docs: trim CLAUDE.md 66.4→44.9KB — verbatim moves to docs/, pointers stay inline

Moved: browser/sidebar/server internals, CHANGELOG release-summary format
spec, project tree, hermetic-E2E detail, slop-scan reference, OpenClaw
publishing. Kept inline: every hard behavioral rule (dist/ ban, redaction
scan-at-sink, egress receipts, bisect commits, eval detach, CHANGELOG
entry rules), the machine-managed GBrain block (byte-identical), and the
'## Deploying to the active skill' header with gbrain-refresh in range
(pinned by test/gbrain-refresh-install-render.test.ts). No voice rewrites.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Garry Tan
2026-08-25 18:10:26 +00:00
co-authored by Claude Fable 5
parent 64f55cc0b1
commit 967c71d32c
7 changed files with 453 additions and 379 deletions
+37 -379
View File
@@ -31,43 +31,14 @@ bun run slop:diff # slop findings in files changed on this branch only
only `auth.json` from `${CODEX_HOME:-~/.codex}` and pins `CODEX_HOME` in the child
env — no `OPENAI_API_KEY` env var needed.
**Env keys in Conductor workspaces.** The `GSTACK_*` env-shim (v1.39.2.0+,
`lib/conductor-env-shim.ts`) promotes `GSTACK_ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` /
`GSTACK_OPENAI_API_KEY` to their canonical names inside gstack's TS binaries.
Tests run through gstack entrypoints inherit this promotion automatically.
Don't echo the key value to stdout, logs, or shell history. The historical
"never pass `env:` to `runAgentSdkTest`" rule is retired: the failure was
partial-env replacement (the SDK's `Options.env` REPLACES the child's entire
environment, so an object without the key broke auth). The runner now always
passes a COMPLETE hermetic env with per-test `env:` merged last, so per-test
overrides are safe; ambient `process.env.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` mutation also
still works (the env builder reads process.env at call time).
**Hermetic local E2E (default).** Every E2E runner (claude -p, PTY, Agent
SDK, codex, gemini) spawns children through `test/helpers/hermetic-env.ts`:
allowlist-scrubbed env (operator `CONDUCTOR_*`, `CLAUDE_*`, `GSTACK_*`,
`MCP_*`, `GBRAIN_*`, and credentials like `GH_TOKEN` never reach children),
a fresh seeded `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR` (no operator `~/.claude` CLAUDE.md /
MCP servers / skills), a temp `GSTACK_HOME`, and `--strict-mcp-config`.
Local eval signal matches CI. Debug against real operator state with
`EVALS_HERMETIC=0` (restores the legacy env AND drops the strict-MCP flag).
Per-test `env:` overrides merge last, so deliberate contamination
(`CONDUCTOR_WORKSPACE_PATH`, per-test `GSTACK_HOME`) keeps working. The
hermetic config dir seeds NO skills by default; a PTY test that types a
`/skill` slash command must pass `seedSkills: true` to the PTY runner, which
points the child's `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR` at `hermeticSkillsConfigDir()` — a
seeded registry that symlinks the LIVE working tree's SKILL.md files (by
design: the skills ARE the subject under test; a snapshot would measure stale
copies). Wiring is pinned by `test/hermetic-wiring.test.ts` (static tripwire),
two gate-tier canaries in `test/skill-e2e-hermetic-canary.test.ts`, and the
seeding tripwires in `test/hermetic-skills-seeding.test.ts` /
`test/pty-skill-seeding-wiring.test.ts`.
E2E tests stream progress in real-time (tool-by-tool via `--output-format stream-json
--verbose`). Results are persisted to `~/.gstack/projects/<slug>/evals/` (legacy
fallback `~/.gstack-dev/evals/`) with auto-comparison
against the previous finalized run (in-flight `_partial` files are never used as
a baseline, so a run can't compare against itself).
**Hermetic E2E + env keys:** every E2E runner spawns children through
`test/helpers/hermetic-env.ts` (allowlist-scrubbed env, fresh seeded
`CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR`, temp `GSTACK_HOME`, `--strict-mcp-config`); per-test
`env:` overrides merge last onto a COMPLETE hermetic env, so they're safe.
A PTY test that types a `/skill` command must pass `seedSkills: true`.
Debug against real operator state with `EVALS_HERMETIC=0`. Full detail
(env-shim, seeding tripwires, wiring tests):
[docs/TESTING_INTERNALS.md](docs/TESTING_INTERNALS.md).
**Diff-based test selection:** `test:evals` and `test:e2e` auto-select tests based
on `git diff` against the base branch. Each test declares its file dependencies in
@@ -111,79 +82,13 @@ tests via `claude -p`. Both must pass before creating a PR.
## Project structure
```
gstack/
├── browse/ # Headless browser CLI (Playwright)
│ ├── src/ # CLI + server + commands
│ │ ├── commands.ts # Command registry (single source of truth)
│ │ └── snapshot.ts # SNAPSHOT_FLAGS metadata array
│ ├── test/ # Integration tests + fixtures
│ └── dist/ # Compiled binary
├── hosts/ # Typed host configs (one per AI agent)
│ ├── claude.ts # Primary host config
│ ├── codex.ts, factory.ts, kiro.ts # Existing hosts
│ ├── opencode.ts, slate.ts, cursor.ts, openclaw.ts # IDE hosts
│ ├── hermes.ts, gbrain.ts # Agent runtime hosts
│ └── index.ts # Registry: exports all, derives Host type
├── scripts/ # Build + DX tooling
│ ├── gen-skill-docs.ts # Template → SKILL.md generator (config-driven)
│ ├── host-config.ts # HostConfig interface + validator
│ ├── host-config-export.ts # Shell bridge for setup script
│ ├── resolvers/ # Template resolver modules (preamble, design, review, gbrain, etc.)
│ ├── skill-check.ts # Health dashboard
│ ├── test-paid-shards.ts # Sharded paid-tier runner (one Bun process per shard)
│ └── dev-skill.ts # Watch mode
├── test/ # Skill validation + eval tests
│ ├── helpers/ # skill-parser.ts, session-runner.ts, llm-judge.ts, eval-store.ts
│ ├── fixtures/ # Ground truth JSON, planted-bug fixtures, eval baselines
│ ├── skill-validation.test.ts # Tier 1: static validation (free, <1s)
│ ├── gen-skill-docs.test.ts # Tier 1: generator quality (free, <1s)
│ ├── skill-llm-eval.test.ts # Tier 3: LLM-as-judge (~$0.15/run)
│ └── skill-e2e-*.test.ts # Tier 2: E2E via claude -p (~$3.85/run, split by category)
├── qa-only/ # /qa-only skill (report-only QA, no fixes)
├── plan-design-review/ # /plan-design-review skill (report-only design audit)
├── design-review/ # /design-review skill (design audit + fix loop)
├── ship/ # Ship workflow skill
├── review/ # PR review skill
├── plan-ceo-review/ # /plan-ceo-review skill
├── plan-eng-review/ # /plan-eng-review skill
├── autoplan/ # /autoplan skill (auto-review pipeline: CEO → design → eng)
├── benchmark/ # /benchmark skill (performance regression detection)
├── canary/ # /canary skill (post-deploy monitoring loop)
├── codex/ # /codex skill (multi-AI second opinion via OpenAI Codex CLI)
├── land-and-deploy/ # /land-and-deploy skill (merge → deploy → canary verify)
├── office-hours/ # /office-hours skill (YC Office Hours — startup diagnostic + builder brainstorm)
├── investigate/ # /investigate skill (systematic root-cause debugging)
├── spec/ # /spec skill (five-phase spec → GitHub issue, optional agent spawn, /ship auto-closes)
├── retro/ # Retrospective skill (includes /retro global cross-project mode)
├── bin/ # CLI utilities (gstack-repo-mode, gstack-slug, gstack-config, gstack-wtree, gstack-evidence, gstack-issue-guard, etc.)
├── document-release/ # /document-release skill (post-ship doc updates + Diataxis coverage map)
├── document-generate/ # /document-generate skill (Diataxis doc generator: tutorial/how-to/reference/explanation)
├── cso/ # /cso skill (OWASP Top 10 + STRIDE security audit)
├── design-consultation/ # /design-consultation skill (design system from scratch)
├── design-shotgun/ # /design-shotgun skill (visual design exploration)
├── open-gstack-browser/ # /open-gstack-browser skill (launch GStack Browser)
├── connect-chrome/ # symlink → open-gstack-browser (backwards compat)
├── design/ # Design binary CLI (GPT Image API)
│ ├── src/ # CLI + commands (generate, variants, compare, serve, etc.)
│ ├── test/ # Integration tests
│ └── dist/ # Compiled binary
├── extension/ # Chrome extension (side panel + activity feed + CSS inspector)
├── lib/ # Shared libraries (worktree.ts, egress-receipt.ts, context-bill.ts, redact-engine.ts, tracker-guard.ts, version-source.ts, code-intelligence/)
├── patches/ # bun `patchedDependencies` patches (playwright-core windowsHide)
├── docs/designs/ # Design documents
├── setup-deploy/ # /setup-deploy skill (one-time deploy config)
├── .github/ # CI workflows + Docker image
│ ├── workflows/ # evals.yml (E2E on Ubicloud), quality-gate.yml (secret scan), dependency-review.yml, osv-scanner.yml, skill-docs.yml, actionlint.yml, and 8 more (windows, periodic evals, release gates, ci-image)
│ └── docker/ # Dockerfile.ci (pre-baked toolchain + Playwright/Chromium)
├── contrib/ # Contributor-only tools (never installed for users)
│ └── add-host/ # /gstack-contrib-add-host skill
├── setup # One-time setup: build binary + symlink skills
├── SKILL.md # Generated from SKILL.md.tmpl (don't edit directly)
├── SKILL.md.tmpl # Template: edit this, run gen:skill-docs
├── ETHOS.md # Builder philosophy (Boil the Ocean, Search Before Building)
└── package.json # Build scripts for browse
```
Full annotated tree: [docs/PROJECT_STRUCTURE.md](docs/PROJECT_STRUCTURE.md).
Quick map: `browse/` headless-browser CLI, `design/` design binary,
`hosts/` typed host configs, `scripts/` build+DX tooling (gen-skill-docs,
resolvers), `test/` validation+evals, `lib/` shared libraries, `bin/` CLI
utilities, `extension/` Chrome extension, one directory per skill
(`ship/`, `review/`, `qa/`, ...), `.github/` CI, `contrib/` contributor
tools, `docs/designs/` design documents.
## SKILL.md workflow
@@ -291,86 +196,12 @@ When you need to interact with a browser (QA, dogfooding, cookie setup), use the
`mcp__claude-in-chrome__*` tools — they are slow, unreliable, and not what this
project uses.
**Sidebar architecture:** Before modifying `sidepanel.js`, `background.js`,
`content.js`, `terminal-agent.ts`, or sidebar-related server endpoints,
read `docs/designs/SIDEBAR_MESSAGE_FLOW.md`. The sidebar has one primary
surface — the **Terminal** pane (interactive `claude` PTY) — with
Activity / Refs / Inspector as debug overlays behind the footer's
`debug` toggle. The chat queue path was ripped once the PTY proved out;
`sidebar-agent.ts` and the `/sidebar-command` / `/sidebar-chat` /
`/sidebar-agent/event` endpoints are gone. The doc covers the WS auth
flow, dual-token model, and threat-model boundary — silent failures
here usually trace to not understanding the cross-component flow.
**Embedder terminal-agent ownership** (v1.42.1.0+, identity-based kill v1.44.0.0+).
`buildFetchHandler` in `browse/src/server.ts` accepts `ServerConfig.ownsTerminalAgent?:
boolean` (default `true`). When `true`, factory shutdown runs the full teardown:
identity-based kill via `killAgentByRecord(readAgentRecord(stateDir))` from
`browse/src/terminal-agent-control.ts` plus `safeUnlinkQuiet` on
`<stateDir>/terminal-port`, `<stateDir>/terminal-internal-token`, and
`<stateDir>/terminal-agent-pid` (the per-boot agent record introduced in v1.44).
Embedders (e.g. the gbrowser phoenix overlay) that pre-launch their own PTY
server must pass `false` so their discovery files survive gstack teardown cycles.
The flag is the third caller-owned teardown gate in `ServerConfig` (alongside
`xvfb?` and `proxyBridge?`); polarity is inverted (explicit bool vs presence) and
documented in the field's JSDoc. CLI `start()` always passes `true` explicitly —
the static-grep test in `browse/test/server-embedder-terminal-port.test.ts` fails
CI if a refactor drops it. Pre-v1.44 used `pkill -f terminal-agent\.ts` (regex
match) which would kill sibling gstack sessions on the same host; the new
`browse/test/terminal-agent-pid-identity.test.ts` static-grep tripwire fails CI
if any source file re-introduces `pkill ... terminal-agent` or `spawnSync('pkill', ...)`.
**WebSocket auth uses Sec-WebSocket-Protocol, not cookies.** Browsers
can't set `Authorization` on a WebSocket upgrade, but they CAN set
`Sec-WebSocket-Protocol` via `new WebSocket(url, [token])`. The agent
reads it, validates against `validTokens`, and MUST echo the protocol
back in the upgrade response — without the echo, Chromium closes the
connection immediately. `Set-Cookie: gstack_pty=...` is kept as a
fallback for non-browser callers (the cross-port `SameSite=Strict`
cookie path doesn't survive from a chrome-extension origin).
**Cross-pane PTY injection.** The toolbar's Cleanup button and the
Inspector's "Send to Code" action both pipe text into the live claude
PTY via `window.gstackInjectToTerminal(text)`, exposed by
`sidepanel-terminal.js`. No `/sidebar-command` POST — the live REPL is
the only execution surface in the sidebar now.
**`/health` MUST NOT surface any token — and it no longer does** (v1.63+).
The historical headed-mode leak of `AUTH_TOKEN` is fixed: `GET /health` is
liveness/status only in every mode. Token bootstrap is `POST /extension-token`,
which validates the caller's Origin against the pinned extension identity
(the `key` field in `extension/manifest.json` pins the extension ID —
`GSTACK_EXTENSION_ID` in `browse/src/server.ts`, derivation reproducible via
`bun browse/scripts/extension-id.ts`) plus a loopback Host. PTY auth still
flows through `POST /pty-session` only. Don't add any token to `/health`.
**Transport-layer security** (v1.6.0.0+). When `pair-agent` starts an ngrok tunnel,
the daemon binds two HTTP listeners: a local listener (127.0.0.1, full command
surface, never forwarded) and a tunnel listener (locked allowlist: `/connect`,
`/command` with a scoped token + 26-command browser-driving allowlist,
`/sidebar-chat`). ngrok forwards only the tunnel port. Root tokens over the tunnel
return 403. SSE endpoints use a 30-minute HttpOnly `gstack_sse` cookie minted via
`POST /sse-session` (never valid against `/command`). Tunnel-surface rejections go
to `~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl` via `tunnel-denial-log.ts`. Before editing
`server.ts`, `sse-session-cookie.ts`, or `tunnel-denial-log.ts`, read
[ARCHITECTURE.md](ARCHITECTURE.md#dual-listener-tunnel-architecture-v1600) —
the module boundary (no imports from `token-registry.ts` into `sse-session-cookie.ts`)
is load-bearing for scope isolation.
**Unicode sanitization at server egress** (v1.38.0.0+). Every server egress that
ships page-content-derived strings MUST go through `JSON.stringify(payload,
sanitizeReplacer)` for object payloads or `sanitizeLoneSurrogates(body)` for text
bodies. Lone UTF-16 surrogate halves from CDP page content otherwise reach the
Anthropic API as `\uD800`-style escapes and trigger a 400. Wired at four egress
points today: `handleCommandInternal` (HTTP + batch via a sanitizing wrapper around
`handleCommandInternalImpl`) and both SSE producers (`/activity/stream`,
`/inspector/events`). Post-stringify regex is a no-op — `JSON.stringify` has
already escaped the surrogate before regex could match, so the replacer must run
inside the encoding pipeline. Before adding a new SSE/WebSocket writer or HTTP
response in `server.ts`, read
[ARCHITECTURE.md](ARCHITECTURE.md#unicode-sanitization-at-server-egress-v13800).
`browse/test/server-sanitize-surrogates.test.ts` pins the wiring with invariant
tests, so bypasses fail CI.
**Server / sidebar / extension internals:** before editing `browse/src/server.ts`,
`extension/`, the sidebar PTY, any SSE endpoint, or CDP session code, read
[docs/BROWSER_INTERNALS.md](docs/BROWSER_INTERNALS.md) — sidebar message flow,
WebSocket auth, tunnel dual-listener rules, Unicode sanitization at egress,
SSE/CDP helpers, setup symlink hardening, and the sidebar security stack all
live there, each pinned by a CI tripwire.
**Egress receipts at every off-machine sink** (v1.63.0.0+). Every gstack-initiated
send off the machine MUST write a hash-chained receipt to
@@ -389,81 +220,6 @@ wire it through the helpers and add it to the enumerated sink list. Inspect with
`bin/gstack-egress` (`list` | `verify`, exit 3 on tamper | `grants`). Threat
model: forensic observability of ATTEMPTED egress, not an exfiltration control.
**SSE endpoint helper** (v1.51.0.0+). New SSE endpoints in `server.ts` MUST route
through `createSseEndpoint(req, config)` from `browse/src/sse-helpers.ts`. The
helper owns the cleanup contract (abort + enqueue-throw + heartbeat-throw, all
idempotent) and bakes in `sanitizeLoneSurrogates` on every JSON.stringify, so
new subscribers can't accidentally regress either invariant. Inline
`ReadableStream` wiring leaked subscribers when the TCP connection died without
firing `req.signal.abort` (Chromium MV3 service-worker suspend, intermediate
proxy half-close). `/activity/stream`, `/inspector/events`, and `/memory`
(SSE-eligible) all route through it. `browse/test/sse-helpers.test.ts` pins the
cleanup contract.
**CDP session lifecycle** (v1.51.0.0+). Direct `page.context().newCDPSession(page)`
calls outside `browse/src/cdp-bridge.ts` fail CI via the static-grep tripwire in
`browse/test/cdp-session-cleanup.test.ts`. Use `withCdpSession(page, async (s) => {...})`
for one-shot CDP work (try/finally detach) or `getOrCreateCdpSession(page, cache)`
for cached sessions tied to a page's lifetime (close-detach via `Map<page, session>`).
Three sites migrated: cdp-bridge frame events, write-commands archive capture,
cdp-inspector. The helpers prevent the per-session leak class where successful-path
detach happened but error-path detach was missed.
**Setup symlink hardening** (v1.38.0.0+). Every link site in `setup` MUST route
through the `_link_or_copy SRC DST` helper near the `IS_WINDOWS` detection. On
Windows without Developer Mode, plain `ln -snf` produces frozen file copies that
don't refresh on `git pull` — silent staleness across every host adapter. The
helper preserves `ln -snf` on Unix and switches to `cp -R` / `cp -f` on Windows.
`test/setup-windows-fallback.test.ts` enforces a static invariant: a single raw
`ln` call outside the helper body fails CI. Windows users get a one-line note
from `_print_windows_copy_note_once` reminding them to re-run `./setup` after
every `git pull`.
**Sidebar security stack** (layered defense against prompt injection):
| Layer | Module | Lives in |
|-------|--------|----------|
| L1-L3 | `content-security.ts` | server + read path — datamarking, hidden element strip, ARIA regex, URL blocklist, envelope wrapping |
| L4 | `security-classifier.ts` (TestSavantAI ONNX) | **security sidecar subprocess only** (`security-sidecar-entry.ts`, driven by `security-sidecar-client.ts` from server.ts) |
| Canary | `security.ts` (generate/inject/detect) | pure utilities — no production injector today (the chat prompt-builder that injected them was ripped) |
| Combiner | `security.ts` (combineVerdict + THRESHOLDS) | pure, tested; retains transcript/deberta vote handling for LayerSignal inputs no live layer produces anymore |
History note: an L4b Haiku transcript classifier and an opt-in DeBERTa ensemble
(`GSTACK_SECURITY_ENSEMBLE=deberta`) existed until the chat-path agent that
invoked them was ripped; both were deleted as dead code (zero production
callers). Do not re-document them as live.
**Critical constraint:** `security-classifier.ts` CANNOT be imported from the
compiled browse binary. `@huggingface/transformers` v4 requires `onnxruntime-node`
which fails to `dlopen` from Bun compile's temp extract dir — hence the sidecar
subprocess. Only `security.ts` (pure-string operations — canary utilities,
verdict combiner, status) is safe for `server.ts`. See
`~/.gstack/projects/garrytan-gstack/ceo-plans/2026-04-19-prompt-injection-guard.md`
§"Pre-Impl Gate 1 Outcome" for the original architectural decision.
**Thresholds** (in `security.ts`): `BLOCK: 0.85`, `WARN: 0.75`, `LOG_ONLY: 0.40`,
`SOLO_CONTENT_BLOCK: 0.92` (label-less content classifiers can't distinguish
"injection" from "phishing aimed at the user", so their solo bar is higher).
The live L4 path applies these in server.ts's sidecar-scan handling; canary
leak always BLOCKs (deterministic).
**Env knobs:**
- `GSTACK_SECURITY_OFF=1` — emergency kill switch. Classifier stays off even if
warmed; the L1-L3 filters keep running.
- Classifier model cache: `~/.gstack/models/testsavant-small/` (112MB, first run only)
- Attack log: `~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl` — written by
`tunnel-denial-log.ts` (tunnel-surface rejections; rotates at 10MB, 5 generations)
History note (#2557): the cross-process session state
(`~/.gstack/security/session-state.json`), `getStatus()`, the `/health`
`security` field, and the sidepanel SEC shield were all removed — the state
file lost its only writer when sidebar-agent.ts was ripped, so the shield
reported a permanent 'inactive' or a stale false-green 'protected' from
leftover disk state. The live defenses (L1-L3 filters, L4 sidecar on the
inject-scan path) report through their own call sites, never through
/health. `browse/test/server-security-surface.test.ts` pins both the
removal and the live L4 wiring. Do not re-document these as live.
## Dev symlink awareness
When developing gstack, `.claude/skills/gstack` may be a symlink back to this
@@ -584,48 +340,11 @@ npx slop-scan scan . --json # machine-readable for diffing
Config: `slop-scan.config.json` at repo root (currently excludes `**/vendor/**`).
### What to fix (genuine quality improvements)
- **Empty catches around file ops** — use `safeUnlink()` (ignores ENOENT, rethrows
EPERM/EIO). A swallowed EPERM in cleanup means silent data loss.
- **Empty catches around process kills** — use `safeKill()` (ignores ESRCH, rethrows
EPERM). A swallowed EPERM means you think you killed something you didn't.
- **Redundant `return await`** — remove when there's no enclosing try block. Saves a
microtask, signals intent.
- **Typed exception catches** — `catch (err) { if (!(err instanceof TypeError)) throw err }`
is genuinely better than `catch {}` when the try block does URL parsing or DOM work.
You know what error you expect, so say so.
### What NOT to fix (linter gaming, not quality)
- **String-matching on error messages** — `err.message.includes('closed')` is brittle.
Playwright/Chrome can change wording anytime. If a fire-and-forget operation can fail
for ANY reason and you don't care, `catch {}` is the correct pattern.
- **Adding comments to exempt pass-through wrappers** — "alias for active session" above
a method just to trip slop-scan's exemption rule is noise, not documentation.
- **Converting extension catch-and-log to selective rethrow** — Chrome extensions crash
entirely on uncaught errors. If the catch logs and continues, that IS the right pattern
for extension code. Don't make it throw.
- **Tightening best-effort cleanup paths** — shutdown, emergency cleanup, and disconnect
code should use `safeUnlinkQuiet()` (swallows ALL errors). A cleanup path that throws
on EPERM means the rest of cleanup doesn't run. That's worse.
### Utilities in `browse/src/error-handling.ts`
| Function | Use when | Behavior |
|----------|----------|----------|
| `safeUnlink(path)` | Normal file deletion | Ignores ENOENT, rethrows others |
| `safeUnlinkQuiet(path)` | Shutdown/emergency cleanup | Swallows all errors |
| `safeKill(pid, signal)` | Sending signals | Ignores ESRCH, rethrows others |
| `isProcessAlive(pid)` | Boolean process checks | Returns true/false, never throws |
### Score tracking
Baseline (2026-04-09, before cleanup): 100 findings, 432.8 score, 2.38 score/file.
After cleanup: 90 findings, 358.1 score, 1.96 score/file.
Don't chase the number. Fix patterns that represent actual code quality problems.
Accept findings where the "sloppy" pattern is the correct engineering choice.
Before fixing any finding, read [docs/SLOP_SCAN.md](docs/SLOP_SCAN.md):
it separates genuine quality fixes (empty catches around file ops →
`safeUnlink()`, process kills → `safeKill()`) from linter gaming we
reject (string-matching error messages, tightening best-effort cleanup).
Utilities live in `browse/src/error-handling.ts`. Don't chase the score.
## Community PR guardrails
@@ -818,59 +537,14 @@ sentence: "Version bump for branch-ahead discipline. No user-facing changes yet.
there. Do not pad. Do not explain the plan that will ship eventually. Do not narrate
the branch's history. When real work lands, the entry will replace this at /ship time.
### Release-summary format (every `## [X.Y.Z]` entry)
### Entry format
Every version entry in `CHANGELOG.md` MUST start with a release-summary section in
the GStack/Garry voice, one viewport's worth of prose + tables that lands like a
verdict, not marketing. The itemized changelog (subsections, bullets, files) goes
BELOW that summary, separated by a `### Itemized changes` header.
The release-summary section gets read by humans, by the auto-update agent, and by
anyone deciding whether to upgrade. The itemized list is for agents that need to
know exactly what changed.
Structure for the top of every `## [X.Y.Z]` entry:
1. **Two-line bold headline** (10-14 words total). Should land like a verdict, not
marketing. Sound like someone who shipped today and cares whether it works.
2. **Lead paragraph** (3-5 sentences). What shipped, what changed for the user.
Specific, concrete, no AI vocabulary, no em dashes, no hype.
3. **A "The X numbers that matter" section** with:
- One short setup paragraph naming the source of the numbers (real production
deployment OR a reproducible benchmark, name the file/command to run).
- A table of 3-6 key metrics with BEFORE / AFTER / Δ columns.
- A second optional table for per-category breakdown if relevant.
- 1-2 sentences interpreting the most striking number in concrete user terms.
4. **A "What this means for [audience]" closing paragraph** (2-4 sentences) tying
the metrics to a real workflow shift. End with what to do.
Voice rules for the release summary:
- No em dashes (use commas, periods, "...").
- No AI vocabulary (delve, robust, comprehensive, nuanced, fundamental, etc.) or
banned phrases ("here's the kicker", "the bottom line", etc.).
- Real numbers, real file names, real commands. Not "fast" but "~30s on 30K pages."
- Short paragraphs, mix one-sentence punches with 2-3 sentence runs.
- Connect to user outcomes: "the agent does ~3x less reading" beats "improved precision."
- Be direct about quality. "Well-designed" or "this is a mess." No dancing.
Source material:
- CHANGELOG previous entry for prior context.
- Benchmark files or `/retro` output for headline numbers.
- Recent commits (`git log <prev-version>..HEAD --oneline`) for what shipped.
- Don't make up numbers. If a metric isn't in a benchmark or production data,
don't include it. Say "no measurement yet" if asked.
Target length: ~250-350 words for the summary. Should render as one viewport.
### Itemized changes (below the release summary)
Write `### Itemized changes` and continue with the detailed subsections (Added,
Changed, Fixed, For contributors). Same rules as the user-facing voice guidance
above, plus:
- **Always credit community contributions.** When an entry includes work from a
community PR, name the contributor with `Contributed by @username`. Contributors
did real work. Thank them publicly every time, no exceptions.
Every `## [X.Y.Z]` entry starts with a release summary (two-line bold
headline, lead paragraph, numbers table, closing paragraph) followed by an
`### Itemized changes` section. Read
[docs/CHANGELOG_STYLE.md](docs/CHANGELOG_STYLE.md) for the full format spec
and voice rules BEFORE writing an entry. Always credit community
contributions with `Contributed by @username`.
## AI effort compression
@@ -1006,26 +680,10 @@ Also when running targeted E2E tests to debug failures:
## Publishing native OpenClaw skills to ClawHub
Native OpenClaw skills live in `openclaw/skills/gstack-openclaw-*/SKILL.md`. These are
hand-crafted methodology skills (not generated by the pipeline) published to ClawHub
so any OpenClaw user can install them.
**Publishing:** The command is `clawhub publish` (NOT `clawhub skill publish`):
```bash
clawhub publish openclaw/skills/gstack-openclaw-office-hours \
--slug gstack-openclaw-office-hours --name "gstack Office Hours" \
--version 1.0.0 --changelog "description of changes"
```
Repeat for each skill: `gstack-openclaw-ceo-review`, `gstack-openclaw-investigate`,
`gstack-openclaw-retro`. Bump `--version` on each update.
**Auth:** `clawhub login` (opens browser for GitHub auth). `clawhub whoami` to verify.
**Updating:** Same `clawhub publish` command with a higher `--version` and `--changelog`.
**Verification:** `clawhub search gstack` to confirm they're live.
Native OpenClaw skills live in `openclaw/skills/gstack-openclaw-*/SKILL.md`.
The command is `clawhub publish` (NOT `clawhub skill publish`) — full
workflow, auth, and verification:
[docs/OPENCLAW_PUBLISHING.md](docs/OPENCLAW_PUBLISHING.md).
## Deploying to the active skill
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# Browser / sidebar / server internals
Moved verbatim from CLAUDE.md (token-load reduction). These are the
load-bearing invariants for `browse/src/server.ts`, the Chrome extension,
the sidebar PTY, SSE endpoints, CDP sessions, and the sidebar security
stack. Every rule here is additionally pinned by a CI tripwire test named
in its paragraph.
**Sidebar architecture:** Before modifying `sidepanel.js`, `background.js`,
`content.js`, `terminal-agent.ts`, or sidebar-related server endpoints,
read `docs/designs/SIDEBAR_MESSAGE_FLOW.md`. The sidebar has one primary
surface — the **Terminal** pane (interactive `claude` PTY) — with
Activity / Refs / Inspector as debug overlays behind the footer's
`debug` toggle. The chat queue path was ripped once the PTY proved out;
`sidebar-agent.ts` and the `/sidebar-command` / `/sidebar-chat` /
`/sidebar-agent/event` endpoints are gone. The doc covers the WS auth
flow, dual-token model, and threat-model boundary — silent failures
here usually trace to not understanding the cross-component flow.
**Embedder terminal-agent ownership** (v1.42.1.0+, identity-based kill v1.44.0.0+).
`buildFetchHandler` in `browse/src/server.ts` accepts `ServerConfig.ownsTerminalAgent?:
boolean` (default `true`). When `true`, factory shutdown runs the full teardown:
identity-based kill via `killAgentByRecord(readAgentRecord(stateDir))` from
`browse/src/terminal-agent-control.ts` plus `safeUnlinkQuiet` on
`<stateDir>/terminal-port`, `<stateDir>/terminal-internal-token`, and
`<stateDir>/terminal-agent-pid` (the per-boot agent record introduced in v1.44).
Embedders (e.g. the gbrowser phoenix overlay) that pre-launch their own PTY
server must pass `false` so their discovery files survive gstack teardown cycles.
The flag is the third caller-owned teardown gate in `ServerConfig` (alongside
`xvfb?` and `proxyBridge?`); polarity is inverted (explicit bool vs presence) and
documented in the field's JSDoc. CLI `start()` always passes `true` explicitly —
the static-grep test in `browse/test/server-embedder-terminal-port.test.ts` fails
CI if a refactor drops it. Pre-v1.44 used `pkill -f terminal-agent\.ts` (regex
match) which would kill sibling gstack sessions on the same host; the new
`browse/test/terminal-agent-pid-identity.test.ts` static-grep tripwire fails CI
if any source file re-introduces `pkill ... terminal-agent` or `spawnSync('pkill', ...)`.
**WebSocket auth uses Sec-WebSocket-Protocol, not cookies.** Browsers
can't set `Authorization` on a WebSocket upgrade, but they CAN set
`Sec-WebSocket-Protocol` via `new WebSocket(url, [token])`. The agent
reads it, validates against `validTokens`, and MUST echo the protocol
back in the upgrade response — without the echo, Chromium closes the
connection immediately. `Set-Cookie: gstack_pty=...` is kept as a
fallback for non-browser callers (the cross-port `SameSite=Strict`
cookie path doesn't survive from a chrome-extension origin).
**Cross-pane PTY injection.** The toolbar's Cleanup button and the
Inspector's "Send to Code" action both pipe text into the live claude
PTY via `window.gstackInjectToTerminal(text)`, exposed by
`sidepanel-terminal.js`. No `/sidebar-command` POST — the live REPL is
the only execution surface in the sidebar now.
**`/health` MUST NOT surface any token — and it no longer does** (v1.63+).
The historical headed-mode leak of `AUTH_TOKEN` is fixed: `GET /health` is
liveness/status only in every mode. Token bootstrap is `POST /extension-token`,
which validates the caller's Origin against the pinned extension identity
(the `key` field in `extension/manifest.json` pins the extension ID —
`GSTACK_EXTENSION_ID` in `browse/src/server.ts`, derivation reproducible via
`bun browse/scripts/extension-id.ts`) plus a loopback Host. PTY auth still
flows through `POST /pty-session` only. Don't add any token to `/health`.
**Transport-layer security** (v1.6.0.0+). When `pair-agent` starts an ngrok tunnel,
the daemon binds two HTTP listeners: a local listener (127.0.0.1, full command
surface, never forwarded) and a tunnel listener (locked allowlist: `/connect`,
`/command` with a scoped token + 26-command browser-driving allowlist,
`/sidebar-chat`). ngrok forwards only the tunnel port. Root tokens over the tunnel
return 403. SSE endpoints use a 30-minute HttpOnly `gstack_sse` cookie minted via
`POST /sse-session` (never valid against `/command`). Tunnel-surface rejections go
to `~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl` via `tunnel-denial-log.ts`. Before editing
`server.ts`, `sse-session-cookie.ts`, or `tunnel-denial-log.ts`, read
[ARCHITECTURE.md](ARCHITECTURE.md#dual-listener-tunnel-architecture-v1600) —
the module boundary (no imports from `token-registry.ts` into `sse-session-cookie.ts`)
is load-bearing for scope isolation.
**Unicode sanitization at server egress** (v1.38.0.0+). Every server egress that
ships page-content-derived strings MUST go through `JSON.stringify(payload,
sanitizeReplacer)` for object payloads or `sanitizeLoneSurrogates(body)` for text
bodies. Lone UTF-16 surrogate halves from CDP page content otherwise reach the
Anthropic API as `\uD800`-style escapes and trigger a 400. Wired at four egress
points today: `handleCommandInternal` (HTTP + batch via a sanitizing wrapper around
`handleCommandInternalImpl`) and both SSE producers (`/activity/stream`,
`/inspector/events`). Post-stringify regex is a no-op — `JSON.stringify` has
already escaped the surrogate before regex could match, so the replacer must run
inside the encoding pipeline. Before adding a new SSE/WebSocket writer or HTTP
response in `server.ts`, read
[ARCHITECTURE.md](ARCHITECTURE.md#unicode-sanitization-at-server-egress-v13800).
`browse/test/server-sanitize-surrogates.test.ts` pins the wiring with invariant
tests, so bypasses fail CI.
**SSE endpoint helper** (v1.51.0.0+). New SSE endpoints in `server.ts` MUST route
through `createSseEndpoint(req, config)` from `browse/src/sse-helpers.ts`. The
helper owns the cleanup contract (abort + enqueue-throw + heartbeat-throw, all
idempotent) and bakes in `sanitizeLoneSurrogates` on every JSON.stringify, so
new subscribers can't accidentally regress either invariant. Inline
`ReadableStream` wiring leaked subscribers when the TCP connection died without
firing `req.signal.abort` (Chromium MV3 service-worker suspend, intermediate
proxy half-close). `/activity/stream`, `/inspector/events`, and `/memory`
(SSE-eligible) all route through it. `browse/test/sse-helpers.test.ts` pins the
cleanup contract.
**CDP session lifecycle** (v1.51.0.0+). Direct `page.context().newCDPSession(page)`
calls outside `browse/src/cdp-bridge.ts` fail CI via the static-grep tripwire in
`browse/test/cdp-session-cleanup.test.ts`. Use `withCdpSession(page, async (s) => {...})`
for one-shot CDP work (try/finally detach) or `getOrCreateCdpSession(page, cache)`
for cached sessions tied to a page's lifetime (close-detach via `Map<page, session>`).
Three sites migrated: cdp-bridge frame events, write-commands archive capture,
cdp-inspector. The helpers prevent the per-session leak class where successful-path
detach happened but error-path detach was missed.
**Setup symlink hardening** (v1.38.0.0+). Every link site in `setup` MUST route
through the `_link_or_copy SRC DST` helper near the `IS_WINDOWS` detection. On
Windows without Developer Mode, plain `ln -snf` produces frozen file copies that
don't refresh on `git pull` — silent staleness across every host adapter. The
helper preserves `ln -snf` on Unix and switches to `cp -R` / `cp -f` on Windows.
`test/setup-windows-fallback.test.ts` enforces a static invariant: a single raw
`ln` call outside the helper body fails CI. Windows users get a one-line note
from `_print_windows_copy_note_once` reminding them to re-run `./setup` after
every `git pull`.
**Sidebar security stack** (layered defense against prompt injection):
| Layer | Module | Lives in |
|-------|--------|----------|
| L1-L3 | `content-security.ts` | server + read path — datamarking, hidden element strip, ARIA regex, URL blocklist, envelope wrapping |
| L4 | `security-classifier.ts` (TestSavantAI ONNX) | **security sidecar subprocess only** (`security-sidecar-entry.ts`, driven by `security-sidecar-client.ts` from server.ts) |
| Canary | `security.ts` (generate/inject/detect) | pure utilities — no production injector today (the chat prompt-builder that injected them was ripped) |
| Combiner | `security.ts` (combineVerdict + THRESHOLDS) | pure, tested; retains transcript/deberta vote handling for LayerSignal inputs no live layer produces anymore |
History note: an L4b Haiku transcript classifier and an opt-in DeBERTa ensemble
(`GSTACK_SECURITY_ENSEMBLE=deberta`) existed until the chat-path agent that
invoked them was ripped; both were deleted as dead code (zero production
callers). Do not re-document them as live.
**Critical constraint:** `security-classifier.ts` CANNOT be imported from the
compiled browse binary. `@huggingface/transformers` v4 requires `onnxruntime-node`
which fails to `dlopen` from Bun compile's temp extract dir — hence the sidecar
subprocess. Only `security.ts` (pure-string operations — canary utilities,
verdict combiner, status) is safe for `server.ts`. See
`~/.gstack/projects/garrytan-gstack/ceo-plans/2026-04-19-prompt-injection-guard.md`
§"Pre-Impl Gate 1 Outcome" for the original architectural decision.
**Thresholds** (in `security.ts`): `BLOCK: 0.85`, `WARN: 0.75`, `LOG_ONLY: 0.40`,
`SOLO_CONTENT_BLOCK: 0.92` (label-less content classifiers can't distinguish
"injection" from "phishing aimed at the user", so their solo bar is higher).
The live L4 path applies these in server.ts's sidecar-scan handling; canary
leak always BLOCKs (deterministic).
**Env knobs:**
- `GSTACK_SECURITY_OFF=1` — emergency kill switch. Classifier stays off even if
warmed; the L1-L3 filters keep running.
- Classifier model cache: `~/.gstack/models/testsavant-small/` (112MB, first run only)
- Attack log: `~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl` — written by
`tunnel-denial-log.ts` (tunnel-surface rejections; rotates at 10MB, 5 generations)
History note (#2557): the cross-process session state
(`~/.gstack/security/session-state.json`), `getStatus()`, the `/health`
`security` field, and the sidepanel SEC shield were all removed — the state
file lost its only writer when sidebar-agent.ts was ripped, so the shield
reported a permanent 'inactive' or a stale false-green 'protected' from
leftover disk state. The live defenses (L1-L3 filters, L4 sidecar on the
inject-scan path) report through their own call sites, never through
/health. `browse/test/server-security-surface.test.ts` pins both the
removal and the live L4 wiring. Do not re-document these as live.
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# CHANGELOG entry format
Moved verbatim from CLAUDE.md (token-load reduction). Read this BEFORE
writing any `## [X.Y.Z]` CHANGELOG entry.
### Release-summary format (every `## [X.Y.Z]` entry)
Every version entry in `CHANGELOG.md` MUST start with a release-summary section in
the GStack/Garry voice, one viewport's worth of prose + tables that lands like a
verdict, not marketing. The itemized changelog (subsections, bullets, files) goes
BELOW that summary, separated by a `### Itemized changes` header.
The release-summary section gets read by humans, by the auto-update agent, and by
anyone deciding whether to upgrade. The itemized list is for agents that need to
know exactly what changed.
Structure for the top of every `## [X.Y.Z]` entry:
1. **Two-line bold headline** (10-14 words total). Should land like a verdict, not
marketing. Sound like someone who shipped today and cares whether it works.
2. **Lead paragraph** (3-5 sentences). What shipped, what changed for the user.
Specific, concrete, no AI vocabulary, no em dashes, no hype.
3. **A "The X numbers that matter" section** with:
- One short setup paragraph naming the source of the numbers (real production
deployment OR a reproducible benchmark, name the file/command to run).
- A table of 3-6 key metrics with BEFORE / AFTER / Δ columns.
- A second optional table for per-category breakdown if relevant.
- 1-2 sentences interpreting the most striking number in concrete user terms.
4. **A "What this means for [audience]" closing paragraph** (2-4 sentences) tying
the metrics to a real workflow shift. End with what to do.
Voice rules for the release summary:
- No em dashes (use commas, periods, "...").
- No AI vocabulary (delve, robust, comprehensive, nuanced, fundamental, etc.) or
banned phrases ("here's the kicker", "the bottom line", etc.).
- Real numbers, real file names, real commands. Not "fast" but "~30s on 30K pages."
- Short paragraphs, mix one-sentence punches with 2-3 sentence runs.
- Connect to user outcomes: "the agent does ~3x less reading" beats "improved precision."
- Be direct about quality. "Well-designed" or "this is a mess." No dancing.
Source material:
- CHANGELOG previous entry for prior context.
- Benchmark files or `/retro` output for headline numbers.
- Recent commits (`git log <prev-version>..HEAD --oneline`) for what shipped.
- Don't make up numbers. If a metric isn't in a benchmark or production data,
don't include it. Say "no measurement yet" if asked.
Target length: ~250-350 words for the summary. Should render as one viewport.
### Itemized changes (below the release summary)
Write `### Itemized changes` and continue with the detailed subsections (Added,
Changed, Fixed, For contributors). Same rules as the user-facing voice guidance
above, plus:
- **Always credit community contributions.** When an entry includes work from a
community PR, name the contributor with `Contributed by @username`. Contributors
did real work. Thank them publicly every time, no exceptions.
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# Publishing native OpenClaw skills to ClawHub
Moved verbatim from CLAUDE.md (token-load reduction).
## Workflow
Native OpenClaw skills live in `openclaw/skills/gstack-openclaw-*/SKILL.md`. These are
hand-crafted methodology skills (not generated by the pipeline) published to ClawHub
so any OpenClaw user can install them.
**Publishing:** The command is `clawhub publish` (NOT `clawhub skill publish`):
```bash
clawhub publish openclaw/skills/gstack-openclaw-office-hours \
--slug gstack-openclaw-office-hours --name "gstack Office Hours" \
--version 1.0.0 --changelog "description of changes"
```
Repeat for each skill: `gstack-openclaw-ceo-review`, `gstack-openclaw-investigate`,
`gstack-openclaw-retro`. Bump `--version` on each update.
**Auth:** `clawhub login` (opens browser for GitHub auth). `clawhub whoami` to verify.
**Updating:** Same `clawhub publish` command with a higher `--version` and `--changelog`.
**Verification:** `clawhub search gstack` to confirm they're live.
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# Project structure
Moved verbatim from CLAUDE.md (token-load reduction).
## Directory tree
```
gstack/
├── browse/ # Headless browser CLI (Playwright)
│ ├── src/ # CLI + server + commands
│ │ ├── commands.ts # Command registry (single source of truth)
│ │ └── snapshot.ts # SNAPSHOT_FLAGS metadata array
│ ├── test/ # Integration tests + fixtures
│ └── dist/ # Compiled binary
├── hosts/ # Typed host configs (one per AI agent)
│ ├── claude.ts # Primary host config
│ ├── codex.ts, factory.ts, kiro.ts # Existing hosts
│ ├── opencode.ts, slate.ts, cursor.ts, openclaw.ts # IDE hosts
│ ├── hermes.ts, gbrain.ts # Agent runtime hosts
│ └── index.ts # Registry: exports all, derives Host type
├── scripts/ # Build + DX tooling
│ ├── gen-skill-docs.ts # Template → SKILL.md generator (config-driven)
│ ├── host-config.ts # HostConfig interface + validator
│ ├── host-config-export.ts # Shell bridge for setup script
│ ├── resolvers/ # Template resolver modules (preamble, design, review, gbrain, etc.)
│ ├── skill-check.ts # Health dashboard
│ ├── test-paid-shards.ts # Sharded paid-tier runner (one Bun process per shard)
│ └── dev-skill.ts # Watch mode
├── test/ # Skill validation + eval tests
│ ├── helpers/ # skill-parser.ts, session-runner.ts, llm-judge.ts, eval-store.ts
│ ├── fixtures/ # Ground truth JSON, planted-bug fixtures, eval baselines
│ ├── skill-validation.test.ts # Tier 1: static validation (free, <1s)
│ ├── gen-skill-docs.test.ts # Tier 1: generator quality (free, <1s)
│ ├── skill-llm-eval.test.ts # Tier 3: LLM-as-judge (~$0.15/run)
│ └── skill-e2e-*.test.ts # Tier 2: E2E via claude -p (~$3.85/run, split by category)
├── qa-only/ # /qa-only skill (report-only QA, no fixes)
├── plan-design-review/ # /plan-design-review skill (report-only design audit)
├── design-review/ # /design-review skill (design audit + fix loop)
├── ship/ # Ship workflow skill
├── review/ # PR review skill
├── plan-ceo-review/ # /plan-ceo-review skill
├── plan-eng-review/ # /plan-eng-review skill
├── autoplan/ # /autoplan skill (auto-review pipeline: CEO → design → eng)
├── benchmark/ # /benchmark skill (performance regression detection)
├── canary/ # /canary skill (post-deploy monitoring loop)
├── codex/ # /codex skill (multi-AI second opinion via OpenAI Codex CLI)
├── land-and-deploy/ # /land-and-deploy skill (merge → deploy → canary verify)
├── office-hours/ # /office-hours skill (YC Office Hours — startup diagnostic + builder brainstorm)
├── investigate/ # /investigate skill (systematic root-cause debugging)
├── spec/ # /spec skill (five-phase spec → GitHub issue, optional agent spawn, /ship auto-closes)
├── retro/ # Retrospective skill (includes /retro global cross-project mode)
├── bin/ # CLI utilities (gstack-repo-mode, gstack-slug, gstack-config, gstack-wtree, gstack-evidence, gstack-issue-guard, etc.)
├── document-release/ # /document-release skill (post-ship doc updates + Diataxis coverage map)
├── document-generate/ # /document-generate skill (Diataxis doc generator: tutorial/how-to/reference/explanation)
├── cso/ # /cso skill (OWASP Top 10 + STRIDE security audit)
├── design-consultation/ # /design-consultation skill (design system from scratch)
├── design-shotgun/ # /design-shotgun skill (visual design exploration)
├── open-gstack-browser/ # /open-gstack-browser skill (launch GStack Browser)
├── connect-chrome/ # symlink → open-gstack-browser (backwards compat)
├── design/ # Design binary CLI (GPT Image API)
│ ├── src/ # CLI + commands (generate, variants, compare, serve, etc.)
│ ├── test/ # Integration tests
│ └── dist/ # Compiled binary
├── extension/ # Chrome extension (side panel + activity feed + CSS inspector)
├── lib/ # Shared libraries (worktree.ts, egress-receipt.ts, context-bill.ts, redact-engine.ts, tracker-guard.ts, version-source.ts, code-intelligence/)
├── patches/ # bun `patchedDependencies` patches (playwright-core windowsHide)
├── docs/designs/ # Design documents
├── setup-deploy/ # /setup-deploy skill (one-time deploy config)
├── .github/ # CI workflows + Docker image
│ ├── workflows/ # evals.yml (E2E on Ubicloud), quality-gate.yml (secret scan), dependency-review.yml, osv-scanner.yml, skill-docs.yml, actionlint.yml, and 8 more (windows, periodic evals, release gates, ci-image)
│ └── docker/ # Dockerfile.ci (pre-baked toolchain + Playwright/Chromium)
├── contrib/ # Contributor-only tools (never installed for users)
│ └── add-host/ # /gstack-contrib-add-host skill
├── setup # One-time setup: build binary + symlink skills
├── SKILL.md # Generated from SKILL.md.tmpl (don't edit directly)
├── SKILL.md.tmpl # Template: edit this, run gen:skill-docs
├── ETHOS.md # Builder philosophy (Boil the Ocean, Search Before Building)
└── package.json # Build scripts for browse
```
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# Slop-scan: what to fix, what to leave
Moved verbatim from CLAUDE.md (token-load reduction). Read before acting
on any slop-scan finding.
### What to fix (genuine quality improvements)
- **Empty catches around file ops** — use `safeUnlink()` (ignores ENOENT, rethrows
EPERM/EIO). A swallowed EPERM in cleanup means silent data loss.
- **Empty catches around process kills** — use `safeKill()` (ignores ESRCH, rethrows
EPERM). A swallowed EPERM means you think you killed something you didn't.
- **Redundant `return await`** — remove when there's no enclosing try block. Saves a
microtask, signals intent.
- **Typed exception catches** — `catch (err) { if (!(err instanceof TypeError)) throw err }`
is genuinely better than `catch {}` when the try block does URL parsing or DOM work.
You know what error you expect, so say so.
### What NOT to fix (linter gaming, not quality)
- **String-matching on error messages** — `err.message.includes('closed')` is brittle.
Playwright/Chrome can change wording anytime. If a fire-and-forget operation can fail
for ANY reason and you don't care, `catch {}` is the correct pattern.
- **Adding comments to exempt pass-through wrappers** — "alias for active session" above
a method just to trip slop-scan's exemption rule is noise, not documentation.
- **Converting extension catch-and-log to selective rethrow** — Chrome extensions crash
entirely on uncaught errors. If the catch logs and continues, that IS the right pattern
for extension code. Don't make it throw.
- **Tightening best-effort cleanup paths** — shutdown, emergency cleanup, and disconnect
code should use `safeUnlinkQuiet()` (swallows ALL errors). A cleanup path that throws
on EPERM means the rest of cleanup doesn't run. That's worse.
### Utilities in `browse/src/error-handling.ts`
| Function | Use when | Behavior |
|----------|----------|----------|
| `safeUnlink(path)` | Normal file deletion | Ignores ENOENT, rethrows others |
| `safeUnlinkQuiet(path)` | Shutdown/emergency cleanup | Swallows all errors |
| `safeKill(pid, signal)` | Sending signals | Ignores ESRCH, rethrows others |
| `isProcessAlive(pid)` | Boolean process checks | Returns true/false, never throws |
### Score tracking
Baseline (2026-04-09, before cleanup): 100 findings, 432.8 score, 2.38 score/file.
After cleanup: 90 findings, 358.1 score, 1.96 score/file.
Don't chase the number. Fix patterns that represent actual code quality problems.
Accept findings where the "sloppy" pattern is the correct engineering choice.
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# Testing internals: env keys, hermetic E2E
Moved verbatim from CLAUDE.md (token-load reduction). Read this before
writing or debugging E2E tests, passing `env:` to a runner, or touching
`test/helpers/hermetic-env.ts`.
**Env keys in Conductor workspaces.** The `GSTACK_*` env-shim (v1.39.2.0+,
`lib/conductor-env-shim.ts`) promotes `GSTACK_ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` /
`GSTACK_OPENAI_API_KEY` to their canonical names inside gstack's TS binaries.
Tests run through gstack entrypoints inherit this promotion automatically.
Don't echo the key value to stdout, logs, or shell history. The historical
"never pass `env:` to `runAgentSdkTest`" rule is retired: the failure was
partial-env replacement (the SDK's `Options.env` REPLACES the child's entire
environment, so an object without the key broke auth). The runner now always
passes a COMPLETE hermetic env with per-test `env:` merged last, so per-test
overrides are safe; ambient `process.env.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` mutation also
still works (the env builder reads process.env at call time).
**Hermetic local E2E (default).** Every E2E runner (claude -p, PTY, Agent
SDK, codex, gemini) spawns children through `test/helpers/hermetic-env.ts`:
allowlist-scrubbed env (operator `CONDUCTOR_*`, `CLAUDE_*`, `GSTACK_*`,
`MCP_*`, `GBRAIN_*`, and credentials like `GH_TOKEN` never reach children),
a fresh seeded `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR` (no operator `~/.claude` CLAUDE.md /
MCP servers / skills), a temp `GSTACK_HOME`, and `--strict-mcp-config`.
Local eval signal matches CI. Debug against real operator state with
`EVALS_HERMETIC=0` (restores the legacy env AND drops the strict-MCP flag).
Per-test `env:` overrides merge last, so deliberate contamination
(`CONDUCTOR_WORKSPACE_PATH`, per-test `GSTACK_HOME`) keeps working. The
hermetic config dir seeds NO skills by default; a PTY test that types a
`/skill` slash command must pass `seedSkills: true` to the PTY runner, which
points the child's `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR` at `hermeticSkillsConfigDir()` — a
seeded registry that symlinks the LIVE working tree's SKILL.md files (by
design: the skills ARE the subject under test; a snapshot would measure stale
copies). Wiring is pinned by `test/hermetic-wiring.test.ts` (static tripwire),
two gate-tier canaries in `test/skill-e2e-hermetic-canary.test.ts`, and the
seeding tripwires in `test/hermetic-skills-seeding.test.ts` /
`test/pty-skill-seeding-wiring.test.ts`.
E2E tests stream progress in real-time (tool-by-tool via `--output-format stream-json
--verbose`). Results are persisted to `~/.gstack/projects/<slug>/evals/` (legacy
fallback `~/.gstack-dev/evals/`) with auto-comparison
against the previous finalized run (in-flight `_partial` files are never used as
a baseline, so a run can't compare against itself).