chore: merge origin/main, resolve VERSION conflict (keep 0.17.0.0)

.github/docker/Dockerfile.ci

@@ -59,5 +59,4 @@ RUN useradd -m -s /bin/bash runner \
     && chmod -R a+rX /opt/node_modules_cache \
     && mkdir -p /home/runner/.gstack && chown -R runner:runner /home/runner/.gstack \
     && chmod 1777 /tmp \
-    && mkdir -p /home/runner/.bun && chown -R runner:runner /home/runner/.bun \
-    && chmod -R 1777 /tmp
+    && mkdir -p /home/runner/.bun && chown -R runner:runner /home/runner/.bun

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,29 @@
 # Changelog
 
+## [0.16.4.0] - 2026-04-13
+
+### Added
+- **Cookie origin pinning.** When you import cookies for specific domains, JS execution is now blocked on pages that don't match those domains. This prevents the attack where a prompt injection navigates to an attacker's site and runs `document.cookie` to steal your imported cookies. Subdomain matching works automatically (importing `.github.com` allows `api.github.com`). When no cookies are imported, everything works as before. 3 PRs from @halbert04.
+- **Command audit log.** Every browse command now gets a persistent forensic trail in `~/.gstack/.browse/browse-audit.jsonl`. Timestamp, command, args, page origin, duration, status, error, and whether cookies were imported. Append-only, never truncated, survives server restarts. Best-effort writes that never block command execution. From @halbert04.
+- **Cookie domain tracking.** gstack now tracks which domains cookies were imported from. Foundation for origin pinning above. Direct imports via `--domain` track automatically. New `--all` flag makes full-browser cookie import an explicit opt-in instead of the default.
+
+### Fixed
+- **Symlink bypass in file writes.** `validateOutputPath` only checked the parent directory for symlinks, not the file itself. A symlink at `/tmp/evil.png` pointing to `/etc/crontab` passed validation because the parent `/tmp` was safe. Now checks the file with `lstatSync` before writing. From @Hybirdss.
+- **Cookie-import path bypass.** Two issues: relative paths bypassed all validation (the `path.isAbsolute()` gate let `sensitive-file.json` through), and symlink resolution was missing (`path.resolve` without `realpathSync`). Now resolves to absolute, resolves symlinks, and checks against safe directories. From @urbantech.
+- **Shell injection in setup scripts.** `gstack-settings-hook` interpolated file paths directly into `bun -e` JavaScript blocks. A path with quotes broke the JS string context. Now uses environment variables (`process.env`). Systematic audit confirmed only this script was vulnerable. From @garagon.
+- **Form field credential leak.** Snapshot redaction only applied to `type="password"` fields. Hidden and text fields named `csrf_token`, `api_key`, `session_id` were exposed unredacted in LLM context. Now checks field name and id against sensitive patterns. From @garagon.
+- **Learnings prompt injection.** Three fixes: input validation (type/key/confidence allowlists), injection pattern detection in insight field (blocks "ignore previous instructions" etc.), and cross-project trust gate (only user-stated learnings cross project boundaries). From @Ziadstr.
+- **IPv6 metadata bypass.** The URL constructor normalizes `::ffff:169.254.169.254` to `::ffff:a9fe:a9fe` (hex), which wasn't in the blocklist. Added both hex-encoded forms. From @mehmoodosman.
+- **Session files world-readable.** Design session files in `/tmp` were created with default permissions (0644). Now 0600 (owner-only). From @garagon.
+- **Frozen lockfile in setup.** `bun install` now uses `--frozen-lockfile` to prevent supply chain attacks via floating semver ranges. From @halbert04.
+- **Dockerfile chmod fix.** Removed duplicate recursive `chmod -R 1777 /tmp` (recursive sticky bit on files has no defined behavior). From @Gonzih.
+- **Hardcoded /tmp in cookie import.** `cookie-import-browser` used `/tmp` directly instead of `os.tmpdir()`, breaking Windows support.
+
+### Security
+- Closed 14 security issues (#665-#675, #566, #479, #467, #545) that were fixed in prior waves but still open on GitHub.
+- Closed 17 community security PRs with thank-you messages and commit references.
+- Security wave 3: 12 fixes, 7 contributors. Big thanks to @Hybirdss, @urbantech, @garagon, @Ziadstr, @halbert04, @mehmoodosman, @Gonzih.
+
 ## [0.16.3.0] - 2026-04-09
 
 ### Changed

bin/gstack-learnings-log

@@ -12,19 +12,75 @@ mkdir -p "$GSTACK_HOME/projects/$SLUG"
 
 INPUT="$1"
 
-# Validate: input must be parseable JSON
-if ! printf '%s' "$INPUT" | bun -e "JSON.parse(await Bun.stdin.text())" 2>/dev/null; then
-  echo "gstack-learnings-log: invalid JSON, skipping" >&2
+# Validate and sanitize input
+VALIDATED=$(printf '%s' "$INPUT" | bun -e "
+const raw = await Bun.stdin.text();
+let j;
+try { j = JSON.parse(raw); } catch { process.stderr.write('gstack-learnings-log: invalid JSON, skipping\n'); process.exit(1); }
+
+// Field validation: type must be from allowed list
+const ALLOWED_TYPES = ['pattern', 'pitfall', 'preference', 'architecture', 'tool', 'operational'];
+if (!j.type || !ALLOWED_TYPES.includes(j.type)) {
+  process.stderr.write('gstack-learnings-log: invalid type \"' + (j.type || '') + '\", must be one of: ' + ALLOWED_TYPES.join(', ') + '\n');
+  process.exit(1);
+}
+
+// Field validation: key must be alphanumeric, hyphens, underscores (no injection surface)
+if (!j.key || !/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/.test(j.key)) {
+  process.stderr.write('gstack-learnings-log: invalid key, must be alphanumeric with hyphens/underscores only\n');
+  process.exit(1);
+}
+
+// Field validation: confidence must be 1-10
+const conf = Number(j.confidence);
+if (!Number.isInteger(conf) || conf < 1 || conf > 10) {
+  process.stderr.write('gstack-learnings-log: confidence must be integer 1-10\n');
+  process.exit(1);
+}
+j.confidence = conf;
+
+// Field validation: source must be from allowed list
+const ALLOWED_SOURCES = ['observed', 'user-stated', 'inferred', 'cross-model'];
+if (j.source && !ALLOWED_SOURCES.includes(j.source)) {
+  process.stderr.write('gstack-learnings-log: invalid source, must be one of: ' + ALLOWED_SOURCES.join(', ') + '\n');
+  process.exit(1);
+}
+
+// Content sanitization: strip instruction-like patterns from insight field
+// These patterns could be used for prompt injection when learnings are loaded into agent context
+if (j.insight) {
+  const INJECTION_PATTERNS = [
+    /ignore\s+(all\s+)?previous\s+(instructions|context|rules)/i,
+    /you\s+are\s+now\s+/i,
+    /always\s+output\s+no\s+findings/i,
+    /skip\s+(all\s+)?(security|review|checks)/i,
+    /override[:\s]/i,
+    /\bsystem\s*:/i,
+    /\bassistant\s*:/i,
+    /\buser\s*:/i,
+    /do\s+not\s+(report|flag|mention)/i,
+    /approve\s+(all|every|this)/i,
+  ];
+  for (const pat of INJECTION_PATTERNS) {
+    if (pat.test(j.insight)) {
+      process.stderr.write('gstack-learnings-log: insight contains suspicious instruction-like content, rejected\n');
+      process.exit(1);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+// Inject timestamp if not present
+if (!j.ts) j.ts = new Date().toISOString();
+
+// Mark trust level based on source
+// user-stated = user explicitly told the agent this. All others are AI-generated.
+j.trusted = j.source === 'user-stated';
+
+console.log(JSON.stringify(j));
+" 2>/dev/null)
+
+if [ $? -ne 0 ] || [ -z "$VALIDATED" ]; then
   exit 1
 fi
 
-# Inject timestamp if not present
-if ! printf '%s' "$INPUT" | bun -e "const j=JSON.parse(await Bun.stdin.text()); if(!j.ts) process.exit(1)" 2>/dev/null; then
-  INPUT=$(printf '%s' "$INPUT" | bun -e "
-    const j = JSON.parse(await Bun.stdin.text());
-    j.ts = new Date().toISOString();
-    console.log(JSON.stringify(j));
-  " 2>/dev/null) || true
-fi
-
-echo "$INPUT" >> "$GSTACK_HOME/projects/$SLUG/learnings.jsonl"
+echo "$VALIDATED" >> "$GSTACK_HOME/projects/$SLUG/learnings.jsonl"

bin/gstack-learnings-search

@@ -68,7 +68,13 @@ for (const line of lines) {
 
     // Determine if this is from the current project or cross-project
     // Cross-project entries are tagged for display
-    e._crossProject = !line.includes(slug) && process.env.GSTACK_SEARCH_CROSS === 'true';
+    const isCrossProject = !line.includes(slug) && process.env.GSTACK_SEARCH_CROSS === 'true';
+    e._crossProject = isCrossProject;
+
+    // Trust gate: cross-project learnings only loaded if trusted (user-stated)
+    // This prevents prompt injection from one project's AI-generated learnings
+    // silently influencing reviews in another project.
+    if (isCrossProject && e.trusted === false) continue;
 
     entries.push(e);
   } catch {}

bin/gstack-settings-hook

@@ -26,10 +26,10 @@ fi
 
 case "$ACTION" in
   add)
-    bun -e "
+    GSTACK_SETTINGS_PATH="$SETTINGS_FILE" GSTACK_HOOK_CMD="$HOOK_CMD" bun -e "
       const fs = require('fs');
-      const settingsPath = '$SETTINGS_FILE';
-      const hookCmd = $(printf '%s' "$HOOK_CMD" | bun -e "process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(require('fs').readFileSync('/dev/stdin','utf8')))");
+      const settingsPath = process.env.GSTACK_SETTINGS_PATH;
+      const hookCmd = process.env.GSTACK_HOOK_CMD;
 
       let settings = {};
       try { settings = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(settingsPath, 'utf8')); } catch {}
@@ -55,9 +55,9 @@ case "$ACTION" in
     ;;
   remove)
     [ -f "$SETTINGS_FILE" ] || exit 0
-    bun -e "
+    GSTACK_SETTINGS_PATH="$SETTINGS_FILE" bun -e "
       const fs = require('fs');
-      const settingsPath = '$SETTINGS_FILE';
+      const settingsPath = process.env.GSTACK_SETTINGS_PATH;
 
       let settings = {};
       try { settings = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(settingsPath, 'utf8')); } catch { process.exit(0); }

bin/gstack-team-init

@@ -139,9 +139,9 @@ HOOK_EOF
 
   # Add hook to project-level settings.json
   if command -v bun >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-    bun -e "
+    GSTACK_SETTINGS_PATH="$SETTINGS" bun -e "
       const fs = require('fs');
-      const settingsPath = '$SETTINGS';
+      const settingsPath = process.env.GSTACK_SETTINGS_PATH;
 
       let settings = {};
       try { settings = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(settingsPath, 'utf8')); } catch {}

browse/src/audit.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+/**
+ * Persistent command audit log — forensic trail for all browse server commands.
+ *
+ * Writes append-only JSONL to .gstack/browse-audit.jsonl. Unlike the in-memory
+ * ring buffers (console, network, dialog), the audit log persists across server
+ * restarts and is never truncated by the server. Each entry records:
+ *
+ *   - timestamp, command, args (truncated), page origin
+ *   - duration, status (ok/error), error message if any
+ *   - whether cookies were imported (elevated security context)
+ *   - connection mode (headless/headed)
+ *
+ * All writes are best-effort — audit failures never cause command failures.
+ */
+
+import * as fs from 'fs';
+
+export interface AuditEntry {
+  ts: string;
+  cmd: string;
+  args: string;
+  origin: string;
+  durationMs: number;
+  status: 'ok' | 'error';
+  error?: string;
+  hasCookies: boolean;
+  mode: 'launched' | 'headed';
+}
+
+const MAX_ARGS_LENGTH = 200;
+const MAX_ERROR_LENGTH = 300;
+
+let auditPath: string | null = null;
+
+export function initAuditLog(logPath: string): void {
+  auditPath = logPath;
+}
+
+export function writeAuditEntry(entry: AuditEntry): void {
+  if (!auditPath) return;
+  try {
+    const truncatedArgs = entry.args.length > MAX_ARGS_LENGTH
+      ? entry.args.slice(0, MAX_ARGS_LENGTH) + '…'
+      : entry.args;
+    const truncatedError = entry.error && entry.error.length > MAX_ERROR_LENGTH
+      ? entry.error.slice(0, MAX_ERROR_LENGTH) + '…'
+      : entry.error;
+
+    const record: Record<string, unknown> = {
+      ts: entry.ts,
+      cmd: entry.cmd,
+      args: truncatedArgs,
+      origin: entry.origin,
+      durationMs: entry.durationMs,
+      status: entry.status,
+      hasCookies: entry.hasCookies,
+      mode: entry.mode,
+    };
+    if (truncatedError) record.error = truncatedError;
+
+    fs.appendFileSync(auditPath, JSON.stringify(record) + '\n');
+  } catch {
+    // Audit write failures are silent — never block command execution
+  }
+}

browse/src/browser-manager.ts

@@ -55,6 +55,9 @@ export class BrowserManager {
   private dialogAutoAccept: boolean = true;
   private dialogPromptText: string | null = null;
 
+  // ─── Cookie Origin Tracking ────────────────────────────────
+  private cookieImportedDomains: Set<string> = new Set();
+
   // ─── Handoff State ─────────────────────────────────────────
   private isHeaded: boolean = false;
   private consecutiveFailures: number = 0;
@@ -749,6 +752,19 @@ export class BrowserManager {
     return this.dialogPromptText;
   }
 
+  // ─── Cookie Origin Tracking ────────────────────────────────
+  trackCookieImportDomains(domains: string[]): void {
+    for (const d of domains) this.cookieImportedDomains.add(d);
+  }
+
+  getCookieImportedDomains(): ReadonlySet<string> {
+    return this.cookieImportedDomains;
+  }
+
+  hasCookieImports(): boolean {
+    return this.cookieImportedDomains.size > 0;
+  }
+
   // ─── Viewport ──────────────────────────────────────────────
   async setViewport(width: number, height: number) {
     await this.getPage().setViewportSize({ width, height });

browse/src/config.ts

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ export interface BrowseConfig {
   consoleLog: string;
   networkLog: string;
   dialogLog: string;
+  auditLog: string;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -70,6 +71,7 @@ export function resolveConfig(
     consoleLog: path.join(stateDir, 'browse-console.log'),
     networkLog: path.join(stateDir, 'browse-network.log'),
     dialogLog: path.join(stateDir, 'browse-dialog.log'),
+    auditLog: path.join(stateDir, 'browse-audit.jsonl'),
   };
 }
 

browse/src/cookie-import-browser.ts

@@ -386,7 +386,8 @@ function openDb(dbPath: string, browserName: string): Database {
 }
 
 function openDbFromCopy(dbPath: string, browserName: string): Database {
-  const tmpPath = `/tmp/browse-cookies-${browserName.toLowerCase()}-${crypto.randomUUID()}.db`;
+  // Use os.tmpdir() instead of hardcoded /tmp for cross-platform support (#708)
+  const tmpPath = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `browse-cookies-${browserName.toLowerCase()}-${crypto.randomUUID()}.db`);
   try {
     fs.copyFileSync(dbPath, tmpPath);
     // Also copy WAL and SHM if they exist (for consistent reads)

browse/src/path-security.ts

@@ -33,7 +33,26 @@ const TEMP_ONLY = [TEMP_DIR].map(d => {
 export function validateOutputPath(filePath: string): void {
   const resolved = path.resolve(filePath);
 
-  // Resolve real path of the parent directory to catch symlinks.
+  // If the target already exists and is a symlink, resolve through it.
+  // Without this, a symlink at /tmp/evil.png → /etc/crontab passes the
+  // parent-directory check (parent is /tmp, which is safe) but the actual
+  // write follows the symlink to /etc/crontab.
+  try {
+    const stat = fs.lstatSync(resolved);
+    if (stat.isSymbolicLink()) {
+      const realTarget = fs.realpathSync(resolved);
+      const isSafe = SAFE_DIRECTORIES.some(dir => isPathWithin(realTarget, dir));
+      if (!isSafe) {
+        throw new Error(`Path must be within: ${SAFE_DIRECTORIES.join(', ')}`);
+      }
+      return; // symlink target verified, no need to check parent
+    }
+  } catch (e: any) {
+    // ENOENT = file doesn't exist yet, fall through to parent-dir check
+    if (e.code !== 'ENOENT') throw e;
+  }
+
+  // For new files (no existing symlink), verify the parent directory.
   // The file itself may not exist yet (e.g., screenshot output).
   // This also handles macOS /tmp → /private/tmp transparently.
   let dir = path.dirname(resolved);

browse/src/read-commands.ts

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
  */
 
 import type { TabSession } from './tab-session';
+import type { BrowserManager } from './browser-manager';
 import { consoleBuffer, networkBuffer, dialogBuffer } from './buffers';
 import type { Page, Frame } from 'playwright';
 import * as fs from 'fs';
@@ -62,10 +63,43 @@ export async function getCleanText(page: Page | Frame): Promise<string> {
   });
 }
 
+/**
+ * When cookies have been imported for specific domains, block JS execution
+ * on pages whose origin doesn't match any imported cookie domain.
+ * Prevents cross-origin cookie exfiltration via `js document.cookie` or
+ * similar when the agent navigates to an untrusted page.
+ */
+function assertJsOriginAllowed(bm: BrowserManager, pageUrl: string): void {
+  if (!bm.hasCookieImports()) return;
+
+  let hostname: string;
+  try {
+    hostname = new URL(pageUrl).hostname;
+  } catch {
+    return; // about:blank, data: URIs — allow (no cookies at risk)
+  }
+
+  const importedDomains = bm.getCookieImportedDomains();
+  const allowed = [...importedDomains].some(domain => {
+    // Exact match or subdomain match (e.g., ".github.com" matches "api.github.com")
+    const normalized = domain.startsWith('.') ? domain : '.' + domain;
+    return hostname === domain.replace(/^\./, '') || hostname.endsWith(normalized);
+  });
+
+  if (!allowed) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `JS execution blocked: current page (${hostname}) does not match any cookie-imported domain. ` +
+      `Imported cookies for: ${[...importedDomains].join(', ')}. ` +
+      `This prevents cross-origin cookie exfiltration. Navigate to an imported domain or run without imported cookies.`
+    );
+  }
+}
+
 export async function handleReadCommand(
   command: string,
   args: string[],
-  session: TabSession
+  session: TabSession,
+  bm?: BrowserManager,
 ): Promise<string> {
   const page = session.getPage();
   // Frame-aware target for content extraction
@@ -116,7 +150,10 @@ export async function handleReadCommand(
               id: input.id || undefined,
               placeholder: input.placeholder || undefined,
               required: input.required || undefined,
-              value: input.type === 'password' ? '[redacted]' : (input.value || undefined),
+              value: input.type === 'password'
+                || (input.name && /(^|[_.-])(token|secret|key|password|credential|auth|jwt|session|csrf|sid)($|[_.-])|api.?key/i.test(input.name))
+                || (input.id && /(^|[_.-])(token|secret|key|password|credential|auth|jwt|session|csrf|sid)($|[_.-])|api.?key/i.test(input.id))
+                ? '[redacted]' : (input.value || undefined),
               options: el.tagName === 'SELECT'
                 ? [...(el as HTMLSelectElement).options].map(o => ({ value: o.value, text: o.text }))
                 : undefined,
@@ -142,6 +179,7 @@ export async function handleReadCommand(
     case 'js': {
       const expr = args[0];
       if (!expr) throw new Error('Usage: browse js <expression>');
+      if (bm) assertJsOriginAllowed(bm, page.url());
       const wrapped = wrapForEvaluate(expr);
       const result = await target.evaluate(wrapped);
       return typeof result === 'object' ? JSON.stringify(result, null, 2) : String(result ?? '');
@@ -150,6 +188,7 @@ export async function handleReadCommand(
     case 'eval': {
       const filePath = args[0];
       if (!filePath) throw new Error('Usage: browse eval <js-file>');
+      if (bm) assertJsOriginAllowed(bm, page.url());
       validateReadPath(filePath);
       if (!fs.existsSync(filePath)) throw new Error(`File not found: ${filePath}`);
       const code = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf-8');

browse/src/server.ts

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ import {
 import { validateTempPath } from './path-security';
 import { resolveConfig, ensureStateDir, readVersionHash } from './config';
 import { emitActivity, subscribe, getActivityAfter, getActivityHistory, getSubscriberCount } from './activity';
+import { initAuditLog, writeAuditEntry } from './audit';
 import { inspectElement, modifyStyle, resetModifications, getModificationHistory, detachSession, type InspectorResult } from './cdp-inspector';
 // Bun.spawn used instead of child_process.spawn (compiled bun binaries
 // fail posix_spawn on all executables including /bin/bash)
@@ -47,6 +48,7 @@ import * as crypto from 'crypto';
 // ─── Config ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 const config = resolveConfig();
 ensureStateDir(config);
+initAuditLog(config.auditLog);
 
 // ─── Auth ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 const AUTH_TOKEN = crypto.randomUUID();
@@ -1013,7 +1015,7 @@ async function handleCommandInternal(
           await cleanupHiddenMarkers(page);
         }
       } else {
-        result = await handleReadCommand(command, args, session);
+        result = await handleReadCommand(command, args, session, browserManager);
       }
     } else if (WRITE_COMMANDS.has(command)) {
       result = await handleWriteCommand(command, args, session, browserManager);
@@ -1088,13 +1090,14 @@ async function handleCommandInternal(
     }
 
     // Activity: emit command_end (skipped for chain subcommands)
+    const successDuration = Date.now() - startTime;
     if (!opts?.skipActivity) {
       emitActivity({
         type: 'command_end',
         command,
         args,
         url: browserManager.getCurrentUrl(),
-        duration: Date.now() - startTime,
+        duration: successDuration,
         status: 'ok',
         result: result,
         tabs: browserManager.getTabCount(),
@@ -1103,6 +1106,17 @@ async function handleCommandInternal(
       });
     }
 
+    writeAuditEntry({
+      ts: new Date().toISOString(),
+      cmd: command,
+      args: args.join(' '),
+      origin: browserManager.getCurrentUrl(),
+      durationMs: successDuration,
+      status: 'ok',
+      hasCookies: browserManager.hasCookieImports(),
+      mode: browserManager.getConnectionMode(),
+    });
+
     browserManager.resetFailures();
     // Restore original active tab if we pinned to a specific one
     if (savedTabId !== null) {
@@ -1120,13 +1134,14 @@ async function handleCommandInternal(
     }
 
     // Activity: emit command_end (error) — skipped for chain subcommands
+    const errorDuration = Date.now() - startTime;
     if (!opts?.skipActivity) {
       emitActivity({
         type: 'command_end',
         command,
         args,
         url: browserManager.getCurrentUrl(),
-        duration: Date.now() - startTime,
+        duration: errorDuration,
         status: 'error',
         error: err.message,
         tabs: browserManager.getTabCount(),
@@ -1135,6 +1150,18 @@ async function handleCommandInternal(
       });
     }
 
+    writeAuditEntry({
+      ts: new Date().toISOString(),
+      cmd: command,
+      args: args.join(' '),
+      origin: browserManager.getCurrentUrl(),
+      durationMs: errorDuration,
+      status: 'error',
+      error: err.message,
+      hasCookies: browserManager.hasCookieImports(),
+      mode: browserManager.getConnectionMode(),
+    });
+
     browserManager.incrementFailures();
     let errorMsg = wrapError(err);
     const hint = browserManager.getFailureHint();

browse/src/url-validation.ts

@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ export const BLOCKED_METADATA_HOSTS = new Set([
   '169.254.169.254',  // AWS/GCP/Azure instance metadata
   'fe80::1',          // IPv6 link-local — common metadata endpoint alias
   '::ffff:169.254.169.254', // IPv4-mapped IPv6 form of the metadata IP
+  '::ffff:a9fe:a9fe', // Hex-encoded IPv4-mapped form (URL constructor normalizes to this)
+  '::a9fe:a9fe',      // Deprecated IPv4-compatible hex form
   'metadata.google.internal', // GCP metadata
   'metadata.azure.internal',  // Azure IMDS
 ]);

browse/src/write-commands.ts

@@ -13,7 +13,8 @@ import { validateNavigationUrl } from './url-validation';
 import { validateOutputPath } from './path-security';
 import * as fs from 'fs';
 import * as path from 'path';
-import { TEMP_DIR } from './platform';
+import { TEMP_DIR, isPathWithin } from './platform';
+import { SAFE_DIRECTORIES } from './path-security';
 import { modifyStyle, undoModification, resetModifications, getModificationHistory } from './cdp-inspector';
 
 /**
@@ -441,16 +442,17 @@ export async function handleWriteCommand(
     case 'cookie-import': {
       const filePath = args[0];
       if (!filePath) throw new Error('Usage: browse cookie-import <json-file>');
-      // Path validation — prevent reading arbitrary files
-      if (path.isAbsolute(filePath)) {
-        const safeDirs = [TEMP_DIR, process.cwd()];
-        const resolved = path.resolve(filePath);
-        if (!safeDirs.some(dir => isPathWithin(resolved, dir))) {
-          throw new Error(`Path must be within: ${safeDirs.join(', ')}`);
-        }
+      // Path validation — resolve to absolute and check against safe dirs.
+      // Fixes #707: relative paths previously bypassed the safe directory check.
+      // Mirrors validateOutputPath() — resolves symlinks (e.g., macOS /tmp → /private/tmp).
+      const resolved = path.resolve(filePath);
+      let resolvedReal = resolved;
+      try { resolvedReal = fs.realpathSync(resolved); } catch {
+        // File may not exist yet — resolve parent dir instead
+        try { resolvedReal = path.join(fs.realpathSync(path.dirname(resolved)), path.basename(resolved)); } catch {}
       }
-      if (path.normalize(filePath).includes('..')) {
-        throw new Error('Path traversal sequences (..) are not allowed');
+      if (!SAFE_DIRECTORIES.some(dir => isPathWithin(resolvedReal, dir))) {
+        throw new Error(`Path must be within: ${SAFE_DIRECTORIES.join(', ')}`);
       }
       if (!fs.existsSync(filePath)) throw new Error(`File not found: ${filePath}`);
       const raw = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf-8');
@@ -476,20 +478,24 @@ export async function handleWriteCommand(
       }
 
       await page.context().addCookies(cookies);
+      const importedDomains = [...new Set(cookies.map((c: any) => c.domain).filter(Boolean))];
+      if (importedDomains.length > 0) bm.trackCookieImportDomains(importedDomains);
       return `Loaded ${cookies.length} cookies from ${filePath}`;
     }
 
     case 'cookie-import-browser': {
       // Two modes:
       // 1. Direct CLI import: cookie-import-browser <browser> --domain <domain> [--profile <profile>]
-      // 2. Open picker UI: cookie-import-browser [browser]
+      //    Requires --domain (or --all to explicitly import everything).
+      // 2. Open picker UI: cookie-import-browser [browser] (interactive domain selection)
       const browserArg = args[0];
       const domainIdx = args.indexOf('--domain');
       const profileIdx = args.indexOf('--profile');
+      const hasAll = args.includes('--all');
       const profile = (profileIdx !== -1 && profileIdx + 1 < args.length) ? args[profileIdx + 1] : 'Default';
 
       if (domainIdx !== -1 && domainIdx + 1 < args.length) {
-        // Direct import mode — no UI
+        // Direct import mode — scoped to specific domain
         const domain = args[domainIdx + 1];
         // Validate --domain against current page hostname to prevent cross-site cookie injection
         const pageHostname = new URL(page.url()).hostname;
@@ -501,13 +507,35 @@ export async function handleWriteCommand(
         const result = await importCookies(browser, [domain], profile);
         if (result.cookies.length > 0) {
           await page.context().addCookies(result.cookies);
+          bm.trackCookieImportDomains([domain]);
         }
         const msg = [`Imported ${result.count} cookies for ${domain} from ${browser}`];
         if (result.failed > 0) msg.push(`(${result.failed} failed to decrypt)`);
         return msg.join(' ');
       }
 
-      // Picker UI mode — open in user's browser
+      if (hasAll) {
+        // Explicit all-cookies import — requires --all flag as a deliberate opt-in.
+        // Imports every non-expired cookie domain from the browser.
+        const browser = browserArg || 'comet';
+        const { listDomains } = await import('./cookie-import-browser');
+        const { domains } = listDomains(browser, profile);
+        const allDomainNames = domains.map((d: any) => d.domain);
+        if (allDomainNames.length === 0) {
+          return `No cookies found in ${browser} (profile: ${profile})`;
+        }
+        const result = await importCookies(browser, allDomainNames, profile);
+        if (result.cookies.length > 0) {
+          await page.context().addCookies(result.cookies);
+          bm.trackCookieImportDomains(allDomainNames);
+        }
+        const msg = [`Imported ${result.count} cookies across ${Object.keys(result.domainCounts).length} domains from ${browser}`];
+        msg.push('(used --all: all browser cookies imported, consider --domain for tighter scoping)');
+        if (result.failed > 0) msg.push(`(${result.failed} failed to decrypt)`);
+        return msg.join(' ');
+      }
+
+      // Picker UI mode — open in user's browser for interactive domain selection
       const port = bm.serverPort;
       if (!port) throw new Error('Server port not available');
 
@@ -525,7 +553,7 @@ export async function handleWriteCommand(
         if (err?.code !== 'ENOENT' && !err?.message?.includes('spawn')) throw err;
       }
 
-      return `Cookie picker opened at http://127.0.0.1:${port}/cookie-picker\nDetected browsers: ${browsers.map(b => b.name).join(', ')}\nSelect domains to import, then close the picker when done.`;
+      return `Cookie picker opened at http://127.0.0.1:${port}/cookie-picker\nDetected browsers: ${browsers.map(b => b.name).join(', ')}\nSelect domains to import, then close the picker when done.\n\nTip: For scripted imports, use --domain <domain> to scope cookies to a single domain.`;
     }
 
     case 'style': {

browse/test/commands.test.ts

@@ -1811,7 +1811,8 @@ describe('Path traversal prevention', () => {
       await handleWriteCommand('cookie-import', ['../../etc/shadow'], bm);
       expect(true).toBe(false);
     } catch (err: any) {
-      expect(err.message).toContain('Path traversal');
+      // Traversal blocked by safe-directory check (#707) or explicit .. check
+      expect(err.message).toMatch(/Path must be within|Path traversal/);
     }
   });
 

design/src/session.ts

@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ export function createSession(
     updatedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
   };
 
-  fs.writeFileSync(sessionPath(id), JSON.stringify(session, null, 2));
+  fs.writeFileSync(sessionPath(id), JSON.stringify(session, null, 2), { mode: 0o600 });
   return session;
 }
 

setup

@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ if [ "$NEEDS_BUILD" -eq 1 ]; then
   log "Building browse binary..."
   (
     cd "$SOURCE_GSTACK_DIR"
-    bun install
+    bun install --frozen-lockfile 2>/dev/null || bun install
     bun run build
   )
   # Safety net: write .version if build script didn't (e.g., git not available during build)