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fix(hooks): fail-closed freeze + shared extractor + careful HIGH tier
Freeze boundary hook had four verified bugs: the grep-first JSON extractor truncated at escaped quotes and failed OPEN on unparseable payloads; the deny JSON was printf-interpolated so a quote- or newline-bearing path silently no-oped the block; the freeze path read stripped INTERNAL spaces (a boundary like ~/My Project could never match); and the path resolver skipped the final component, letting an in-boundary symlink write through to an out-of-boundary target. Fixes, structurally: one shared sourced helper (careful/bin/hook-extract.sh) now owns JSON extraction and JSON-encoded decision envelopes for BOTH hooks -- the two-copy drift is how freeze kept a broken extractor after careful's was fixed. Freeze is now deny-tier fail-closed (unparseable payload denies, parsed-but-no-file_path still allows), trims only leading/trailing whitespace, and resolves symlinks through the final path component. Careful gains a HIGH tier (hard deny, simple commands only): recursive delete of /, ~, or $HOME, and force-push to the repo's default branch. Compound commands always fall through to the MEDIUM ask; --force-with-lease is never HIGH. Documented as a best-effort advisory hard-stop, not a policy boundary. Plus additive-only project patterns (~/.gstack/careful-patterns.txt + per-project file): config can only ADD warn rules, never suppress a baseline family. test/hook-scripts.test.ts: 89 tests incl. malformed-payload deny, parseable deny JSON for hostile paths, space-bearing boundaries, symlink escape, HIGH tier splits, additive invariant, invalid-regex resilience. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Garry Tan
co-authored by
Claude Fable 5
Claude Fable 5
parent
2be6c06ba8
commit
455c805125
+29
-1
@@ -64,6 +64,34 @@ The hook reads the command from the tool input JSON, checks it against the
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patterns above, and returns a `hookSpecificOutput` payload with
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`permissionDecision: "ask"` and a warning reason if a match is found (the
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decision must be nested under `hookSpecificOutput` — Claude Code ignores a
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top-level `permissionDecision`). You can always override the warning and proceed.
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top-level `permissionDecision`). You can always override a MEDIUM warning and
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proceed.
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## HIGH tier (hard deny)
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A tiny set of catastrophic commands is **denied outright** while /careful is
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active, not just warned:
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- `rm -r`/`-R` targeting exactly `/`, `~`, or `$HOME`
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- `git push --force` / `-f` to the repo's **default branch**
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HIGH only fires on SIMPLE commands (no `;`, `&&`, `||`, `|`, newline) — string
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matching cannot resolve what a compound command does, so compound shapes fall
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through to the ordinary MEDIUM ask. `--force-with-lease` is deliberately not
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matched (it's the safe force variant). This is a best-effort advisory
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hard-stop, not a policy boundary: /careful is opt-in and session-scoped, so
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the escape hatch is ending the /careful session.
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## Project patterns (additive only)
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Add your own warn rules — one POSIX ERE per line, `#` comments allowed — in:
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- `~/.gstack/careful-patterns.txt` (all projects)
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- `~/.gstack/projects/<slug>/careful-patterns.txt` (this project)
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Matching lines warn with `[careful] Project rule matched: <pattern>`. Config
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can only ADD rules: the files are consulted after the built-in families, so no
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file content can suppress or weaken a baseline warning. Invalid regex lines
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are skipped.
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To deactivate, end the conversation or start a new one. Hooks are session-scoped.
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+29
-1
@@ -59,6 +59,34 @@ The hook reads the command from the tool input JSON, checks it against the
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patterns above, and returns a `hookSpecificOutput` payload with
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`permissionDecision: "ask"` and a warning reason if a match is found (the
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decision must be nested under `hookSpecificOutput` — Claude Code ignores a
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top-level `permissionDecision`). You can always override the warning and proceed.
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top-level `permissionDecision`). You can always override a MEDIUM warning and
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proceed.
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## HIGH tier (hard deny)
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A tiny set of catastrophic commands is **denied outright** while /careful is
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active, not just warned:
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- `rm -r`/`-R` targeting exactly `/`, `~`, or `$HOME`
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- `git push --force` / `-f` to the repo's **default branch**
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HIGH only fires on SIMPLE commands (no `;`, `&&`, `||`, `|`, newline) — string
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matching cannot resolve what a compound command does, so compound shapes fall
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through to the ordinary MEDIUM ask. `--force-with-lease` is deliberately not
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matched (it's the safe force variant). This is a best-effort advisory
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hard-stop, not a policy boundary: /careful is opt-in and session-scoped, so
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the escape hatch is ending the /careful session.
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## Project patterns (additive only)
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Add your own warn rules — one POSIX ERE per line, `#` comments allowed — in:
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- `~/.gstack/careful-patterns.txt` (all projects)
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- `~/.gstack/projects/<slug>/careful-patterns.txt` (this project)
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Matching lines warn with `[careful] Project rule matched: <pattern>`. Config
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can only ADD rules: the files are consulted after the built-in families, so no
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file content can suppress or weaken a baseline warning. Invalid regex lines
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are skipped.
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To deactivate, end the conversation or start a new one. Hooks are session-scoped.
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+104
-30
@@ -1,14 +1,23 @@
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# check-careful.sh — PreToolUse hook for /careful skill
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# Reads JSON from stdin, checks Bash command for destructive patterns.
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# Returns a PreToolUse hookSpecificOutput with permissionDecision "ask" to warn,
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# or {} to allow. The decision MUST be nested under hookSpecificOutput — Claude
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# Code ignores a top-level permissionDecision, which silently no-ops the warning.
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# Two tiers:
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# HIGH — a tiny set of catastrophic SIMPLE commands returns "deny"
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# (best-effort advisory hard-stop, not a policy boundary).
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# MEDIUM — the destructive families below return "ask" (always overridable).
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# The decision MUST be nested under hookSpecificOutput — Claude Code ignores a
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# top-level permissionDecision, which silently no-ops the warning.
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set -euo pipefail
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# Read stdin (JSON with tool_input)
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INPUT=$(cat)
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# Shared JSON helpers (extractor + encoder) — one copy for careful AND freeze.
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# See hook-extract.sh for the drift history that motivated the shared file.
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_HOOK_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
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# shellcheck source=careful/bin/hook-extract.sh
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. "$_HOOK_DIR/hook-extract.sh"
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# Extract the "command" field value from tool_input with a real JSON parser.
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#
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# The previous extractor was
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@@ -21,31 +30,17 @@ INPUT=$(cat)
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# bash -c "rm -rf /" -> CMD='bash -c \' -> allowed
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# echo "x"; rm -rf ~ -> CMD='echo \' -> allowed
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#
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# The python3 fallback never rescued these because CMD was non-empty, so the
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# `[ -z "$CMD" ]` guard did not fire. Parse the payload properly instead, and
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# fail CLOSED when it cannot be parsed at all — a hook that gates destructive
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# commands must not allow-by-default on unreadable input.
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#
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# python3 is tried first because it ships with macOS and most Linux distros and
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# is reliably on PATH in a hook environment; node is the fallback.
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extract_cmd() {
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if command -v python3 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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printf '%s' "$INPUT" | python3 -c 'import sys,json; d=json.loads(sys.stdin.read()); c=d.get("tool_input",{}).get("command",""); sys.stdout.write(c if isinstance(c,str) else "")' 2>/dev/null && return 0
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fi
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if command -v node >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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printf '%s' "$INPUT" | node -e 'let s="";process.stdin.on("data",d=>s+=d).on("end",()=>{try{const j=JSON.parse(s);const c=(j&&j.tool_input&&j.tool_input.command)||"";process.stdout.write(typeof c==="string"?c:"")}catch(e){process.exit(3)}})' 2>/dev/null && return 0
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fi
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return 1
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}
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# Parse the payload properly instead, and fail CLOSED when it cannot be parsed
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# at all — a hook that gates destructive commands must not allow-by-default on
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# unreadable input.
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set +e
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CMD=$(extract_cmd)
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CMD=$(gstack_hook_extract_field "$INPUT" command)
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EXTRACT_RC=$?
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set -e
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# No parser available, or the payload is not parseable JSON. Fail closed.
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if [ "$EXTRACT_RC" -ne 0 ] && [ -n "$INPUT" ]; then
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printf '{"hookSpecificOutput":{"hookEventName":"PreToolUse","permissionDecision":"ask","permissionDecisionReason":"[careful] Could not parse the tool payload to safety-check this command. Approve only if you know what it does."}}\n'
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gstack_hook_decision ask "[careful] Could not parse the tool payload to safety-check this command. Approve only if you know what it does."
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exit 0
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fi
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@@ -55,6 +50,12 @@ if [ -z "$CMD" ]; then
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exit 0
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fi
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# Log a hook fire event (pattern name only, never command content).
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_careful_log_fire() {
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mkdir -p ~/.gstack/analytics 2>/dev/null || true
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echo '{"event":"hook_fire","skill":"careful","pattern":"'"$1"'","ts":"'$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ)'","repo":"'$(basename "$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel 2>/dev/null)" 2>/dev/null || echo "unknown")'"}' >> ~/.gstack/analytics/skill-usage.jsonl 2>/dev/null || true
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}
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# Normalize: lowercase for case-insensitive SQL matching
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CMD_LOWER=$(printf '%s' "$CMD" | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')
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@@ -71,10 +72,54 @@ CMD_LOWER=$(printf '%s' "$CMD" | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')
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# primitives as a reason to ask: they are vanishingly rare in commands a human
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# actually means to run unattended.
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if printf '%s' "$CMD" | grep -qE '\$\{IFS\}|\$IFS|\$\(echo[^)]*base64[^)]*\)|base64[[:space:]]+(-d|--decode)[^|]*\|[[:space:]]*(sh|bash)' 2>/dev/null; then
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printf '{"hookSpecificOutput":{"hookEventName":"PreToolUse","permissionDecision":"ask","permissionDecisionReason":"[careful] Shell obfuscation detected (IFS word-splitting or base64-to-shell). Read the command carefully before approving."}}\n'
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gstack_hook_decision ask "[careful] Shell obfuscation detected (IFS word-splitting or base64-to-shell). Read the command carefully before approving."
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exit 0
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fi
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# --- HIGH tier: hard deny (best-effort advisory hard-stop, NOT a policy boundary) ---
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# Only SIMPLE commands are eligible: string matching cannot resolve what a
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# compound command does (`cd X && git push --force` — whose cwd? which repo?),
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# so anything containing ; && || | or a newline falls through to the MEDIUM ask
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# families below — conservative failure = ask, never guess.
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# --force-with-lease is deliberately NOT matched here (it is the safe variant).
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# curl|sh stays MEDIUM/allow territory: hard-denying it would block legitimate
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# installer flows, including gstack's own setup pattern.
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_IS_SIMPLE=1
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case "$CMD" in
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*';'*|*'&&'*|*'||'*|*'|'*|*$'\n'*) _IS_SIMPLE=0 ;;
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esac
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if [ "$_IS_SIMPLE" -eq 1 ]; then
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# Recursive delete aimed at the filesystem root or the whole home directory.
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if printf '%s' "$CMD" | grep -qE '^[[:space:]]*(sudo[[:space:]]+)?rm[[:space:]]+(-[a-zA-Z]*[rR][a-zA-Z]*[[:space:]]+)+(/|~|\$HOME)/?[[:space:]]*$' 2>/dev/null; then
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_careful_log_fire "high_rm_root"
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gstack_hook_decision deny "[careful][HIGH] Recursive delete of / or the home directory is blocked while /careful is active. If you truly mean it, end the /careful session first."
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exit 0
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fi
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# Force-push to the repo's default branch (the shared history everyone pulls).
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if printf '%s' "$CMD" | grep -qE '^[[:space:]]*git[[:space:]]+push([[:space:]]|$)' 2>/dev/null \
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&& printf '%s' "$CMD" | grep -qE '(^|[[:space:]])(-f|--force)($|[[:space:]])' 2>/dev/null; then
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_DEFAULT_BRANCH=$(git symbolic-ref refs/remotes/origin/HEAD 2>/dev/null | sed 's|.*/||' || true)
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if [ -n "$_DEFAULT_BRANCH" ]; then
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_TARGETS_DEFAULT=0
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if printf '%s' "$CMD" | grep -qE "(^|[[:space:]])${_DEFAULT_BRANCH}([[:space:]]|$)" 2>/dev/null; then
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_TARGETS_DEFAULT=1
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elif printf '%s' "$CMD" | grep -qE '^[[:space:]]*git[[:space:]]+push([[:space:]]+(-f|--force))*[[:space:]]*$' 2>/dev/null; then
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# Bare `git push --force` (force flags only, no remote/ref): it targets
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# the current branch's upstream, which is the default branch only when
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# we are ON it. Any other arg shape (explicit remote + feature ref,
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# exotic refspecs) falls through to the MEDIUM ask below.
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_CURRENT_BRANCH=$(git branch --show-current 2>/dev/null || true)
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[ -n "$_CURRENT_BRANCH" ] && [ "$_CURRENT_BRANCH" = "$_DEFAULT_BRANCH" ] && _TARGETS_DEFAULT=1
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fi
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if [ "$_TARGETS_DEFAULT" -eq 1 ]; then
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_careful_log_fire "high_force_push_default"
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gstack_hook_decision deny "[careful][HIGH] Force-push to the default branch ($_DEFAULT_BRANCH) is blocked while /careful is active. Use --force-with-lease on a feature branch, or end the /careful session if you truly mean it."
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exit 0
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fi
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fi
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fi
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fi
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# --- Check for safe exceptions (one standalone rm of build artifacts) ---
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# Match the complete command. Parsing only the last rm is unsafe because shell
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# syntax or comments can hide an earlier destructive command, for example:
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@@ -102,7 +147,7 @@ case "$CMD" in
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;;
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esac
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# --- Destructive pattern checks ---
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# --- Destructive pattern checks (MEDIUM tier — always overridable) ---
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WARN=""
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PATTERN=""
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@@ -154,14 +199,43 @@ if [ -z "$WARN" ] && printf '%s' "$CMD" | grep -qE 'docker\s+(rm\s+-f|system\s+p
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PATTERN="docker_destructive"
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fi
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# --- Additive project patterns ---
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# Config can only ADD warn rules, never remove or weaken a baseline family:
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# these files are consulted AFTER the hardcoded checks and only when none of
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# them matched, so no file content can suppress a baseline warning. One POSIX
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# ERE per line; blank lines and #-comments skipped; an invalid regex is
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# skipped (never fatal — the hook must not break on a typo in config).
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if [ -z "$WARN" ]; then
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_GSTACK_HOME_DIR="${GSTACK_HOME:-$HOME/.gstack}"
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_PATTERN_FILES="$_GSTACK_HOME_DIR/careful-patterns.txt"
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eval "$("$_HOOK_DIR/../../bin/gstack-slug" 2>/dev/null)" 2>/dev/null || true
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if [ -n "${SLUG:-}" ]; then
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_PATTERN_FILES="$_PATTERN_FILES
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$_GSTACK_HOME_DIR/projects/$SLUG/careful-patterns.txt"
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fi
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while IFS= read -r _PF; do
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[ -f "$_PF" ] || continue
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while IFS= read -r _PAT || [ -n "$_PAT" ]; do
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case "$_PAT" in ''|'#'*) continue ;; esac
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_PAT_RC=0
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printf '' | grep -qE "$_PAT" 2>/dev/null || _PAT_RC=$?
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[ "$_PAT_RC" -eq 2 ] && continue # invalid ERE — skip the line
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if printf '%s' "$CMD" | grep -qE "$_PAT" 2>/dev/null; then
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WARN="Project rule matched: $_PAT"
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PATTERN="project_rule"
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break
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fi
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done < "$_PF"
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[ -n "$WARN" ] && break
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done <<EOF_PATTERN_FILES
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$_PATTERN_FILES
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EOF_PATTERN_FILES
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fi
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# --- Output ---
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if [ -n "$WARN" ]; then
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# Log hook fire event (pattern name only, never command content)
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mkdir -p ~/.gstack/analytics 2>/dev/null || true
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echo '{"event":"hook_fire","skill":"careful","pattern":"'"$PATTERN"'","ts":"'$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ)'","repo":"'$(basename "$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel 2>/dev/null)" 2>/dev/null || echo "unknown")'"}' >> ~/.gstack/analytics/skill-usage.jsonl 2>/dev/null || true
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WARN_ESCAPED=$(printf '%s' "$WARN" | sed 's/"/\\"/g')
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printf '{"hookSpecificOutput":{"hookEventName":"PreToolUse","permissionDecision":"ask","permissionDecisionReason":"[careful] %s"}}\n' "$WARN_ESCAPED"
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_careful_log_fire "$PATTERN"
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gstack_hook_decision ask "[careful] $WARN"
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else
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echo '{}'
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fi
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@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# hook-extract.sh — SHARED JSON helpers for gstack PreToolUse hooks.
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# Sourced (never executed) by careful/bin/check-careful.sh and
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# freeze/bin/check-freeze.sh via a path relative to each hook script.
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#
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# ONE copy on purpose. These two hooks previously carried separate extractor
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# copies; the escaped-quote truncation bug got fixed in careful's copy while
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# freeze silently kept the broken one. Any future parsing fix lands here and
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# reaches both hooks by construction.
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# gstack_hook_extract_field PAYLOAD FIELD
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# Prints tool_input.FIELD when PAYLOAD is valid JSON and the field is a
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# string ("" when absent or non-string). Returns 1 when no parser is
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# available or the payload is not parseable JSON — the CALLER decides the
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# polarity for that case (careful asks, freeze denies).
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#
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# python3 is tried first because it ships with macOS and most Linux distros
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# and is reliably on PATH in a hook environment; node is the fallback.
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gstack_hook_extract_field() {
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_ghef_payload="$1"
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_ghef_field="$2"
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if command -v python3 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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printf '%s' "$_ghef_payload" | python3 -c 'import sys,json
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field = sys.argv[1]
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d = json.loads(sys.stdin.read())
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c = d.get("tool_input", {}).get(field, "")
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sys.stdout.write(c if isinstance(c, str) else "")' "$_ghef_field" 2>/dev/null && return 0
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fi
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if command -v node >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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printf '%s' "$_ghef_payload" | node -e 'let s="";process.stdin.on("data",d=>s+=d).on("end",()=>{try{const j=JSON.parse(s);const c=(j&&j.tool_input&&j.tool_input[process.argv[1]])||"";process.stdout.write(typeof c==="string"?c:"")}catch(e){process.exit(3)}})' "$_ghef_field" 2>/dev/null && return 0
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fi
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return 1
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}
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# gstack_hook_json_string TEXT
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# Prints TEXT as a JSON string literal (surrounding quotes included),
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# encoding quotes, backslashes, control characters and newlines. Never build
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# hook JSON with printf/sed interpolation: a path containing a quote or a
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# newline produces malformed JSON, and Claude Code silently ignores the
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# whole decision — a deny that no-ops exactly when it matters.
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gstack_hook_json_string() {
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_ghjs_text="$1"
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if command -v python3 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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printf '%s' "$_ghjs_text" | python3 -c 'import sys,json; sys.stdout.write(json.dumps(sys.stdin.read()))' 2>/dev/null && return 0
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fi
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if command -v node >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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printf '%s' "$_ghjs_text" | node -e 'let s="";process.stdin.on("data",d=>s+=d).on("end",()=>process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(s)))' 2>/dev/null && return 0
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fi
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# Last-resort fallback (no parser on PATH): strip to a safe charset so the
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# envelope stays valid JSON even if the message loses characters.
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printf '"%s"' "$(printf '%s' "$_ghjs_text" | tr -cd 'a-zA-Z0-9 ._/:@=+-' )"
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}
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# gstack_hook_decision DECISION REASON
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# Emits the full PreToolUse hookSpecificOutput envelope with REASON safely
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# JSON-encoded. DECISION is "ask" or "deny". The decision MUST be nested
|
||||
# under hookSpecificOutput — Claude Code ignores a top-level
|
||||
# permissionDecision, which silently no-ops the block.
|
||||
gstack_hook_decision() {
|
||||
_ghd_decision="$1"
|
||||
_ghd_reason="$2"
|
||||
_ghd_encoded=$(gstack_hook_json_string "$_ghd_reason")
|
||||
printf '{"hookSpecificOutput":{"hookEventName":"PreToolUse","permissionDecision":"%s","permissionDecisionReason":%s}}\n' "$_ghd_decision" "$_ghd_encoded"
|
||||
}
|
||||
+11
-3
@@ -76,14 +76,22 @@ again. To remove it, run `/unfreeze` or end the session."
|
||||
|
||||
## How it works
|
||||
|
||||
The hook reads `file_path` from the Edit/Write tool input JSON, then checks
|
||||
whether the path starts with the freeze directory. If not, it returns a
|
||||
The hook reads `file_path` from the Edit/Write tool input JSON (shared
|
||||
real-JSON extractor with /careful — one copy, sourced by both hooks), then
|
||||
checks whether the path starts with the freeze directory. If not, it returns a
|
||||
`hookSpecificOutput` payload with `permissionDecision: "deny"` to block the
|
||||
operation (nested under `hookSpecificOutput` — Claude Code ignores a top-level
|
||||
`permissionDecision`).
|
||||
|
||||
Polarity is fail-closed: a tool payload the hook cannot parse is DENIED, not
|
||||
allowed — a boundary that fails open is not a boundary. A payload that parses
|
||||
but has no `file_path` (a non-file tool) is allowed. Symlinks are resolved
|
||||
through their FINAL component, so an in-boundary symlink pointing outside the
|
||||
boundary is checked against its target.
|
||||
|
||||
The freeze boundary persists for the session via the state file. The hook
|
||||
script reads it on every Edit/Write invocation.
|
||||
script reads it on every Edit/Write invocation. Boundaries containing spaces
|
||||
are supported.
|
||||
|
||||
## Notes
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+11
-3
@@ -71,14 +71,22 @@ again. To remove it, run `/unfreeze` or end the session."
|
||||
|
||||
## How it works
|
||||
|
||||
The hook reads `file_path` from the Edit/Write tool input JSON, then checks
|
||||
whether the path starts with the freeze directory. If not, it returns a
|
||||
The hook reads `file_path` from the Edit/Write tool input JSON (shared
|
||||
real-JSON extractor with /careful — one copy, sourced by both hooks), then
|
||||
checks whether the path starts with the freeze directory. If not, it returns a
|
||||
`hookSpecificOutput` payload with `permissionDecision: "deny"` to block the
|
||||
operation (nested under `hookSpecificOutput` — Claude Code ignores a top-level
|
||||
`permissionDecision`).
|
||||
|
||||
Polarity is fail-closed: a tool payload the hook cannot parse is DENIED, not
|
||||
allowed — a boundary that fails open is not a boundary. A payload that parses
|
||||
but has no `file_path` (a non-file tool) is allowed. Symlinks are resolved
|
||||
through their FINAL component, so an in-boundary symlink pointing outside the
|
||||
boundary is checked against its target.
|
||||
|
||||
The freeze boundary persists for the session via the state file. The hook
|
||||
script reads it on every Edit/Write invocation.
|
||||
script reads it on every Edit/Write invocation. Boundaries containing spaces
|
||||
are supported.
|
||||
|
||||
## Notes
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+52
-13
@@ -4,11 +4,24 @@
|
||||
# Returns a PreToolUse hookSpecificOutput with permissionDecision "deny" to block,
|
||||
# or {} to allow. The decision MUST be nested under hookSpecificOutput — Claude
|
||||
# Code ignores a top-level permissionDecision, which silently no-ops the block.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Polarity: freeze is a DENY-tier hook, so an unreadable payload DENIES
|
||||
# (fail closed). A payload that parses but has no file_path is a non-file
|
||||
# tool — allow. This is the opposite edge-handling from careful's ask-tier
|
||||
# and intentionally so: /guard runs both, and a boundary that fails open is
|
||||
# not a boundary.
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
|
||||
# Read stdin
|
||||
INPUT=$(cat)
|
||||
|
||||
# Shared JSON helpers (extractor + encoder) — one copy for careful AND freeze.
|
||||
# freeze previously carried its own grep-first extractor which truncated at
|
||||
# escaped quotes and failed OPEN; the shared file kills that drift class.
|
||||
_HOOK_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
|
||||
# shellcheck source=careful/bin/hook-extract.sh
|
||||
. "$_HOOK_DIR/../../careful/bin/hook-extract.sh"
|
||||
|
||||
# Locate the freeze directory state file
|
||||
STATE_DIR="${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_DATA:-$HOME/.gstack}"
|
||||
FREEZE_FILE="$STATE_DIR/freeze-dir.txt"
|
||||
@@ -19,7 +32,11 @@ if [ ! -f "$FREEZE_FILE" ]; then
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
FREEZE_DIR=$(tr -d '[:space:]' < "$FREEZE_FILE")
|
||||
# First line, trimmed of LEADING/TRAILING whitespace only. The previous
|
||||
# `tr -d '[:space:]'` deleted INTERNAL spaces too, so a boundary like
|
||||
# "~/My Project/src" could never match anything — every edit denied (or the
|
||||
# mangled path accidentally allowed the wrong tree).
|
||||
FREEZE_DIR=$(head -n 1 "$FREEZE_FILE" 2>/dev/null | sed 's/^[[:space:]]*//;s/[[:space:]]*$//')
|
||||
|
||||
# If freeze dir is empty, allow
|
||||
if [ -z "$FREEZE_DIR" ]; then
|
||||
@@ -27,16 +44,20 @@ if [ -z "$FREEZE_DIR" ]; then
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# Extract file_path from tool_input JSON
|
||||
# Try grep/sed first, fall back to Python for escaped quotes
|
||||
FILE_PATH=$(printf '%s' "$INPUT" | grep -o '"file_path"[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*"[^"]*"' | head -1 | sed 's/.*:[[:space:]]*"//;s/"$//' || true)
|
||||
# Extract file_path from tool_input with the shared real-JSON parser.
|
||||
set +e
|
||||
FILE_PATH=$(gstack_hook_extract_field "$INPUT" file_path)
|
||||
EXTRACT_RC=$?
|
||||
set -e
|
||||
|
||||
# Python fallback if grep returned empty
|
||||
if [ -z "$FILE_PATH" ]; then
|
||||
FILE_PATH=$(printf '%s' "$INPUT" | python3 -c 'import sys,json; print(json.loads(sys.stdin.read()).get("tool_input",{}).get("file_path",""))' 2>/dev/null || true)
|
||||
# Unparseable payload (or no parser available): DENY. A boundary hook that
|
||||
# allows what it cannot read is not a boundary.
|
||||
if [ "$EXTRACT_RC" -ne 0 ] && [ -n "$INPUT" ]; then
|
||||
gstack_hook_decision deny "[freeze] Could not parse the tool payload to check the freeze boundary. Blocked (fail closed). Freeze boundary: $FREEZE_DIR"
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# If we couldn't extract a file path, allow (don't block on parse failure)
|
||||
# Parsed fine but no file_path field: a non-file tool payload — allow.
|
||||
if [ -z "$FILE_PATH" ]; then
|
||||
echo '{}'
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
@@ -53,11 +74,26 @@ esac
|
||||
# Normalize: remove double slashes and trailing slash
|
||||
FILE_PATH=$(printf '%s' "$FILE_PATH" | sed 's|/\+|/|g;s|/$||')
|
||||
|
||||
# Resolve symlinks and .. sequences (POSIX-portable, works on macOS)
|
||||
# Resolve symlinks and .. sequences (POSIX-portable, works on macOS).
|
||||
# The FULL path is resolved, including the FINAL component: the previous
|
||||
# version resolved only the parent directory, so an in-boundary symlink
|
||||
# pointing at an out-of-boundary target sailed through the check while the
|
||||
# actual write landed outside the boundary. A final component that is a
|
||||
# symlink is followed (bounded, cycle-safe) so the TARGET gets checked; a
|
||||
# final component that does not exist yet (new file) has nothing to follow
|
||||
# and parent resolution is the correct behavior.
|
||||
_resolve_path() {
|
||||
local _dir _base
|
||||
_dir="$(dirname "$1")"
|
||||
_base="$(basename "$1")"
|
||||
local _p="$1" _dir _base _tgt _i=0
|
||||
while [ -L "$_p" ] && [ "$_i" -lt 40 ]; do
|
||||
_tgt=$(readlink "$_p" 2>/dev/null) || break
|
||||
case "$_tgt" in
|
||||
/*) _p="$_tgt" ;;
|
||||
*) _p="$(dirname "$_p")/$_tgt" ;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
_i=$((_i + 1))
|
||||
done
|
||||
_dir="$(dirname "$_p")"
|
||||
_base="$(basename "$_p")"
|
||||
_dir="$(cd "$_dir" 2>/dev/null && pwd -P || printf '%s' "$_dir")"
|
||||
printf '%s/%s' "$_dir" "$_base"
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -76,6 +112,9 @@ case "$FILE_PATH" in
|
||||
mkdir -p ~/.gstack/analytics 2>/dev/null || true
|
||||
echo '{"event":"hook_fire","skill":"freeze","pattern":"boundary_deny","ts":"'$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ)'","repo":"'$(basename "$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel 2>/dev/null)" 2>/dev/null || echo "unknown")'"}' >> ~/.gstack/analytics/skill-usage.jsonl 2>/dev/null || true
|
||||
|
||||
printf '{"hookSpecificOutput":{"hookEventName":"PreToolUse","permissionDecision":"deny","permissionDecisionReason":"[freeze] Blocked: %s is outside the freeze boundary (%s). Only edits within the frozen directory are allowed."}}\n' "$FILE_PATH" "$FREEZE_DIR"
|
||||
# The reason is JSON-encoded by the shared helper. Never interpolate paths
|
||||
# into hand-built JSON: a path containing a quote or newline produced
|
||||
# malformed JSON here, and the deny silently no-oped.
|
||||
gstack_hook_decision deny "[freeze] Blocked: $FILE_PATH is outside the freeze boundary ($FREEZE_DIR). Only edits within the frozen directory are allowed."
|
||||
;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
|
||||
+265
-15
@@ -8,11 +8,12 @@ const ROOT = path.resolve(import.meta.dir, '..');
|
||||
const CAREFUL_SCRIPT = path.join(ROOT, 'careful', 'bin', 'check-careful.sh');
|
||||
const FREEZE_SCRIPT = path.join(ROOT, 'freeze', 'bin', 'check-freeze.sh');
|
||||
|
||||
function runHook(scriptPath: string, input: object, env?: Record<string, string>): { exitCode: number; output: any; raw: string } {
|
||||
function runHook(scriptPath: string, input: object, env?: Record<string, string>, cwd?: string): { exitCode: number; output: any; raw: string } {
|
||||
const result = spawnSync('bash', [scriptPath], {
|
||||
input: JSON.stringify(input),
|
||||
stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
|
||||
env: { ...process.env, ...env },
|
||||
cwd,
|
||||
timeout: 5000,
|
||||
});
|
||||
const raw = result.stdout.toString().trim();
|
||||
@@ -23,6 +24,25 @@ function runHook(scriptPath: string, input: object, env?: Record<string, string>
|
||||
return { exitCode: result.status ?? 1, output, raw };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Scratch git repo with a resolvable origin default branch — the HIGH-tier
|
||||
// force-push check reads `git symbolic-ref refs/remotes/origin/HEAD` from the
|
||||
// hook's cwd, and Conductor worktrees don't reliably carry that ref.
|
||||
function withGitRepo(defaultBranch: string, currentBranch: string, fn: (repoDir: string) => void) {
|
||||
const repoDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gstack-careful-git-'));
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const git = (args: string[]) =>
|
||||
spawnSync('git', ['-c', 'user.email=t@test', '-c', 'user.name=t', ...args], { cwd: repoDir, timeout: 5000 });
|
||||
git(['init', '-q', '-b', defaultBranch]);
|
||||
git(['commit', '--allow-empty', '-q', '-m', 'init']);
|
||||
// A symbolic ref may dangle; the hook only reads its NAME.
|
||||
git(['symbolic-ref', 'refs/remotes/origin/HEAD', `refs/remotes/origin/${defaultBranch}`]);
|
||||
if (currentBranch !== defaultBranch) git(['checkout', '-q', '-b', currentBranch]);
|
||||
fn(repoDir);
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
fs.rmSync(repoDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function runHookRaw(scriptPath: string, rawInput: string, env?: Record<string, string>): { exitCode: number; output: any; raw: string } {
|
||||
const result = spawnSync('bash', [scriptPath], {
|
||||
input: rawInput,
|
||||
@@ -161,12 +181,13 @@ describe('check-careful.sh', () => {
|
||||
|
||||
// Capital -R is the documented recursive flag on BSD rm (macOS) and accepted
|
||||
// by GNU rm. Both greps previously required a lowercase r, so `rm -R /`
|
||||
// silently allowed.
|
||||
test('rm -R / warns (capital -R recursive)', () => {
|
||||
// silently allowed. A bare recursive delete of / is now HIGH-tier: denied,
|
||||
// not asked.
|
||||
test('rm -R / denies (HIGH tier: recursive delete of root)', () => {
|
||||
const { exitCode, output } = runHook(CAREFUL_SCRIPT, carefulInput('rm -R /'));
|
||||
expect(exitCode).toBe(0);
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecision).toBe('ask');
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecisionReason).toContain('recursive delete');
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecision).toBe('deny');
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecisionReason).toContain('HIGH');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('rm -fR /home/user warns (capital R in flag cluster)', () => {
|
||||
@@ -326,18 +347,26 @@ describe('check-careful.sh', () => {
|
||||
// --- Git destructive commands ---
|
||||
|
||||
describe('git destructive commands', () => {
|
||||
test('git push --force warns with force-push', () => {
|
||||
const { exitCode, output } = runHook(CAREFUL_SCRIPT, carefulInput('git push --force origin main'));
|
||||
expect(exitCode).toBe(0);
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecision).toBe('ask');
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecisionReason).toContain('force-push');
|
||||
// Force-push to a NON-default branch is MEDIUM (ask). Force-push to the
|
||||
// default branch is HIGH (deny) — covered in the HIGH tier describe. The
|
||||
// fixture repo pins the default branch so the split is deterministic
|
||||
// regardless of the host repo's origin/HEAD.
|
||||
test('git push --force warns with force-push (non-default target)', () => {
|
||||
withGitRepo('trunk', 'trunk', (repoDir) => {
|
||||
const { exitCode, output } = runHook(CAREFUL_SCRIPT, carefulInput('git push --force origin main'), undefined, repoDir);
|
||||
expect(exitCode).toBe(0);
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecision).toBe('ask');
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecisionReason).toContain('force-push');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('git push -f warns', () => {
|
||||
const { exitCode, output } = runHook(CAREFUL_SCRIPT, carefulInput('git push -f origin main'));
|
||||
expect(exitCode).toBe(0);
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecision).toBe('ask');
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecisionReason).toContain('force-push');
|
||||
test('git push -f warns (non-default target)', () => {
|
||||
withGitRepo('trunk', 'trunk', (repoDir) => {
|
||||
const { exitCode, output } = runHook(CAREFUL_SCRIPT, carefulInput('git push -f origin main'), undefined, repoDir);
|
||||
expect(exitCode).toBe(0);
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecision).toBe('ask');
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecisionReason).toContain('force-push');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('git reset --hard warns with uncommitted', () => {
|
||||
@@ -443,6 +472,132 @@ describe('check-careful.sh', () => {
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecisionReason).toContain('recursive delete');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// --- HIGH tier (hard deny) ---
|
||||
// A tiny set of catastrophic SIMPLE commands is denied outright while
|
||||
// /careful is active. Best-effort advisory hard-stop, not a policy boundary:
|
||||
// compound commands always fall through to the MEDIUM ask.
|
||||
|
||||
describe('HIGH tier (hard deny)', () => {
|
||||
test.each(['rm -rf /', 'rm -rf ~', 'rm -rf $HOME', 'sudo rm -rf /', 'rm -Rf ~/'])(
|
||||
'denies catastrophic recursive delete: %s',
|
||||
(command) => {
|
||||
const { exitCode, output } = runHook(CAREFUL_SCRIPT, carefulInput(command));
|
||||
expect(exitCode).toBe(0);
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecision).toBe('deny');
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecisionReason).toContain('HIGH');
|
||||
},
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
test('rm -rf ~/subdir stays MEDIUM ask (not the whole home dir)', () => {
|
||||
const { exitCode, output } = runHook(CAREFUL_SCRIPT, carefulInput('rm -rf ~/subdir'));
|
||||
expect(exitCode).toBe(0);
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecision).toBe('ask');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('git push --force origin <default branch> denies', () => {
|
||||
withGitRepo('main', 'feature', (repoDir) => {
|
||||
const { exitCode, output } = runHook(CAREFUL_SCRIPT, carefulInput('git push --force origin main'), undefined, repoDir);
|
||||
expect(exitCode).toBe(0);
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecision).toBe('deny');
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecisionReason).toContain('default branch');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('bare git push --force while ON the default branch denies', () => {
|
||||
withGitRepo('main', 'main', (repoDir) => {
|
||||
const { exitCode, output } = runHook(CAREFUL_SCRIPT, carefulInput('git push --force'), undefined, repoDir);
|
||||
expect(exitCode).toBe(0);
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecision).toBe('deny');
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecisionReason).toContain('HIGH');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('bare git push --force on a feature branch asks (MEDIUM)', () => {
|
||||
withGitRepo('main', 'feature', (repoDir) => {
|
||||
const { exitCode, output } = runHook(CAREFUL_SCRIPT, carefulInput('git push --force'), undefined, repoDir);
|
||||
expect(exitCode).toBe(0);
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecision).toBe('ask');
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecisionReason).toContain('force-push');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('git push -f origin feature asks (MEDIUM — not the default branch)', () => {
|
||||
withGitRepo('main', 'main', (repoDir) => {
|
||||
const { exitCode, output } = runHook(CAREFUL_SCRIPT, carefulInput('git push -f origin feature'), undefined, repoDir);
|
||||
expect(exitCode).toBe(0);
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecision).toBe('ask');
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecisionReason).toContain('force-push');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('compound force-push falls through to ask, never deny (cannot resolve cwd)', () => {
|
||||
withGitRepo('main', 'main', (repoDir) => {
|
||||
const { exitCode, output } = runHook(CAREFUL_SCRIPT, carefulInput('cd elsewhere && git push --force origin main'), undefined, repoDir);
|
||||
expect(exitCode).toBe(0);
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecision).toBe('ask');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('--force-with-lease is never HIGH (the safe force variant)', () => {
|
||||
withGitRepo('main', 'main', (repoDir) => {
|
||||
const { exitCode, output } = runHook(CAREFUL_SCRIPT, carefulInput('git push --force-with-lease origin main'), undefined, repoDir);
|
||||
expect(exitCode).toBe(0);
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecision).not.toBe('deny');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// --- Additive project patterns ---
|
||||
// Config can only ADD warn rules. The files are consulted after the baseline
|
||||
// families, so no file content can suppress a baseline match.
|
||||
|
||||
describe('additive project patterns', () => {
|
||||
function withPatternFile(content: string, fn: (gstackHome: string) => void) {
|
||||
const gstackHome = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gstack-careful-pat-'));
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(gstackHome, 'careful-patterns.txt'), content);
|
||||
try {
|
||||
fn(gstackHome);
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
fs.rmSync(gstackHome, { recursive: true, force: true });
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
test('a project pattern adds an ask rule', () => {
|
||||
withPatternFile('# infra safety\nterraform\\s+destroy\n', (gstackHome) => {
|
||||
const { exitCode, output } = runHook(CAREFUL_SCRIPT, carefulInput('terraform destroy -auto-approve'), { GSTACK_HOME: gstackHome });
|
||||
expect(exitCode).toBe(0);
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecision).toBe('ask');
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecisionReason).toContain('Project rule');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('a garbage pattern file cannot suppress a baseline match (additive invariant)', () => {
|
||||
withPatternFile('# override: allow everything\nallow-everything\nignore baseline\n', (gstackHome) => {
|
||||
const { exitCode, output } = runHook(CAREFUL_SCRIPT, carefulInput('rm -rf /var/data'), { GSTACK_HOME: gstackHome });
|
||||
expect(exitCode).toBe(0);
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecision).toBe('ask');
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecisionReason).toContain('recursive delete');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('an invalid regex line is skipped without breaking the hook', () => {
|
||||
withPatternFile('([unclosed\nterraform\\s+destroy\n', (gstackHome) => {
|
||||
const { exitCode, output } = runHook(CAREFUL_SCRIPT, carefulInput('terraform destroy'), { GSTACK_HOME: gstackHome });
|
||||
expect(exitCode).toBe(0);
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecision).toBe('ask');
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecisionReason).toContain('Project rule');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('safe commands still allow with a pattern file present', () => {
|
||||
withPatternFile('terraform\\s+destroy\n', (gstackHome) => {
|
||||
const { exitCode, output } = runHook(CAREFUL_SCRIPT, carefulInput('ls -la'), { GSTACK_HOME: gstackHome });
|
||||
expect(exitCode).toBe(0);
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecision).toBeUndefined();
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ============================================================
|
||||
@@ -550,5 +705,100 @@ describe('check-freeze.sh', () => {
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecision).toBeUndefined();
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('malformed JSON payload DENIES (fail closed — freeze is a deny-tier hook)', () => {
|
||||
withFreezeDir('/Users/dev/project/src/', (stateDir) => {
|
||||
const { exitCode, output } = runHookRaw(
|
||||
FREEZE_SCRIPT,
|
||||
'not json at all {{{{',
|
||||
{ CLAUDE_PLUGIN_DATA: stateDir },
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(exitCode).toBe(0);
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecision).toBe('deny');
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecisionReason).toContain('fail closed');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('a quote-bearing path outside the boundary emits PARSEABLE deny JSON', () => {
|
||||
// The old printf-interpolated deny emitted malformed JSON for paths
|
||||
// containing quotes — Claude Code silently ignored the whole decision,
|
||||
// so the deny no-oped exactly when the path was hostile.
|
||||
withFreezeDir('/Users/dev/project/src/', (stateDir) => {
|
||||
const { exitCode, output, raw } = runHook(
|
||||
FREEZE_SCRIPT,
|
||||
freezeInput('/tmp/evil"quoted/x.ts'),
|
||||
{ CLAUDE_PLUGIN_DATA: stateDir },
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(exitCode).toBe(0);
|
||||
expect(() => JSON.parse(raw)).not.toThrow();
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecision).toBe('deny');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('a newline-bearing path outside the boundary emits PARSEABLE deny JSON', () => {
|
||||
withFreezeDir('/Users/dev/project/src/', (stateDir) => {
|
||||
const { exitCode, output, raw } = runHook(
|
||||
FREEZE_SCRIPT,
|
||||
freezeInput('/tmp/evil\npath.ts'),
|
||||
{ CLAUDE_PLUGIN_DATA: stateDir },
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(exitCode).toBe(0);
|
||||
expect(() => JSON.parse(raw)).not.toThrow();
|
||||
expect(output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecision).toBe('deny');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe('space-bearing freeze boundary', () => {
|
||||
// The old `tr -d '[:space:]'` stripped INTERNAL spaces from the freeze
|
||||
// path, so a boundary like ".../My Project/src" never matched anything.
|
||||
test('a boundary containing spaces allows edits inside it', () => {
|
||||
const base = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gstack-freeze-space-'));
|
||||
const boundary = path.join(base, 'My Project', 'src');
|
||||
fs.mkdirSync(boundary, { recursive: true });
|
||||
try {
|
||||
withFreezeDir(boundary + '/', (stateDir) => {
|
||||
const inside = runHook(FREEZE_SCRIPT, freezeInput(path.join(boundary, 'index.ts')), { CLAUDE_PLUGIN_DATA: stateDir });
|
||||
expect(inside.exitCode).toBe(0);
|
||||
expect(inside.output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecision).toBeUndefined();
|
||||
|
||||
const outside = runHook(FREEZE_SCRIPT, freezeInput(path.join(base, 'elsewhere.ts')), { CLAUDE_PLUGIN_DATA: stateDir });
|
||||
expect(outside.exitCode).toBe(0);
|
||||
expect(outside.output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecision).toBe('deny');
|
||||
});
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
fs.rmSync(base, { recursive: true, force: true });
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe('symlink boundary escape', () => {
|
||||
// The old resolver followed the parent directory but NOT the final path
|
||||
// component, so an in-boundary symlink pointing outside the boundary was
|
||||
// allowed while the write landed outside.
|
||||
test('an in-boundary symlink to an outside target denies', () => {
|
||||
const base = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gstack-freeze-link-'));
|
||||
const boundary = path.join(base, 'boundary');
|
||||
const outside = path.join(base, 'outside');
|
||||
fs.mkdirSync(boundary, { recursive: true });
|
||||
fs.mkdirSync(outside, { recursive: true });
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(outside, 'secret.txt'), 'x');
|
||||
fs.symlinkSync(path.join(outside, 'secret.txt'), path.join(boundary, 'link.txt'));
|
||||
try {
|
||||
withFreezeDir(boundary + '/', (stateDir) => {
|
||||
const viaLink = runHook(FREEZE_SCRIPT, freezeInput(path.join(boundary, 'link.txt')), { CLAUDE_PLUGIN_DATA: stateDir });
|
||||
expect(viaLink.exitCode).toBe(0);
|
||||
expect(viaLink.output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecision).toBe('deny');
|
||||
|
||||
// A real in-boundary file is unaffected.
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(boundary, 'real.txt'), 'y');
|
||||
const real = runHook(FREEZE_SCRIPT, freezeInput(path.join(boundary, 'real.txt')), { CLAUDE_PLUGIN_DATA: stateDir });
|
||||
expect(real.exitCode).toBe(0);
|
||||
expect(real.output.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecision).toBeUndefined();
|
||||
});
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
fs.rmSync(base, { recursive: true, force: true });
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user