test: coverage for TEMP_DIRS widening and remote-serving TEMP_ONLY asymmetry

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 14:38:59 +02:00 · 2026-08-29 05:01:22 +00:00
parent 6c28ccfced
commit c22592ceb0
1 changed files with 72 additions and 0 deletions
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+/**
+ * TEMP_DIRS portability allowlist (platform.ts) and its path-security wiring.
+ *
+ * TEMP_DIRS widens LOCAL path validation to include os.tmpdir() — on macOS
+ * that is the per-user /var/folders dir, and TMPDIR-honoring CI/sandbox
+ * environments point it elsewhere entirely. The load-bearing SECURITY
+ * invariant is asymmetry: SAFE_DIRECTORIES (local read/write) gains
+ * os.tmpdir(), while validateTempPath (REMOTE file serving, GET /file) stays
+ * pinned to classic TEMP_DIR alone — widening that one would let a tunnel
+ * client fetch files from an arbitrary TMPDIR (e.g. $HOME/tmp).
+ */
+import { describe, it, expect } from 'bun:test';
+import { TEMP_DIR, TEMP_DIRS } from '../src/platform';
+import { SAFE_DIRECTORIES, validateOutputPath, validateReadPath, validateTempPath } from '../src/path-security';
+import * as fs from 'fs';
+import * as path from 'path';
+import * as os from 'os';
+
+const real = (p: string) => { try { return fs.realpathSync(p); } catch { return p; } };
+const tmpdirIsDistinct = real(os.tmpdir()) !== real(TEMP_DIR);
+
+describe('TEMP_DIRS allowlist shape', () => {
+  it('contains exactly TEMP_DIR + os.tmpdir() deduped, and SAFE_DIRECTORIES wires them realpathed alongside cwd', () => {
+    expect(TEMP_DIRS).toContain(TEMP_DIR);
+    expect(TEMP_DIRS).toContain(os.tmpdir());
+    expect(new Set(TEMP_DIRS).size).toBe(TEMP_DIRS.length);
+    // Nothing else sneaks into the allowlist.
+    for (const d of TEMP_DIRS) {
+      expect([TEMP_DIR, os.tmpdir()]).toContain(d);
+    }
+    expect(SAFE_DIRECTORIES).toContain(real(os.tmpdir()));
+    expect(SAFE_DIRECTORIES).toContain(real(process.cwd()));
+  });
+});
+
+describe('local commands accept os.tmpdir() paths (TMPDIR-honoring environments)', () => {
+  it('validateReadPath allows an existing file under os.tmpdir()', () => {
+    const f = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `browse-tempdirs-read-${Date.now()}.js`);
+    fs.writeFileSync(f, 'document.title');
+    try {
+      expect(() => validateReadPath(f)).not.toThrow();
+    } finally {
+      fs.unlinkSync(f);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('validateOutputPath allows a new (not-yet-existing) file under os.tmpdir()', () => {
+    const f = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `browse-tempdirs-out-${Date.now()}.png`);
+    expect(() => validateOutputPath(f)).not.toThrow();
+    expect(fs.existsSync(f)).toBe(false); // validation never creates the file
+  });
+});
+
+describe('remote file serving stays pinned to TEMP_DIR alone (no exfil widening)', () => {
+  it('validateTempPath REJECTS a file under a distinct os.tmpdir() — local-only allowlist never reaches the remote surface', () => {
+    if (!tmpdirIsDistinct) {
+      // On hosts where os.tmpdir() IS /tmp the asymmetry is untestable this
+      // way — but then the allowlist must have collapsed to the single dir.
+      expect(TEMP_DIRS).toEqual([TEMP_DIR]);
+      return;
+    }
+    const f = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `browse-tempdirs-remote-${Date.now()}.txt`);
+    fs.writeFileSync(f, 'served?');
+    try {
+      // Same file: fine for local commands, forbidden for remote serving.
+      expect(() => validateReadPath(f)).not.toThrow();
+      expect(() => validateTempPath(f)).toThrow(/temp directory/i);
+    } finally {
+      fs.unlinkSync(f);
+    }
+  });
+});