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* fix(browse): never chmod shared, symlinked, or foreign-owned dirs to 0700 restrictDirectoryPermissions unconditionally chmodded its target. On hosts where the process holds CAP_FOWNER (Docker as root, CI sandboxes) that chmod SUCCEEDS on root-owned /tmp whenever a state file is configured there (BROWSE_STATE_FILE=/tmp/x.json derives stateDir=/tmp), and a 0700 /tmp breaks access(2)-based checks machine-wide for every other process. The POSIX branch now refuses shared sticky dirs, world-writable mounts under root, foreign-owned dirs, and symlinked state dirs; refusals warn once per process instead of failing silent; owned-but-unreadable dirs keep their chmod self-repair; and the check-then-act race is closed with fd-anchored O_NOFOLLOW + fstat/fchmod on a single inode. Regression tests cover the sticky-dir, foreign-uid, mkdirSecure-reapply, and symlinked-dir shapes. * fix: hash with sha256sum before shasum on Linux (config slugs + setup verify) shasum is perl/macOS; coreutils-only Linux ships sha256sum. Two call sites hard-coded shasum: gstack-config's sha8_of/sha16 (so resolve-user-slug exited 127 for any Linux user with a git email, the Layer-3 fallback) and the generated bun-installer checksum snippet in the browse/qa NEEDS_SETUP flow (spurious "checksum mismatch" on the same distros). Both now resolve sha256sum first and fall back to shasum -a 256. New shim-PATH tests pin BOTH hasher branches of sha8_of to a known vector and cover the sha8->sha16 collision escalation end to end. * feat(contract): Aside is the recommended driver for third-party web actions The Third-Party Web Actions contract (ship, spec, office-hours, land-and-deploy, setup-deploy) now names the Aside AI browser as the recommended driver: it acts across the user's real logged-in sessions, which is what vendor-dashboard moments need. Supersedes the v1.65.0.0 de-Aside stance by explicit user directive (2026-08-27). Detection is a runtime probe (command -v + aside --version under a portable gtimeout/timeout/bare guard; nonzero exit = not detected). Consent options render per detection state with Aside recommended and the first-party stack ($B headed + handoff, GStack Browser) as the universal fallback. Absent on macOS, the contract mentions the aside.com download (macOS 15+) once per task; gstack never runs an installer and binary presence is never consent. Drive discipline: step-wise over whole-task delegation, vendor confirm mode on, vendor skill/--help text scoped to operational syntax only, secrets minimized (autofill / human-used copy buttons), Apple credential creation never a drive target in any skill, failure path quotes redacted errors and falls back only with fresh consent. test/third-party-actions.test.ts pins every load-bearing sentence (21 tests) plus repo-wide tripwires: an aside command allowlist (--version/--help only, code spans AND prose) and a ban on Aside installer invocations across all generated docs. Budget ratchet fixture and carve skeleton ceilings refreshed in this commit per the ratchet protocol. * chore: regenerate remaining browse-setup snippet consumers The sha256sum-first checksum fallback in the generated NEEDS_SETUP snippet renders into every browse-consuming skill, not just browse/qa. Mechanical regen of the other ten consumers; no template changes here. * test: consent-gate E2E suite + functional fs-capability probes Five hermetic gate-tier E2E cases (tpa-present / absent-linux / broken / absent-darwin / apple-ban) drive the real contract section through claude -p with PATH shims for aside and uname; the absent cases filter any REAL aside binary out of the child PATH and assert absence with Bun.which before spawning, so dev machines cannot leak into detection. Registered per-case in E2E_TOUCHFILES/E2E_TIERS with template-level deps (ship/SKILL.md.tmpl, gen-skill-docs.ts) and added to the evals.yml matrix with tier: gate. eval:bg:periodic's detach timeout rises to 36000s for the grown periodic shard census (floor-enforced by test/eval-detach-timeout-floor.test.ts); CLAUDE.md doc updated to match. test/helpers/fs-caps.ts adds canRevokeWrites/canRevokeReads functional probes; 13 chmod-based tests swap their uid-0-only guards for the probes so suites skip honestly on CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE containers (this sandbox: uid 1000 with full caps) instead of asserting revocations the kernel ignores. path-validation's symlink test targets /etc/passwd (exists everywhere; /etc/crontab is absent on Amazon Linux). * docs: file the Aside follow-ups in TODOS Phase-2 QA logged-in-evidence path (P3), a hostile-vendor-skill E2E for the contract's override sentence (P2), and fd-anchoring the file-level permission writes to match the directory hardening (P3). * chore: bump version and changelog (v1.72.0.0) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: update project documentation for v1.72.0.0 docs/skills.md: Third-Party Web Actions subsection under /ship (Aside recommended driver, consent rules, credential boundaries). BROWSER.md: "Aside and third-party drives" subsection under Real-browser mode + ToC entry, including the no-gstack-side-audit-trail caveat (ship adversarial finding 12). TODOS.md: mark the finding-12 doc note done. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: apply cross-model doc review fixes for v1.72.0.0 docs/skills.md: restore the /ship closing line above the new subsection. BROWSER.md: ToC label matches the heading; BROWSE_STATE_FILE env row documents the new dir-hardening refusal + one-time warning. CHANGELOG: correct the hasher precedence wording (sha256sum first, shasum fallback) and the fs-caps count (14 test files, verified against the diff). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: close cross-model doc-review gaps for v1.72.0.0 setup's manual bun-verify instruction gets the same sha256sum-first fallback the automated snippet got (coreutils-only Linux); BROWSER.md's BROWSE_STATE_FILE row now lists the under-root world-writable refusal; test-cost ceilings in CLAUDE.md/CONTRIBUTING.md updated for the five new gate E2E cases (~$4.20 E2E / ~$4.35 evals). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(test): gate the symlink-refusal test to POSIX and drop the umask assumption The symlink regression test exercised the POSIX O_NOFOLLOW branch but ran on Windows, where restrictDirectoryPermissions takes the icacls branch and stat has no POSIX modes (0o666 always) — windows-free-tests failed on mode 493 vs 438. Early-return on win32 like every sibling test in the file, and assert the target's mode is UNCHANGED (captured post-mkdir) instead of hardcoding 0o755, which a strict umask would also break. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
59 lines
2.2 KiB
TypeScript
59 lines
2.2 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Functional filesystem-capability probe for tests that simulate failure by
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* revoking permissions (chmod 0500 a dir, then assert writes fail).
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*
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* The existing `process.getuid?.() === 0` guards catch only literal root —
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* but containers with CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, user-namespace sandboxes, and some
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* overlay/fuse mounts ignore mode bits for non-root users too (observed:
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* Vercel sandbox, uid 1000, writes succeed in a 0500 dir). There the
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* "unwritable" simulation silently holds nothing and the test asserts a
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* failure that never happens. This probe tests the actual behavior once per
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* process instead of guessing from the uid.
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*/
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import * as fs from 'fs';
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import * as path from 'path';
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import * as os from 'os';
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let cachedWrite: boolean | null = null;
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let cachedRead: boolean | null = null;
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/** True when chmod 0000 on a file actually blocks this process's reads. */
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export function canRevokeReads(): boolean {
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if (cachedRead !== null) return cachedRead;
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if (process.platform === 'win32' || process.getuid?.() === 0) return (cachedRead = false);
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const dir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'fs-caps-'));
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const file = path.join(dir, 'probe');
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fs.writeFileSync(file, 'x');
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fs.chmodSync(file, 0o000);
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try {
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fs.readFileSync(file);
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cachedRead = false; // read succeeded → mode bits are not enforced here
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} catch {
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cachedRead = true;
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} finally {
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fs.chmodSync(file, 0o600);
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fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
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}
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return cachedRead;
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}
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/** True when chmod 0500 on a directory actually blocks this process's writes. */
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export function canRevokeWrites(): boolean {
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if (cachedWrite !== null) return cachedWrite;
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if (process.platform === 'win32' || process.getuid?.() === 0) return (cachedWrite = false);
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const dir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'fs-caps-'));
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const locked = path.join(dir, 'locked');
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fs.mkdirSync(locked);
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fs.chmodSync(locked, 0o500);
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try {
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fs.writeFileSync(path.join(locked, 'probe'), 'x');
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cachedWrite = false; // write succeeded → mode bits are not enforced here
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} catch {
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cachedWrite = true;
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} finally {
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fs.chmodSync(locked, 0o700);
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fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
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}
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return cachedWrite;
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}
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