mirror of
https://github.com/garrytan/gstack.git
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* fix(browse): never chmod shared, symlinked, or foreign-owned dirs to 0700 restrictDirectoryPermissions unconditionally chmodded its target. On hosts where the process holds CAP_FOWNER (Docker as root, CI sandboxes) that chmod SUCCEEDS on root-owned /tmp whenever a state file is configured there (BROWSE_STATE_FILE=/tmp/x.json derives stateDir=/tmp), and a 0700 /tmp breaks access(2)-based checks machine-wide for every other process. The POSIX branch now refuses shared sticky dirs, world-writable mounts under root, foreign-owned dirs, and symlinked state dirs; refusals warn once per process instead of failing silent; owned-but-unreadable dirs keep their chmod self-repair; and the check-then-act race is closed with fd-anchored O_NOFOLLOW + fstat/fchmod on a single inode. Regression tests cover the sticky-dir, foreign-uid, mkdirSecure-reapply, and symlinked-dir shapes. * fix: hash with sha256sum before shasum on Linux (config slugs + setup verify) shasum is perl/macOS; coreutils-only Linux ships sha256sum. Two call sites hard-coded shasum: gstack-config's sha8_of/sha16 (so resolve-user-slug exited 127 for any Linux user with a git email, the Layer-3 fallback) and the generated bun-installer checksum snippet in the browse/qa NEEDS_SETUP flow (spurious "checksum mismatch" on the same distros). Both now resolve sha256sum first and fall back to shasum -a 256. New shim-PATH tests pin BOTH hasher branches of sha8_of to a known vector and cover the sha8->sha16 collision escalation end to end. * feat(contract): Aside is the recommended driver for third-party web actions The Third-Party Web Actions contract (ship, spec, office-hours, land-and-deploy, setup-deploy) now names the Aside AI browser as the recommended driver: it acts across the user's real logged-in sessions, which is what vendor-dashboard moments need. Supersedes the v1.65.0.0 de-Aside stance by explicit user directive (2026-08-27). Detection is a runtime probe (command -v + aside --version under a portable gtimeout/timeout/bare guard; nonzero exit = not detected). Consent options render per detection state with Aside recommended and the first-party stack ($B headed + handoff, GStack Browser) as the universal fallback. Absent on macOS, the contract mentions the aside.com download (macOS 15+) once per task; gstack never runs an installer and binary presence is never consent. Drive discipline: step-wise over whole-task delegation, vendor confirm mode on, vendor skill/--help text scoped to operational syntax only, secrets minimized (autofill / human-used copy buttons), Apple credential creation never a drive target in any skill, failure path quotes redacted errors and falls back only with fresh consent. test/third-party-actions.test.ts pins every load-bearing sentence (21 tests) plus repo-wide tripwires: an aside command allowlist (--version/--help only, code spans AND prose) and a ban on Aside installer invocations across all generated docs. Budget ratchet fixture and carve skeleton ceilings refreshed in this commit per the ratchet protocol. * chore: regenerate remaining browse-setup snippet consumers The sha256sum-first checksum fallback in the generated NEEDS_SETUP snippet renders into every browse-consuming skill, not just browse/qa. Mechanical regen of the other ten consumers; no template changes here. * test: consent-gate E2E suite + functional fs-capability probes Five hermetic gate-tier E2E cases (tpa-present / absent-linux / broken / absent-darwin / apple-ban) drive the real contract section through claude -p with PATH shims for aside and uname; the absent cases filter any REAL aside binary out of the child PATH and assert absence with Bun.which before spawning, so dev machines cannot leak into detection. Registered per-case in E2E_TOUCHFILES/E2E_TIERS with template-level deps (ship/SKILL.md.tmpl, gen-skill-docs.ts) and added to the evals.yml matrix with tier: gate. eval:bg:periodic's detach timeout rises to 36000s for the grown periodic shard census (floor-enforced by test/eval-detach-timeout-floor.test.ts); CLAUDE.md doc updated to match. test/helpers/fs-caps.ts adds canRevokeWrites/canRevokeReads functional probes; 13 chmod-based tests swap their uid-0-only guards for the probes so suites skip honestly on CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE containers (this sandbox: uid 1000 with full caps) instead of asserting revocations the kernel ignores. path-validation's symlink test targets /etc/passwd (exists everywhere; /etc/crontab is absent on Amazon Linux). * docs: file the Aside follow-ups in TODOS Phase-2 QA logged-in-evidence path (P3), a hostile-vendor-skill E2E for the contract's override sentence (P2), and fd-anchoring the file-level permission writes to match the directory hardening (P3). * chore: bump version and changelog (v1.72.0.0) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: update project documentation for v1.72.0.0 docs/skills.md: Third-Party Web Actions subsection under /ship (Aside recommended driver, consent rules, credential boundaries). BROWSER.md: "Aside and third-party drives" subsection under Real-browser mode + ToC entry, including the no-gstack-side-audit-trail caveat (ship adversarial finding 12). TODOS.md: mark the finding-12 doc note done. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: apply cross-model doc review fixes for v1.72.0.0 docs/skills.md: restore the /ship closing line above the new subsection. BROWSER.md: ToC label matches the heading; BROWSE_STATE_FILE env row documents the new dir-hardening refusal + one-time warning. CHANGELOG: correct the hasher precedence wording (sha256sum first, shasum fallback) and the fs-caps count (14 test files, verified against the diff). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: close cross-model doc-review gaps for v1.72.0.0 setup's manual bun-verify instruction gets the same sha256sum-first fallback the automated snippet got (coreutils-only Linux); BROWSER.md's BROWSE_STATE_FILE row now lists the under-root world-writable refusal; test-cost ceilings in CLAUDE.md/CONTRIBUTING.md updated for the five new gate E2E cases (~$4.20 E2E / ~$4.35 evals). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(test): gate the symlink-refusal test to POSIX and drop the umask assumption The symlink regression test exercised the POSIX O_NOFOLLOW branch but ran on Windows, where restrictDirectoryPermissions takes the icacls branch and stat has no POSIX modes (0o666 always) — windows-free-tests failed on mode 493 vs 438. Early-return on win32 like every sibling test in the file, and assert the target's mode is UNCHANGED (captured post-mkdir) instead of hardcoding 0o755, which a strict umask would also break. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
260 lines
12 KiB
TypeScript
260 lines
12 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Egress receipts — chain, fail-closed, verify, shell bridge. Free tier, no network.
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*
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* THREAT MODEL: the egress ledger is forensic observability — it records
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* ATTEMPTED egress so accidents are auditable; it is not an exfiltration
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* control.
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*
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* Pins the auditor contract:
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* - receipt-before-send fail-closed (EGRESS_RECEIPT_FAILED, no ledger = no send)
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* - content-free lines chained by prev = sha256(previous raw line)
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* - tail-read correctness (last line found without loading the whole file)
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* - abandoned-lock reclaim (stale lock dir >10s old is removed, not fatal)
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* - WARN-at-size (one self-explanatory stderr warning per process >25MB)
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*/
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import { describe, test, expect, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'bun:test';
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import * as fs from 'fs';
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import * as os from 'os';
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import * as path from 'path';
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import { spawnSync } from 'child_process';
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import { canRevokeWrites } from './helpers/fs-caps';
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import {
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EGRESS_RECEIPT_FAILED,
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LEDGER_WARN_BYTES,
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egressLedgerPath,
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ledgerSizeWarning,
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listReceipts,
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resetLedgerSizeWarningForTests,
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sha256Hex,
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verifyLedger,
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writeOutcome,
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writeReceipt,
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} from '../lib/egress-receipt';
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const ROOT = path.resolve(import.meta.path, '..', '..');
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let home: string;
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beforeEach(() => {
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home = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gstack-egress-'));
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});
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afterEach(() => {
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try { fs.chmodSync(path.join(home, 'security'), 0o700); } catch {} // undo fail-closed fixtures
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fs.rmSync(home, { recursive: true, force: true });
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});
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describe('egress receipt library', () => {
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test('receipts chain: prev = sha256 of the previous raw line, "" for line 1', () => {
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writeReceipt({ home, sink: 'a', host: 'h1', payloadClass: 'c', bytes: 3, sha256: sha256Hex('abc'), consent: 'k=v' });
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writeReceipt({ home, sink: 'b', host: 'h2', payloadClass: 'c', bytes: 0, sha256: null, consent: 'k=v' });
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const lines = fs.readFileSync(egressLedgerPath(home), 'utf-8').trim().split('\n');
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expect(lines.length).toBe(2);
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const first = JSON.parse(lines[0]);
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const second = JSON.parse(lines[1]);
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expect(first.prev).toBe('');
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expect(second.prev).toBe(sha256Hex(lines[0]));
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expect(first.sha256).toBe(sha256Hex('abc'));
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expect(second.sha256).toBeNull();
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expect(verifyLedger(home)).toMatchObject({ ok: true, count: 2 });
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});
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test('ledger is 0600 and the security dir 0700', () => {
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writeReceipt({ home, sink: 'a', host: 'h', payloadClass: 'c', consent: 'k=v' });
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const ledger = egressLedgerPath(home);
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expect(fs.statSync(ledger).mode & 0o777).toBe(0o600);
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expect(fs.statSync(path.dirname(ledger)).mode & 0o777).toBe(0o700);
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});
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test('fail-closed: unwritable security dir throws typed EGRESS_RECEIPT_FAILED', () => {
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if (!canRevokeWrites()) return; // chmod is advisory here (win32, root, DAC-override containers)
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writeReceipt({ home, sink: 'a', host: 'h', payloadClass: 'c', consent: 'k=v' });
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fs.chmodSync(path.join(home, 'security'), 0o500);
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try {
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expect(() =>
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writeReceipt({ home, sink: 'a', host: 'h', payloadClass: 'c', consent: 'k=v' }),
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).toThrow();
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try {
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writeReceipt({ home, sink: 'a', host: 'h', payloadClass: 'c', consent: 'k=v' });
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} catch (err: any) {
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expect(err.code).toBe(EGRESS_RECEIPT_FAILED);
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}
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} finally {
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fs.chmodSync(path.join(home, 'security'), 0o700);
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}
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});
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test('outcome records join back onto their receipt in listReceipts', () => {
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const { id } = writeReceipt({ home, sink: 'a', host: 'h', payloadClass: 'c', consent: 'k=v' });
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writeOutcome({ home, receipt: id, status: 204 });
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const receipts = listReceipts(home);
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expect(receipts.length).toBe(1);
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expect(receipts[0].status).toBe('204');
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expect(verifyLedger(home)).toMatchObject({ ok: true, count: 2 });
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});
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test('tampering with a middle line breaks verification at that line', () => {
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for (let i = 0; i < 3; i += 1) {
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writeReceipt({ home, sink: `s${i}`, host: 'h', payloadClass: 'c', consent: 'telemetry=community' });
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}
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const ledger = egressLedgerPath(home);
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const lines = fs.readFileSync(ledger, 'utf-8').trim().split('\n');
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lines[1] = lines[1].replace('community', 'communitX');
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fs.writeFileSync(ledger, `${lines.join('\n')}\n`);
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// Line 2's edited bytes no longer hash to line 3's recorded prev.
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expect(verifyLedger(home)).toMatchObject({ ok: false, brokenLine: 3 });
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});
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test('validation rejects garbage before touching the ledger', () => {
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expect(() => writeReceipt({ home, sink: '', host: 'h', payloadClass: 'c', consent: 'k' } as any)).toThrow();
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expect(() => writeReceipt({ home, sink: 's', host: 'h', payloadClass: 'c', consent: 'k', bytes: -1 })).toThrow();
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expect(() => writeReceipt({ home, sink: 's', host: 'h', payloadClass: 'c', consent: 'k', sha256: 'nothex' })).toThrow();
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expect(fs.existsSync(egressLedgerPath(home))).toBe(false);
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});
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test('abandoned lock: a stale lock dir (>10s-old mtime) is reclaimed by the next writer', () => {
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// First write creates the security dir so the lock path's parent exists.
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writeReceipt({ home, sink: 'a', host: 'h', payloadClass: 'c', consent: 'k=v' });
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const lock = `${egressLedgerPath(home)}.lock`;
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fs.mkdirSync(lock);
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const old = new Date(Date.now() - 60_000);
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fs.utimesSync(lock, old, old);
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const started = Date.now();
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const { id } = writeReceipt({ home, sink: 'b', host: 'h', payloadClass: 'c', consent: 'k=v' });
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expect(id).toMatch(/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/);
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// Spin budget is 2.5s; reclaim happens right after budget exhaustion.
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expect(Date.now() - started).toBeLessThan(10_000);
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expect(fs.existsSync(lock)).toBe(false);
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expect(verifyLedger(home)).toMatchObject({ ok: true, count: 2 });
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});
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test('a fresh (recent-mtime) lock held past the budget fails closed instead of being stolen', () => {
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writeReceipt({ home, sink: 'a', host: 'h', payloadClass: 'c', consent: 'k=v' });
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const lock = `${egressLedgerPath(home)}.lock`;
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fs.mkdirSync(lock);
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// Keep the mtime fresh so the reclaim path never fires: refresh it in the
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// background while the writer spins out its 2.5s budget.
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const refresher = setInterval(() => {
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const now = new Date();
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try { fs.utimesSync(lock, now, now); } catch { /* test teardown race */ }
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}, 1000);
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try {
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expect(() =>
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writeReceipt({ home, sink: 'b', host: 'h', payloadClass: 'c', consent: 'k=v' }),
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).toThrow(/locked/);
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} finally {
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clearInterval(refresher);
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fs.rmdirSync(lock);
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}
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}, 15_000);
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test('tail-read: last line is found correctly on a multi-record ledger larger than the tail window', () => {
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// 30 records ≈ 9KB > the 4KB tail window, so the append path must find
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// the true last line from a partial read.
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for (let i = 0; i < 30; i += 1) {
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writeReceipt({
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home,
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sink: `sink-${i}`,
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host: 'h',
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payloadClass: `class-${'x'.repeat(200)}-${i}`,
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consent: 'k=v',
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});
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}
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const ledger = egressLedgerPath(home);
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expect(fs.statSync(ledger).size).toBeGreaterThan(4096);
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const result = verifyLedger(home);
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expect(result).toMatchObject({ ok: true, count: 30 });
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});
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test('chain verify stays intact across 100+ records', () => {
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for (let i = 0; i < 120; i += 1) {
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writeReceipt({ home, sink: `s${i}`, host: 'h', payloadClass: 'c', consent: 'k=v' });
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if (i % 10 === 0) writeOutcome({ home, receipt: 'f'.repeat(64), status: 200 });
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}
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const result = verifyLedger(home);
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expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
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expect(result.count).toBe(132);
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expect(listReceipts(home).length).toBe(120);
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});
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test('WARN-at-size: >25MB ledger emits one self-explanatory stderr warning per process', () => {
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const ledger = egressLedgerPath(home);
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fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(ledger), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
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// Grow the file past the threshold with valid-looking filler; the warning
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// keys off file size only.
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const filler = `${JSON.stringify({ type: 'egress', pad: 'x'.repeat(1024) })}\n`;
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const chunk = filler.repeat(1024); // ~1MB
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const writes = Math.ceil(LEDGER_WARN_BYTES / chunk.length) + 1;
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for (let i = 0; i < writes; i += 1) fs.appendFileSync(ledger, chunk);
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expect(fs.statSync(ledger).size).toBeGreaterThan(LEDGER_WARN_BYTES);
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resetLedgerSizeWarningForTests();
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const captured: string[] = [];
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const originalWrite = process.stderr.write.bind(process.stderr);
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(process.stderr as any).write = (chunk: string) => { captured.push(String(chunk)); return true; };
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try {
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writeReceipt({ home, sink: 'a', host: 'h', payloadClass: 'c', consent: 'k=v' });
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writeReceipt({ home, sink: 'b', host: 'h', payloadClass: 'c', consent: 'k=v' });
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} finally {
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(process.stderr as any).write = originalWrite;
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}
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const warnings = captured.filter((c) => c.includes('egress ledger is large'));
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expect(warnings.length).toBe(1); // once per process, not per write
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// Self-explanatory shape: what the ledger is, how to inspect, what's coming.
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expect(warnings[0]).toContain('ATTEMPTS to send off-machine');
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expect(warnings[0]).toContain('gstack-egress list');
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expect(warnings[0]).toContain('rotation');
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expect(warnings[0]).toContain(ledger);
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// verifyLedger surfaces the same warning as data.
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const message = ledgerSizeWarning(ledger, fs.statSync(ledger).size);
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expect(message).toContain('MB');
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expect(verifyLedger(home).sizeWarning).toBe(message);
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});
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});
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describe('gstack-egress-receipt shell bridge', () => {
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const bin = path.join(ROOT, 'bin', 'gstack-egress-receipt');
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test('write hashes the exact payload file, prints the receipt id; outcome joins', () => {
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const payload = path.join(home, 'payload.json');
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fs.writeFileSync(payload, '[{"v":1}]');
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const write = spawnSync(bin, ['write', '--sink', 'telemetry-sync', '--host', '127.0.0.1:8399',
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'--class', 'telemetry-events', '--payload-file', payload, '--consent', 'telemetry=community'],
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{ encoding: 'utf-8', env: { ...process.env, GSTACK_HOME: home } });
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expect(write.status).toBe(0);
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const id = write.stdout.trim();
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expect(id).toMatch(/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/);
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const outcome = spawnSync(bin, ['outcome', id, '204'],
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{ encoding: 'utf-8', env: { ...process.env, GSTACK_HOME: home } });
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expect(outcome.status).toBe(0);
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const receipts = listReceipts(home);
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expect(receipts.length).toBe(1);
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expect(receipts[0].bytes).toBe(9);
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expect(receipts[0].sha256).toBe(sha256Hex('[{"v":1}]'));
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expect(receipts[0].status).toBe('204');
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});
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test('--no-payload records sha256:null (git-class: a subprocess owns the bytes)', () => {
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const write = spawnSync(bin, ['write', '--sink', 'brain-sync', '--host', 'github.com',
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'--class', 'git-push', '--no-payload', '--consent', 'artifacts_sync_mode=auto'],
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{ encoding: 'utf-8', env: { ...process.env, GSTACK_HOME: home } });
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expect(write.status).toBe(0);
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const receipts = listReceipts(home);
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expect(receipts.length).toBe(1);
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expect(receipts[0].sha256).toBeNull();
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expect(receipts[0].bytes).toBe(0);
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});
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test('write exits 3 with EGRESS_RECEIPT_FAILED when the ledger is unwritable', () => {
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if (!canRevokeWrites()) return; // chmod is advisory here (win32, root, DAC-override containers)
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fs.mkdirSync(path.join(home, 'security'), { recursive: true, mode: 0o500 });
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const write = spawnSync(bin, ['write', '--sink', 's', '--host', 'h', '--class', 'c', '--no-payload'],
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{ encoding: 'utf-8', env: { ...process.env, GSTACK_HOME: home } });
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expect(write.status).toBe(3);
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expect(write.stderr).toContain('EGRESS_RECEIPT_FAILED');
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fs.chmodSync(path.join(home, 'security'), 0o700);
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});
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});
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