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fix(browse): single-point Unicode sanitization at server egress
Add sanitizeLoneSurrogates (regex-based UTF-16 lone-half cleaner) and sanitizeReplacer (JSON.stringify replacer that runs the cleaner on every string field during encoding). Split handleCommandInternal into handleCommandInternalImpl (raw) plus a thin sanitizing wrapper. The wrapper applies sanitizeLoneSurrogates to cr.result so both single-command (handleCommand line 1034) and batch-loop (line 1966) egress paths inherit it. Inline INVARIANT comment near the wrapper documents the architectural constraint. Both SSE producers (activity feed at /activity/stream and inspector stream) stringify with sanitizeReplacer. Post-stringify regex is ineffective on those paths because JSON.stringify has already converted the lone surrogate into the escape sequence "\\\\uD800" before any regex could match it; the replacer runs during stringify on the raw string value, so the substitution lands. Originated from @realcarsonterry PR #1463 (handleCommand-only wrap). Architectural lift to handleCommandInternal + SSE coverage authored on this branch. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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+68
-6
@@ -59,6 +59,43 @@ import * as net from 'net';
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import * as path from 'path';
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import * as crypto from 'crypto';
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// ─── Unicode Sanitization ───────────────────────────────────────
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// Remove unpaired UTF-16 surrogate halves (\uD800–\uDFFF). Page DOM text,
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// OCR output, and other CDP-sourced strings can contain lone surrogates;
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// JSON consumers downstream (Anthropic API in particular) reject them with
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// "no low surrogate in string". Valid surrogate pairs (e.g. emoji) survive
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// unchanged. Lone halves become U+FFFD (�).
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//
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// INVARIANT: every server egress path that ships page-content strings MUST
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// route through this sanitizer. handleCommandInternal wraps the final
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// cr.result string (text/plain bodies carry lone surrogates verbatim;
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// JSON.stringify already escapes them). The two SSE producers below
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// stringify with `sanitizeReplacer` so payload string fields get cleaned
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// BEFORE escaping. Plain post-stringify regex is a no-op there because
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// JSON.stringify converts \uD800 → "\\ud800" — the regex can't see the
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// surrogate after that point.
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function sanitizeLoneSurrogates(str: string): string {
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return str.replace(/[\uD800-\uDFFF]/g, (match, offset) => {
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const code = match.charCodeAt(0);
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if (code >= 0xD800 && code <= 0xDBFF) {
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const next = str.charCodeAt(offset + 1);
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if (next >= 0xDC00 && next <= 0xDFFF) return match;
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}
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if (code >= 0xDC00 && code <= 0xDFFF) {
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const prev = str.charCodeAt(offset - 1);
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if (prev >= 0xD800 && prev <= 0xDBFF) return match;
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}
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return '�';
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});
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}
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// JSON.stringify replacer that sanitizes string values before they get
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// escape-encoded. Pair with stringify when the consumer will JSON.parse the
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// payload back into JS strings (SSE clients do this).
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function sanitizeReplacer(_key: string, value: unknown): unknown {
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return typeof value === 'string' ? sanitizeLoneSurrogates(value) : value;
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}
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// ─── Config ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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const config = resolveConfig();
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ensureStateDir(config);
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@@ -683,7 +720,7 @@ interface CommandResult {
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* skipActivity: true when called from chain (chain emits 1 event for all subcommands)
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* chainDepth: recursion guard — reject nested chains (depth > 0 means inside a chain)
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*/
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async function handleCommandInternal(
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async function handleCommandInternalImpl(
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body: { command: string; args?: string[]; tabId?: number },
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tokenInfo?: TokenInfo | null,
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opts?: { skipRateCheck?: boolean; skipActivity?: boolean; chainDepth?: number },
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@@ -1027,6 +1064,21 @@ async function handleCommandInternal(
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}
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}
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/**
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* Sanitizing wrapper around handleCommandInternalImpl. ALL callers (single-command
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* HTTP, batch loop, scoped-token dispatch) go through this so the lone-surrogate
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* sanitization happens once at the architectural choke point, not per-leaf.
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* Do not bypass this by calling handleCommandInternalImpl directly.
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*/
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async function handleCommandInternal(
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body: { command: string; args?: string[]; tabId?: number },
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tokenInfo?: TokenInfo | null,
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opts?: { skipRateCheck?: boolean; skipActivity?: boolean; chainDepth?: number },
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): Promise<CommandResult> {
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const cr = await handleCommandInternalImpl(body, tokenInfo, opts);
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return { ...cr, result: sanitizeLoneSurrogates(cr.result) };
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}
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/** HTTP wrapper — converts CommandResult to Response */
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async function handleCommand(body: any, tokenInfo?: TokenInfo | null): Promise<Response> {
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const cr = await handleCommandInternal(body, tokenInfo);
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@@ -1827,19 +1879,24 @@ export async function start() {
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const stream = new ReadableStream({
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start(controller) {
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// SSE egress invariant: every JSON.stringify here ships page-content-derived
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// fields (URLs, command args, errors) to the sidebar. Lone surrogates must
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// be sanitized DURING stringify (via sanitizeReplacer) so they're cleaned
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// before escape-encoding — post-stringify regex is ineffective because
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// JSON.stringify has already converted \uD800 → "\\ud800".
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// 1. Gap detection + replay
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const { entries, gap, gapFrom, availableFrom } = getActivityAfter(afterId);
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if (gap) {
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controller.enqueue(encoder.encode(`event: gap\ndata: ${JSON.stringify({ gapFrom, availableFrom })}\n\n`));
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controller.enqueue(encoder.encode(`event: gap\ndata: ${JSON.stringify({ gapFrom, availableFrom }, sanitizeReplacer)}\n\n`));
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}
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for (const entry of entries) {
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controller.enqueue(encoder.encode(`event: activity\ndata: ${JSON.stringify(entry)}\n\n`));
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controller.enqueue(encoder.encode(`event: activity\ndata: ${JSON.stringify(entry, sanitizeReplacer)}\n\n`));
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}
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// 2. Subscribe for live events
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const unsubscribe = subscribe((entry) => {
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try {
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controller.enqueue(encoder.encode(`event: activity\ndata: ${JSON.stringify(entry)}\n\n`));
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controller.enqueue(encoder.encode(`event: activity\ndata: ${JSON.stringify(entry, sanitizeReplacer)}\n\n`));
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} catch (err: any) {
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console.debug('[browse] Activity SSE stream error, unsubscribing:', err.message);
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unsubscribe();
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@@ -2188,10 +2245,15 @@ export async function start() {
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const encoder = new TextEncoder();
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const stream = new ReadableStream({
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start(controller) {
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// SSE egress invariant: inspectorData and CDP event payloads carry
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// page-DOM strings (selectors, attribute values, console messages).
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// sanitizeReplacer cleans lone surrogates DURING JSON.stringify so
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// they're neutralized before escape-encoding (post-stringify regex
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// is a no-op once \uD800 has become "\\ud800").
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// Send current state immediately
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if (inspectorData) {
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controller.enqueue(encoder.encode(
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`event: state\ndata: ${JSON.stringify({ data: inspectorData, timestamp: inspectorTimestamp })}\n\n`
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`event: state\ndata: ${JSON.stringify({ data: inspectorData, timestamp: inspectorTimestamp }, sanitizeReplacer)}\n\n`
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));
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}
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@@ -2199,7 +2261,7 @@ export async function start() {
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const notify: InspectorSubscriber = (event) => {
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try {
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controller.enqueue(encoder.encode(
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`event: inspector\ndata: ${JSON.stringify(event)}\n\n`
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`event: inspector\ndata: ${JSON.stringify(event, sanitizeReplacer)}\n\n`
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));
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} catch (err: any) {
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console.debug('[browse] Inspector SSE stream error:', err.message);
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