Files
gstack/browse/test/pair-agent-e2e.test.ts
T
85fd9db554 v1.68.3.0 fix(pairing): re-pair to narrow revokes the old grant on the spot (#2665)
* fix(pairing): reject reserved clientId 'root' at all token writers

'root' is the sentinel checkScope/checkDomain/checkRate and the server
command gate use for the omnipotent caller, so a scoped token carrying it
bypasses every enforcement path. Add ReservedClientIdError + a shared
assertValidClientId; createToken/createSetupKey throw, restoreRegistry
skips-and-logs (a corrupt state file must not brick boot). /pair and /token
surface it as a named 400, and the CLI fast-fails --client root.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(pairing): release tab ownership on revoke

tabOwnership cleared only on tab close, so after DELETE /token a same-name
re-pair inherited the revoked agent's authenticated tabs (own-only access
keys on owner === clientId). Add BrowserManager.releaseClientTabs and run it
unconditionally in DELETE /token (ownership outlives the token, so an
expired-token client can still own tabs); 404 only when both nothing was
revoked and nothing released. Response now carries tabs_released.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* v1.68.3.0 fix(pairing): re-pair to narrow revokes the old grant on the spot

POST /pair minted a new setup key but never touched the agent's live
session, so re-pairing --client X --restrict read while X was connected (or
whose 5-min key expired unexchanged) left the original full-access session,
eval included, alive up to 24h.

A reducing re-pair (fewer scopes, tighter domains, lower rate, stricter tab
policy) now revokes the live session and releases its tabs before minting
the new key (grantReducesAccess + revokeClientFully; superseded in the
response). Non-reducing re-pairs keep the session and only drop stale PENDING
setup keys, so a broaden/refresh never strands a working agent and a
narrowing re-pair issued before the agent connects can't leave the old broad
key exchangeable. Revoke happens before mint (revokeToken deletes all of a
client's tokens). CLI prints a version-skew-safe supersede notice and warns
when a re-pair-shaped call omits --client. Docs + CHANGELOG + VERSION.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(pairing): harden re-pair per adversarial review

Adversarial review of the diff found four issues, now fixed:
- Validate the requested grant BEFORE the supersede revoke: a reducing
  re-pair with a bad scope/rate no longer destroys the live session and
  then fails to mint a replacement (assertValidTokenOptions runs up front).
- A re-pair with no live session releases tabs orphaned by an expired
  incarnation, closing the tab-inheritance gap /pair had (DELETE /token
  already released unconditionally).
- Test the DELETE /token revoked=0/tabs>0 path and the /pair orphaned-tab
  release at the handler level (HTTP e2e can't, headless owns no tabs).
- Test the CLI --client root fast-fail; fix its null-guard (parseFlag
  returns null when --client is absent).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Garry Tan <garry@ycombinator.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 15:32:26 -07:00

594 lines
26 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* End-to-end integration test for the pair-agent flow under dual-listener.
*
* Spawns the browse daemon as a subprocess with BROWSE_HEADLESS_SKIP=1 so
* the HTTP layer runs without launching a real browser. Then exercises the
* full ceremony: /pair with root Bearer → setup_key → /connect → scoped
* token → /command rejection and acceptance paths.
*
* This is the "receipt" for the wave's central 'pair-agent still works'
* claim. Source-level tests in dual-listener.test.ts cover the tunnel
* surface filter shape. Source-level tests in sse-session-cookie.test.ts
* cover the cookie registry. This file covers the BEHAVIOR: does an HTTP
* client following the documented ceremony actually get a working flow.
*
* Tunnel listener binding (/tunnel/start) is NOT exercised here — it
* requires an ngrok authtoken and live network. The dual-listener filter
* logic is covered by source-level guards; a live tunnel test belongs in
* a separate paid-evals suite.
*/
import { describe, test, expect, beforeAll, afterAll } from 'bun:test';
import * as fs from 'fs';
import * as os from 'os';
import * as path from 'path';
import { GSTACK_EXTENSION_ID } from '../src/server';
const ROOT = path.resolve(import.meta.dir, '../..');
const SERVER_ENTRY = path.join(ROOT, 'browse/src/server.ts');
interface DaemonHandle {
proc: ReturnType<typeof Bun.spawn>;
port: number;
token: string;
stateFile: string;
tempDir: string;
baseUrl: string;
}
async function waitForReady(baseUrl: string, timeoutMs = 15_000): Promise<void> {
const deadline = Date.now() + timeoutMs;
while (Date.now() < deadline) {
try {
const resp = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/health`, {
signal: AbortSignal.timeout(1000),
});
if (resp.ok) return;
} catch {
// not ready yet
}
await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 200));
}
throw new Error(`Daemon did not become ready within ${timeoutMs}ms`);
}
async function spawnDaemon(): Promise<DaemonHandle> {
const tempDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'pair-agent-e2e-'));
const stateFile = path.join(tempDir, 'browse.json');
// Pick a high ephemeral port
const port = 20000 + Math.floor(Math.random() * 20000);
const proc = Bun.spawn(['bun', 'run', SERVER_ENTRY], {
cwd: ROOT,
env: {
...process.env,
BROWSE_HEADLESS_SKIP: '1',
BROWSE_PORT: String(port),
BROWSE_STATE_FILE: stateFile,
BROWSE_PARENT_PID: '0',
BROWSE_IDLE_TIMEOUT: '600000',
},
stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
});
const baseUrl = `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`;
await waitForReady(baseUrl);
// Read the token from the state file that the daemon wrote
const state = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(stateFile, 'utf-8'));
return { proc, port, token: state.token, stateFile, tempDir, baseUrl };
}
function killDaemon(handle: DaemonHandle): void {
try { handle.proc.kill('SIGKILL'); } catch {}
try { fs.rmSync(handle.tempDir, { recursive: true, force: true }); } catch {}
}
describe('pair-agent flow end-to-end (HTTP only, no ngrok)', () => {
let daemon: DaemonHandle;
beforeAll(async () => {
daemon = await spawnDaemon();
}, 20_000);
afterAll(() => {
if (daemon) killDaemon(daemon);
});
test('GET /health returns daemon status and NEVER includes a token (even for chrome-extension origins)', async () => {
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/health`, {
headers: { Origin: `chrome-extension://${GSTACK_EXTENSION_ID}` },
});
expect(resp.status).toBe(200);
const body = await resp.json() as any;
expect(body.status).toBeDefined();
// v1.62: token bootstrap moved to POST /extension-token. /health is
// liveness-only in every mode.
expect(body.token).toBeUndefined();
});
test('GET /health without origin does NOT include token', async () => {
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/health`);
expect(resp.status).toBe(200);
const body = await resp.json() as any;
expect(body.token).toBeUndefined();
});
test('POST /extension-token with pinned Origin over real HTTP (Host carries port) returns the token', async () => {
// Real fetch → Host arrives as '127.0.0.1:<port>'; the server must parse
// the hostname out rather than compare the raw header (amendment C9).
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/extension-token`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { Origin: `chrome-extension://${GSTACK_EXTENSION_ID}` },
});
expect(resp.status).toBe(200);
const body = await resp.json() as any;
expect(body.token).toBe(daemon.token);
});
test('POST /extension-token with a non-pinned extension Origin returns 403 without the token', async () => {
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/extension-token`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { Origin: 'chrome-extension://aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa' },
});
expect(resp.status).toBe(403);
const body = await resp.json() as any;
expect(body.token).toBeUndefined();
});
test('GET /connect alive probe returns {alive: true} unauth', async () => {
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/connect`);
expect(resp.status).toBe(200);
const body = await resp.json() as any;
expect(body.alive).toBe(true);
});
test('POST /pair with root Bearer returns a setup_key', async () => {
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/pair`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}`,
},
body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: 'test-agent' }),
});
expect(resp.status).toBe(200);
const body = await resp.json() as any;
expect(body.setup_key).toBeDefined();
expect(typeof body.setup_key).toBe('string');
expect(body.setup_key.length).toBeGreaterThan(10);
});
test('POST /pair without root Bearer returns 403', async () => {
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/pair`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: 'no-auth' }),
});
expect(resp.status).toBe(403);
});
test('POST /connect with setup_key exchanges for a scoped token', async () => {
// 1) Get a setup key
const pairResp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/pair`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}`,
},
body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: 'e2e-connect' }),
});
const { setup_key } = await pairResp.json() as any;
// 2) Exchange setup key for scoped token via /connect
const connectResp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/connect`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ setup_key }),
});
expect(connectResp.status).toBe(200);
const { token, scopes } = await connectResp.json() as any;
expect(token).toBeDefined();
expect(typeof token).toBe('string');
expect(token).not.toBe(daemon.token); // scoped token, not root
expect(Array.isArray(scopes)).toBe(true);
});
// ─── Pair scope contract: defaults, explicit lists, typo naming ───────
test('default /connect scopes are exactly read,write,admin,meta', async () => {
const pairResp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/pair`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: 'default-scopes' }),
});
const { setup_key, scopes: pairScopes } = await pairResp.json() as any;
expect(pairScopes).toEqual(['read', 'write', 'admin', 'meta']);
const connectResp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/connect`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ setup_key }),
});
const { scopes } = await connectResp.json() as any;
expect(scopes).toEqual(['read', 'write', 'admin', 'meta']);
});
test('explicit scopes are honored end-to-end (the --restrict wire contract)', async () => {
const pairResp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/pair`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: 'restricted-scopes', scopes: ['read'] }),
});
const { setup_key } = await pairResp.json() as any;
const connectResp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/connect`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ setup_key }),
});
const { scopes } = await connectResp.json() as any;
expect(scopes).toEqual(['read']);
});
test('POST /pair with a scope typo fails fast, naming the scope', async () => {
// Regression: pre-fix this returned 200 with a poisoned setup key whose
// failure surfaced at /connect as a misleading "Invalid request body".
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/pair`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: 'typo-agent', scopes: ['raed'] }),
});
expect(resp.status).toBe(400);
const body = await resp.json() as any;
expect(body.error).toContain('Invalid scope: raed');
});
test('POST /token with a scope typo names the scope too', async () => {
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/token`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: 'typo-token', scopes: ['wirte'] }),
});
expect(resp.status).toBe(400);
const body = await resp.json() as any;
expect(body.error).toContain('Invalid scope: wirte');
});
test('control cannot ride in through a /pair scopes list without the control flag', async () => {
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/pair`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: 'sneaky', scopes: ['read', 'control'] }),
});
expect(resp.status).toBe(400);
const body = await resp.json() as any;
expect(body.error).toContain('control');
});
test('scope-denied 403 hint points at --restrict/--control, never --admin', async () => {
// Regression: the old hint said "re-pair with --admin", which is a legacy
// alias for --control — following it over-granted browser-wide control.
const pairResp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/pair`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: 'hint-agent', scopes: ['read'] }),
});
const { setup_key } = await pairResp.json() as any;
const connectResp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/connect`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ setup_key }),
});
const { token } = await connectResp.json() as any;
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/command`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` },
body: JSON.stringify({ command: 'goto', args: ['https://example.com'] }),
});
expect(resp.status).toBe(403);
const body = await resp.json() as any;
expect(body.hint).toContain('--restrict');
expect(body.hint).toContain('--control');
expect(body.hint).not.toContain('--admin');
});
// ─── D2: reserved clientId is rejected with a named 400 ───────────────
test('POST /pair with clientId "root" returns 400 naming the reservation', async () => {
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/pair`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: 'root' }),
});
expect(resp.status).toBe(400);
const body = await resp.json() as any;
// The reservation is named, NOT hidden behind the generic "Invalid request body".
expect(body.error).toContain('root');
expect(body.error).not.toBe('Invalid request body');
});
test('POST /token with clientId "root" returns 400 naming the reservation', async () => {
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/token`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: 'root' }),
});
expect(resp.status).toBe(400);
const body = await resp.json() as any;
expect(body.error).toContain('root');
expect(body.error).not.toBe('Invalid request body');
});
// ─── D1: a reducing re-pair supersedes the prior grant immediately ────
const pairAs = async (body: any) => (await (await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/pair`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
body: JSON.stringify(body),
})).json()) as any;
const connectKey = async (setup_key: string) => {
const r = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/connect`, {
method: 'POST', headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' }, body: JSON.stringify({ setup_key }),
});
return { status: r.status, body: await r.json().catch(() => ({})) as any };
};
const statusWith = (token: string) => fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/command`, {
method: 'POST', headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` },
body: JSON.stringify({ command: 'status', args: [] }),
});
test('reducing re-pair revokes the prior session immediately, without exchanging the new key', async () => {
const { setup_key: k1 } = await pairAs({ clientId: 'reduce-me' }); // broad
const { body: c1 } = await connectKey(k1);
const s1 = c1.token as string;
expect((await statusWith(s1)).status).not.toBe(401); // works
// Narrow WITHOUT exchanging the new key — this is the whole bug.
const rp = await pairAs({ clientId: 'reduce-me', scopes: ['read'] });
expect(rp.superseded?.tokens_deleted).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1);
expect((await statusWith(s1)).status).toBe(401); // old session revoked
// The new narrow key still works and yields the reduced scope.
const c2 = await connectKey(rp.setup_key);
expect(c2.status).toBe(200);
expect(c2.body.scopes).toEqual(['read']);
expect((await statusWith(c2.body.token)).status).not.toBe(401);
});
test('reducing re-pair BEFORE connect kills the stale broad setup key; only the narrow key works', async () => {
const { setup_key: broad } = await pairAs({ clientId: 'shadow' }); // never connected
const rp = await pairAs({ clientId: 'shadow', scopes: ['read'] }); // narrowing re-pair
expect(rp.superseded).toBeUndefined(); // no live session existed
expect((await connectKey(broad)).status).toBe(401); // stale broad key dead
const c = await connectKey(rp.setup_key);
expect(c.status).toBe(200);
expect(c.body.scopes).toEqual(['read']); // narrow key survives
});
test('broadening re-pair does NOT revoke the working session (no outage)', async () => {
const first = await pairAs({ clientId: 'broaden', scopes: ['read'] });
expect(first.superseded).toBeUndefined(); // first pair supersedes nothing
const { body: c } = await connectKey(first.setup_key);
const s = c.token as string;
expect((await statusWith(s)).status).not.toBe(401);
const rp = await pairAs({ clientId: 'broaden', scopes: ['read', 'write'] }); // broaden
expect(rp.superseded).toBeUndefined(); // session not superseded
expect((await statusWith(s)).status).not.toBe(401); // still working
});
test('a reducing re-pair with an INVALID scope 400s and leaves the live session intact', async () => {
// Regression: the supersede revoke must run AFTER validation. A scope typo
// (--restrict red) on a narrowing re-pair must not destroy the session and
// then fail to mint a replacement — the agent would be knocked offline.
const { setup_key: k } = await pairAs({ clientId: 'validate-me' });
const { body: c } = await connectKey(k);
const s = c.token as string;
expect((await statusWith(s)).status).not.toBe(401);
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/pair`, {
method: 'POST', headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: 'validate-me', scopes: ['red'] }),
});
expect(resp.status).toBe(400);
expect((await resp.json() as any).error).toContain('red');
// The working session survives the validation error (not revoked).
expect((await statusWith(s)).status).not.toBe(401);
});
// ─── D3: DELETE /token releases tabs unconditionally; 404 only when empty ─
test('DELETE /token returns tabs_released and 404 only when nothing to revoke or release', async () => {
const pairResp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/pair`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: 'd3-agent' }),
});
const { setup_key } = await pairResp.json() as any;
await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/connect`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ setup_key }),
});
const del = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/token/d3-agent`, {
method: 'DELETE', headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
});
expect(del.status).toBe(200);
const body = await del.json() as any;
expect(body.tokens_deleted).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1);
// Headless-skip daemon owns no real tabs, but the field is always present.
expect(body.tabs_released).toBe(0);
// Nothing to revoke AND nothing to release → 404.
const del2 = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/token/nonexistent-xyz`, {
method: 'DELETE', headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
});
expect(del2.status).toBe(404);
});
// ─── Revocation e2e: revoke-all + the /agents verification surface ────
test('DELETE /token revokes session AND setup keys; agent leaves /agents; token 401s; re-connect fails', async () => {
const pair = async () => {
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/pair`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: 'revoke-e2e' }),
});
return (await resp.json() as any).setup_key as string;
};
const key1 = await pair();
const connectResp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/connect`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ setup_key: key1 }),
});
const { token: scopedToken } = await connectResp.json() as any;
// A second, UNSPENT setup key for the same clientId (the re-grant hole).
const key2 = await pair();
const pre = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/command`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${scopedToken}` },
body: JSON.stringify({ command: 'status', args: [] }),
});
expect(pre.status).not.toBe(401);
// /agents lists the session AND the pending setup key, never the token.
const agentsPre = await (await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/agents`, {
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
})).json() as any;
expect(agentsPre.agents.some((a: any) => a.clientId === 'revoke-e2e' && !a.pending)).toBe(true);
expect(agentsPre.agents.some((a: any) => a.clientId === 'revoke-e2e' && a.pending)).toBe(true);
for (const a of agentsPre.agents) expect(a.token).toBeUndefined();
// Regression: pre-fix this deleted only the spent setup key and returned
// a false 200 while the session survived. Count covers session + spent
// key + pending key.
const del = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/token/revoke-e2e`, {
method: 'DELETE',
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
});
expect(del.status).toBe(200);
const delBody = await del.json() as any;
expect(delBody.revoked).toBe('revoke-e2e');
expect(delBody.tokens_deleted).toBe(3);
// Assert per-clientId absence, NOT list-empty: this file shares one
// daemon and other tests' agents remain listed.
const agentsPost = await (await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/agents`, {
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
})).json() as any;
expect(agentsPost.agents.some((a: any) => a.clientId === 'revoke-e2e')).toBe(false);
const post = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/command`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${scopedToken}` },
body: JSON.stringify({ command: 'status', args: [] }),
});
expect(post.status).toBe(401);
// The leftover unspent key is dead too (re-grant hole closed).
const reconnect = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/connect`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ setup_key: key2 }),
});
expect(reconnect.status).toBe(401);
});
test('second DELETE /token for the same clientId returns 404, not a false 200', async () => {
// Regression: pre-fix, consecutive DELETEs both returned 200 — the first
// consumed the spent setup key, the second the session. Depends on the
// previous test having revoked 'revoke-e2e' (bun runs file tests in order).
const del = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/token/revoke-e2e`, {
method: 'DELETE',
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
});
expect(del.status).toBe(404);
});
test('DELETE /token decodes percent-encoded clientIds', async () => {
const pairResp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/pair`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: 'space agent' }),
});
const { setup_key } = await pairResp.json() as any;
await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/connect`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ setup_key }),
});
const del = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/token/${encodeURIComponent('space agent')}`, {
method: 'DELETE',
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
});
expect(del.status).toBe(200);
const agents = await (await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/agents`, {
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
})).json() as any;
expect(agents.agents.some((a: any) => a.clientId === 'space agent')).toBe(false);
});
test('DELETE /token with malformed percent-encoding returns 400', async () => {
const del = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/token/%E0%A4%A`, {
method: 'DELETE',
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
});
expect(del.status).toBe(400);
});
test('POST /command with no auth returns 401', async () => {
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/command`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ command: 'status', args: [] }),
});
expect(resp.status).toBe(401);
});
test('POST /sse-session with root Bearer returns a Set-Cookie for gstack_sse', async () => {
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/sse-session`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
});
expect(resp.status).toBe(200);
const setCookie = resp.headers.get('set-cookie');
expect(setCookie).not.toBeNull();
expect(setCookie!).toContain('gstack_sse=');
expect(setCookie!).toContain('HttpOnly');
expect(setCookie!).toContain('SameSite=Strict');
});
test('POST /sse-session without root Bearer returns 401', async () => {
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/sse-session`, { method: 'POST' });
expect(resp.status).toBe(401);
});
test('GET /activity/stream without auth returns 401', async () => {
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/activity/stream`);
expect(resp.status).toBe(401);
});
test('GET /activity/stream with ?token= (legacy) is rejected', async () => {
// The old ?token= query param is no longer accepted (N1).
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/activity/stream?token=${daemon.token}`);
expect(resp.status).toBe(401);
});
// NB: we don't test "SSE succeeds with Bearer" end-to-end here because
// Bun's fetch doesn't return the Response for a long-lived stream until
// data flows, and SSE holds open forever. The 401-paths above are enough
// to prove the auth gate; source-level tests in dual-listener.test.ts
// cover the cookie path. A live SSE behavioral test would belong in a
// separate eventsource-based harness.
test('/welcome regex gate: safe slug resolves; dangerous slug does not path-traverse', async () => {
// The regex gate lives in server.ts — we can't easily flip GSTACK_SLUG
// on a running daemon, but we CAN verify the endpoint serves something
// reasonable for the default 'unknown' slug (no crash, no 500).
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/welcome`);
expect(resp.status).toBe(200);
expect(resp.headers.get('content-type')).toContain('text/html');
const body = await resp.text();
// Must not include path-traversal-decoded content
expect(body).not.toContain('root:x:0:0'); // /etc/passwd signature
});
});