Files
gstack/bin/gstack-learnings-search
Garry Tan 7e96fe299b fix: security wave 3 — 12 fixes, 7 contributors (v0.16.4.0) (#988)
* fix(security): validateOutputPath symlink bypass — check file-level symlinks

validateOutputPath() previously only resolved symlinks on the parent directory.
A symlink at /tmp/evil.png → /etc/crontab passed the parent check (parent is
/tmp, which is safe) but the write followed the symlink outside safe dirs.

Add lstatSync() check: if the target file exists and is a symlink, resolve
through it and verify the real target is within SAFE_DIRECTORIES. ENOENT
(file doesn't exist yet) falls through to the existing parent-dir check.

Closes #921

Co-Authored-By: Yunsu <Hybirdss@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): shell injection in bin/ scripts — use env vars instead of interpolation

gstack-settings-hook interpolated $SETTINGS_FILE directly into bun -e
double-quoted blocks. A path containing quotes or backticks breaks the JS
string context, enabling arbitrary code execution.

Replace direct interpolation with environment variables (process.env).
Same fix applied to gstack-team-init which had the same pattern.

Systematic audit confirmed only these two scripts were vulnerable — all
other bin/ scripts already use stdin piping or env vars.

Closes #858

Co-Authored-By: Gus <garagon@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): cookie-import path validation bypass + hardcoded /tmp

Two fixes:
1. cookie-import relative path bypass (#707): path.isAbsolute() gated the
   entire validation, so relative paths like "sensitive-file.json" bypassed
   the safe-directory check entirely. Now always resolves to absolute path
   with realpathSync for symlink resolution, matching validateOutputPath().

2. Hardcoded /tmp in cookie-import-browser (#708): openDbFromCopy used
   /tmp directly instead of os.tmpdir(), breaking Windows support.

Also adds explicit imports for SAFE_DIRECTORIES and isPathWithin in
write-commands.ts (previously resolved implicitly through bundler).

Closes #852

Co-Authored-By: Toby Morning <urbantech@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): redact form fields with sensitive names, not just type=password

Form redaction only applied to type="password" fields. Hidden and text
fields named csrf_token, api_key, session_id, etc. were exposed unredacted
in LLM context, leaking secrets.

Extend redaction to check field name and id against sensitive patterns:
token, secret, key, password, credential, auth, jwt, session, csrf, sid,
api_key. Uses the same pattern style as SENSITIVE_COOKIE_NAME.

Closes #860

Co-Authored-By: Gus <garagon@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): restrict session file permissions to owner-only

Design session files written to /tmp with default umask (0644) were
world-readable on shared systems. Sessions contain design prompts and
feedback history.

Set mode 0o600 (owner read/write only) on both create and update paths.

Closes #859

Co-Authored-By: Gus <garagon@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): enforce frozen lockfile during setup

bun install without --frozen-lockfile resolves ^semver ranges from npm on
every run. If an attacker publishes a compromised compatible version of any
dependency, the next ./setup pulls it silently.

Add --frozen-lockfile with fallback to plain install (for fresh clones
where bun.lock may not exist yet). Matches the pattern already used in
the .agents/ generation block (line 237).

Closes #614

Co-Authored-By: Alberto Martinez <halbert04@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix: remove duplicate recursive chmod on /tmp in Dockerfile.ci

chmod -R 1777 /tmp recursively sets sticky bit on files (no defined
behavior), not just the directory. Deduplicate to single chmod 1777 /tmp.

Closes #747

Co-Authored-By: Maksim Soltan <Gonzih@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): learnings input validation + cross-project trust gate

Three fixes to the learnings system:

1. Input validation in gstack-learnings-log: type must be from allowed list,
   key must be alphanumeric, confidence must be 1-10 integer, source must
   be from allowed list. Prevents injection via malformed fields.

2. Prompt injection defense: insight field checked against 10 instruction-like
   patterns (ignore previous, system:, override, etc.). Rejected with clear
   error message.

3. Cross-project trust gate in gstack-learnings-search: AI-generated learnings
   from other projects are filtered out. Only user-stated learnings cross
   project boundaries. Prevents silent prompt injection across codebases.

Also adds trusted field (true for user-stated source, false for AI-generated)
to enable the trust gate at read time.

Closes #841

Co-Authored-By: Ziad Al Sharif <Ziadstr@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(security): track cookie-imported domains and scope cookie imports

Foundation for origin-pinned JS execution (#616). Tracks which domains
cookies were imported from so the JS/eval commands can verify execution
stays within imported origins.

Changes:
- BrowserManager: new cookieImportedDomains Set with track/get/has methods
- cookie-import: tracks imported cookie domains after addCookies
- cookie-import-browser: tracks domains on --domain direct import
- cookie-import-browser --all: new explicit opt-in for all-domain import
  (previously implicit behavior, now requires deliberate flag)

Closes #615

Co-Authored-By: Alberto Martinez <halbert04@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(security): pin JS/eval execution to cookie-imported origins

When cookies have been imported for specific domains, block JS execution
on pages whose origin doesn't match. Prevents the attack chain:
1. Agent imports cookies for github.com
2. Prompt injection navigates to attacker.com
3. Agent runs js document.cookie → exfiltrates github cookies

assertJsOriginAllowed() checks the current page hostname against imported
cookie domains with subdomain matching (.github.com allows api.github.com).
When no cookies are imported, all origins allowed (nothing to protect).
about:blank and data: URIs are allowed (no cookies at risk).

Depends on #615 (cookie domain tracking).

Closes #616

Co-Authored-By: Alberto Martinez <halbert04@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(security): add persistent command audit log

Append-only JSONL audit trail for all browse server commands. Unlike
in-memory ring buffers, the audit log persists across restarts and is
never truncated. Each entry records: timestamp, command, args (truncated
to 200 chars), page origin, duration, status, error (truncated to 300
chars), hasCookies flag, connection mode.

All writes are best-effort — audit failures never block command execution.
Log stored at ~/.gstack/.browse/browse-audit.jsonl.

Closes #617

Co-Authored-By: Alberto Martinez <halbert04@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): block hex-encoded IPv4-mapped IPv6 metadata bypass

URL constructor normalizes ::ffff:169.254.169.254 to ::ffff:a9fe:a9fe
(hex form), which was not in the blocklist. Similarly, ::169.254.169.254
normalizes to ::a9fe:a9fe.

Add both hex-encoded forms to BLOCKED_METADATA_HOSTS so they're caught
by the direct hostname check in validateNavigationUrl.

Closes #739

Co-Authored-By: Osman Mehmood <mehmoodosman@users.noreply.github.com>

* chore: bump version and changelog (v0.16.4.0)

Security wave 3: 12 fixes, 7 contributors.
Cookie origin pinning, command audit log, domain tracking.
Symlink bypass, path validation, shell injection, form redaction,
learnings injection, IPv6 SSRF, session permissions, frozen lockfile.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Yunsu <Hybirdss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Gus <garagon@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Toby Morning <urbantech@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alberto Martinez <halbert04@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Maksim Soltan <Gonzih@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ziad Al Sharif <Ziadstr@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Osman Mehmood <mehmoodosman@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-13 07:49:37 -10:00

139 lines
4.8 KiB
Bash
Executable File

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# gstack-learnings-search — read and filter project learnings
# Usage: gstack-learnings-search [--type TYPE] [--query KEYWORD] [--limit N] [--cross-project]
#
# Reads ~/.gstack/projects/$SLUG/learnings.jsonl, applies confidence decay,
# resolves duplicates (latest winner per key+type), and outputs formatted text.
# Exit 0 silently if no learnings file exists.
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
eval "$("$SCRIPT_DIR/gstack-slug" 2>/dev/null)"
GSTACK_HOME="${GSTACK_HOME:-$HOME/.gstack}"
TYPE=""
QUERY=""
LIMIT=10
CROSS_PROJECT=false
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
case "$1" in
--type) TYPE="$2"; shift 2 ;;
--query) QUERY="$2"; shift 2 ;;
--limit) LIMIT="$2"; shift 2 ;;
--cross-project) CROSS_PROJECT=true; shift ;;
*) shift ;;
esac
done
LEARNINGS_FILE="$GSTACK_HOME/projects/$SLUG/learnings.jsonl"
# Collect all JSONL files to search
FILES=()
[ -f "$LEARNINGS_FILE" ] && FILES+=("$LEARNINGS_FILE")
if [ "$CROSS_PROJECT" = true ]; then
# Add other projects' learnings (max 5, sorted by mtime)
for f in $(find "$GSTACK_HOME/projects" -name "learnings.jsonl" -not -path "*/$SLUG/*" 2>/dev/null | head -5); do
FILES+=("$f")
done
fi
if [ ${#FILES[@]} -eq 0 ]; then
exit 0
fi
# Process all files through bun for JSON parsing, decay, dedup, filtering
GSTACK_SEARCH_TYPE="$TYPE" GSTACK_SEARCH_QUERY="$QUERY" GSTACK_SEARCH_LIMIT="$LIMIT" GSTACK_SEARCH_SLUG="$SLUG" GSTACK_SEARCH_CROSS="$CROSS_PROJECT" \
cat "${FILES[@]}" 2>/dev/null | GSTACK_SEARCH_TYPE="$TYPE" GSTACK_SEARCH_QUERY="$QUERY" GSTACK_SEARCH_LIMIT="$LIMIT" GSTACK_SEARCH_SLUG="$SLUG" GSTACK_SEARCH_CROSS="$CROSS_PROJECT" bun -e "
const lines = (await Bun.stdin.text()).trim().split('\n').filter(Boolean);
const now = Date.now();
const type = process.env.GSTACK_SEARCH_TYPE || '';
const query = (process.env.GSTACK_SEARCH_QUERY || '').toLowerCase();
const limit = parseInt(process.env.GSTACK_SEARCH_LIMIT || '10', 10);
const slug = process.env.GSTACK_SEARCH_SLUG || '';
const entries = [];
for (const line of lines) {
try {
const e = JSON.parse(line);
if (!e.key || !e.type) continue;
// Apply confidence decay: observed/inferred lose 1pt per 30 days
let conf = e.confidence || 5;
if (e.source === 'observed' || e.source === 'inferred') {
const days = Math.floor((now - new Date(e.ts).getTime()) / 86400000);
conf = Math.max(0, conf - Math.floor(days / 30));
}
e._effectiveConfidence = conf;
// Determine if this is from the current project or cross-project
// Cross-project entries are tagged for display
const isCrossProject = !line.includes(slug) && process.env.GSTACK_SEARCH_CROSS === 'true';
e._crossProject = isCrossProject;
// Trust gate: cross-project learnings only loaded if trusted (user-stated)
// This prevents prompt injection from one project's AI-generated learnings
// silently influencing reviews in another project.
if (isCrossProject && e.trusted === false) continue;
entries.push(e);
} catch {}
}
// Dedup: latest winner per key+type
const seen = new Map();
for (const e of entries) {
const dk = e.key + '|' + e.type;
const existing = seen.get(dk);
if (!existing || new Date(e.ts) > new Date(existing.ts)) {
seen.set(dk, e);
}
}
let results = Array.from(seen.values());
// Filter by type
if (type) results = results.filter(e => e.type === type);
// Filter by query
if (query) results = results.filter(e =>
(e.key || '').toLowerCase().includes(query) ||
(e.insight || '').toLowerCase().includes(query) ||
(e.files || []).some(f => f.toLowerCase().includes(query))
);
// Sort by effective confidence desc, then recency
results.sort((a, b) => {
if (b._effectiveConfidence !== a._effectiveConfidence) return b._effectiveConfidence - a._effectiveConfidence;
return new Date(b.ts).getTime() - new Date(a.ts).getTime();
});
// Limit
results = results.slice(0, limit);
if (results.length === 0) process.exit(0);
// Format output
const byType = {};
for (const e of results) {
const t = e.type || 'unknown';
if (!byType[t]) byType[t] = [];
byType[t].push(e);
}
// Summary line
const counts = Object.entries(byType).map(([t, arr]) => arr.length + ' ' + t + (arr.length > 1 ? 's' : ''));
console.log('LEARNINGS: ' + results.length + ' loaded (' + counts.join(', ') + ')');
console.log('');
for (const [t, arr] of Object.entries(byType)) {
console.log('## ' + t.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + t.slice(1) + 's');
for (const e of arr) {
const cross = e._crossProject ? ' [cross-project]' : '';
const files = e.files?.length ? ' (files: ' + e.files.join(', ') + ')' : '';
console.log('- [' + e.key + '] (confidence: ' + e._effectiveConfidence + '/10, ' + e.source + ', ' + (e.ts || '').split('T')[0] + ')' + cross);
console.log(' ' + e.insight + files);
}
console.log('');
}
" 2>/dev/null || exit 0