Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into garrytan/e2e-test-triage

# Conflicts:
#	CHANGELOG.md
This commit is contained in:
Garry Tan
2026-03-24 15:16:48 -07:00
6 changed files with 135 additions and 76 deletions
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@@ -15,3 +15,4 @@ bun.lock
.env.local
.env.*
!.env.example
supabase/.temp/
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@@ -1,5 +1,12 @@
# Changelog
## [0.11.16.1] - 2026-03-24 — Installation ID Privacy Fix
### Fixed
- **Installation IDs are now random UUIDs instead of hostname hashes.** The old `SHA-256(hostname+username)` approach meant anyone who knew your machine identity could compute your installation ID. Now uses a random UUID stored in `~/.gstack/installation-id` — not derivable from any public input, rotatable by deleting the file.
- **RLS verification script handles edge cases.** `verify-rls.sh` now correctly treats INSERT success as expected (kept for old client compat), handles 409 conflicts and 204 no-ops.
## [0.11.16.0] - 2026-03-24 — Smarter CI + Telemetry Security
### Changed
+1 -1
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@@ -1 +1 @@
0.11.16.0
0.11.16.1
+20 -9
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@@ -106,18 +106,29 @@ if [ -d "$STATE_DIR/sessions" ]; then
fi
# Generate installation_id for community tier
# Uses a random UUID stored locally — not derived from hostname/user so it
# can't be guessed or correlated by someone who knows your machine identity.
INSTALL_ID=""
if [ "$TIER" = "community" ]; then
HOST="$(hostname 2>/dev/null || echo "unknown")"
USER="$(whoami 2>/dev/null || echo "unknown")"
if command -v shasum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
INSTALL_ID="$(printf '%s-%s' "$HOST" "$USER" | shasum -a 256 | awk '{print $1}')"
elif command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
INSTALL_ID="$(printf '%s-%s' "$HOST" "$USER" | sha256sum | awk '{print $1}')"
elif command -v openssl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
INSTALL_ID="$(printf '%s-%s' "$HOST" "$USER" | openssl dgst -sha256 | awk '{print $NF}')"
ID_FILE="$HOME/.gstack/installation-id"
if [ -f "$ID_FILE" ]; then
INSTALL_ID="$(cat "$ID_FILE" 2>/dev/null)"
fi
if [ -z "$INSTALL_ID" ]; then
# Generate a random UUID v4
if command -v uuidgen >/dev/null 2>&1; then
INSTALL_ID="$(uuidgen | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')"
elif [ -r /proc/sys/kernel/random/uuid ]; then
INSTALL_ID="$(cat /proc/sys/kernel/random/uuid)"
else
# Fallback: random hex from /dev/urandom
INSTALL_ID="$(od -An -tx1 -N16 /dev/urandom 2>/dev/null | tr -d ' \n')"
fi
if [ -n "$INSTALL_ID" ]; then
mkdir -p "$(dirname "$ID_FILE")" 2>/dev/null
printf '%s' "$INSTALL_ID" > "$ID_FILE" 2>/dev/null
fi
fi
# If no SHA-256 command available, install_id stays empty
fi
# Local-only fields (never sent remotely)
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@@ -1,10 +1,13 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# verify-rls.sh — smoke test that anon key is locked out after 002_tighten_rls.sql
# verify-rls.sh — smoke test after deploying 002_tighten_rls.sql
#
# Verifies:
# - SELECT denied on all tables and views (security fix)
# - UPDATE denied on installations (security fix)
# - INSERT still allowed on tables (kept for old client compat)
#
# Run manually after deploying the migration:
# bash supabase/verify-rls.sh
#
# All 9 checks should PASS (anon key denied for reads AND writes).
set -uo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
@@ -14,90 +17,127 @@ URL="$GSTACK_SUPABASE_URL"
KEY="$GSTACK_SUPABASE_ANON_KEY"
PASS=0
FAIL=0
TOTAL=0
# check <description> <expected> <method> <path> [data]
# expected: "deny" (want 401/403) or "allow" (want 200/201)
check() {
local desc="$1"
local method="$2"
local path="$3"
local data="${4:-}"
local expected="$2"
local method="$3"
local path="$4"
local data="${5:-}"
TOTAL=$(( TOTAL + 1 ))
local args=(-sf -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --max-time 10
-H "apikey: ${KEY}"
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${KEY}"
-H "Content-Type: application/json")
local resp_file
resp_file="$(mktemp 2>/dev/null || echo "/tmp/verify-rls-$$-$TOTAL")"
local http_code
if [ "$method" = "GET" ]; then
HTTP="$(curl "${args[@]}" "${URL}/rest/v1/${path}" 2>/dev/null || echo "000")"
http_code="$(curl -s -o "$resp_file" -w '%{http_code}' --max-time 10 \
"${URL}/rest/v1/${path}" \
-H "apikey: ${KEY}" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${KEY}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" 2>/dev/null)" || http_code="000"
elif [ "$method" = "POST" ]; then
HTTP="$(curl "${args[@]}" -X POST "${URL}/rest/v1/${path}" -H "Prefer: return=minimal" -d "$data" 2>/dev/null || echo "000")"
http_code="$(curl -s -o "$resp_file" -w '%{http_code}' --max-time 10 \
-X POST "${URL}/rest/v1/${path}" \
-H "apikey: ${KEY}" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${KEY}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Prefer: return=minimal" \
-d "$data" 2>/dev/null)" || http_code="000"
elif [ "$method" = "PATCH" ]; then
HTTP="$(curl "${args[@]}" -X PATCH "${URL}/rest/v1/${path}" -d "$data" 2>/dev/null || echo "000")"
http_code="$(curl -s -o "$resp_file" -w '%{http_code}' --max-time 10 \
-X PATCH "${URL}/rest/v1/${path}" \
-H "apikey: ${KEY}" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${KEY}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "$data" 2>/dev/null)" || http_code="000"
fi
# Only 401/403 prove RLS denial. 200 (even empty) means access is granted.
# 5xx means something errored but access wasn't denied by policy.
case "$HTTP" in
401|403)
echo " PASS $desc (HTTP $HTTP, denied by RLS)"
PASS=$(( PASS + 1 ))
;;
200)
# 200 means the request was accepted — check if data was returned
if [ "$method" = "GET" ]; then
BODY="$(curl -sf --max-time 10 "${URL}/rest/v1/${path}" -H "apikey: ${KEY}" -H "Authorization: Bearer ${KEY}" -H "Content-Type: application/json" 2>/dev/null || echo "")"
if [ "$BODY" = "[]" ] || [ -z "$BODY" ]; then
echo " WARN $desc (HTTP $HTTP, empty — may be RLS or empty table, verify manually)"
FAIL=$(( FAIL + 1 ))
# Trim to last 3 chars (the HTTP code) in case of concatenation
http_code="$(echo "$http_code" | grep -oE '[0-9]{3}$' || echo "000")"
if [ "$expected" = "deny" ]; then
case "$http_code" in
401|403)
echo " PASS $desc (HTTP $http_code, denied)"
PASS=$(( PASS + 1 )) ;;
200|204)
# For GETs: 200+empty means RLS filtering (pass). 200+data means leak (fail).
# For PATCH: 204 means no rows matched — could be RLS or missing row.
if [ "$method" = "GET" ]; then
body="$(cat "$resp_file" 2>/dev/null || echo "")"
if [ "$body" = "[]" ] || [ -z "$body" ]; then
echo " PASS $desc (HTTP $http_code, empty — RLS filtering)"
PASS=$(( PASS + 1 ))
else
echo " FAIL $desc (HTTP $http_code, got data!)"
FAIL=$(( FAIL + 1 ))
fi
else
echo " FAIL $desc (HTTP $HTTP, got data)"
FAIL=$(( FAIL + 1 ))
fi
else
echo " FAIL $desc (HTTP $HTTP, write accepted)"
FAIL=$(( FAIL + 1 ))
fi
;;
201)
echo " FAIL $desc (HTTP $HTTP, write succeeded!)"
FAIL=$(( FAIL + 1 ))
;;
000)
echo " WARN $desc (connection failed)"
FAIL=$(( FAIL + 1 ))
;;
*)
# 404, 406, 500, etc. — access not definitively denied by RLS
echo " WARN $desc (HTTP $HTTP — not a clean RLS denial)"
FAIL=$(( FAIL + 1 ))
;;
esac
# PATCH 204 = no rows affected. RLS blocked the update or row doesn't exist.
# Either way, the attacker can't modify data.
echo " PASS $desc (HTTP $http_code, no rows affected)"
PASS=$(( PASS + 1 ))
fi ;;
000)
echo " WARN $desc (connection failed)"
FAIL=$(( FAIL + 1 )) ;;
*)
echo " WARN $desc (HTTP $http_code — unexpected)"
FAIL=$(( FAIL + 1 )) ;;
esac
elif [ "$expected" = "allow" ]; then
case "$http_code" in
200|201|204|409)
# 409 = conflict (duplicate key) — INSERT policy works, row already exists
echo " PASS $desc (HTTP $http_code, allowed as expected)"
PASS=$(( PASS + 1 )) ;;
401|403)
echo " FAIL $desc (HTTP $http_code, denied — should be allowed)"
FAIL=$(( FAIL + 1 )) ;;
000)
echo " WARN $desc (connection failed)"
FAIL=$(( FAIL + 1 )) ;;
*)
echo " WARN $desc (HTTP $http_code — unexpected)"
FAIL=$(( FAIL + 1 )) ;;
esac
fi
rm -f "$resp_file" 2>/dev/null || true
}
echo "RLS Lockdown Verification"
echo "RLS Verification (after 002_tighten_rls.sql)"
echo "━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━"
echo ""
echo "Read denial checks:"
check "SELECT telemetry_events" GET "telemetry_events?select=*&limit=1"
check "SELECT installations" GET "installations?select=*&limit=1"
check "SELECT update_checks" GET "update_checks?select=*&limit=1"
check "SELECT crash_clusters" GET "crash_clusters?select=*&limit=1"
check "SELECT skill_sequences" GET "skill_sequences?select=skill_a&limit=1"
echo "Read denial (should be blocked):"
check "SELECT telemetry_events" deny GET "telemetry_events?select=*&limit=1"
check "SELECT installations" deny GET "installations?select=*&limit=1"
check "SELECT update_checks" deny GET "update_checks?select=*&limit=1"
check "SELECT crash_clusters" deny GET "crash_clusters?select=*&limit=1"
check "SELECT skill_sequences" deny GET "skill_sequences?select=skill_a&limit=1"
echo ""
echo "Write denial checks:"
check "INSERT telemetry_events" POST "telemetry_events" '{"gstack_version":"test","os":"test","event_timestamp":"2026-01-01T00:00:00Z","outcome":"test"}'
check "INSERT update_checks" POST "update_checks" '{"gstack_version":"test","os":"test"}'
check "INSERT installations" POST "installations" '{"installation_id":"test_verify_rls"}'
check "UPDATE installations" PATCH "installations?installation_id=eq.test_verify_rls" '{"gstack_version":"hacked"}'
echo "Update denial (should be blocked):"
check "UPDATE installations" deny PATCH "installations?installation_id=eq.test_verify_rls" '{"gstack_version":"hacked"}'
echo ""
echo "Insert allowed (kept for old client compat):"
check "INSERT telemetry_events" allow POST "telemetry_events" '{"gstack_version":"verify_rls_test","os":"test","event_timestamp":"2026-01-01T00:00:00Z","outcome":"test"}'
check "INSERT update_checks" allow POST "update_checks" '{"gstack_version":"verify_rls_test","os":"test"}'
check "INSERT installations" allow POST "installations" '{"installation_id":"verify_rls_test"}'
echo ""
echo "━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━"
echo "Results: $PASS passed, $FAIL failed (of 9 checks)"
echo "Results: $PASS passed, $FAIL failed (of $TOTAL checks)"
if [ "$FAIL" -gt 0 ]; then
echo "VERDICT: FAIL — anon key still has access"
echo "VERDICT: FAIL"
exit 1
else
echo "VERDICT: PASS — anon key fully locked out"
echo "VERDICT: PASS — reads/updates blocked, inserts allowed"
exit 0
fi
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@@ -78,8 +78,8 @@ describe('gstack-telemetry-log', () => {
const events = parseJsonl();
expect(events).toHaveLength(1);
// installation_id should be a SHA-256 hash (64 hex chars)
expect(events[0].installation_id).toMatch(/^[a-f0-9]{64}$/);
// installation_id should be a UUID v4 (or hex fallback)
expect(events[0].installation_id).toMatch(/^[a-f0-9-]{32,36}$/);
});
test('installation_id is null for anonymous tier', () => {