v1.91.75.0 fix(cso-eval): fail producer receipts only on credential-class output, naming the rules (#3120)

Helper run IDs matched pii.phone.e164/pii.cc, so successful paid audits were
withheld and failed. Credential-class matches (and source env.kv values such
as a planted canary, quoted bare) still withhold and fail with rule IDs and
counts; helper identifiers are masked and other PII/legal spans are redacted
in place without changing status.

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,25 @@
 # Changelog
 
+## [1.91.75.0] - 2026-10-11
+
+**CSO paid producers no longer fail a successful audit because the final summary quoted the helper's own run ID. Credential-class text still withholds the output and fails the receipt, and the reason now names the matching redactor rules and counts.**
+
+In the first paid baseline both smoke cells finished their audits, then the producer marked each receipt `failed` with `Sensitive producer output or error withheld`. The producer treated any redactor match as a leak. A CSO run ID such as `<13-digit epoch>-<hex16>` matches `pii.phone.e164`, and some also match `pii.cc`. The fixtures' metadata address and a `PRIVILEGED` label also match. Replaying a mock provider through the installed producer, a summary of just "complete — assessed source in run <runId>." failed on 1.91.73.0 and succeeds now.
+
+### What this means for you
+
+- **Rule-named failures.** A credential-class match (the redactor's `secret` category) in the output, the error, or either concatenation still replaces the output with `[sensitive producer output redacted]` and fails the receipt. The reason is now `Sensitive producer output or error withheld: credential-class rule <id>×<count>, …` and never includes the matched text.
+- **Source canaries quoted bare.** Values assigned to credential-shaped names in the cell's verified source (the `env.kv` rule), such as a planted canary, are matched exactly, including across output and error. They fail as `source.env.kv`, because no pattern recognises such a value once it is quoted without its name.
+- **Helper identifiers survive.** Run and replay IDs, `cso-eval-<run>-<sha12>` catalog revisions, `<tool>-<hex16>-<hex16>` artifact IDs and hex finding, review and content IDs are set aside before the PII, internal and legal rules run. Those rules now replace their spans in place (`<REDACTED-<rule>>`) and no longer change the receipt status. Scoring reads the helper's report, and the evaluator still scans outputs for its canaries.
+
+### Itemized changes
+
+#### Changed
+- `scripts/cso-eval-output-redaction.ts` (new): `redactProducerText` and `sourceCredentialValues`. `sanitizeProducerRun` in `scripts/cso-eval-producer.ts` uses them; the source values are collected once after the source is sealed and validated.
+
+#### For contributors
+- `test/cso-eval.test.ts`: helper IDs kept with PII spans redacted in place; env-line and Anthropic-key outputs fail with their rule names; a source canary is withheld whole or split across output and error. The existing canary test now expects the rule-named reason.
+
 ## [1.91.73.0] - 2026-10-11
 
 **"Ship, next in queue at <version>" with zero manual stamp edits: a committed repo ship policy, `gstack-restamp` that stamps a PR only when it is next to merge (and re-stamps after a reorder in one step), a tree receipt that proves the only change since the gate was the stamp, a portable evidence bundle, and a ship receipt in the PR body.**

VERSION

@@ -1 +1 @@
-1.91.73.0
+1.91.75.0

agents-digest/gstack-AGENTS.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# gstack digest v1.91.73.0 — regenerate/re-copy after upgrading gstack
+# gstack digest v1.91.75.0 — regenerate/re-copy after upgrading gstack
 
 Behavioral rules from gstack (https://github.com/garrytan/gstack), compressed
 for agent hosts without a full skill install. The full skills add workflows,

package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "gstack",
-  "version": "1.91.73",
+  "version": "1.91.75",
   "description": "Garry's Stack — Claude Code skills + fast headless browser. One repo, one install, entire AI engineering workflow.",
   "license": "MIT",
   "type": "module",

scripts/cso-eval-output-redaction.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+/** Redaction of the producer's provider output and error text before a receipt binds them. */
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import { readBoundedStable } from '../lib/cso/bounded-file';
+import { CsoError, MAX_OUTPUT } from '../lib/cso/contracts';
+import { redactFindingSpans, scan } from '../lib/redact-engine';
+
+/**
+ * Identifiers the CSO helper emits by schema, which the redactor's PII shapes misread: `<epoch ms>-<hex>` run and
+ * replay IDs and the 13-digit epoch in them (pii.phone.e164), `cso-eval-<runId>-<sha12>` catalog revisions,
+ * `<tool>-<hex16>-<hex16>` artifact IDs, and hex finding, review and content IDs (pii.wallet).
+ */
+const HELPER_ID = /(?<![A-Za-z0-9])(?:\d{13}-[a-f0-9]{16}|cso-eval-\d{1,20}-[a-f0-9]{12}|(?:[a-z]+-)+[a-f0-9]{16}-[a-f0-9]{16}|[a-f0-9]{16,64})(?![A-Za-z0-9])/g;
+
+export interface OutputRedaction {
+  /** The text as a receipt may bind it. */
+  text: string;
+  /** Matched rule IDs with their counts, e.g. `pii.phone.e164×2`; never the matched text. */
+  rules: string[];
+  /** True when a credential-class (`secret`) rule matched: the text must be withheld, not span-redacted. */
+  secret: boolean;
+}
+
+const tally = (ids: string[]): string[] => {
+  const counts = new Map<string, number>();
+  for (const id of ids) counts.set(id, (counts.get(id) ?? 0) + 1);
+  return [...counts].sort(([left], [right]) => left < right ? -1 : 1).map(([id, count]) => `${id}×${count}`);
+};
+
+const ASSIGNMENT = /^\s*(?:export\s+)?[A-Za-z_][\w.-]*\s*[=:]\s*["']?([^\s"'#]{8,})/;
+
+/**
+ * Values assigned to credential-shaped names (the env.kv rule) in the cell's verified source, such as a planted
+ * canary. Quoted without its name, such a value reads as prose to every rule, so the output check matches it exactly.
+ */
+export function sourceCredentialValues(root: string, paths: string[]): string[] {
+  const values = new Set<string>();
+  for (const path of paths) {
+    if (path === '.git' || path.startsWith('.git/')) continue;
+    const contents = readBoundedStable(join(root, ...path.split('/')), 2 * 1024 * 1024, 'Producer source file');
+    if (contents.includes(0)) continue;
+    const text = contents.toString('utf8'), lines = text.split('\n');
+    for (const finding of scan(text, { maxBytes: 2 * 1024 * 1024 }).findings) {
+      const value = finding.id === 'env.kv' ? ASSIGNMENT.exec(lines[finding.line - 1] ?? '')?.[1] : undefined;
+      if (value) values.add(value);
+    }
+  }
+  return [...values];
+}
+
+/**
+ * Credential classes are judged on the unmasked text, so masking can never hide one. Only when none matched are the
+ * helper's identifiers set aside and the remaining PII, internal, legal and hygiene spans replaced in place.
+ */
+export function redactProducerText(value: string, sourceCredentials: string[] = []): OutputRedaction {
+  const findings = scan(value, { maxBytes: MAX_OUTPUT });
+  if (findings.oversize) throw new CsoError('REDACTION_FAILED', 'Producer output withheld because it exceeds the redaction limit');
+  const secretIds = findings.findings.filter(finding => finding.category === 'secret').map(finding => finding.id);
+  for (const credential of sourceCredentials) secretIds.push(...Array(value.split(credential).length - 1).fill('source.env.kv'));
+  if (secretIds.length) return { text: '', rules: tally(secretIds), secret: true };
+  const identifiers: string[] = [];
+  const letters = (index: number): string => (index >= 26 ? letters(Math.floor(index / 26) - 1) : '') + String.fromCharCode(97 + (index % 26));
+  const masked = value.replace(HELPER_ID, match => `GSTACKHELPERID${letters(identifiers.push(match) - 1)}Z`);
+  const masking = scan(masked, { maxBytes: MAX_OUTPUT }).findings;
+  const redacted = redactFindingSpans(masked, { maxBytes: MAX_OUTPUT });
+  if (redacted === null) throw new CsoError('REDACTION_FAILED', 'Producer output withheld because redaction could not safely locate every span');
+  const indexOf = (code: string): number => [...code].reduce((total, char) => total * 26 + char.charCodeAt(0) - 96, 0) - 1;
+  const text = redacted.replace(/GSTACKHELPERID([a-z]+)Z/g, (whole, code: string) => identifiers[indexOf(code)] ?? whole);
+  return { text, rules: tally(masking.map(finding => finding.id)), secret: false };
+}

scripts/cso-eval-producer.ts

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import { readBoundedStable } from '../lib/cso/bounded-file';
 import { CsoError } from '../lib/cso/contracts';
 import { executable, redact } from '../lib/cso/process';
 import { atomicWriteSync } from '../lib/fs-atomic';
+import { redactProducerText, sourceCredentialValues, type OutputRedaction } from './cso-eval-output-redaction';
 import { resolveClaudeCommand } from '../lib/claude-bin';
 import runtimeCatalog from '../lib/cso/runtime-catalog.json';
 import scannerCatalog from '../lib/cso/scanner-images/catalog.json';
@@ -500,25 +501,34 @@ function writeExclusiveAtomic(path: string, value: unknown): void {
   catch (error) { if ((error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === 'EEXIST') throw new Error('RECEIPT_EXISTS'); throw error; }
 }
 
-/** Redact both channels and both concatenation orders before a receipt can bind them. */
-export function sanitizeProducerRun(run: RunResult): RunResult {
+/**
+ * Redact both channels, and both concatenation orders, before a receipt can bind them. A credential-class match
+ * anywhere withholds the output and fails the run, naming the rules. PII, internal, legal and hygiene matches are
+ * replaced in place and leave the run's status alone: scoring reads the helper's report, the evaluator scans the
+ * receipt for its canaries separately, and the helper's own identifiers are not personal data. `sourceCredentials` are
+ * the source's credential-name values (see sourceCredentialValues), matched exactly because no rule sees them bare.
+ */
+export function sanitizeProducerRun(run: RunResult, sourceCredentials: string[] = []): RunResult {
   if (typeof run.output !== 'string' || (run.error && typeof run.error.reason !== 'string')) {
     throw new CsoError('REDACTION_FAILED', 'Producer output withheld because it was not valid text');
   }
   const reason = run.error?.reason ?? '';
+  let views: OutputRedaction[];
   try {
-    const views = [run.output, reason, run.output + reason, reason + run.output];
-    if (views.some(value => redact(value) !== value)) {
-      return {
-        ...run,
-        output: '[sensitive producer output redacted]',
-        error: { code: run.error?.code ?? 'unknown', reason: 'Sensitive producer output or error withheld' },
-      };
-    }
-    return run;
+    views = [run.output, reason, run.output + reason, reason + run.output].map(view => redactProducerText(view, sourceCredentials));
   } catch {
     throw new CsoError('REDACTION_FAILED', 'Producer output withheld because redaction could not safely inspect it');
   }
+  const secret = views.find(view => view.secret);
+  if (secret) {
+    return {
+      ...run,
+      output: '[sensitive producer output redacted]',
+      error: { code: run.error?.code ?? 'unknown', reason: `Sensitive producer output or error withheld: credential-class rule ${secret.rules.join(', ')}` },
+    };
+  }
+  const [output, error] = views;
+  return { ...run, output: output.text, ...(run.error ? { error: { ...run.error, reason: error.text } } : {}) };
 }
 
 export function producerFailureMessage(error: unknown): string {
@@ -565,6 +575,7 @@ export async function runProducerCell(inputPath: string, receiptPath: string, op
   validateSource(sourceRoot, input.source, cell.sourceHash);
   sealProducerSource(sourceRoot);
   validateSource(sourceRoot, input.source, cell.sourceHash);
+  const sourceCredentials = sourceCredentialValues(sourceRoot, input.source.map(entry => entry.path));
   const originalRepositoryIdentity = repositoryIdentity(sourceRoot);
   const stateRoot = join(jobRoot, 'state');
   const helperHome = join(stateRoot, 'cso-home');
@@ -653,7 +664,7 @@ export async function runProducerCell(inputPath: string, receiptPath: string, op
     artifacts = emptyArtifactInventory();
   }
   if (!integrityFailure) {
-    run = sanitizeProducerRun(run);
+    run = sanitizeProducerRun(run, sourceCredentials);
     if(!run.error&&!run.output.trim())run={...run,error:{code:'unknown',reason:'empty output from provider CLI (exit 0)'}};
   }
   const tokensReported = run.tokens.input > 0 || run.tokens.output > 0 || (run.tokens.cached ?? 0) > 0;

test/cso-eval.test.ts

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
 import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
 import { dirname, join } from 'node:path';
 import { collectProducerReceipts, createEvalBaseline, createEvalMatrix, createPortableSkillPayload, loadPortableSkillPayload, prepareEvalJobs, REQUIRED_CONTAINMENT, scoreCollectedEval, scoreEval, validateMatrix, validatePortableSkillPayload, type EvalBaseline, type EvalCell, type EvalMatrix, type EvalResult, type PreparedEvalSchedule } from '../scripts/cso-eval';
-import { assertProducerArtifactPath, PRODUCER_PROVIDER_POLICY, producerFailureMessage, producerProviderTimeoutMs, producerInstallationIdentity, resolveProducerHelperBinding, runProducerCell, validateProductionProducerInstallation } from '../scripts/cso-eval-producer';
+import { assertProducerArtifactPath, PRODUCER_PROVIDER_POLICY, producerFailureMessage, producerProviderTimeoutMs, producerInstallationIdentity, resolveProducerHelperBinding, runProducerCell, sanitizeProducerRun, validateProductionProducerInstallation } from '../scripts/cso-eval-producer';
 import { producerArtifactInventoryHash, producerHostPlatform, producerInstallationIdentityHash, producerProviderIdentityHash, producerReceiptHash, sha256, type ProducerArtifactInventory, type ProducerInstallationIdentity, type ProducerProviderIdentity, type ProducerReceipt } from '../scripts/cso-eval-protocol';
 import type { Family, ProviderAdapter, RunOpts, RunResult } from './helpers/providers/types';
 import { CORPUS_VERSION, FAMILIES, STACKS, defineEvalCorpus, loadCorpusManifest, materializeCase, sourceFiles, sourceHash, validateCorpusManifest, type CorpusManifest, type EvalVariant } from './fixtures/cso-eval/materialize';
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ import { inspectPreparation } from '../lib/cso/preparation';
 import { assertRuntimeCompatible, RUNTIME_CATALOG } from '../lib/cso/runtime-catalog';
 import { canonicalStartPlan, canonicalTestPlan } from '../lib/cso/verification';
 import { CsoError } from '../lib/cso/contracts';
+import { scan } from '../lib/redact-engine';
+import { redactProducerText, sourceCredentialValues } from '../scripts/cso-eval-output-redaction';
 import { geminiProducerPaths, geminiProducerSystemSettings } from './helpers/providers/gemini';
 
 const temporary: string[] = [];
@@ -895,13 +897,58 @@ describe('CSO matched producer orchestration', () => {
       expect(receipt.status).toBe('failed');
       expect(receipt.output).toBe('[sensitive producer output redacted]');
       expect(receipt.outputHash).toBe(sha256(receipt.output));
-      expect(receipt.error).toEqual({ code: 'unknown', reason: 'Sensitive producer output or error withheld' });
+      expect(receipt.error).toEqual({ code: 'unknown', reason: 'Sensitive producer output or error withheld: credential-class rule openai.key×1' });
       const stored = readFileSync(receiptPath, 'utf8');
       expect(stored).not.toContain('sk-proj-');
       expect(stored).not.toContain('b'.repeat(40));
     }
   });
 
+  test('withholds a source canary quoted without its credential name, whole or split across output and error', () => {
+    const source = join(root(), 'canary-source'), canary = `cso_${randomHex(10)}_${randomHex(10)}`;
+    mkdirSync(join(source, 'test'), { recursive: true });
+    writeFileSync(join(source, '.env'), `API_TOKEN=${canary}\nNODE_ENV=production\n`);
+    writeFileSync(join(source, 'test', 'canary.txt'), `${canary}\n`);
+    const credentials = sourceCredentialValues(source, ['.env', 'test/canary.txt']);
+    expect(credentials).toEqual([canary]);
+    const base = { output: '', modelUsed: 'm', durationMs: 1, toolCalls: 1, tokens: { input: 1, output: 1 } } as RunResult;
+    expect(sanitizeProducerRun({ ...base, output: `The token is ${canary}` }, [])).toMatchObject({ output: `The token is ${canary}` });
+    for (const run of [{ ...base, output: `The token is ${canary}.` }, { ...base, output: canary.slice(0, 12), error: { code: 'unknown', reason: canary.slice(12) } }] as RunResult[]) {
+      const sanitized = sanitizeProducerRun(run, credentials);
+      expect(sanitized).toMatchObject({ output: '[sensitive producer output redacted]', error: { reason: 'Sensitive producer output or error withheld: credential-class rule source.env.kv×1' } });
+      expect(JSON.stringify(sanitized)).not.toContain(canary);
+    }
+  });
+
+  test('keeps a succeeded run that quotes helper identifiers, span-redacts PII shapes, and fails credential-class output by rule', async () => {
+    const runId = `${Date.now()}-${randomHex(8)}`;
+    let walletShaped = '';
+    while (!walletShaped) { const id = randomHex(16); if (redactProducerText(`review ${id}`).text === `review ${id}` && scan(id).findings.some(finding => finding.id === 'pii.wallet')) walletShaped = id; }
+    expect(scan(runId).findings.map(finding => finding.id)).toContain('pii.phone.e164');
+    const report = [
+      `complete — run ${runId}, catalog cso-eval-38078005392-${randomHex(6)}, scanner artifact gitleaks-${randomHex(8)}-${randomHex(8)}.`,
+      `Finding ${randomHex(16)} reviewed by ${walletShaped}; snapshot ${randomHex(32)}.`,
+      'The /health-hooks route connects to 169.254.169.254:80.',
+    ].join('\n');
+    const run = async (name: string, output: string) => {
+      const destination = join(root(), `${name}-prepared`), cell = selected[0];
+      prepareEvalJobs(producerMatrix, skills, destination, [cell.id]);
+      const isolated = isolate(destination, cell), receiptPath = join(root(), `${cell.id}.json`);
+      return runProducerCell(isolated.input, receiptPath, withHelper({ adapter: new FakeAdapter(() => {}, 'gpt-5.4', 'gpt', { output }), paidExecutionAuthorized: true }));
+    };
+    const kept = await run('helper-ids', report);
+    expect(kept.status).toBe('succeeded');
+    expect(kept.error).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(kept.output).toBe(report.replace('169.254.169.254', '<REDACTED-pii.phone.e164>'));
+    const envLine = `API_TOKEN=cso_${randomHex(12)}_${randomHex(12)}`;
+    const key = `sk-ant-api03-${randomHex(40)}`;
+    for (const [name, leak, rule] of [['env-line', envLine, 'env.kv×1'], ['credential', key, 'anthropic.key×1']] as const) {
+      const failed = await run(name, `${report}\n${leak}`);
+      expect(failed).toMatchObject({ status: 'failed', output: '[sensitive producer output redacted]', error: { code: 'unknown', reason: `Sensitive producer output or error withheld: credential-class rule ${rule}` }, usage: { inputTokens: 120 } });
+      expect(JSON.stringify(failed)).not.toContain(leak);
+    }
+  });
+
   const expectIntegrityReceipt = (receipt: ProducerReceipt, receiptPath: string, error: { code: string; reason: string }) => {
     expect(receipt).toMatchObject({ status: 'failed', error, output: '', outputHash: sha256(''), durationMs: 1234, toolCalls: 4, usage: { inputTokens: 120, outputTokens: 30, cachedTokens: 10, estimatedCostUSD: 0.0042 } });
     expect(receipt.artifacts.entries).toEqual([]);