docs(designs): add BROWSER_SKILLS_V1 design doc

Captures the 13 locked decisions, two-axis trust model (daemon-side
scoped tokens + process-side env access), 3-tier lookup, file
layout, and full responses to all 8 Codex outside-voice findings.
Includes Phase 2-4 sketches for future branches.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Garry Tan
2026-04-26 05:09:44 -07:00
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# Browser-Skills v1 — codifying repeated browser flows
**Status:** Phase 1 shipped on `garrytan/browserharness`. Phases 2-4 enumerated below.
**Last updated:** 2026-04-26
**Authors:** garrytan (with /plan-eng-review and /codex outside-voice review)
## What this is
Browser-skills are per-task directories that codify a repeated browser flow
into a deterministic Playwright script. Each skill has:
```
browser-skills/<name>/
├── SKILL.md # frontmatter + prose contract
├── script.ts # deterministic logic
├── _lib/browse-client.ts # vendored copy of the SDK
├── fixtures/<host>-<date>.html # captured page for tests
└── script.test.ts # parser tests against the fixture
```
A user (or, in Phase 2, an agent that just got a flow right) creates a skill
once. Future invocations run the script, returning JSON in 200ms instead of
the 30 seconds an agent would burn re-exploring via `$B` primitives.
The shipped reference is `hackernews-frontpage`: scrapes the HN front page,
returns 30 stories as JSON. Try `$B skill list` and `$B skill run hackernews-frontpage`.
## Why this is different from domain-skills (v1.8.0.0)
- **Domain-skills** = "agent remembers facts about a site." JSONL notes keyed
by hostname, injected into prompts at session start. State machine handles
quarantine → active → global promotion.
- **Browser-skills** = "agent codifies procedures into deterministic scripts."
Per-task directories, executed via `$B skill run`, scoped tokens at the
daemon for per-spawn capability isolation.
Both use the same mental model (per-host, three-tier scoping). The procedure
layer is where the bigger productivity gain lives because it pushes scraping
and form automation out of latent space and into reproducible code.
## Why this is not the existing P1 ("self-authoring `$B` commands")
The original P1 was blocked on Codex's T1 objection: agent-authored TypeScript
cannot run safely *inside* the daemon (ambient globals, constructor gadgets,
top-level-await TOCTOU between approval and execution). The right design was
"out-of-process worker isolation with capability-passing IPC." That's a hard
project that may never ship.
Browser-skills sidestep the entire problem by running scripts *outside* the
daemon as standalone Bun processes. The daemon never imports or evals skill
code. Skills talk to the daemon over loopback HTTP — same wire format any
external client would use.
The plan as approved replaces the existing P1.
---
## Phasing
| Phase | Branch | Scope |
|-------|--------|-------|
| **1** | `garrytan/browserharness` (this) | SDK, storage, `$B skill list/run/show/test/rm` subcommands, scoped-token model, bundled `hackernews-frontpage` reference. **Shipped.** |
| **2** | new (`browser-skills-scrape-automate`) | `/scrape` and `/automate` skill templates that prototype a flow then offer the skillify approval gate. |
| **3** | new (`browser-skills-resolver`) | Resolver injection at session start (per-host browser-skill discovery). Mirrors domain-skill injection. `gstack-config browser_skillify_prompts` knob. |
| **4** | new | Eval test infrastructure (LLM-judge), fixture-staleness detection, periodic re-validation against live pages. |
---
## Phase 1 architecture
### Decisions locked (13)
1. **Phase 1 = full storage + SDK + subcommands + bundled reference.** No agent
authoring yet. Phase 2 lands `/scrape` and `/automate`.
2. **Two verbs in Phase 2: `/scrape` (read-only) and `/automate` (mutating).**
They share skillify approval-gate machinery but live as separate skill
templates.
3. **Replaces the existing self-authoring-`$B` P1 in TODOS.md.** Same
user-visible goal, no in-daemon isolation problem.
4. **SDK distribution: sibling file inside each skill (Option E).** The
canonical SDK lives at `browse/src/browse-client.ts` (~250 LOC). Each skill
ships a copy at `<skill>/_lib/browse-client.ts`. Phase 2's generator copies
the current SDK alongside every generated script. Each skill is fully
self-contained: copy the directory anywhere, it runs. Version drift
impossible (the SDK is frozen at the version the skill was authored
against). Disk cost: ~3KB per skill.
5. **Three-tier lookup: bundled → global → project.** Bundled skills ship
read-only with the gstack install (`<gstack-install>/browser-skills/<name>/`).
Global at `~/.gstack/browser-skills/<name>/`. Per-project at
`<project>/.gstack/browser-skills/<name>/`. Lookup walks tiers in priority
order project → global → bundled; first hit wins. **`$B skill list`
prints the resolved tier alongside each skill name** so "why did it run
that one?" is never a debugging mystery.
6. **Trust model: scoped tokens at spawn time, NOT env-scrub-as-sandbox.**
See "Trust model" below. (Revised from original env-scrub plan after
Codex flagged it as security theater.)
7. **Single source of truth: SKILL.md frontmatter only.** No `meta.json`.
Frontmatter holds host, triggers, args, version, source, trusted.
SHA256/staleness deferred to Phase 4 as a separate `.checksum` sidecar
if it lands at all.
8. **No INDEX.json. Walk the directory.** `$B skill list` enumerates the
three tiers and parses each SKILL.md frontmatter. ~5-10ms for 50 skills.
Eliminates the entire "index drifted from disk" bug class.
9. **`$B skill run` output protocol.** stdout = JSON. stderr = streaming
logs. Exit 0 / nonzero. Default 60s timeout, override via `--timeout=Ns`.
Max stdout 1MB (truncate + nonzero exit if exceeded). Matches `gh` /
`kubectl` / `docker` conventions.
10. **Fixture replay: two patterns for two test types.** SDK unit test
stands up an in-test mock HTTP server. End-to-end skill tests parse
bundled HTML fixtures via the script's exported parser function (no
daemon required). Phase 1 fixture-only is adequate for `hackernews-frontpage`;
Phase 2 `/automate` will need richer fixtures.
11. **Reference skill: `hackernews-frontpage`.** Scrapes HN front page
(titles, points, comments). No auth, stable HTML, ideal fixture-test
target.
12. **Token/port discovery: scoped-token env-only for spawned skills;
state-file fallback for standalone debug runs.** When spawned via
`$B skill run`, the SDK reads `GSTACK_PORT` + `GSTACK_SKILL_TOKEN` from
env. For standalone `bun run script.ts`, the SDK falls back to
`<project>/.gstack/browse.json` (the actual state-file path per
`config.ts:50`).
13. **CHANGELOG honesty.** Phase 1 lead: humans can hand-write deterministic
browser scripts that gstack runs. Phase 1 explicitly notes that agent
authoring lands in next release. No fabricated perf numbers — Phase 1
has no before/after.
### Trust model (decision #6 in detail)
Two orthogonal axes:
| Axis | Mechanism | Default |
|------|-----------|---------|
| **Daemon-side capability** | Per-spawn scoped token bound to `read+write` scope (the 17-cmd browser-driving surface, minus admin commands like `eval`/`js`/`cookies`/`storage`). Single-use clientId encodes skill name + spawn id. Revoked when the spawn exits. | Always scoped (never the daemon root token). |
| **Process-side env access** | SKILL.md frontmatter `trusted: true` passes `process.env` minus `GSTACK_TOKEN`. `trusted: false` (default) drops everything except a minimal allowlist (LANG, LC_ALL, TERM, TZ, locked PATH) and explicitly strips secret-pattern keys (TOKEN/KEY/SECRET/PASSWORD, AWS_*, AZURE_*, GCP_*, ANTHROPIC_*, OPENAI_*, GITHUB_*, etc.). | Untrusted (must opt in). |
`GSTACK_PORT` and `GSTACK_SKILL_TOKEN` are always injected last so a parent
process cannot override them by setting them in env.
**What this gets right:** the daemon-side scoped token is enforceable by the
daemon. A skill that tries to call `eval` (admin scope) gets a 403 even though
the SDK exposes it. The capability boundary is in the right place.
**What this does NOT close:** Bun has no built-in FS sandbox. An untrusted
skill can still `import 'fs'` and read whatever the OS user can read (e.g.
`~/.ssh/id_rsa`). The env scrub is hygiene, not a sandbox. OS-level isolation
(`sandbox-exec`, namespaces) is Phase 4 work and drops in cleanly behind the
existing trusted/untrusted contract.
The original plan called env-scrub a sandbox. Codex correctly flagged that as
theater. The revised plan calls it what it is: best-effort hygiene plus
defense-in-depth, with the real boundary at the daemon-side scoped token.
### File layout
```
browse/src/
├── browse-client.ts # canonical SDK (~250 LOC)
├── browser-skills.ts # 3-tier walk + frontmatter parser + tombstones
├── browser-skill-commands.ts # $B skill list/show/run/test/rm + spawnSkill
└── skill-token.ts # mintSkillToken / revokeSkillToken wrappers
browser-skills/
└── hackernews-frontpage/ # bundled reference skill
├── SKILL.md
├── script.ts
├── _lib/browse-client.ts # byte-identical copy of canonical
├── fixtures/hn-2026-04-26.html
└── script.test.ts
browse/test/
├── skill-token.test.ts # mint/revoke lifecycle, scope assertions
├── browse-client.test.ts # mock HTTP server, wire format, auth
├── browser-skills-storage.test.ts # 3-tier walk, frontmatter, tombstones
└── browser-skill-commands.test.ts # parseRunArgs, dispatch, env scrub, spawn
test/skill-validation.test.ts # extended: bundled-skill contract checks
```
### What does NOT change
- Domain-skills storage, state machine, or injection. Untouched.
- Tunnel-surface allowlist (`server.ts:118-123`). Same 17 commands.
- L1-L6 security stack. Browser-skills don't inject text into prompts in
Phase 1; Phase 3's resolver injection will ride the existing UNTRUSTED
envelope.
- The `cli.ts` HTTP client at `sendCommand()`. The SDK is a separate module
with a different concern (library vs CLI process).
---
## Codex outside-voice findings (post-review responses)
The /codex review flagged 8 findings. The plan addresses them as follows:
| # | Finding | Phase 1 response |
|---|---------|------------------|
| 1 | Trust model is fake without FS sandbox | **Closed** by decision #6 (scoped tokens) above. |
| 2 | Phase 1 is overbuilt for one bundled skill (lookup tiers, tombstones, etc.) | **Acknowledged but kept.** User chose full Phase 1 to lock the architecture before Phase 2 lands agent authoring. Each subsystem is small enough to remove cleanly if data later says it's unused. |
| 3 | Existing client pattern in `cli.ts:398` may make sibling SDK redundant | **Verified false.** Line 398 is the end of `extractTabId()` (a flag-parser). The actual HTTP client is `sendCommand()` at cli.ts:401-467, but it's CLI-coupled (`process.stdout.write`, `process.exit`, server-restart recovery). Not reusable as a library. The new `browse-client.ts` mirrors its wire format but is library-shaped. |
| 4 | "First hit wins" lookup is opaque | **Mitigated** by listing the resolved tier inline in `$B skill list` and `$B skill show`. Future: optional `--source bundled\|global\|project` flag if the tier override proves confusing. |
| 5 | Atomic skill packaging matters more than the index question; symlink defenses | **Closed for Phase 1**: bundled skills ship as part of the gstack install (no live writes; atomic by virtue of being read-only files in the install dir). Phase 2's `writeBrowserSkill` will write to a temp dir then rename, and use `realpath`/`lstat` discipline (existing `browse/src/path-security.ts`). |
| 6 | Phase 2 synthesis from activity feed is weak (lossy ring buffer) | **Open issue for Phase 2 design.** The activity feed is telemetry, not a replay IR. Phase 2 will need a structured recorder OR re-prompting the agent to write the script from scratch using its own context. Decide in Phase 2's design pass. |
| 7 | Bun runtime regression: skill scripts as standalone Bun reintroduce a Bun runtime requirement | **Open issue for Phase 2 distribution.** Phase 1 sidesteps this because the bundled reference skill ships inside the gstack install (which already builds with Bun). Phase 2 needs to decide between (a) shipping a Bun binary with each generated skill, (b) compiling skills to self-contained executables, or (c) using Node.js with `cli.ts`'s HTTP pattern. |
| 8 | `file://` fixtures don't prove timing/auth/navigation/lazy hydration | **Documented limit.** Adequate for `hackernews-frontpage`. Phase 2 `/automate` will need richer fixtures (mock daemon with timing, recorded HAR replay, etc.). |
---
## Phase 2 sketch (for reference)
Two skill templates: `/scrape` and `/automate`. Both run a prototype flow via
`$B` primitives, get the user's "looks right" signal, then offer the skillify
approval gate that writes a Phase-1-shaped browser-skill to disk.
Open design questions deferred to Phase 2:
- **Where do user-authored skills live by default — global or per-project?**
Lean global for procedures, with per-project override (mirrors domain-skill
scope). Phase 1 storage helpers already support both lookup paths.
- **How does the agent synthesize the script?** Codex finding #6: the activity
feed is lossy. Options: (a) structured recorder that captures full $B
invocations to a separate buffer; (b) re-prompt the agent to write from
scratch using its own context, with the activity feed as a reference.
- **Bun runtime distribution.** Codex finding #7. Options: (a) ship Bun
binary with each skill; (b) compile each skill to a self-contained binary;
(c) use Node + the existing `cli.ts` pattern.
## Phase 3 sketch
Resolver injection at session start. Mirror the domain-skill injection at
`server.ts:722-743`:
```ts
const browserSkillsBlock = await renderBrowserSkillsForHost(hostname, projectSlug);
if (browserSkillsBlock) {
systemPrompt += `\n\n${browserSkillsBlock}`;
}
```
`renderBrowserSkillsForHost()` reads the 3 tiers, filters to skills whose
`host` field matches, and emits an UNTRUSTED-wrapped block listing them.
`gstack-config browser_skillify_prompts` (default off): when on, end-of-task
nudges in `/qa`, `/design-review`, etc. fire when activity feed shows ≥N
commands on a single host AND no skill exists yet for that host+intent.
## Phase 4 sketch
- LLM-judge eval ("did the agent reach for the skill instead of re-exploring?").
- Fixture-staleness detection — compare bundled fixture against live page.
- OS-level FS sandbox for untrusted spawns (`sandbox-exec` on macOS,
namespaces / seccomp on Linux).
- `$B skill upgrade <name>` — regenerate the sibling SDK copy when the
canonical SDK changes.
---
## Verification (Phase 1)
`bun test` passes the new test files:
- `browse/test/skill-token.test.ts` — 15 assertions
- `browse/test/browse-client.test.ts` — 26 assertions
- `browse/test/browser-skills-storage.test.ts` — 31 assertions
- `browse/test/browser-skill-commands.test.ts` — 29 assertions
- `browser-skills/hackernews-frontpage/script.test.ts` — 13 assertions
- `test/skill-validation.test.ts` — 7 new bundled-skill assertions
End-to-end with the daemon running:
```bash
$B skill list # shows hackernews-frontpage (bundled)
$B skill show hackernews-frontpage # prints SKILL.md
$B skill run hackernews-frontpage # returns JSON of 30 stories
$B skill test hackernews-frontpage # runs script.test.ts
```