Files
gstack/browse/test/pair-agent-e2e.test.ts
T
Garry TanandClaude Fable 5 51932eceef v1.68.2.0 fix: tunnel revoke exists and revokes everything — setup keys included, verified live (#2646)
* fix(browse): revokeToken deletes ALL tokens for a clientId, not the first Map hit

revokeToken deleted the first Map entry matching the clientId and returned
true. After a normal pairing, two entries share one clientId: the spent setup
key (kept by exchangeSetupKey for idempotent re-exchange) and the session
token, in that insertion order. Revoke ate the setup key, reported success,
and the live session survived: DELETE /token/<id> returned a false 200 while
/agents kept listing the agent. Worse, an unspent setup key created after the
session survived revoke, so a "revoked" agent could POST /connect and mint a
fresh session within the key's 5-minute validity window.

revokeToken now deletes every matching entry and returns the delete count
(truthy-compatible with the old boolean). The DELETE /token handler logs
"Revoked N token(s)" and returns tokens_deleted so the multi-token class
stays visible; revokeSkillToken wraps Boolean() to keep its documented
contract. Regression tests pin shapes a (spent-key shadowing), b (re-grant
hole), c (multiple pending keys), and bystander isolation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(browse): tunnel revoke/agents CLI with post-revoke verification

`$B tunnel revoke <name>` was documented in the instruction block,
pair-agent/SKILL.md, and REMOTE_BROWSER_ACCESS.md but implemented nowhere:
the CLI forwarded it to the daemon as Unknown command 'tunnel', and nothing
in the repo called DELETE /token/:clientId or GET /agents.

New pre-server short-circuit (#2254 pattern: tokens are memory-only, never
boot a daemon to revoke against it). `tunnel revoke <name>` DELETEs the
token, prints the deleted count ("(count unknown)" for old daemons that
answer {revoked} without tokens_deleted), then RE-READS GET /agents to prove
the agent is gone. The still-listed branch is the version-skew net: a new
CLI against a still-running old daemon with the first-match revoke bug exits
1 and says to re-run (each old-daemon call deletes the next match) or stop.
An alive pid with an unreachable port reports "Could not reach daemon"
(exit 1), never a false "no daemon". `tunnel agents` lists sessions plus
pending (unexchanged) setup keys, which GET /agents now exposes via
listTokens({includeSetup}) — without them the revocation view was blind to
a paired-but-never-connected agent. Setup-key tokens never leave the server.
DELETE /token/ now decodeURIComponents the clientId (400 on malformed
encoding) so CLI-encoded names round-trip.

Tests: subprocess CLI coverage (usage paths, no-daemon exit 0 without
spawning, live pair/connect/revoke loop, pending-key listing), stub-daemon
pins for the skew and unreachable branches, and e2e pins for revoke-all
semantics, percent-encoded ids, and the second-DELETE-is-404 regression.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(browse): CLI always sends explicit pair scopes via shared DEFAULT_PAIR_SCOPES

The effective pairing default lived in two places: the CLI omitted scopes
unless --restrict was passed, and the server filled in its own literal.
handlePairAgent now always sends an explicit scopes list and both sides
reference one exported constant, DEFAULT_PAIR_SCOPES, so the default cannot
silently drift again (pinned by a server-auth source tripwire).

Three input traps closed in the same surface:
- Bare --restrict (or --restrict swallowing the next flag) parsed as "no
  restriction" and silently granted FULL access, the opposite of the user's
  intent. validatePairAgentFlags rejects it pre-server, before any consent
  gate, so an arg error never boots a daemon.
- A scopes list could smuggle the control scope past the explicit flag:
  --restrict "read,control" minted a control-scoped session with no
  --control. /pair now 400s on control in a scopes list without the control
  flag, and the CLI points the user at --control.
- Option typos validated only at exchange time: createSetupKey stored any
  scope string and any rateLimit, so /pair returned 200 with a poisoned
  setup key whose failure surfaced to the REMOTE agent at /connect as a
  misleading "Invalid request body". Shared validation now runs in both
  creators and throws typed InvalidScopeError; /pair and /token 400 with the
  message, naming the bad scope or negative rateLimit. Also
  `opts.rateLimit || 10` became `?? 10` so the documented "0 = unlimited"
  survives the /pair path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(browse): 403 hint stops recommending --admin; invariant names both scope defaults

The scope-denied hint told restricted agents to "re-pair with --admin for
eval/cookies/storage" — but --admin is a legacy alias for --control, so
following it over-granted browser-wide destructive commands on top of the
admin scope the default already carries. The hint now matches the CLI's
sibling wording: re-pair without --restrict for page access, --control for
browser control.

Registry invariant #2 claimed "admin scope denied by default" three releases
after b73f3644 deliberately made /pair grant admin. It now names BOTH
defaults precisely (registry API functions default read+write; the /pair
ceremony grants DEFAULT_PAIR_SCOPES) so the header cannot lie one layer down.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(pair-agent): document the full-access default, --restrict, and real revocation

The pairing docs still described the pre-b73f3644 model: read+write default,
--admin as the opt-in for JS/cookies/storage. Reality for three releases:
/pair grants read+write+admin+meta (the pairing ceremony is the trust
boundary) and --admin is a legacy alias for --control. A user following the
skill believed they granted a sandboxed session and actually granted JS
execution on their logged-in browser.

pair-agent/SKILL.md.tmpl (SKILL.md regenerated in this commit) now states
the real default, the tunnel-allowlist nuance (eval works remotely; the
js/cookies/storage commands are local-only), --restrict for sandboxed
sessions with an untrusted-content advisory (scope caps prompt-injection
blast radius), and --control for browser-wide ops. "Revoking access"
documents the now-real tunnel revoke (deletes session + pending setup keys,
verifies against the agent list) and tunnel agents, and replaces the
never-implemented `tunnel rotate` with `$B stop` — tokens are memory-only,
so a daemon restart already rotates everything.

REMOTE_BROWSER_ACCESS.md: /connect example shows the real default scopes,
the scope table gains the control row, the 403 hint row matches the new
server wording, and the false claim that /sidebar-chat is on the tunnel
allowlist is gone (TUNNEL_PATHS is /connect + /command; /sidebar-chat no
longer exists in server.ts at all). ARCHITECTURE.md drops the same phantom
endpoint from the allowlist prose and endpoint table.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* v1.68.2.0: revoke-all, real tunnel revoke, truthful pairing docs

Version slot allocated against the live remote via bin/gstack-next-version
(clean patch bump from 1.68.1.0, no collision). CHANGELOG entry covers the
revoke-all fix, the new tunnel revoke/agents CLI, the explicit-scopes wire
contract, and the pairing-docs truth pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(browse): adversarial-review hardening — 6 findings fixed, regression-pinned

Pre-push adversarial review (4 lenses, refute-style verification: 13 raw
findings, 7 refuted, 6 confirmed) caught these; each fix carries a pin:

1. --restrict=read (equals form) sailed past validatePairAgentFlags —
   hasFlag/parseFlag are exact-token matches — so the user asked for a
   read-only sandbox and silently got FULL access: the exact failure mode
   this branch claims to close. The equals form is now a hard error before
   any server work.
2. handleTunnel trimmed the agent name but clientIds are stored verbatim,
   so a space-padded agent was unrevocable by the documented kill switch
   (trimmed DELETE 404'd while the grant stayed live). Names now pass
   through verbatim; the live-daemon test revokes ' padded'.
3. The sole pin for "CLI always sends explicit scopes" passed vacuously on
   a simulated revert: toContain('DEFAULT_PAIR_SCOPES') was satisfied by a
   comment. The tripwire now matches the code shape with a regex and bans
   the conditional spread formatting-insensitively.
4. The rewritten 403 scope hint was unpinned — new e2e asserts it names
   --restrict and --control and never --admin.
5. tunnelRevoke's verify-failure and HTTP-error branches and tunnelAgents'
   unreadable-list branch had no coverage — three stub-daemon pins added
   (an unreadable list must never render as "No paired agents").
6. CHANGELOG claimed "40+ new test cases"; the honest count is 35.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-19 22:33:46 -07:00

465 lines
19 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* End-to-end integration test for the pair-agent flow under dual-listener.
*
* Spawns the browse daemon as a subprocess with BROWSE_HEADLESS_SKIP=1 so
* the HTTP layer runs without launching a real browser. Then exercises the
* full ceremony: /pair with root Bearer → setup_key → /connect → scoped
* token → /command rejection and acceptance paths.
*
* This is the "receipt" for the wave's central 'pair-agent still works'
* claim. Source-level tests in dual-listener.test.ts cover the tunnel
* surface filter shape. Source-level tests in sse-session-cookie.test.ts
* cover the cookie registry. This file covers the BEHAVIOR: does an HTTP
* client following the documented ceremony actually get a working flow.
*
* Tunnel listener binding (/tunnel/start) is NOT exercised here — it
* requires an ngrok authtoken and live network. The dual-listener filter
* logic is covered by source-level guards; a live tunnel test belongs in
* a separate paid-evals suite.
*/
import { describe, test, expect, beforeAll, afterAll } from 'bun:test';
import * as fs from 'fs';
import * as os from 'os';
import * as path from 'path';
import { GSTACK_EXTENSION_ID } from '../src/server';
const ROOT = path.resolve(import.meta.dir, '../..');
const SERVER_ENTRY = path.join(ROOT, 'browse/src/server.ts');
interface DaemonHandle {
proc: ReturnType<typeof Bun.spawn>;
port: number;
token: string;
stateFile: string;
tempDir: string;
baseUrl: string;
}
async function waitForReady(baseUrl: string, timeoutMs = 15_000): Promise<void> {
const deadline = Date.now() + timeoutMs;
while (Date.now() < deadline) {
try {
const resp = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/health`, {
signal: AbortSignal.timeout(1000),
});
if (resp.ok) return;
} catch {
// not ready yet
}
await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 200));
}
throw new Error(`Daemon did not become ready within ${timeoutMs}ms`);
}
async function spawnDaemon(): Promise<DaemonHandle> {
const tempDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'pair-agent-e2e-'));
const stateFile = path.join(tempDir, 'browse.json');
// Pick a high ephemeral port
const port = 20000 + Math.floor(Math.random() * 20000);
const proc = Bun.spawn(['bun', 'run', SERVER_ENTRY], {
cwd: ROOT,
env: {
...process.env,
BROWSE_HEADLESS_SKIP: '1',
BROWSE_PORT: String(port),
BROWSE_STATE_FILE: stateFile,
BROWSE_PARENT_PID: '0',
BROWSE_IDLE_TIMEOUT: '600000',
},
stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
});
const baseUrl = `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`;
await waitForReady(baseUrl);
// Read the token from the state file that the daemon wrote
const state = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(stateFile, 'utf-8'));
return { proc, port, token: state.token, stateFile, tempDir, baseUrl };
}
function killDaemon(handle: DaemonHandle): void {
try { handle.proc.kill('SIGKILL'); } catch {}
try { fs.rmSync(handle.tempDir, { recursive: true, force: true }); } catch {}
}
describe('pair-agent flow end-to-end (HTTP only, no ngrok)', () => {
let daemon: DaemonHandle;
beforeAll(async () => {
daemon = await spawnDaemon();
}, 20_000);
afterAll(() => {
if (daemon) killDaemon(daemon);
});
test('GET /health returns daemon status and NEVER includes a token (even for chrome-extension origins)', async () => {
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/health`, {
headers: { Origin: `chrome-extension://${GSTACK_EXTENSION_ID}` },
});
expect(resp.status).toBe(200);
const body = await resp.json() as any;
expect(body.status).toBeDefined();
// v1.62: token bootstrap moved to POST /extension-token. /health is
// liveness-only in every mode.
expect(body.token).toBeUndefined();
});
test('GET /health without origin does NOT include token', async () => {
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/health`);
expect(resp.status).toBe(200);
const body = await resp.json() as any;
expect(body.token).toBeUndefined();
});
test('POST /extension-token with pinned Origin over real HTTP (Host carries port) returns the token', async () => {
// Real fetch → Host arrives as '127.0.0.1:<port>'; the server must parse
// the hostname out rather than compare the raw header (amendment C9).
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/extension-token`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { Origin: `chrome-extension://${GSTACK_EXTENSION_ID}` },
});
expect(resp.status).toBe(200);
const body = await resp.json() as any;
expect(body.token).toBe(daemon.token);
});
test('POST /extension-token with a non-pinned extension Origin returns 403 without the token', async () => {
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/extension-token`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { Origin: 'chrome-extension://aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa' },
});
expect(resp.status).toBe(403);
const body = await resp.json() as any;
expect(body.token).toBeUndefined();
});
test('GET /connect alive probe returns {alive: true} unauth', async () => {
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/connect`);
expect(resp.status).toBe(200);
const body = await resp.json() as any;
expect(body.alive).toBe(true);
});
test('POST /pair with root Bearer returns a setup_key', async () => {
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/pair`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}`,
},
body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: 'test-agent' }),
});
expect(resp.status).toBe(200);
const body = await resp.json() as any;
expect(body.setup_key).toBeDefined();
expect(typeof body.setup_key).toBe('string');
expect(body.setup_key.length).toBeGreaterThan(10);
});
test('POST /pair without root Bearer returns 403', async () => {
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/pair`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: 'no-auth' }),
});
expect(resp.status).toBe(403);
});
test('POST /connect with setup_key exchanges for a scoped token', async () => {
// 1) Get a setup key
const pairResp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/pair`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}`,
},
body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: 'e2e-connect' }),
});
const { setup_key } = await pairResp.json() as any;
// 2) Exchange setup key for scoped token via /connect
const connectResp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/connect`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ setup_key }),
});
expect(connectResp.status).toBe(200);
const { token, scopes } = await connectResp.json() as any;
expect(token).toBeDefined();
expect(typeof token).toBe('string');
expect(token).not.toBe(daemon.token); // scoped token, not root
expect(Array.isArray(scopes)).toBe(true);
});
// ─── Pair scope contract: defaults, explicit lists, typo naming ───────
test('default /connect scopes are exactly read,write,admin,meta', async () => {
const pairResp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/pair`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: 'default-scopes' }),
});
const { setup_key, scopes: pairScopes } = await pairResp.json() as any;
expect(pairScopes).toEqual(['read', 'write', 'admin', 'meta']);
const connectResp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/connect`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ setup_key }),
});
const { scopes } = await connectResp.json() as any;
expect(scopes).toEqual(['read', 'write', 'admin', 'meta']);
});
test('explicit scopes are honored end-to-end (the --restrict wire contract)', async () => {
const pairResp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/pair`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: 'restricted-scopes', scopes: ['read'] }),
});
const { setup_key } = await pairResp.json() as any;
const connectResp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/connect`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ setup_key }),
});
const { scopes } = await connectResp.json() as any;
expect(scopes).toEqual(['read']);
});
test('POST /pair with a scope typo fails fast, naming the scope', async () => {
// Regression: pre-fix this returned 200 with a poisoned setup key whose
// failure surfaced at /connect as a misleading "Invalid request body".
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/pair`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: 'typo-agent', scopes: ['raed'] }),
});
expect(resp.status).toBe(400);
const body = await resp.json() as any;
expect(body.error).toContain('Invalid scope: raed');
});
test('POST /token with a scope typo names the scope too', async () => {
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/token`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: 'typo-token', scopes: ['wirte'] }),
});
expect(resp.status).toBe(400);
const body = await resp.json() as any;
expect(body.error).toContain('Invalid scope: wirte');
});
test('control cannot ride in through a /pair scopes list without the control flag', async () => {
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/pair`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: 'sneaky', scopes: ['read', 'control'] }),
});
expect(resp.status).toBe(400);
const body = await resp.json() as any;
expect(body.error).toContain('control');
});
test('scope-denied 403 hint points at --restrict/--control, never --admin', async () => {
// Regression: the old hint said "re-pair with --admin", which is a legacy
// alias for --control — following it over-granted browser-wide control.
const pairResp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/pair`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: 'hint-agent', scopes: ['read'] }),
});
const { setup_key } = await pairResp.json() as any;
const connectResp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/connect`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ setup_key }),
});
const { token } = await connectResp.json() as any;
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/command`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` },
body: JSON.stringify({ command: 'goto', args: ['https://example.com'] }),
});
expect(resp.status).toBe(403);
const body = await resp.json() as any;
expect(body.hint).toContain('--restrict');
expect(body.hint).toContain('--control');
expect(body.hint).not.toContain('--admin');
});
// ─── Revocation e2e: revoke-all + the /agents verification surface ────
test('DELETE /token revokes session AND setup keys; agent leaves /agents; token 401s; re-connect fails', async () => {
const pair = async () => {
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/pair`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: 'revoke-e2e' }),
});
return (await resp.json() as any).setup_key as string;
};
const key1 = await pair();
const connectResp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/connect`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ setup_key: key1 }),
});
const { token: scopedToken } = await connectResp.json() as any;
// A second, UNSPENT setup key for the same clientId (the re-grant hole).
const key2 = await pair();
const pre = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/command`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${scopedToken}` },
body: JSON.stringify({ command: 'status', args: [] }),
});
expect(pre.status).not.toBe(401);
// /agents lists the session AND the pending setup key, never the token.
const agentsPre = await (await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/agents`, {
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
})).json() as any;
expect(agentsPre.agents.some((a: any) => a.clientId === 'revoke-e2e' && !a.pending)).toBe(true);
expect(agentsPre.agents.some((a: any) => a.clientId === 'revoke-e2e' && a.pending)).toBe(true);
for (const a of agentsPre.agents) expect(a.token).toBeUndefined();
// Regression: pre-fix this deleted only the spent setup key and returned
// a false 200 while the session survived. Count covers session + spent
// key + pending key.
const del = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/token/revoke-e2e`, {
method: 'DELETE',
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
});
expect(del.status).toBe(200);
const delBody = await del.json() as any;
expect(delBody.revoked).toBe('revoke-e2e');
expect(delBody.tokens_deleted).toBe(3);
// Assert per-clientId absence, NOT list-empty: this file shares one
// daemon and other tests' agents remain listed.
const agentsPost = await (await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/agents`, {
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
})).json() as any;
expect(agentsPost.agents.some((a: any) => a.clientId === 'revoke-e2e')).toBe(false);
const post = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/command`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${scopedToken}` },
body: JSON.stringify({ command: 'status', args: [] }),
});
expect(post.status).toBe(401);
// The leftover unspent key is dead too (re-grant hole closed).
const reconnect = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/connect`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ setup_key: key2 }),
});
expect(reconnect.status).toBe(401);
});
test('second DELETE /token for the same clientId returns 404, not a false 200', async () => {
// Regression: pre-fix, consecutive DELETEs both returned 200 — the first
// consumed the spent setup key, the second the session. Depends on the
// previous test having revoked 'revoke-e2e' (bun runs file tests in order).
const del = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/token/revoke-e2e`, {
method: 'DELETE',
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
});
expect(del.status).toBe(404);
});
test('DELETE /token decodes percent-encoded clientIds', async () => {
const pairResp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/pair`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: 'space agent' }),
});
const { setup_key } = await pairResp.json() as any;
await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/connect`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ setup_key }),
});
const del = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/token/${encodeURIComponent('space agent')}`, {
method: 'DELETE',
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
});
expect(del.status).toBe(200);
const agents = await (await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/agents`, {
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
})).json() as any;
expect(agents.agents.some((a: any) => a.clientId === 'space agent')).toBe(false);
});
test('DELETE /token with malformed percent-encoding returns 400', async () => {
const del = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/token/%E0%A4%A`, {
method: 'DELETE',
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
});
expect(del.status).toBe(400);
});
test('POST /command with no auth returns 401', async () => {
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/command`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ command: 'status', args: [] }),
});
expect(resp.status).toBe(401);
});
test('POST /sse-session with root Bearer returns a Set-Cookie for gstack_sse', async () => {
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/sse-session`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
});
expect(resp.status).toBe(200);
const setCookie = resp.headers.get('set-cookie');
expect(setCookie).not.toBeNull();
expect(setCookie!).toContain('gstack_sse=');
expect(setCookie!).toContain('HttpOnly');
expect(setCookie!).toContain('SameSite=Strict');
});
test('POST /sse-session without root Bearer returns 401', async () => {
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/sse-session`, { method: 'POST' });
expect(resp.status).toBe(401);
});
test('GET /activity/stream without auth returns 401', async () => {
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/activity/stream`);
expect(resp.status).toBe(401);
});
test('GET /activity/stream with ?token= (legacy) is rejected', async () => {
// The old ?token= query param is no longer accepted (N1).
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/activity/stream?token=${daemon.token}`);
expect(resp.status).toBe(401);
});
// NB: we don't test "SSE succeeds with Bearer" end-to-end here because
// Bun's fetch doesn't return the Response for a long-lived stream until
// data flows, and SSE holds open forever. The 401-paths above are enough
// to prove the auth gate; source-level tests in dual-listener.test.ts
// cover the cookie path. A live SSE behavioral test would belong in a
// separate eventsource-based harness.
test('/welcome regex gate: safe slug resolves; dangerous slug does not path-traverse', async () => {
// The regex gate lives in server.ts — we can't easily flip GSTACK_SLUG
// on a running daemon, but we CAN verify the endpoint serves something
// reasonable for the default 'unknown' slug (no crash, no 500).
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/welcome`);
expect(resp.status).toBe(200);
expect(resp.headers.get('content-type')).toContain('text/html');
const body = await resp.text();
// Must not include path-traversal-decoded content
expect(body).not.toContain('root:x:0:0'); // /etc/passwd signature
});
});