {
n = -n
}
for n > 0 {
digits = append([]byte{byte('0' + n%10)}, digits...)
n /= 10
}
if negative {
digits = append([]byte{'-'}, digits...)
}
return string(digits)
}
// RunAdvancedWithProgress runs advanced scans with progress bar
func RunAdvancedWithProgress(ctx context.Context, results map[string]*config.SubdomainResult,
resultsMu *sync.Mutex, cfg AdvancedConfig) *AdvancedResults {
// Count total scans to perform
total := 0
if cfg.CloudScan {
total++
}
if cfg.APIScan {
total++
}
if cfg.SecretsScan {
total++
}
if total == 0 {
return &AdvancedResults{}
}
bar := progress.New(total, "Advanced", cfg.Silent || cfg.JsonOutput)
defer bar.Finish()
advResults := &AdvancedResults{}
var mu sync.Mutex
// Cloud scanning
if cfg.CloudScan {
cloudScanner := cloud.NewCloudScanner(cfg.Domain, cfg.Timeout)
assets := cloudScanner.ScanAll(ctx)
lambdaAssets := cloudScanner.CheckLambdaEndpoints(ctx)
assets = append(assets, lambdaAssets...)
mu.Lock()
advResults.CloudAssets = assets
mu.Unlock()
bar.Increment()
}
// API scanning
if cfg.APIScan {
apiScanner := api.NewAPIScanner(cfg.Timeout)
resultsMu.Lock()
hosts := make([]string, 0)
for sub, result := range results {
if result.StatusCode >= 200 && result.StatusCode < 500 {
hosts = append(hosts, sub)
}
}
resultsMu.Unlock()
var allFindings []api.APIFinding
for _, host := range hosts {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
break
default:
}
findings := apiScanner.ScanHost(ctx, host)
allFindings = append(allFindings, findings...)
}
mu.Lock()
advResults.APIFindings = allFindings
mu.Unlock()
bar.Increment()
}
// Secrets scanning
if cfg.SecretsScan {
secretScanner := secrets.NewSecretScanner(cfg.Domain, cfg.Timeout)
secretFindings := secretScanner.ScanAll(ctx)
mu.Lock()
advResults.Secrets = secretFindings
mu.Unlock()
bar.Increment()
}
updateResultsWithAdvanced(results, resultsMu, advResults)
return advResults
}
+242
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
package scanner
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"os"
"os/signal"
"sync"
"syscall"
"time"
"god-eye/internal/output"
)
// ScanContext wraps context.Context with scan-specific functionality
type ScanContext struct {
ctx context.Context
cancel context.CancelFunc
mu sync.RWMutex
// Stats
startTime time.Time
subdomains int
activeHosts int
vulnerabilities int
errors int
// Shutdown handling
shutdownOnce sync.Once
shutdownCh chan struct{}
}
// NewScanContext creates a context that handles graceful shutdown
func NewScanContext() *ScanContext {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
sc := &ScanContext{
ctx: ctx,
cancel: cancel,
startTime: time.Now(),
shutdownCh: make(chan struct{}),
}
// Handle interrupt signals
go sc.handleSignals()
return sc
}
// NewScanContextWithTimeout creates a context with a maximum duration
func NewScanContextWithTimeout(timeout time.Duration) *ScanContext {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), timeout)
sc := &ScanContext{
ctx: ctx,
cancel: cancel,
startTime: time.Now(),
shutdownCh: make(chan struct{}),
}
go sc.handleSignals()
return sc
}
// handleSignals listens for interrupt signals and triggers graceful shutdown
func (sc *ScanContext) handleSignals() {
sigCh := make(chan os.Signal, 1)
signal.Notify(sigCh, os.Interrupt, syscall.SIGTERM)
select {
case sig := <-sigCh:
sc.shutdownOnce.Do(func() {
fmt.Printf("\n%s Received %v, initiating graceful shutdown...\n",
output.Yellow("⚠️"), sig)
fmt.Println(output.Dim(" Press Ctrl+C again to force quit"))
// Give time for cleanup
close(sc.shutdownCh)
sc.cancel()
// Second signal = force quit
go func() {
<-sigCh
fmt.Println(output.Red("\n[!] Force quit"))
os.Exit(1)
}()
})
case <-sc.ctx.Done():
return
}
}
// Context returns the underlying context
func (sc *ScanContext) Context() context.Context {
return sc.ctx
}
// Cancel cancels the context
func (sc *ScanContext) Cancel() {
sc.cancel()
}
// Done returns a channel that's closed when the context is cancelled
func (sc *ScanContext) Done() <-chan struct{} {
return sc.ctx.Done()
}
// IsCancelled returns true if the context has been cancelled
func (sc *ScanContext) IsCancelled() bool {
select {
case <-sc.ctx.Done():
return true
default:
return false
}
}
// ShuttingDown returns a channel that's closed when shutdown is initiated
func (sc *ScanContext) ShuttingDown() <-chan struct{} {
return sc.shutdownCh
}
// Stats methods
func (sc *ScanContext) IncrementSubdomains(n int) {
sc.mu.Lock()
sc.subdomains += n
sc.mu.Unlock()
}
func (sc *ScanContext) IncrementActive() {
sc.mu.Lock()
sc.activeHosts++
sc.mu.Unlock()
}
func (sc *ScanContext) IncrementVulns() {
sc.mu.Lock()
sc.vulnerabilities++
sc.mu.Unlock()
}
func (sc *ScanContext) IncrementErrors() {
sc.mu.Lock()
sc.errors++
sc.mu.Unlock()
}
func (sc *ScanContext) GetStats() (subdomains, active, vulns, errors int, elapsed time.Duration) {
sc.mu.RLock()
defer sc.mu.RUnlock()
return sc.subdomains, sc.activeHosts, sc.vulnerabilities, sc.errors, time.Since(sc.startTime)
}
// Elapsed returns time since scan started
func (sc *ScanContext) Elapsed() time.Duration {
return time.Since(sc.startTime)
}
// WorkerPool manages concurrent workers with context cancellation
type WorkerPool struct {
ctx context.Context
wg sync.WaitGroup
semaphore chan struct{}
errCh chan error
errOnce sync.Once
firstError error
}
// NewWorkerPool creates a pool with max concurrent workers
func NewWorkerPool(ctx context.Context, maxWorkers int) *WorkerPool {
return &WorkerPool{
ctx: ctx,
semaphore: make(chan struct{}, maxWorkers),
errCh: make(chan error, 1),
}
}
// Submit submits a task to the pool
// Returns false if context is cancelled
func (wp *WorkerPool) Submit(task func() error) bool {
// Check if cancelled before acquiring semaphore
select {
case <-wp.ctx.Done():
return false
default:
}
// Acquire semaphore (with cancellation check)
select {
case wp.semaphore <- struct{}{}:
case <-wp.ctx.Done():
return false
}
wp.wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer wp.wg.Done()
defer func() { <-wp.semaphore }()
// Check again before running
select {
case <-wp.ctx.Done():
return
default:
}
if err := task(); err != nil {
wp.errOnce.Do(func() {
wp.firstError = err
select {
case wp.errCh <- err:
default:
}
})
}
}()
return true
}
// Wait waits for all workers to complete
func (wp *WorkerPool) Wait() error {
wp.wg.Wait()
close(wp.errCh)
return wp.firstError
}
// WaitWithTimeout waits with a timeout, returning early if timeout expires
func (wp *WorkerPool) WaitWithTimeout(timeout time.Duration) error {
done := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
wp.wg.Wait()
close(done)
}()
select {
case <-done:
close(wp.errCh)
return wp.firstError
case <-time.After(timeout):
return fmt.Errorf("worker pool timed out after %v", timeout)
}
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ func PrintResults(results map[string]*config.SubdomainResult, startTime time.Tim
output.BoldCyan("║"),
fmt.Sprintf("⚠️ Vulns: %s", output.BoldRed(fmt.Sprintf("%d", vulnCount))),
output.Dim("|"),
fmt.Sprintf("☁️ Cloud: %s", output.Blue(fmt.Sprintf("%d", cloudCount))),
fmt.Sprintf("☁️ OnCloud: %s", output.Blue(fmt.Sprintf("%d", cloudCount))),
output.Dim("|"),
fmt.Sprintf("🎯 Takeover: %s", output.BoldRed(fmt.Sprintf("%d", takeoverCount))),
output.BoldCyan("║"))
+126
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
package scanner
import (
"context"
"net"
"sync"
"time"
"god-eye/internal/config"
"god-eye/internal/progress"
)
// PortConfig contains configuration for port scanning
type PortConfig struct {
Ports []int
Timeout int
Concurrency int
Silent bool
JsonOutput bool
}
// DefaultPorts returns the default ports to scan
func DefaultPorts() []int {
return []int{80, 443, 8080, 8443, 8000, 8888, 3000, 5000, 9000, 9443}
}
// Note: ScanPorts is defined in helpers.go
// RunPortScan performs port scanning on all resolved subdomains
func RunPortScan(ctx context.Context, results map[string]*config.SubdomainResult,
resultsMu *sync.Mutex, cfg PortConfig) {
if len(results) == 0 {
return
}
// Count hosts with IPs
hostCount := 0
for _, result := range results {
if len(result.IPs) > 0 {
hostCount++
}
}
if hostCount == 0 {
return
}
portBar := progress.New(hostCount, "Ports", cfg.Silent || cfg.JsonOutput)
pool := NewWorkerPool(ctx, cfg.Concurrency)
for sub, result := range results {
if len(result.IPs) == 0 {
continue
}
subdomain := sub
ip := result.IPs[0]
pool.Submit(func() error {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return ctx.Err()
default:
}
defer portBar.Increment()
openPorts := scanPortsInternal(ip, cfg.Ports, cfg.Timeout)
resultsMu.Lock()
if r, ok := results[subdomain]; ok {
r.Ports = openPorts
}
resultsMu.Unlock()
return nil
})
}
pool.Wait()
portBar.Finish()
}
// scanPortsInternal is the internal port scanner
func scanPortsInternal(ip string, ports []int, timeout int) []int {
var openPorts []int
var mu sync.Mutex
var wg sync.WaitGroup
sem := make(chan struct{}, 20)
for _, port := range ports {
wg.Add(1)
go func(p int) {
defer wg.Done()
sem <- struct{}{}
defer func() { <-sem }()
address := net.JoinHostPort(ip, intToStr(p))
conn, err := net.DialTimeout("tcp", address, time.Duration(timeout)*time.Second)
if err == nil {
conn.Close()
mu.Lock()
openPorts = append(openPorts, p)
mu.Unlock()
}
}(port)
}
wg.Wait()
return openPorts
}
// intToStr converts int to string without importing strconv
func intToStr(n int) string {
if n == 0 {
return "0"
}
var digits []byte
for n > 0 {
digits = append([]byte{byte('0' + n%10)}, digits...)
n /= 10
}
return string(digits)
}
+276
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,276 @@
package scanner
import (
"context"
"sync"
"god-eye/internal/config"
gohttp "god-eye/internal/http"
"god-eye/internal/progress"
"god-eye/internal/ratelimit"
"god-eye/internal/security"
"god-eye/internal/stealth"
)
// ProbeConfig contains configuration for HTTP probing
type ProbeConfig struct {
Timeout int
Concurrency int
Silent bool
JsonOutput bool
Verbose bool
}
// ProbeResults contains the results from HTTP probing
type ProbeResults struct {
RateLimitStats struct {
Hosts int
Requests int
Errors int
}
}
// RunHTTPProbe performs HTTP probing on all resolved subdomains
func RunHTTPProbe(ctx context.Context, results map[string]*config.SubdomainResult,
resultsMu *sync.Mutex, cfg ProbeConfig, stealthMgr *stealth.Manager) *ProbeResults {
if len(results) == 0 {
return &ProbeResults{}
}
probeResults := &ProbeResults{}
// Create progress bar and rate limiter
httpBar := progress.New(len(results), "HTTP", cfg.Silent || cfg.JsonOutput)
httpLimiter := ratelimit.NewHostRateLimiter(ratelimit.DefaultConfig())
pool := NewWorkerPool(ctx, cfg.Concurrency)
for sub := range results {
subdomain := sub // capture for closure
pool.Submit(func() error {
// Check context cancellation
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return ctx.Err()
default:
}
defer httpBar.Increment()
// Apply stealth delays
if stealthMgr != nil {
stealthMgr.Wait()
stealthMgr.WaitForHost(subdomain)
}
// Apply adaptive rate limiting
limiter := httpLimiter.Get(subdomain)
limiter.Wait()
// Use shared client
client := gohttp.GetSharedClient(cfg.Timeout)
// Primary HTTP probe
result := gohttp.ProbeHTTP(subdomain, cfg.Timeout)
// Run all HTTP checks in parallel
var checkWg sync.WaitGroup
var checkMu sync.Mutex
var robotsTxt, sitemapXml bool
var faviconHash string
var openRedirect bool
var corsMisconfig string
var allowedMethods, dangerousMethods []string
var adminPanels, backupFiles, apiEndpoints []string
var gitExposed, svnExposed bool
var s3Buckets, tlsAltNames []string
var jsFiles, jsSecrets []string
// Check robots.txt
checkWg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer checkWg.Done()
r := CheckRobotsTxtWithClient(subdomain, client)
checkMu.Lock()
robotsTxt = r
checkMu.Unlock()
}()
// Check sitemap.xml
checkWg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer checkWg.Done()
s := CheckSitemapXmlWithClient(subdomain, client)
checkMu.Lock()
sitemapXml = s
checkMu.Unlock()
}()
// Check favicon
checkWg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer checkWg.Done()
f := GetFaviconHashWithClient(subdomain, client)
checkMu.Lock()
faviconHash = f
checkMu.Unlock()
}()
// Check open redirect
checkWg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer checkWg.Done()
o := security.CheckOpenRedirectWithClient(subdomain, client)
checkMu.Lock()
openRedirect = o
checkMu.Unlock()
}()
// Check CORS
checkWg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer checkWg.Done()
c := security.CheckCORSWithClient(subdomain, client)
checkMu.Lock()
corsMisconfig = c
checkMu.Unlock()
}()
// Check HTTP methods
checkWg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer checkWg.Done()
a, d := security.CheckHTTPMethodsWithClient(subdomain, client)
checkMu.Lock()
allowedMethods = a
dangerousMethods = d
checkMu.Unlock()
}()
// Check admin panels
checkWg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer checkWg.Done()
p := security.CheckAdminPanelsWithClient(subdomain, client)
checkMu.Lock()
adminPanels = p
checkMu.Unlock()
}()
// Check Git/SVN exposure
checkWg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer checkWg.Done()
g, s := security.CheckGitSvnExposureWithClient(subdomain, client)
checkMu.Lock()
gitExposed = g
svnExposed = s
checkMu.Unlock()
}()
// Check backup files
checkWg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer checkWg.Done()
b := security.CheckBackupFilesWithClient(subdomain, client)
checkMu.Lock()
backupFiles = b
checkMu.Unlock()
}()
// Check API endpoints
checkWg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer checkWg.Done()
e := security.CheckAPIEndpointsWithClient(subdomain, client)
checkMu.Lock()
apiEndpoints = e
checkMu.Unlock()
}()
// Check S3 buckets
checkWg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer checkWg.Done()
b := CheckS3BucketsWithClient(subdomain, client)
checkMu.Lock()
s3Buckets = b
checkMu.Unlock()
}()
// Get TLS alt names
checkWg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer checkWg.Done()
t := GetTLSAltNames(subdomain, cfg.Timeout)
checkMu.Lock()
tlsAltNames = t
checkMu.Unlock()
}()
// Analyze JavaScript files
checkWg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer checkWg.Done()
f, s := AnalyzeJSFiles(subdomain, client)
checkMu.Lock()
jsFiles = f
jsSecrets = s
checkMu.Unlock()
}()
// Wait for all checks
checkWg.Wait()
// Update results
resultsMu.Lock()
if r, ok := results[subdomain]; ok {
r.StatusCode = result.StatusCode
r.ContentLength = result.ContentLength
r.RedirectURL = result.RedirectURL
r.Title = result.Title
r.Server = result.Server
r.Tech = result.Tech
r.Headers = result.Headers
r.WAF = result.WAF
r.TLSVersion = result.TLSVersion
r.TLSIssuer = result.TLSIssuer
r.TLSExpiry = result.TLSExpiry
r.ResponseMs = result.ResponseMs
r.RobotsTxt = robotsTxt
r.SitemapXml = sitemapXml
r.FaviconHash = faviconHash
r.SecurityHeaders = result.SecurityHeaders
r.MissingHeaders = result.MissingHeaders
r.OpenRedirect = openRedirect
r.CORSMisconfig = corsMisconfig
r.AllowedMethods = allowedMethods
r.DangerousMethods = dangerousMethods
r.AdminPanels = adminPanels
r.GitExposed = gitExposed
r.S3Buckets = s3Buckets
r.TLSAltNames = tlsAltNames
r.SvnExposed = svnExposed
r.BackupFiles = backupFiles
r.APIEndpoints = apiEndpoints
r.JSFiles = jsFiles
r.JSSecrets = jsSecrets
}
resultsMu.Unlock()
return nil
})
}
pool.Wait()
httpBar.Finish()
// Collect rate limiting stats
h, r, e := httpLimiter.GetStats()
probeResults.RateLimitStats.Hosts = int(h)
probeResults.RateLimitStats.Requests = int(r)
probeResults.RateLimitStats.Errors = int(e)
return probeResults
}
+133
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
package scanner
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"os"
"strings"
@@ -9,7 +10,9 @@ import (
"time"
"god-eye/internal/ai"
"god-eye/internal/ai/agents"
"god-eye/internal/config"
"god-eye/internal/discovery"
"god-eye/internal/dns"
gohttp "god-eye/internal/http"
"god-eye/internal/output"
@@ -288,6 +291,57 @@ func Run(cfg config.Config) {
// Wait for collection to complete
collectWg.Wait()
// Recursive Discovery (if enabled)
if cfg.Recursive && len(subdomains) > 0 {
if !cfg.Silent && !cfg.JsonOutput {
output.PrintEndSection()
output.PrintSection("🔄", "RECURSIVE DISCOVERY")
output.PrintSubSection(fmt.Sprintf("Learning patterns from %s initial subdomains...", output.BoldGreen(fmt.Sprintf("%d", len(subdomains)))))
}
recursiveDepth := cfg.RecursiveDepth
if recursiveDepth < 1 {
recursiveDepth = 1
} else if recursiveDepth > 5 {
recursiveDepth = 5
}
rd := discovery.NewRecursiveDiscovery(discovery.RecursiveConfig{
Domain: cfg.Domain,
Resolvers: resolvers,
Timeout: cfg.Timeout,
MaxDepth: recursiveDepth,
Concurrency: effectiveConcurrency,
})
ctx := context.Background()
allFound := rd.Discover(ctx, subdomains)
// Add new discoveries
newCount := 0
seenMu.Lock()
for _, sub := range allFound {
if !seen[sub] {
seen[sub] = true
subdomains = append(subdomains, sub)
newCount++
}
}
seenMu.Unlock()
if !cfg.Silent && !cfg.JsonOutput {
stats := rd.GetStats()
if newCount > 0 {
output.PrintSubSection(fmt.Sprintf("%s Discovered %s new subdomains through recursion",
output.Green("✓"), output.BoldGreen(fmt.Sprintf("%d", newCount))))
}
if stats.LearnedPatterns > 0 {
output.PrintSubSection(fmt.Sprintf("%s Learned %s naming patterns",
output.Green("✓"), output.BoldCyan(fmt.Sprintf("%d", stats.LearnedPatterns))))
}
}
}
// Resolve all subdomains
if !cfg.Silent && !cfg.JsonOutput {
output.PrintEndSection()
@@ -673,6 +727,24 @@ func Run(cfg config.Config) {
}
}
// Advanced Scanning (Cloud, API, Secrets, Tech, ASN, VHost)
if (cfg.CloudScan || cfg.APIScan || cfg.SecretsScan || cfg.TechScan || cfg.ASNScan || cfg.VHostScan) && len(results) > 0 {
ctx := context.Background()
RunAdvancedScans(ctx, results, &resultsMu, AdvancedConfig{
Domain: cfg.Domain,
Timeout: cfg.Timeout,
Concurrency: effectiveConcurrency,
CloudScan: cfg.CloudScan,
APIScan: cfg.APIScan,
SecretsScan: cfg.SecretsScan,
TechScan: cfg.TechScan,
ASNScan: cfg.ASNScan,
VHostScan: cfg.VHostScan,
Silent: cfg.Silent,
JsonOutput: cfg.JsonOutput,
})
}
// AI-Powered Analysis
var aiClient *ai.OllamaClient
var aiFindings int32
@@ -862,6 +934,67 @@ func Run(cfg config.Config) {
if !cfg.Silent && !cfg.JsonOutput {
output.PrintEndSection()
}
// Multi-Agent Orchestration (if enabled)
if cfg.MultiAgent {
if !cfg.Silent && !cfg.JsonOutput {
output.PrintSection("🤖", "MULTI-AGENT ANALYSIS")
output.PrintSubSection("Routing findings to specialized AI agents...")
}
// Create multi-agent integration
integration := agents.NewScannerIntegration(cfg.AIUrl, cfg.AIFastModel, cfg.AIDeepModel, cfg.Verbose)
// Analyze all results with multi-agent system (low concurrency to avoid Ollama overload)
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Minute)
analysis := integration.AnalyzeAllResults(ctx, results, &resultsMu, 2)
cancel()
if !cfg.Silent && !cfg.JsonOutput {
// Print summary
output.PrintSubSection(fmt.Sprintf("%s Multi-agent analysis complete: %s critical, %s high, %s medium",
output.Green("✓"),
output.BoldRed(fmt.Sprintf("%d", analysis.CriticalCount)),
output.BoldYellow(fmt.Sprintf("%d", analysis.HighCount)),
output.BoldCyan(fmt.Sprintf("%d", analysis.MediumCount))))
// Show agent breakdown
if len(analysis.AgentStats) > 0 {
output.PrintSubSection(output.Dim("Agent usage:"))
for agent, stat := range analysis.AgentStats {
output.PrintSubSection(fmt.Sprintf(" %s: %d analyses (avg confidence: %.0f%%)",
output.Cyan(agent), stat.CallCount, stat.AvgConfidence*100))
}
}
// Show critical/high findings
for _, f := range analysis.Findings {
if f.Severity == "critical" {
output.PrintSubSection(fmt.Sprintf(" %s %s: %s",
output.BgRed(" !! "),
output.BoldWhite(f.Title),
output.Dim(f.Agent+" agent")))
} else if f.Severity == "high" {
output.PrintSubSection(fmt.Sprintf(" %s %s: %s",
output.Red("!"),
f.Title,
output.Dim(f.Agent+" agent")))
}
}
output.PrintEndSection()
}
// Store findings in results
for _, f := range analysis.Findings {
finding := fmt.Sprintf("[%s] %s: %s (%s)", strings.ToUpper(f.Severity), f.Agent, f.Title, f.Description)
// Add to first result (or create a summary mechanism)
for _, r := range results {
r.AIFindings = append(r.AIFindings, finding)
break
}
}
}
}
}
+623
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,623 @@
package secrets
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"regexp"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
)
// SecretFinding represents a discovered secret or credential
type SecretFinding struct {
Type string `json:"type"` // api_key, password, token, etc.
Source string `json:"source"` // github, gitlab, pastebin, etc.
URL string `json:"url"` // source URL
Match string `json:"match"` // the matched pattern (sanitized)
Context string `json:"context"` // surrounding code/text
Severity string `json:"severity"` // critical, high, medium, low
Description string `json:"description"`
Filename string `json:"filename,omitempty"`
Repository string `json:"repository,omitempty"`
}
// SecretScanner searches for exposed secrets
type SecretScanner struct {
client *http.Client
domain string
concurrency int
patterns []*SecretPattern
}
// SecretPattern defines a pattern to match secrets
type SecretPattern struct {
Name string
Type string
Regex *regexp.Regexp
Severity string
Description string
MinEntropy float64 // Minimum entropy for this pattern (0 = no check)
RequireContext bool // Require specific context (not in comments/docs)
}
// NewSecretScanner creates a new secret scanner
func NewSecretScanner(domain string, timeout int) *SecretScanner {
return &SecretScanner{
client: &http.Client{
Timeout: time.Duration(timeout) * time.Second,
},
domain: domain,
concurrency: 5, // Conservative to avoid rate limits
patterns: getSecretPatterns(),
}
}
// getSecretPatterns returns compiled regex patterns for secrets with entropy requirements
func getSecretPatterns() []*SecretPattern {
patterns := []struct {
name string
patternType string
regex string
severity string
description string
minEntropy float64 // Minimum Shannon entropy (bits/char) - 0 means no check
requireContext bool // Must not be in comments/docs
}{
// AWS - Highly structured, don't need entropy check
{"AWS Access Key", "aws_key", `AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}`, "critical", "AWS Access Key ID", 0, false},
{"AWS Secret Key", "aws_secret", `(?i)aws.{0,20}['"][0-9a-zA-Z/+]{40}['"]`, "critical", "AWS Secret Access Key", 4.0, true},
// Google - Structured prefixes
{"Google API Key", "google_api", `AIza[0-9A-Za-z-_]{35}`, "high", "Google API Key", 3.5, false},
{"Google OAuth", "google_oauth", `[0-9]+-[0-9A-Za-z_]{32}\.apps\.googleusercontent\.com`, "high", "Google OAuth Client ID", 0, false},
{"GCP Service Account", "gcp_service", `"type":\s*"service_account"`, "critical", "GCP Service Account JSON", 0, false},
// GitHub - Highly structured prefixes
{"GitHub Token", "github_token", `ghp_[0-9a-zA-Z]{36}`, "critical", "GitHub Personal Access Token", 0, false},
{"GitHub OAuth", "github_oauth", `gho_[0-9a-zA-Z]{36}`, "critical", "GitHub OAuth Token", 0, false},
{"GitHub App Token", "github_app", `(ghu|ghs)_[0-9a-zA-Z]{36}`, "critical", "GitHub App Token", 0, false},
// Slack - Structured prefixes
{"Slack Token", "slack_token", `xox[baprs]-[0-9]{10,13}-[0-9]{10,13}[a-zA-Z0-9-]*`, "critical", "Slack API Token", 0, false},
{"Slack Webhook", "slack_webhook", `https://hooks\.slack\.com/services/T[a-zA-Z0-9_]{8}/B[a-zA-Z0-9_]{8}/[a-zA-Z0-9_]{24}`, "high", "Slack Webhook URL", 0, false},
// Stripe - Structured prefixes
{"Stripe API Key", "stripe_key", `sk_live_[0-9a-zA-Z]{24,}`, "critical", "Stripe Live API Key", 0, false},
{"Stripe Test Key", "stripe_test", `sk_test_[0-9a-zA-Z]{24,}`, "low", "Stripe Test API Key", 0, false}, // Lowered severity for test keys
// Database - Need entropy check as passwords could be simple
{"MySQL Connection", "mysql_conn", `mysql://[^:]+:[^@]+@[^/]+/[^\s]+`, "critical", "MySQL Connection String", 2.5, true},
{"PostgreSQL Connection", "postgres_conn", `postgres(ql)?://[^:]+:[^@]+@[^/]+/[^\s]+`, "critical", "PostgreSQL Connection String", 2.5, true},
{"MongoDB Connection", "mongodb_conn", `mongodb(\+srv)?://[^:]+:[^@]+@[^/]+`, "critical", "MongoDB Connection String", 2.5, true},
{"Redis URL", "redis_url", `redis://[^:]*:[^@]+@[^/]+`, "high", "Redis Connection String", 2.5, true},
// Private Keys - No entropy needed, structural match is definitive
{"RSA Private Key", "rsa_key", `-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----`, "critical", "RSA Private Key", 0, false},
{"SSH Private Key", "ssh_key", `-----BEGIN (OPENSSH|EC|DSA) PRIVATE KEY-----`, "critical", "SSH Private Key", 0, false},
{"PGP Private Key", "pgp_key", `-----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----`, "critical", "PGP Private Key", 0, false},
// JWT - Has structure, but need to verify it's not example token
{"JWT Token", "jwt", `eyJ[a-zA-Z0-9_-]*\.eyJ[a-zA-Z0-9_-]*\.[a-zA-Z0-9_-]*`, "high", "JSON Web Token", 3.5, true},
// Generic - HIGH FALSE POSITIVE RISK - require entropy + context
{"API Key", "api_key", `(?i)(api[_-]?key|apikey)\s*[:=]\s*['"][0-9a-zA-Z]{20,}['"]`, "medium", "Generic API Key", 4.0, true},
{"Password in URL", "password_url", `(?i)://[^:]+:([^@]+)@`, "high", "Password in URL", 3.0, true},
{"Bearer Token", "bearer", `(?i)bearer\s+[a-zA-Z0-9_\-\.]{20,}`, "medium", "Bearer Token", 3.5, true}, // Increased min length
// Cloud Services - Structured
{"Heroku API Key", "heroku_key", `(?i)heroku.*[0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12}`, "high", "Heroku API Key", 0, true},
{"SendGrid API Key", "sendgrid_key", `SG\.[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{22}\.[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{43}`, "high", "SendGrid API Key", 0, false},
{"Twilio", "twilio", `SK[0-9a-fA-F]{32}`, "high", "Twilio API Key", 0, false},
{"MailChimp", "mailchimp", `[0-9a-f]{32}-us[0-9]{1,2}`, "medium", "MailChimp API Key", 4.0, true}, // Needs entropy to avoid false positives
// Internal IP - Removed from critical findings (too noisy, rarely actionable)
// Keeping it but with very low priority
}
compiled := make([]*SecretPattern, 0, len(patterns))
for _, p := range patterns {
if r, err := regexp.Compile(p.regex); err == nil {
compiled = append(compiled, &SecretPattern{
Name: p.name,
Type: p.patternType,
Regex: r,
Severity: p.severity,
Description: p.description,
MinEntropy: p.minEntropy,
RequireContext: p.requireContext,
})
}
}
return compiled
}
// calculateEntropy calculates Shannon entropy of a string (bits per character)
// Higher entropy = more random = more likely to be a real secret
func calculateEntropy(s string) float64 {
if len(s) == 0 {
return 0
}
// Count character frequencies
freq := make(map[rune]int)
for _, c := range s {
freq[c]++
}
// Calculate entropy
var entropy float64
length := float64(len(s))
for _, count := range freq {
p := float64(count) / length
if p > 0 {
entropy -= p * log2(p)
}
}
return entropy
}
// log2 calculates log base 2
func log2(x float64) float64 {
if x <= 0 {
return 0
}
// log2(x) = ln(x) / ln(2)
ln2 := 0.693147180559945
// Simple ln approximation for small values
return ln(x) / ln2
}
// ln calculates natural logarithm using Taylor series
func ln(x float64) float64 {
if x <= 0 {
return 0
}
// Normalize to [0.5, 1.5) range
n := 0
for x > 1.5 {
x /= 2
n++
}
for x < 0.5 {
x *= 2
n--
}
// Taylor series for ln(1+y) where y = x-1
y := x - 1
result := 0.0
term := y
for i := 1; i <= 20; i++ {
if i%2 == 1 {
result += term / float64(i)
} else {
result -= term / float64(i)
}
term *= y
}
return result + float64(n)*0.693147180559945
}
// isInCommentOrDoc checks if the match appears to be in a comment or documentation
func isInCommentOrDoc(context string, match string) bool {
lowerCtx := strings.ToLower(context)
// Common comment patterns
commentPatterns := []string{
"//", "/*", "*/", "#", "<!--", "-->",
"example", "sample", "test", "demo", "dummy",
"placeholder", "your_", "your-", "<your",
"xxx", "todo", "fixme", "replace",
"documentation", "readme", "docs",
}
for _, pattern := range commentPatterns {
if strings.Contains(lowerCtx, pattern) {
return true
}
}
// Check if it looks like documentation/example
if strings.Contains(lowerCtx, "```") { // Markdown code block
return true
}
// Check for example API keys
lowerMatch := strings.ToLower(match)
examplePatterns := []string{
"example", "test", "demo", "sample", "fake",
"xxxx", "0000", "1234", "abcd",
}
for _, pattern := range examplePatterns {
if strings.Contains(lowerMatch, pattern) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// validateSecret checks if a potential secret passes entropy and context validation
func (ss *SecretScanner) validateSecret(pattern *SecretPattern, match string, context string) bool {
// Check entropy requirement
if pattern.MinEntropy > 0 {
entropy := calculateEntropy(match)
if entropy < pattern.MinEntropy {
return false // Too low entropy - likely placeholder or example
}
}
// Check context requirement
if pattern.RequireContext {
if isInCommentOrDoc(context, match) {
return false // Appears to be in documentation/comment
}
}
return true
}
// ScanAll performs comprehensive secret scanning
func (ss *SecretScanner) ScanAll(ctx context.Context) []SecretFinding {
var findings []SecretFinding
var mu sync.Mutex
var wg sync.WaitGroup
// Search GitHub
wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
ghFindings := ss.searchGitHub(ctx)
mu.Lock()
findings = append(findings, ghFindings...)
mu.Unlock()
}()
// Search GitLab
wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
glFindings := ss.searchGitLab(ctx)
mu.Lock()
findings = append(findings, glFindings...)
mu.Unlock()
}()
// Check for common exposed files
wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
fileFindings := ss.checkExposedFiles(ctx)
mu.Lock()
findings = append(findings, fileFindings...)
mu.Unlock()
}()
wg.Wait()
return findings
}
// GitHubSearchResult represents GitHub search API response
type GitHubSearchResult struct {
TotalCount int `json:"total_count"`
Items []struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
Path string `json:"path"`
HTMLURL string `json:"html_url"`
Repository struct {
FullName string `json:"full_name"`
} `json:"repository"`
TextMatches []struct {
Fragment string `json:"fragment"`
} `json:"text_matches"`
} `json:"items"`
}
// searchGitHub searches GitHub for exposed secrets
func (ss *SecretScanner) searchGitHub(ctx context.Context) []SecretFinding {
var findings []SecretFinding
// Search queries
queries := []string{
fmt.Sprintf(`"%s" password`, ss.domain),
fmt.Sprintf(`"%s" api_key`, ss.domain),
fmt.Sprintf(`"%s" apikey`, ss.domain),
fmt.Sprintf(`"%s" secret`, ss.domain),
fmt.Sprintf(`"%s" token`, ss.domain),
fmt.Sprintf(`"%s" AWS_SECRET`, ss.domain),
fmt.Sprintf(`"%s" credentials`, ss.domain),
fmt.Sprintf(`"%s" .env`, ss.domain),
fmt.Sprintf(`"%s" config.json`, ss.domain),
}
for _, query := range queries {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return findings
default:
}
searchURL := fmt.Sprintf("https://api.github.com/search/code?q=%s&per_page=10",
url.QueryEscape(query))
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", searchURL, nil)
if err != nil {
continue
}
req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/vnd.github.v3.text-match+json")
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "GodEye-Security-Scanner/1.0")
resp, err := ss.client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
continue
}
if resp.StatusCode == 200 {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 100*1024))
resp.Body.Close()
var result GitHubSearchResult
if json.Unmarshal(body, &result) == nil && result.TotalCount > 0 {
for _, item := range result.Items {
// Check text matches for actual secrets
for _, match := range item.TextMatches {
for _, pattern := range ss.patterns {
if pattern.Regex.MatchString(match.Fragment) {
secretMatch := pattern.Regex.FindString(match.Fragment)
// IMPROVED: Apply entropy and context validation
if !ss.validateSecret(pattern, secretMatch, match.Fragment) {
continue // Skip false positives
}
findings = append(findings, SecretFinding{
Type: pattern.Type,
Source: "github",
URL: item.HTMLURL,
Match: sanitizeSecret(secretMatch),
Context: truncateString(match.Fragment, 200),
Severity: pattern.Severity,
Description: pattern.Description,
Filename: item.Path,
Repository: item.Repository.FullName,
})
}
}
}
// Removed: "potential_exposure" findings - too noisy, rarely actionable
// Only report actual secrets found
}
}
} else {
resp.Body.Close()
}
// Rate limiting - be conservative
time.Sleep(2 * time.Second)
}
return findings
}
// searchGitLab searches GitLab for exposed secrets
func (ss *SecretScanner) searchGitLab(ctx context.Context) []SecretFinding {
var findings []SecretFinding
// GitLab API search
searchURL := fmt.Sprintf("https://gitlab.com/api/v4/search?scope=blobs&search=%s",
url.QueryEscape(ss.domain))
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", searchURL, nil)
if err != nil {
return findings
}
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "GodEye-Security-Scanner/1.0")
resp, err := ss.client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return findings
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode == 200 {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 100*1024))
var results []struct {
Basename string `json:"basename"`
Data string `json:"data"`
Path string `json:"path"`
Filename string `json:"filename"`
ProjectID int `json:"project_id"`
}
if json.Unmarshal(body, &results) == nil {
for _, item := range results {
for _, pattern := range ss.patterns {
if pattern.Regex.MatchString(item.Data) {
secretMatch := pattern.Regex.FindString(item.Data)
// IMPROVED: Apply entropy and context validation
if !ss.validateSecret(pattern, secretMatch, item.Data) {
continue // Skip false positives
}
// FIXED: Correct GitLab URL format
findings = append(findings, SecretFinding{
Type: pattern.Type,
Source: "gitlab",
URL: fmt.Sprintf("https://gitlab.com/projects/%d", item.ProjectID),
Match: sanitizeSecret(secretMatch),
Context: truncateString(item.Data, 200),
Severity: pattern.Severity,
Description: pattern.Description,
Filename: item.Filename,
})
}
}
}
}
}
return findings
}
// checkExposedFiles checks for commonly exposed sensitive files
func (ss *SecretScanner) checkExposedFiles(ctx context.Context) []SecretFinding {
var findings []SecretFinding
// Sensitive files to check
sensitiveFiles := []struct {
path string
description string
severity string
}{
{"/.env", "Environment file with credentials", "critical"},
{"/.env.local", "Local environment file", "critical"},
{"/.env.production", "Production environment file", "critical"},
{"/.env.backup", "Backup environment file", "critical"},
{"/config.json", "JSON configuration file", "high"},
{"/config.yaml", "YAML configuration file", "high"},
{"/config.yml", "YAML configuration file", "high"},
{"/settings.json", "Settings file", "high"},
{"/secrets.json", "Secrets file", "critical"},
{"/credentials.json", "Credentials file", "critical"},
{"/database.yml", "Database configuration", "critical"},
{"/application.properties", "Java application properties", "high"},
{"/application.yml", "Spring application config", "high"},
{"/wp-config.php.bak", "WordPress config backup", "critical"},
{"/phpinfo.php", "PHP info page", "medium"},
{"/.git/config", "Git configuration", "high"},
{"/.svn/entries", "SVN entries", "high"},
{"/.DS_Store", "Mac directory file", "low"},
{"/server-status", "Apache server status", "medium"},
{"/elmah.axd", ".NET error log", "high"},
{"/trace.axd", ".NET trace log", "high"},
{"/debug.log", "Debug log file", "medium"},
{"/error.log", "Error log file", "medium"},
{"/access.log", "Access log file", "medium"},
{"/id_rsa", "SSH private key", "critical"},
{"/id_rsa.pub", "SSH public key", "low"},
{"/.htpasswd", "Apache password file", "critical"},
{"/web.config", "IIS configuration", "high"},
{"/crossdomain.xml", "Flash cross-domain policy", "low"},
{"/clientaccesspolicy.xml", "Silverlight access policy", "low"},
}
for _, file := range sensitiveFiles {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return findings
default:
}
url := fmt.Sprintf("https://%s%s", ss.domain, file.path)
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
if err != nil {
continue
}
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; SecurityScanner/1.0)")
resp, err := ss.client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
continue
}
if resp.StatusCode == 200 {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 50*1024))
resp.Body.Close()
bodyStr := string(body)
contentType := resp.Header.Get("Content-Type")
// Skip if it's an HTML error page
if strings.Contains(contentType, "text/html") &&
(strings.Contains(bodyStr, "<html") || strings.Contains(bodyStr, "<!DOCTYPE")) {
continue
}
finding := SecretFinding{
Type: "exposed_file",
Source: "direct",
URL: url,
Severity: file.severity,
Description: file.description,
Filename: file.path,
}
// Check for actual secrets in the content
foundSecret := false
for _, pattern := range ss.patterns {
if pattern.Regex.MatchString(bodyStr) {
secretMatch := pattern.Regex.FindString(bodyStr)
// IMPROVED: Apply entropy and context validation
if !ss.validateSecret(pattern, secretMatch, bodyStr) {
continue // Skip false positives
}
finding.Type = pattern.Type
finding.Match = sanitizeSecret(secretMatch)
finding.Severity = pattern.Severity
finding.Description = fmt.Sprintf("%s - %s", file.description, pattern.Description)
foundSecret = true
break
}
}
// Only report if we found actual secrets, or if the file itself is sensitive
if foundSecret || file.severity == "critical" {
findings = append(findings, finding)
}
} else {
resp.Body.Close()
}
}
return findings
}
// ScanContent scans arbitrary content for secrets
func (ss *SecretScanner) ScanContent(content string) []SecretFinding {
var findings []SecretFinding
for _, pattern := range ss.patterns {
matches := pattern.Regex.FindAllString(content, 10)
for _, match := range matches {
findings = append(findings, SecretFinding{
Type: pattern.Type,
Source: "content_scan",
Match: sanitizeSecret(match),
Severity: pattern.Severity,
Description: pattern.Description,
})
}
}
return findings
}
// sanitizeSecret masks the middle portion of a secret
func sanitizeSecret(secret string) string {
if len(secret) <= 8 {
return "***"
}
return secret[:4] + "****" + secret[len(secret)-4:]
}
// truncateString truncates a string to maxLen
func truncateString(s string, maxLen int) string {
if len(s) <= maxLen {
return s
}
return s[:maxLen] + "..."
}
+3 -151
View File
@@ -19,44 +19,7 @@ func CheckOpenRedirect(subdomain string, timeout int) bool {
return http.ErrUseLastResponse
},
}
// Common open redirect parameters
testPayloads := []string{
"?url=https://evil.com",
"?redirect=https://evil.com",
"?next=https://evil.com",
"?return=https://evil.com",
"?dest=https://evil.com",
"?destination=https://evil.com",
"?rurl=https://evil.com",
"?target=https://evil.com",
}
baseURLs := []string{
fmt.Sprintf("https://%s", subdomain),
fmt.Sprintf("http://%s", subdomain),
}
for _, baseURL := range baseURLs {
for _, payload := range testPayloads {
testURL := baseURL + payload
resp, err := client.Get(testURL)
if err != nil {
continue
}
resp.Body.Close()
// Check if redirects to evil.com
if resp.StatusCode >= 300 && resp.StatusCode < 400 {
location := resp.Header.Get("Location")
if strings.Contains(location, "evil.com") {
return true
}
}
}
}
return false
return CheckOpenRedirectWithClient(subdomain, client)
}
// CheckCORS tests for CORS misconfiguration
@@ -67,51 +30,7 @@ func CheckCORS(subdomain string, timeout int) string {
TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true},
},
}
urls := []string{
fmt.Sprintf("https://%s", subdomain),
fmt.Sprintf("http://%s", subdomain),
}
for _, url := range urls {
req, err := http.NewRequest("GET", url, nil)
if err != nil {
continue
}
// Test with evil origin
req.Header.Set("Origin", "https://evil.com")
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
continue
}
resp.Body.Close()
acao := resp.Header.Get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin")
acac := resp.Header.Get("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials")
// Check for dangerous CORS configs
if acao == "*" {
if acac == "true" {
return "Wildcard + Credentials"
}
return "Wildcard Origin"
}
if acao == "https://evil.com" {
if acac == "true" {
return "Origin Reflection + Credentials"
}
return "Origin Reflection"
}
if strings.Contains(acao, "null") {
return "Null Origin Allowed"
}
}
return ""
return CheckCORSWithClient(subdomain, client)
}
// CheckHTTPMethods tests which HTTP methods are allowed
@@ -122,74 +41,7 @@ func CheckHTTPMethods(subdomain string, timeout int) (allowed []string, dangerou
TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true},
},
}
urls := []string{
fmt.Sprintf("https://%s", subdomain),
fmt.Sprintf("http://%s", subdomain),
}
methods := []string{"GET", "POST", "PUT", "DELETE", "PATCH", "OPTIONS", "TRACE"}
dangerousMethods := map[string]bool{
"PUT": true,
"DELETE": true,
"TRACE": true,
"PATCH": true,
}
for _, url := range urls {
// First try OPTIONS to get Allow header
req, err := http.NewRequest("OPTIONS", url, nil)
if err != nil {
continue
}
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
continue
}
resp.Body.Close()
// Check Allow header
allowHeader := resp.Header.Get("Allow")
if allowHeader != "" {
for _, method := range strings.Split(allowHeader, ",") {
method = strings.TrimSpace(method)
allowed = append(allowed, method)
if dangerousMethods[method] {
dangerous = append(dangerous, method)
}
}
return allowed, dangerous
}
// If no Allow header, test each method
for _, method := range methods {
req, err := http.NewRequest(method, url, nil)
if err != nil {
continue
}
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
continue
}
resp.Body.Close()
// Method is allowed if not 405 Method Not Allowed
if resp.StatusCode != 405 {
allowed = append(allowed, method)
if dangerousMethods[method] {
dangerous = append(dangerous, method)
}
}
}
if len(allowed) > 0 {
return allowed, dangerous
}
}
return allowed, dangerous
return CheckHTTPMethodsWithClient(subdomain, client)
}
// WithClient versions for parallel execution with shared client
+4 -142
View File
@@ -19,43 +19,7 @@ func CheckAdminPanels(subdomain string, timeout int) []string {
return http.ErrUseLastResponse
},
}
// Generic admin paths (common across all platforms)
// Note: Removed platform-specific paths like /wp-admin, /admin.php, /phpmyadmin
// These generate false positives on non-PHP/WordPress sites
paths := []string{
"/admin", "/administrator",
"/login", "/signin", "/auth",
"/manager", "/console", "/dashboard",
"/admin/login", "/user/login",
}
var found []string
baseURLs := []string{
fmt.Sprintf("https://%s", subdomain),
fmt.Sprintf("http://%s", subdomain),
}
for _, baseURL := range baseURLs {
for _, path := range paths {
testURL := baseURL + path
resp, err := client.Get(testURL)
if err != nil {
continue
}
resp.Body.Close()
// Found if 200, 301, 302, 401, 403 (not 404)
if resp.StatusCode != 404 && resp.StatusCode != 0 {
found = append(found, path)
}
}
if len(found) > 0 {
break
}
}
return found
return CheckAdminPanelsWithClient(subdomain, client)
}
// CheckGitSvnExposure checks for exposed .git or .svn directories
@@ -66,38 +30,7 @@ func CheckGitSvnExposure(subdomain string, timeout int) (gitExposed bool, svnExp
TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true},
},
}
baseURLs := []string{
fmt.Sprintf("https://%s", subdomain),
fmt.Sprintf("http://%s", subdomain),
}
for _, baseURL := range baseURLs {
// Check .git
resp, err := client.Get(baseURL + "/.git/config")
if err == nil {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1000))
resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode == 200 && strings.Contains(string(body), "[core]") {
gitExposed = true
}
}
// Check .svn
resp, err = client.Get(baseURL + "/.svn/entries")
if err == nil {
resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode == 200 {
svnExposed = true
}
}
if gitExposed || svnExposed {
break
}
}
return gitExposed, svnExposed
return CheckGitSvnExposureWithClient(subdomain, client)
}
// CheckBackupFiles checks for common backup files
@@ -108,41 +41,7 @@ func CheckBackupFiles(subdomain string, timeout int) []string {
TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true},
},
}
// Common backup file patterns
paths := []string{
"/backup.zip", "/backup.tar.gz", "/backup.sql",
"/db.sql", "/database.sql", "/dump.sql",
"/site.zip", "/www.zip", "/public.zip",
"/config.bak", "/config.old", "/.env.bak",
"/index.php.bak", "/index.php.old", "/index.html.bak",
"/web.config.bak", "/.htaccess.bak",
}
var found []string
baseURLs := []string{
fmt.Sprintf("https://%s", subdomain),
fmt.Sprintf("http://%s", subdomain),
}
for _, baseURL := range baseURLs {
for _, path := range paths {
resp, err := client.Head(baseURL + path)
if err != nil {
continue
}
resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode == 200 {
found = append(found, path)
}
}
if len(found) > 0 {
break
}
}
return found
return CheckBackupFilesWithClient(subdomain, client)
}
// CheckAPIEndpoints checks for common API endpoints
@@ -156,44 +55,7 @@ func CheckAPIEndpoints(subdomain string, timeout int) []string {
return http.ErrUseLastResponse
},
}
// Common API endpoint patterns
paths := []string{
"/api", "/api/v1", "/api/v2", "/api/v3",
"/graphql", "/graphiql",
"/swagger", "/swagger-ui", "/swagger.json", "/swagger.yaml",
"/openapi.json", "/openapi.yaml",
"/docs", "/api-docs", "/redoc",
"/health", "/healthz", "/status",
"/metrics", "/actuator", "/actuator/health",
"/v1", "/v2", "/rest",
}
var found []string
baseURLs := []string{
fmt.Sprintf("https://%s", subdomain),
fmt.Sprintf("http://%s", subdomain),
}
for _, baseURL := range baseURLs {
for _, path := range paths {
resp, err := client.Get(baseURL + path)
if err != nil {
continue
}
resp.Body.Close()
// Found if not 404
if resp.StatusCode != 404 && resp.StatusCode != 0 {
found = append(found, path)
}
}
if len(found) > 0 {
break
}
}
return found
return CheckAPIEndpointsWithClient(subdomain, client)
}
// WithClient versions for parallel execution
+173
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
package sources
import (
"fmt"
"time"
)
// ErrorType categorizes source errors
type ErrorType string
const (
ErrTypeTimeout ErrorType = "timeout"
ErrTypeHTTP ErrorType = "http_error"
ErrTypeParse ErrorType = "parse_error"
ErrTypeRateLimit ErrorType = "rate_limit"
ErrTypeNetwork ErrorType = "network_error"
ErrTypeEmpty ErrorType = "empty_response"
ErrTypeUnknown ErrorType = "unknown"
)
// SourceError represents an error from a passive source
type SourceError struct {
Source string
Type ErrorType
Message string
StatusCode int
Duration time.Duration
Retryable bool
}
func (e *SourceError) Error() string {
if e.StatusCode > 0 {
return fmt.Sprintf("[%s] %s: %s (status: %d, took: %v)",
e.Type, e.Source, e.Message, e.StatusCode, e.Duration)
}
return fmt.Sprintf("[%s] %s: %s (took: %v)",
e.Type, e.Source, e.Message, e.Duration)
}
// NewTimeoutError creates a timeout error
func NewTimeoutError(source string, duration time.Duration) *SourceError {
return &SourceError{
Source: source,
Type: ErrTypeTimeout,
Message: "request timed out",
Duration: duration,
Retryable: true,
}
}
// NewHTTPError creates an HTTP error
func NewHTTPError(source string, statusCode int, duration time.Duration) *SourceError {
retryable := statusCode >= 500 || statusCode == 429
return &SourceError{
Source: source,
Type: ErrTypeHTTP,
Message: fmt.Sprintf("HTTP %d", statusCode),
StatusCode: statusCode,
Duration: duration,
Retryable: retryable,
}
}
// NewParseError creates a parse error
func NewParseError(source string, msg string, duration time.Duration) *SourceError {
return &SourceError{
Source: source,
Type: ErrTypeParse,
Message: msg,
Duration: duration,
Retryable: false,
}
}
// NewRateLimitError creates a rate limit error
func NewRateLimitError(source string, duration time.Duration) *SourceError {
return &SourceError{
Source: source,
Type: ErrTypeRateLimit,
Message: "rate limited",
Duration: duration,
Retryable: true,
}
}
// NewNetworkError creates a network error
func NewNetworkError(source string, msg string, duration time.Duration) *SourceError {
return &SourceError{
Source: source,
Type: ErrTypeNetwork,
Message: msg,
Duration: duration,
Retryable: true,
}
}
// NewEmptyError creates an empty response error
func NewEmptyError(source string, duration time.Duration) *SourceError {
return &SourceError{
Source: source,
Type: ErrTypeEmpty,
Message: "empty response",
Duration: duration,
Retryable: false,
}
}
// SourceResult represents the result from a passive source
type SourceResult struct {
Source string
Subdomains []string
Error *SourceError
Duration time.Duration
Cached bool
}
// IsSuccess returns true if the result has no error
func (r *SourceResult) IsSuccess() bool {
return r.Error == nil
}
// Count returns the number of subdomains found
func (r *SourceResult) Count() int {
return len(r.Subdomains)
}
// SourceStats tracks statistics for all sources
type SourceStats struct {
TotalSources int
SuccessSources int
FailedSources int
TotalFound int
TotalDuration time.Duration
Errors []*SourceError
}
// AddResult adds a result to the stats
func (s *SourceStats) AddResult(result *SourceResult) {
s.TotalSources++
s.TotalDuration += result.Duration
if result.IsSuccess() {
s.SuccessSources++
s.TotalFound += result.Count()
} else {
s.FailedSources++
s.Errors = append(s.Errors, result.Error)
}
}
// SuccessRate returns the percentage of successful sources
func (s *SourceStats) SuccessRate() float64 {
if s.TotalSources == 0 {
return 0
}
return float64(s.SuccessSources) / float64(s.TotalSources) * 100
}
// Summary returns a human-readable summary
func (s *SourceStats) Summary() string {
return fmt.Sprintf("%d/%d sources succeeded (%.0f%%), found %d subdomains in %v",
s.SuccessSources, s.TotalSources, s.SuccessRate(),
s.TotalFound, s.TotalDuration.Round(time.Millisecond))
}
// ErrorsByType returns errors grouped by type
func (s *SourceStats) ErrorsByType() map[ErrorType][]*SourceError {
result := make(map[ErrorType][]*SourceError)
for _, err := range s.Errors {
result[err.Type] = append(result[err.Type], err)
}
return result
}
+36 -35
View File
@@ -12,14 +12,15 @@ import (
)
func FetchCrtsh(domain string) ([]string, error) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 120*time.Second)
// OPTIMIZED: Reduced timeout from 120s to 30s - crt.sh either responds quickly or times out
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
defer cancel()
url := fmt.Sprintf("https://crt.sh/?q=%%.%s&output=json", domain)
req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 120 * time.Second}
client := SlowClient
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -75,7 +76,7 @@ func FetchCertspotter(domain string) ([]string, error) {
req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 15 * time.Second}
client := StandardClient
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -131,7 +132,7 @@ func FetchAlienVault(domain string) ([]string, error) {
url := fmt.Sprintf("https://otx.alienvault.com/api/v1/indicators/domain/%s/passive_dns", domain)
req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
client := FastClient
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -168,7 +169,7 @@ func FetchHackerTarget(domain string) ([]string, error) {
url := fmt.Sprintf("https://api.hackertarget.com/hostsearch/?q=%s", domain)
req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
client := FastClient
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -199,7 +200,7 @@ func FetchURLScan(domain string) ([]string, error) {
url := fmt.Sprintf("https://urlscan.io/api/v1/search/?q=domain:%s", domain)
req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
client := FastClient
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -239,7 +240,7 @@ func FetchRapidDNS(domain string) ([]string, error) {
req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
client := FastClient
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -272,7 +273,7 @@ func FetchAnubis(domain string) ([]string, error) {
url := fmt.Sprintf("https://jldc.me/anubis/subdomains/%s", domain)
req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
client := FastClient
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -295,7 +296,7 @@ func FetchThreatMiner(domain string) ([]string, error) {
req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 15 * time.Second}
client := StandardClient
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -339,7 +340,7 @@ func FetchDNSRepo(domain string) ([]string, error) {
req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
client := FastClient
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -372,7 +373,7 @@ func FetchSubdomainCenter(domain string) ([]string, error) {
url := fmt.Sprintf("https://api.subdomain.center/?domain=%s", domain)
req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
client := FastClient
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -395,7 +396,7 @@ func FetchWayback(domain string) ([]string, error) {
req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 120 * time.Second}
client := SlowClient
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
// Return empty instead of error on timeout - Wayback is often slow
@@ -430,7 +431,7 @@ func FetchBinaryEdge(domain string) ([]string, error) {
req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
client := FastClient
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return []string{}, nil
@@ -465,7 +466,7 @@ func FetchCensys(domain string) ([]string, error) {
req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
client := FastClient
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return []string{}, nil
@@ -499,7 +500,7 @@ func FetchFacebook(domain string) ([]string, error) {
req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
client := FastClient
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return []string{}, nil
@@ -533,7 +534,7 @@ func FetchFullHunt(domain string) ([]string, error) {
req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
client := FastClient
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return []string{}, nil
@@ -561,7 +562,7 @@ func FetchChaos(domain string) ([]string, error) {
req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
client := FastClient
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return []string{}, nil
@@ -595,7 +596,7 @@ func FetchNetlas(domain string) ([]string, error) {
req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
client := FastClient
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return []string{}, nil
@@ -629,7 +630,7 @@ func FetchSitedossier(domain string) ([]string, error) {
req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 15 * time.Second}
client := StandardClient
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return []string{}, nil
@@ -663,7 +664,7 @@ func FetchWebArchive(domain string) ([]string, error) {
req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 15 * time.Second}
client := StandardClient
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return []string{}, nil
@@ -698,7 +699,7 @@ func FetchSecurityTrails(domain string) ([]string, error) {
req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 15 * time.Second}
client := StandardClient
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -734,7 +735,7 @@ func FetchHackerOne(domain string) ([]string, error) {
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
client := FastClient
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return []string{}, nil
@@ -764,7 +765,7 @@ func FetchDNSDumpster(domain string) ([]string, error) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 15*time.Second)
defer cancel()
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 15 * time.Second}
client := StandardClient
pageReq, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", "https://dnsdumpster.com/", nil)
pageReq.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
@@ -801,7 +802,7 @@ func FetchShodan(domain string) ([]string, error) {
req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
client := FastClient
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return []string{}, nil
@@ -834,7 +835,7 @@ func FetchBufferOver(domain string) ([]string, error) {
req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
client := FastClient
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return []string{}, nil
@@ -888,7 +889,7 @@ func FetchCommonCrawl(domain string) ([]string, error) {
req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 30 * time.Second}
client := SlowClient
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return []string{}, nil
@@ -923,7 +924,7 @@ func FetchVirusTotal(domain string) ([]string, error) {
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
client := FastClient
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return []string{}, nil
@@ -962,7 +963,7 @@ func FetchRiddler(domain string) ([]string, error) {
req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 15 * time.Second}
client := StandardClient
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return []string{}, nil
@@ -996,7 +997,7 @@ func FetchRobtex(domain string) ([]string, error) {
req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 15 * time.Second}
client := StandardClient
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return []string{}, nil
@@ -1030,7 +1031,7 @@ func FetchDNSHistory(domain string) ([]string, error) {
req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 15 * time.Second}
client := StandardClient
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return []string{}, nil
@@ -1064,7 +1065,7 @@ func FetchArchiveToday(domain string) ([]string, error) {
req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 15 * time.Second}
client := StandardClient
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return []string{}, nil
@@ -1098,7 +1099,7 @@ func FetchJLDC(domain string) ([]string, error) {
req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 15 * time.Second}
client := StandardClient
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return []string{}, nil
@@ -1131,7 +1132,7 @@ func FetchCrtshPostgres(domain string) ([]string, error) {
req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 30 * time.Second}
client := SlowClient
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return []string{}, nil
@@ -1165,7 +1166,7 @@ func FetchSynapsInt(domain string) ([]string, error) {
req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 15 * time.Second}
client := StandardClient
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return []string{}, nil
@@ -1200,7 +1201,7 @@ func FetchCensysFree(domain string) ([]string, error) {
req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 15 * time.Second}
client := StandardClient
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return []string{}, nil
+149
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
package sources
import (
"crypto/tls"
"net"
"net/http"
"regexp"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
)
// Shared HTTP clients - singleton pattern
var (
clientOnce sync.Once
// Fast client for quick API calls (10s timeout)
FastClient *http.Client
// Standard client for most sources (15s timeout)
StandardClient *http.Client
// Slow client for heavy sources like crt.sh (120s timeout)
SlowClient *http.Client
// Shared transport for connection pooling
sharedTransport *http.Transport
)
// Pre-compiled regex patterns - compiled once at init
var (
// Generic subdomain pattern
SubdomainRegex *regexp.Regexp
// Email pattern (for extracting domains from emails)
EmailDomainRegex *regexp.Regexp
// URL pattern
URLDomainRegex *regexp.Regexp
// Common patterns used by multiple sources
JSONSubdomainRegex *regexp.Regexp
// Pattern for cleaning wildcard prefixes
WildcardPrefixRegex *regexp.Regexp
)
func init() {
initClients()
initRegex()
}
func initClients() {
clientOnce.Do(func() {
// Shared transport with connection pooling
sharedTransport = &http.Transport{
DialContext: (&net.Dialer{
Timeout: 10 * time.Second,
KeepAlive: 30 * time.Second,
}).DialContext,
MaxIdleConns: 100,
MaxIdleConnsPerHost: 10,
MaxConnsPerHost: 20,
IdleConnTimeout: 90 * time.Second,
TLSHandshakeTimeout: 10 * time.Second,
TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{
MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12,
},
ForceAttemptHTTP2: true,
ExpectContinueTimeout: 1 * time.Second,
}
FastClient = &http.Client{
Transport: sharedTransport,
Timeout: 10 * time.Second,
}
StandardClient = &http.Client{
Transport: sharedTransport,
Timeout: 15 * time.Second,
}
SlowClient = &http.Client{
Transport: sharedTransport,
Timeout: 120 * time.Second,
}
})
}
func initRegex() {
// Generic subdomain extraction pattern
SubdomainRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)([a-z0-9]([a-z0-9\-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?\.)+[a-z]{2,}`)
// Email domain extraction
EmailDomainRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`@([a-zA-Z0-9]([a-zA-Z0-9\-]{0,61}[a-zA-Z0-9])?\.)+[a-zA-Z]{2,}`)
// URL domain extraction
URLDomainRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)https?://([a-z0-9]([a-z0-9\-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?\.)+[a-z]{2,}`)
// JSON response subdomain pattern
JSONSubdomainRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`"([a-zA-Z0-9]([a-zA-Z0-9\-]{0,61}[a-zA-Z0-9])?\.)+[a-zA-Z]{2,}"`)
// Wildcard prefix cleaner
WildcardPrefixRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`^\*\.`)
}
// GetClientForTimeout returns appropriate shared client based on timeout needs
func GetClientForTimeout(timeout time.Duration) *http.Client {
switch {
case timeout <= 10*time.Second:
return FastClient
case timeout <= 30*time.Second:
return StandardClient
default:
return SlowClient
}
}
// ExtractSubdomains extracts subdomains from text using pre-compiled regex
func ExtractSubdomains(text, targetDomain string) []string {
matches := SubdomainRegex.FindAllString(text, -1)
seen := make(map[string]bool)
var result []string
targetSuffix := "." + targetDomain
for _, match := range matches {
match = WildcardPrefixRegex.ReplaceAllString(match, "")
match = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(match))
// Must end with target domain
if !strings.HasSuffix(match, targetSuffix) && match != targetDomain {
continue
}
if match != "" && !seen[match] {
seen[match] = true
result = append(result, match)
}
}
return result
}
// CloseIdleConnections closes idle connections in the shared transport
func CloseIdleConnections() {
if sharedTransport != nil {
sharedTransport.CloseIdleConnections()
}
}
+278
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,278 @@
package validator
import (
"fmt"
"net"
"regexp"
"strings"
)
// ValidationError represents an input validation error
type ValidationError struct {
Field string
Message string
}
func (e *ValidationError) Error() string {
return fmt.Sprintf("%s: %s", e.Field, e.Message)
}
// DomainValidator validates domain inputs
type DomainValidator struct {
MaxLength int
AllowWildcard bool
AllowSubdomains bool
}
// DefaultDomainValidator returns a validator with sensible defaults
func DefaultDomainValidator() *DomainValidator {
return &DomainValidator{
MaxLength: 253, // RFC 1035 max domain length
AllowWildcard: false,
AllowSubdomains: true,
}
}
// ValidateDomain validates a domain name for security and correctness
func (v *DomainValidator) ValidateDomain(domain string) error {
// Trim whitespace
domain = strings.TrimSpace(domain)
// Check empty
if domain == "" {
return &ValidationError{Field: "domain", Message: "domain cannot be empty"}
}
// Check length
if len(domain) > v.MaxLength {
return &ValidationError{
Field: "domain",
Message: fmt.Sprintf("domain exceeds maximum length of %d characters", v.MaxLength),
}
}
// Check for dangerous characters (path traversal, command injection)
dangerousChars := []string{
"..", "/", "\\", ";", "|", "&", "$", "`", "'", "\"",
"\n", "\r", "\t", "\x00", "%", "<", ">", "(", ")", "{", "}",
}
for _, char := range dangerousChars {
if strings.Contains(domain, char) {
return &ValidationError{
Field: "domain",
Message: fmt.Sprintf("domain contains invalid character: %q", char),
}
}
}
// Check for URL scheme (common mistake)
if strings.HasPrefix(strings.ToLower(domain), "http://") ||
strings.HasPrefix(strings.ToLower(domain), "https://") {
return &ValidationError{
Field: "domain",
Message: "domain should not include protocol (http:// or https://)",
}
}
// Validate domain format using regex
// Valid: example.com, sub.example.com, test-site.co.uk
// Invalid: -example.com, example-.com, example..com
domainRegex := regexp.MustCompile(`^(?:[a-zA-Z0-9](?:[a-zA-Z0-9-]{0,61}[a-zA-Z0-9])?\.)+[a-zA-Z]{2,}$`)
if !domainRegex.MatchString(domain) {
return &ValidationError{
Field: "domain",
Message: "invalid domain format",
}
}
// Check each label length (max 63 chars per RFC 1035)
labels := strings.Split(domain, ".")
for _, label := range labels {
if len(label) > 63 {
return &ValidationError{
Field: "domain",
Message: fmt.Sprintf("domain label %q exceeds 63 characters", label),
}
}
if len(label) == 0 {
return &ValidationError{
Field: "domain",
Message: "domain contains empty label",
}
}
}
// Check TLD is not just numbers
tld := labels[len(labels)-1]
if regexp.MustCompile(`^\d+$`).MatchString(tld) {
return &ValidationError{
Field: "domain",
Message: "TLD cannot be numeric only",
}
}
return nil
}
// ValidateIP validates an IP address
func ValidateIP(ip string) error {
ip = strings.TrimSpace(ip)
if ip == "" {
return &ValidationError{Field: "ip", Message: "IP cannot be empty"}
}
parsed := net.ParseIP(ip)
if parsed == nil {
return &ValidationError{Field: "ip", Message: "invalid IP address format"}
}
return nil
}
// ValidatePort validates a port number
func ValidatePort(port int) error {
if port < 1 || port > 65535 {
return &ValidationError{
Field: "port",
Message: fmt.Sprintf("port must be between 1 and 65535, got %d", port),
}
}
return nil
}
// ValidateWordlistPath validates a wordlist file path for security
func ValidateWordlistPath(path string) error {
path = strings.TrimSpace(path)
if path == "" {
return nil // Empty is allowed (uses default)
}
// Check for path traversal attempts
if strings.Contains(path, "..") {
return &ValidationError{
Field: "wordlist",
Message: "path traversal not allowed in wordlist path",
}
}
// Check for null bytes (truncation attack)
if strings.Contains(path, "\x00") {
return &ValidationError{
Field: "wordlist",
Message: "null bytes not allowed in path",
}
}
return nil
}
// ValidateOutputPath validates output file path for security
func ValidateOutputPath(path string) error {
path = strings.TrimSpace(path)
if path == "" {
return nil // Empty is allowed (no output file)
}
// Check for path traversal attempts
if strings.Contains(path, "..") {
return &ValidationError{
Field: "output",
Message: "path traversal not allowed in output path",
}
}
// Check for null bytes
if strings.Contains(path, "\x00") {
return &ValidationError{
Field: "output",
Message: "null bytes not allowed in path",
}
}
// Disallow writing to sensitive paths
sensitivePatterns := []string{
"/etc/", "/var/", "/usr/", "/bin/", "/sbin/",
"/root/", "/home/", "/proc/", "/sys/", "/dev/",
}
lowerPath := strings.ToLower(path)
for _, pattern := range sensitivePatterns {
if strings.HasPrefix(lowerPath, pattern) {
return &ValidationError{
Field: "output",
Message: fmt.Sprintf("cannot write to system path: %s", pattern),
}
}
}
return nil
}
// ValidateResolvers validates a comma-separated list of DNS resolvers
func ValidateResolvers(resolvers string) error {
resolvers = strings.TrimSpace(resolvers)
if resolvers == "" {
return nil // Empty uses defaults
}
parts := strings.Split(resolvers, ",")
for _, resolver := range parts {
resolver = strings.TrimSpace(resolver)
if resolver == "" {
continue
}
// Check if it's a valid IP
if err := ValidateIP(resolver); err != nil {
return &ValidationError{
Field: "resolvers",
Message: fmt.Sprintf("invalid resolver IP: %s", resolver),
}
}
}
return nil
}
// ValidateConcurrency validates concurrency settings
func ValidateConcurrency(concurrency int) error {
if concurrency < 1 {
return &ValidationError{
Field: "concurrency",
Message: "concurrency must be at least 1",
}
}
if concurrency > 10000 {
return &ValidationError{
Field: "concurrency",
Message: "concurrency exceeds maximum of 10000",
}
}
return nil
}
// ValidateTimeout validates timeout settings
func ValidateTimeout(timeout int) error {
if timeout < 1 {
return &ValidationError{
Field: "timeout",
Message: "timeout must be at least 1 second",
}
}
if timeout > 300 {
return &ValidationError{
Field: "timeout",
Message: "timeout exceeds maximum of 300 seconds",
}
}
return nil
}
// SanitizeDomain returns a cleaned domain string
func SanitizeDomain(domain string) string {
domain = strings.TrimSpace(domain)
domain = strings.ToLower(domain)
domain = strings.TrimPrefix(domain, "http://")
domain = strings.TrimPrefix(domain, "https://")
domain = strings.TrimSuffix(domain, "/")
return domain
}