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feat(server): add pty-session-cookie module for the Terminal tab
Mirrors `sse-session-cookie.ts` exactly. Mints short-lived 30-min HttpOnly cookies for authenticating the Terminal-tab WebSocket upgrade against the terminal-agent. Same TTL, same opportunistic-pruning shape, same "scoped tokens never valid as root" invariant. Two registries instead of one because the cookie names are different (`gstack_sse` vs `gstack_pty`) and the token spaces must not overlap. No callers yet — wired up in the next commit.
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/**
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* Session cookie registry for the Terminal sidebar tab's PTY WebSocket.
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*
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* Why this exists: WebSocket clients in browsers cannot send Authorization
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* headers on the upgrade request. The terminal-agent's /ws upgrade therefore
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* authenticates via cookie. We never put the PTY token in /health (codex
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* outside-voice finding #2: /health already leaks AUTH_TOKEN to any
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* localhost caller in headed mode; reusing that path for shell access would
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* widen an existing bug). Instead, the extension does an authenticated
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* POST /pty-session with the bootstrap AUTH_TOKEN; the server mints a
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* short-lived cookie scoped to this terminal session and pushes it to the
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* agent via loopback. The browser then carries the cookie automatically on
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* the WS upgrade.
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*
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* Design mirrors `sse-session-cookie.ts` deliberately. Same TTL, same
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* scoped-token-must-not-be-valid-as-root invariant, same opportunistic
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* pruning. Two registries instead of one because the cookie names are
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* different (`gstack_sse` vs `gstack_pty`) and the token spaces must not
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* overlap — an SSE-read cookie must never grant PTY access, and vice versa.
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*/
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import * as crypto from 'crypto';
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interface Session {
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createdAt: number;
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expiresAt: number;
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}
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const TTL_MS = 30 * 60 * 1000; // 30 minutes — matches SSE cookie
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const MAX_SESSIONS = 10_000;
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const sessions = new Map<string, Session>();
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export const PTY_COOKIE_NAME = 'gstack_pty';
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/** Mint a fresh PTY session token. */
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export function mintPtySessionToken(): { token: string; expiresAt: number } {
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const token = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('base64url');
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const now = Date.now();
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const expiresAt = now + TTL_MS;
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sessions.set(token, { createdAt: now, expiresAt });
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pruneExpired(now);
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return { token, expiresAt };
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}
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/**
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* Validate a token. Returns true only if the token exists AND is not expired.
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* Lazily removes expired entries; opportunistically prunes a few more on
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* every call so the registry stays bounded under reconnect pressure.
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*/
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export function validatePtySessionToken(token: string | null | undefined): boolean {
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if (!token) return false;
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const s = sessions.get(token);
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if (!s) {
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pruneExpired(Date.now());
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return false;
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}
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if (Date.now() > s.expiresAt) {
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sessions.delete(token);
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pruneExpired(Date.now());
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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/**
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* Drop a session token (called on WS close so a leaked cookie can't be
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* replayed against a new PTY).
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*/
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export function revokePtySessionToken(token: string | null | undefined): void {
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if (!token) return;
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sessions.delete(token);
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}
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/** Parse the PTY session token from a Cookie header. */
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export function extractPtyCookie(req: Request): string | null {
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const cookieHeader = req.headers.get('cookie');
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if (!cookieHeader) return null;
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for (const part of cookieHeader.split(';')) {
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const [name, ...valueParts] = part.trim().split('=');
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if (name === PTY_COOKIE_NAME) {
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return valueParts.join('=') || null;
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}
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}
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return null;
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}
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/**
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* Build the Set-Cookie header value for the PTY session cookie.
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* - HttpOnly: not readable from JS (mitigates XSS exfiltration).
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* - SameSite=Strict: not sent on cross-site requests (mitigates CSWSH).
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* - Path=/: scope to whole origin so /ws and /pty-session both see it.
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* - Max-Age matches the TTL.
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*
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* Secure is intentionally omitted: the daemon binds to 127.0.0.1 over plain
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* HTTP; setting Secure would prevent the browser from ever sending it back.
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*/
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export function buildPtySetCookie(token: string): string {
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const maxAge = Math.floor(TTL_MS / 1000);
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return `${PTY_COOKIE_NAME}=${token}; HttpOnly; SameSite=Strict; Path=/; Max-Age=${maxAge}`;
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}
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/** Clear the PTY session cookie. */
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export function buildPtyClearCookie(): string {
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return `${PTY_COOKIE_NAME}=; HttpOnly; SameSite=Strict; Path=/; Max-Age=0`;
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}
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function pruneExpired(now: number): void {
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let checked = 0;
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for (const [token, session] of sessions) {
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if (checked++ >= 20) break;
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if (session.expiresAt <= now) sessions.delete(token);
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}
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while (sessions.size > MAX_SESSIONS) {
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const first = sessions.keys().next().value;
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if (!first) break;
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sessions.delete(first);
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}
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}
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// Test-only reset.
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export function __resetPtySessions(): void {
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sessions.clear();
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}
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