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gstack/BROWSER.md
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Garry TanandClaude Fable 5 c118e2402e v1.64.1.0 v1.64.1.0: the code-smell fix wave — every pipeline guard now provably fires (net −24,943 lines) (#2572)
* fix(ci): skill-docs freshness gate covers all 10 hosts and can actually fail

The Codex/Factory gates ran 'git diff --exit-code -- .agents/' / '-- .factory/',
but both paths are gitignored (.gitignore:16-17) — git diff on ignored untracked
paths is always empty, so those two gates were structurally incapable of failing
and 7 of 10 hosts had no gate at all.

New shape: one 'gen:skill-docs --host all' pass (the generator hard-fails on any
per-host error, gating all 10 hosts on generates-cleanly), byte-freshness via
git diff for tracked output, plus a porcelain check that fails on untracked
generated strays (git diff can't see brand-new files). The gitignored-hosts
byte-freshness limitation is documented in the workflow comment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(test): exorcise the sidebar-agent ghost from the test suite

browse/src/sidebar-agent.ts was deleted in the v1.14 sidebar refactor, but the
test suite kept testing it for 48 versions. Nothing noticed because the free
suite runs in no CI job and Bun-era module-load errors were suppressed in the
Windows shard runner via an exclusion pattern whose own comment documented the
breakage ('broken on every platform since v1.14 ... exit 0').

- Delete sidebar-security.test.ts + security-source-contracts.test.ts: crashed
  at module load (unguarded readFileSync of the deleted file); per-assertion
  triage confirmed every SERVER_SRC pin targeted the deleted chat prompt
  builder (zero hits in today's server.ts) — nothing to port.
- Delete sidebar-integration.test.ts: 11 of 13 tests exercised deleted
  endpoints (/sidebar-command queue, /sidebar-agent/event, chat buffer); the 2
  passing tests pinned only the blanket auth gate, covered by
  server-auth.test.ts + dual-listener.test.ts.
- Delete test/skill-e2e-sidebar.test.ts: E2E for the deleted queue flow.
- sidebar-ux.test.ts 1,669 -> 830 lines: 20 dead-chat describes + 15 dead
  tests removed (incl. 10 vacuous passes asserting on empty indexOf slices);
  2 stale pins on LIVE features fixed (content.js typed-catch CSSOM fallback,
  arrow-hint window widened). 95 pass / 0 fail.
- sidebar-tabs.test.ts: both failures were stale pins, not regressions —
  forceRestart's deliberate ws.close(4001) and the terminal-agent spawn that
  moved into spawnTerminalAgent() (identity-based kill refactor). 28 pass.
- touchfiles.ts: drop the three sidebar E2E entries from BOTH maps
  (E2E_TOUCHFILES + E2E_TIERS) — they pointed diff-selection at the deleted
  file, so those tests were unreachable by any diff.
- test-free-shards.ts: remove the now-dead sidebar-agent exclusion pattern.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(ci): run the free test suite in CI (it ran nowhere)

The full free suite (bun test: browse/test/ + test/ + make-pdf/test/) had no CI
job on any Linux/macOS runner — only Windows curated shards, paid evals, and
doc-freshness gates existed. That's how two module-load-crashing test files
survived 48 versions.

Same cached Dockerfile.ci image and container wiring as evals.yml (deps
restore, build, Chromium verify). Includes a module-load-error guard: older
Bun reported test-file import crashes with exit 0 on macOS/Linux, so the job
also fails on any nonzero 'N errors' count in the summary — future crash-class
regressions can't hide from the exact job built to catch them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(test): validate touchfile dependency paths exist on disk

New guard in touchfiles.test.ts: every non-glob dep path must exist, and every
glob's anchor directory must exist. This is the axis the 181-key two-map sync
discipline never covered — an entry can point at a long-deleted file and
diff-based selection then silently never triggers those tests (the sidebar
trio sat rotted for 48 versions).

First run immediately caught a fourth rotted entry: 'spec authored quality'
referenced test/fixtures/spec/** (directory does not exist) and selected for a
judge test that exists nowhere in the repo. Removed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): remove deleted /sidebar-chat endpoint from tunnel allowlist

TUNNEL_PATHS is the audited tunnel attack surface — its own comment says every
addition widens it. '/sidebar-chat' stayed in the set after the endpoint was
deleted with the chat-queue path, meaning any future route matching that path
would have been silently tunnel-exposed. The set is now exactly the pair
ceremony (/connect) and the scoped command endpoint (/command), and the
dual-listener closed-set pin enforces that.

Also repairs a pre-existing red pin in dual-listener.test.ts: v1.63.0.0 made
the tunnel allowlist args-aware (canDispatchOverTunnel gained a second param)
without updating the test — red on main since then, invisible because the free
suite had no CI job.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): delete chain's shadow dispatcher that skipped every security gate

meta-commands.ts carried a 'CLI mode' fallback that re-implemented command
routing without the server pipeline's gates: no scope check, no domain check,
no tab ownership, no rate limit, no hidden-element stripping, no scoped-token
enveloping — and it called handleReadCommand without a BrowserManager, which
also skipped the JS-origin cookie-exfiltration assertion. It was unreachable
in production (server.ts always passes executeCommand) and one boolean away
from being live.

chain now hard-errors without a server context. handleReadCommand's bm param
is required and assertJsOriginAllowed runs unconditionally. The chain tests
that exercised the deleted fallback now route through a server-shaped
executeCommand adapter (real handlers + trust wrapping + {status,result}
envelope), so their behavioral coverage — sequencing, trust markers, pipe
format, aliases, error reporting — survives on the production-shaped path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(extension): delete the dead chat-queue client surface

The sidebar-command handler in background.js POSTed to a server endpoint that
no longer exists (deleted with the chat queue) — ~35 lines of fully-wired dead
code including error handling for the permanent 404, plus its allowlist entry.
No sender in the extension ever emitted the message type.

chatEnabled leaves the /health contract (server hardcoded false, background.js
re-derived it, nothing consumed it — the chat input element it guarded is gone
from sidepanel.html). BROWSE_SIDEBAR_CHAT env flag had zero readers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): delete dead exports the ripped chat path left behind

Three-way split by importer class:

(a) Zero importers, deleted: the whole attack-attempt logging cluster in
security.ts (logAttempt, AttemptRecord, salted hashPayload + device-salt,
attempts.jsonl rotation, telemetry spawn plumbing incl.
buildTelemetrySpawnCommand/resolveBashBinary — the LIVE attempts.jsonl writer
is tunnel-denial-log.ts with its own rotation); the decision-file handshake
(writeDecision/readDecision/clearDecision/excerptForReview — written for
sidebar-agent's poll loop, which no longer exists); sidebar-utils.ts (whole
module — its sanitizeExtensionUrl 'sanitized before embedding in a prompt'
for the deleted prompt builder); 8 dead server.ts imports (sanitizeExtensionUrl,
generateCanary, injectCanary, writeDecision, rotateRoot, serializeRegistry,
restoreRegistry, clearAgentRecord); buildPtyClearCookie + buildSseClearCookie;
WEBDRIVER_MASK_SCRIPT (orphaned by the D7 stealth narrowing — applyStealth
never used it).

(b) Dead-pin tests edited with their exports: the 'still exported' pin in
stealth-layer-c, the string-content describe in stealth-webdriver (its live
applyStealth behavioral coverage untouched), the clear-cookie assertions,
security-review-flow.test.ts deleted whole (all 4 describes exercised the
dead decision mechanism, incl. a 'simulated sidebar-agent poll loop').

(c) KEPT deliberately: leaseCount (live behavioral coverage),
extractPtyCookie + validatePtySessionToken (extractPtyCookie is adopted by
the terminal-agent cookie-parse unification later in this wave),
resetSessionMarker + clearContentFilters (test-support API for the live
content-security layer).

Also fixes two pre-existing red pins found while here, invisible until the
free suite got a CI job: the v1.44 spawnClaude->maybeSpawnPty rename in
terminal-agent.test.ts, and a cross-file test-isolation bug where
content-security.test.ts's clearContentFilters() wiped the auto-registered
url-blocklist filter for every later file in the same bun process
(security-integration.test.ts failed on co-run; afterAll now restores it).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): delete the dead ML layers — transcript classifier and DeBERTa ensemble

The L4b Haiku transcript classifier and the opt-in DeBERTa ensemble
(GSTACK_SECURITY_ENSEMBLE=deberta, a documented 721MB download) had ZERO
production callers since the chat-path agent that invoked them was ripped.
The only live ML path is scanPageContent (testsavant) inside the security
sidecar subprocess. Deleted by import graph:

- security-classifier.ts 614 -> 265 lines: HAIKU_MODEL, checkTranscript,
  shouldRunTranscriptCheck, loadDeberta, scanPageContentDeberta, ToolCallInput,
  all DEBERTA_* consts + load state. Header now states the live truth
  (imported only by security-sidecar-entry.ts). downloadFile kept, name
  intact — it is an enumerated egress sink (HF model download).
- security-bunnative.ts + test: a research skeleton self-described as 'NOT a
  production replacement', shipped into src/ with zero importers.
- security-bench-ensemble{,-live}.test.ts + the Haiku response fixture: a
  paid live-model benchmark for a layer that could not fire. The
  security-classifier-tdz test's only case exercised checkTranscript — gone.
- security.ts: layer-model header rewritten to the live architecture;
  StatusDetail.layers -> {testsavant, canary}; getStatus() no longer requires
  the impossible transcript==='ok' for 'protected' (old on-disk session state
  with a transcript key is tolerated on read, never re-emitted).
- security-sidecar-entry.ts needed zero changes: it serializes
  getClassifierStatus() verbatim and no consumer read .transcript (verified
  in sidecar-client + server.ts).
- BROWSER.md security section matches reality (ensemble knob gone, 112MB not
  22MB, sidecar hosting documented). combineVerdict/THRESHOLDS retained as
  the pure, tested combiner of record — comments now flag transcript/deberta
  votes as producer-less.

Net: 26 pass in security.test.ts incl. a NEW regression test for stale-
transcript disk tolerance; egress-receipt tripwire green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: scrub the sidebar-agent ghost from comments and CLAUDE.md

20+ comments across 10 files still described the deleted sidebar-agent.ts as a
live process — including load-bearing architecture claims ('IMPORTED ONLY BY
sidebar-agent.ts', 'sidebar-agent fills this in on first prompt-injection
load', 'kill sidebar-agent' in shutdown docs) and ~60 lines of tombstone
blocks in server.ts enumerating deleted identifiers by name (a false grep
surface: searching processAgentEvent hit server.ts and looked live).

CLAUDE.md's security-stack section now documents the LIVE architecture: L1-L3
content filters + testsavant via the security sidecar subprocess; the
L4b/ensemble rows, the GSTACK_SECURITY_ENSEMBLE knob, and the 721MB DeBERTa
download are gone (deleted as dead code this wave) with an explicit
do-not-re-document note; attempts.jsonl is correctly attributed to
tunnel-denial-log.ts; the no-live-writer status of classifierStatus is stated.

Comments that survive now describe what IS, not what WAS: the promotion gate
in domain-skills.ts explains why classifier_score>0 is load-bearing given no
L4 load-time scan exists; file-permissions.ts names real sensitive files.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(gen): delete the codex-helpers shadow module

gen-skill-docs.ts imported externalSkillName (unaliased) from
resolvers/codex-helpers.ts at line 21 and then re-declared the same function
locally — the import was silently shadowed, and the imported copy was the
STALE one (it lacked the frontmatterName param the local copy grew). Three
more functions were byte-identical duplicates, imported only under _-prefixed
aliases to keep the module 'referenced', and transformFrontmatter was a
superseded hardcoded-Codex variant. Nothing else imported the module.

Also drops three dead top-of-file imports (COMMAND_DESCRIPTIONS,
SNAPSHOT_FLAGS — which pulled the whole browse/src module graph into every
generator run for nothing — and an unused review-resolver trio).

Proof: bun run gen:skill-docs exits 0 with a byte-identical tree (zero-diff
regen); gen-skill-docs.test.ts 405/405 green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(server): delete ServerConfig.idleTimeoutMs + chromiumProfile — documented, never read

Both fields carried JSDoc asserting embedder behavior that did not exist:
the idle check reads the module-level IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS env constant, and both
resolveChromiumProfile() call sites pass no argument. Worse than absent — an
embedder passing idleTimeoutMs: 5000 silently got 30 minutes.

Wiring them honestly is impossible today: the idle timer, activity state, and
shutdown target are module-global, so a per-factory value would lie for any
process running more than one handler. Deleted instead, with a ServerConfig
note pointing at the deferred singleton/route-table refactor where real
support belongs. BROWSE_IDLE_TIMEOUT and CHROMIUM_PROFILE env remain the
honest knobs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): wire appendSecureFile at the four real log-append sites

file-permissions.ts carries a 24-line rationale for why POSIX mode bits are
insufficient on Windows and implements appendSecureFile (0600 at create,
Windows ACL on first write only) — but its single caller was the dead
logAttempt, while the four REAL page-content log writers (console/network/
dialog logs in server.ts, the command audit log) used raw fs.appendFileSync
with no mode. Page-content-derived logs now get owner-only permissions from
birth on every platform.

Verified before wiring: mode applies atomically at create via appendFileSync
{mode}, and the ACL pass runs only on first write — no per-append subprocess
cost on the hot console-log path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(stealth): handoff() uses the shared profile resolution + lock cleanup

The headless-to-headed handoff path hardcoded ~/.gstack/chromium-profile,
silently ignoring $CHROMIUM_PROFILE and $GSTACK_HOME (gbrowser's gbd sets
per-workspace profiles), and skipped cleanSingletonLocks() — so a handoff
into a profile with a stale SingletonLock could hang where launchHeaded()
would have recovered.

This was the third live drift between the three Chromium launch paths; the
first two are documented in comments as shipped stealth regressions. Minimal
targeted fix — the full buildLaunchConfig() extraction stays in the deferred
queue.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(gen): resolver registry describes the template language again

Seven registered {{PLACEHOLDER}}s had zero uses in any .tmpl (checked in both
bare and :arg forms): REDACT_TAXONOMY_TABLE, TEST_COVERAGE_AUDIT_REVIEW,
MODEL_OVERLAY, QUESTION_PREFERENCE_CHECK, QUESTION_LOG, INLINE_TUNE_FEEDBACK,
MAKE_PDF_SETUP. The last two of those families are invoked programmatically by
preamble.ts (functions kept, registry entries dropped); the question-tuning
trio and the review coverage-audit wrapper were documented by their own module
as existing 'for unit testing' that no test performed — deleted, along with
generateRedactTaxonomyTable + its EXAMPLE/TIER_BLURB constants (its '/cso
renders the full table' comment was itself stale) and its test describe.

Also deletes the gated-resolver mechanism (ResolverEntry/appliesTo/
unwrapResolver + test/resolver-entry.test.ts): fully built, fully tested,
used by zero of the 65 registry entries — the generator loop simplifies to a
direct function call. CLAUDE.md's redact-doc line stops advertising the dead
token.

Proof: zero-diff regen (0 SKILL.md changed); gen-skill-docs + skill-validation
737 tests green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(gen): wire boundaryInstruction from host config; drop three no-op binDir ternaries

hosts/codex.ts declared boundaryInstruction and nothing read it — review.ts
kept its own byte-identical CODEX_BOUNDARY literal (verified equal + trailing
escaped newlines). The resolver now reads the config, so the boundary has one
owner. (autoplan's template carries deliberately generic variants, enforced by
gen-skill-docs.test.ts:1358 — untouched by design.)

The 'ctx.host === codex ? $GSTACK_BIN : ctx.paths.binDir' ternary appeared in
three resolvers and could never change the result: resolvers/types.ts already
sets binDir to $GSTACK_BIN for every usesEnvVars host including codex.

Proof: zero-diff regen for claude AND codex hosts; gen-skill-docs +
host-config suites green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(test-infra): judge uses resolveClaudeBinary; eval:watch reads the real partials dir

judgePtyState spawned the bare string 'claude' three definitions below the
resolveClaudeBinary() helper this same file exports — broken under hermetic
PATHs where every other launch in the file resolves correctly.

eval:watch read _partial-e2e.json from the legacy global ~/.gstack-dev/evals/
while EvalCollector writes it into the per-project eval dir (or
GSTACK_EVAL_DIR) — so the dashboard's completed-tests panel was empty
whenever slug detection succeeded, i.e. the normal case. The heartbeat and
per-run progress logs stay global by design (session-runner.ts: 'heartbeat
stays global'). The three eval-CLI docstrings stop claiming the legacy dir
is the primary location.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(test): delete the superseded SDK ship-idempotency suite and three orphaned fixtures

test/skill-e2e-ship-idempotency.test.ts's own header documented that the
monolith's SDK-harness version tests a synthetic prompt while it exercises
the real /ship skill — the author knew the old suite was superseded and left
both running, two paid LLM runs for one behavior. The weaker copy is gone;
its 'ship-idempotency' diff-selection key goes with it (the dedicated file is
periodic-tier, which always runs under EVALS_ALL — the key had no remaining
consumer).

Fixture rot: test/fixtures/golden-ship-claude.md was a 128KB zero-reader
orphan that had drifted 46KB from its live successor
(test/fixtures/golden/claude-ship-SKILL.md) while looking authoritative;
parity-baseline-v1.46.0.0.json and v1.53.0.0.json had zero readers (three
tests pin three OTHER baseline versions — consolidation is queued, deletion
of the unreferenced two is free).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(bin): delete zero-caller scripts; make host-config-export's docstring honest

- bin/gstack-open-url (14 lines): announced in a CHANGELOG entry, wired into
  nothing, ever. bin/gstack-platform-detect (27 lines): zero callers, and its
  hand-rolled host list was already stale (SLATE_HOST.md cites it as a
  problem). Note: the deprecated gstack-brain-consumer/reader pair the audit
  flagged was already deleted upstream in v1.63 with a stay-deleted tripwire.
- scripts/task-emission-schema.ts (61 lines): a typed schema module nothing
  imported; the tasks-section comment now documents the JSONL fields inline.
- scripts/host-config-export.ts claimed to be the 'shell bridge for the bash
  setup script' — setup never calls it (its hand-rolled host lists drifting
  is a known follow-up). Docstring now states what it IS: a standalone,
  test-pinned query CLI not yet wired into setup. Its validateValue +
  CLI_REGEX/PATH_REGEX internals were dead (defined for a guarantee the
  header claimed but nothing enforced).
- KEPT deliberately: scripts/preflight-agent-sdk.ts — a documented manual
  diagnostic (CONTRIBUTING.md + USING_GBRAIN_WITH_GSTACK.md reference it).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(server): one lone-surrogate sanitizer, one sanitizeReplacer, one startTunnel

Three copies of the surrogate sanitizer existed with two algorithms
(sanitize.ts regex vs a hand-rolled charCodeAt walk in server.ts — verified
byte-identical across 11 edge cases before converging) plus two identical
sanitizeReplacer definitions each wrapping a different copy. sanitize.ts is
now the single source of truth; the runs-INSIDE-JSON.stringify egress
invariant is unchanged at every call site and its pin tests were adapted to
the new import shape without losing intent.

The ngrok tunnel-start sequence existed three times in server.ts — the
/tunnel/start route and the BROWSE_TUNNEL=1 autostart were line-for-line
equivalent (a comment admitted 'Same cleanup as /tunnel/start's error path').
One startTunnel() now owns the ephemeral loopback bind, the pre-send egress
receipt, the state-file RMW via tmpStatePath(), and the ordered error-path
cleanup; callers keep their distinct response surfaces. The
BROWSE_TUNNEL_LOCAL_ONLY test path shares nothing (no ngrok, different state
field) and deliberately stays separate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): one session-cookie registry implementation, two instances

pty-session-cookie.ts and sse-session-cookie.ts were byte-identical modulo
the cookie name — mint/validate/parse/prune/TTL, the exact code a security
fix would have to land in twice (and a third hand-rolled cookie parse in
terminal-agent.ts had already diverged; unified next commit).
createSessionCookieStore() owns the implementation; both modules become thin
instantiations keeping every exported name, their distinct threat-model
docstrings, and separate token spaces (an SSE-read cookie must never grant
PTY access). pty-session-lease.ts deliberately stays out — different contract
(sessionId/secret split, refresh, env TTL).

The factory imports nothing from token-registry (cookie-picker-auth-isolation
invariant, still pinned by sse-session-cookie.test.ts).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): terminal-agent uses the shared PTY cookie parser

The /ws upgrade's cookie fallback hand-parsed the Cookie header inline — the
fourth copy of the session-cookie parse, and the one that had already
diverged from the others. Parsing now goes through extractPtyCookie;
validation deliberately stays against the agent's own in-process validTokens
map (the server's registry lives in a different process). The ws-handler pin
test now pins the shared-parser call instead of the raw cookie-name literal.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(hosts): defineHost() factory — 10 copy-paste host files become declarations

hosts/*.ts were ten copies of one file: runtimeRoot byte-identical in 9/10,
pathRewrites mechanically derivable from the host name for 7/10, the 11-entry
toolRewrites map byte-identical between openclaw and gbrain, and every asset
change a 10-file edit (cursor and slate had already fallen out of three other
hand-maintained lists). defineHost() owns the defaults; each host file now
declares only what makes it different (slate/cursor: 8 lines each). Shared
constants: CROSS_MODEL_RESOLVERS, GBRAIN_RESOLVERS, EXEC_STYLE_TOOL_REWRITES.
Genuinely-different things stayed explicit: codex/factory $GSTACK_ROOT
rewrites, hermes's tool vocabulary, claude's denylist+prefixable install,
opencode's wider runtimeRoot.

Proof: JSON.stringify(ALL_HOST_CONFIGS) dump-diff before/after EMPTY (and a
runtime walk confirmed no function-valued or undefined-keyed fields, so the
JSON diff is complete); gen:skill-docs --host all zero-diff; host-config +
gen-skill-docs + idempotency suites 485/485. Host files 595 -> 285 lines.
docs/ADDING_A_HOST.md teaches the factory pattern.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(lib): fs-atomic — one atomic-write implementation, with the race actually fixed

Atomic tmp-write-then-rename was reimplemented ~20 times across lib/, bin/,
and browse/src with three tmp-suffix conventions. One of them was a latent
bug this commit closes: lib/worktree.ts used a bare '.tmp' suffix — the
deterministic-tmp collision race browse/src/server.ts documents having hit
in production (its fix, pid+random, was trapped in a comment at one site).

lib/fs-atomic.ts: atomicWriteSync (always throws, best-effort tmp cleanup,
pid+random suffix, optional mode applied at tmp creation so the file never
exists with looser permissions) + atomicWriteQuiet (shutdown paths only).
Unit tests pin the throw/quiet contracts, 0600 mode, tmp-name uniqueness
(captured via the read-only-dir failure path — Bun's fs exports are
readonly, no monkeypatching), and no-stray-tmp cleanup.

Migrated: lib/worktree.ts (the bare-.tmp bug), lib/gstack-decision.ts
(snapshot + compact log), lib/gbrain-local-status.ts (probe cache). browse
sites follow separately.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(lib): jsonl-store's docstring stops lying; mode option added; lib bypasses adopted

The header claimed 'single source of truth... the ONLY copy' with write-time
injection REJECTION — while appendJsonl never screened anything, only 1 of
~10 JSONL stores imported it, and a bypass appender lived in the same
directory. Now: the contract is explicit (screening is the CALLER's job via
hasInjection/firstInjectionMatch; the enforcing callers are named), a
option applies 0600 at create for sensitive stores, and the lib bypasses are
adopted (gstack-memory-helpers ×2, redact-audit-log — which keeps its chmod
backstop for files created looser by pre-mode versions). browse/src keeps
its own appenders by design (compiled-binary surface, own secure-append
helper) and the header now says so. gstack-decision's batched archive append
stays deliberate (single-write crash-window semantics appendJsonl's
one-record contract can't express).

New pins: 0600-at-create, and a test that documents appendJsonl does NOT
self-screen — so nobody can re-document it as self-screening without making
it true.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(browse): migrate hand-rolled atomic writes to lib/fs-atomic

Seven sites, each audited for its existing throw-vs-swallow contract before
migrating: writeSessionState + the four fire-and-forget tab/state writers use
atomicWriteQuiet (they swallowed before); writeAgentRecord + the boot-time
port-file write use atomicWriteSync (they threw before — and writeAgentRecord
previously leaked its tmp file on rename failure, which the helper cleans).
All carry {mode: 0o600} plus restrictFilePermissions after successful writes,
preserving the Windows ACL hardening that writeSecureFile provided (mode bits
are POSIX-only). server.ts untouched: its three state writes route through
tmpStatePath(), pinned by server-tmp-state-path.test.ts.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(hosts): delete five dead HostConfig fields

metadataFormat (generator hardcodes openai.yaml), sidecar (behavior lives in
setup's create_agents_sidecar — knowledge preserved as a comment in codex.ts),
install.prefixable (skill_prefix is implemented entirely in bin/gstack-config),
staticFiles (docstring cited a SOUL.md that never existed anywhere), and
adapter (its only would-be consumer, openclaw-adapter.ts, was fully dead —
with a test asserting the field was undefined). Kept: learningsMode (wired
next), linkingStrategy (validation reads it), coAuthorTrailer (consumed by
resolvers/utility.ts).

Proof: JSON dump diff shows ONLY the deleted keys vanishing; zero-diff regen
across all 10 hosts; host-config + gen-skill-docs suites green. Note: this
commit also carries chunk-23 edits to the shared hosts/claude.ts +
define-host.ts + host-config.test.ts files (skipSkills collapse, stale
line-number comment drops) — pathspec commits, concurrent prep.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(gen): preamble tiers are explicit; silent ?? 4 default becomes an error; spec stops rendering its preamble twice

Eight skills (scrape, diagram, spec, skillify, pair-agent, landing-report,
open-gstack-browser + its connect-chrome symlink) silently received the
HEAVIEST tier-4 preamble because a missing frontmatter field defaulted to 4.
Tiers are now declared in every {{PREAMBLE}} template's frontmatter and a
missing declaration throws at generation time with the template path (the 5
templates without {{PREAMBLE}} never invoke the resolver). The stale
hand-written tier-map comment (wrong in 3 of 4 rows) is gone.

Bonus bug fixed: spec/SKILL.md.tmpl mentioned {{PREAMBLE}} in prose, so the
generator inlined the ENTIRE preamble a second time — spec/SKILL.md shrinks
127,462 -> 80,924 bytes (-46,538) from de-duplication alone. skill-size-budget
gains a reasoned INTENTIONAL_SHRINKS entry (its frozen baseline had measured
the doubled-preamble bug). New tests: missing-tier throw carries the path;
every {{PREAMBLE}} template declares a tier. (Carries chunk-23 edits in the
shared test/gen-skill-docs.test.ts.)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(gen): learningsMode is read from host config, not a hardcoded host name

resolvers/learnings.ts branched on ctx.host === 'codex' while every host
declared learningsMode — the field was decorative, and the 7 hosts configured
'basic' (cursor, slate, kiro, opencode, openclaw, hermes, gbrain) silently
received the 'full' cross-project flow their runtimes can't execute (it
depends on AskUserQuestion + gstack-config plumbing). Output now matches
declaration: basic hosts get the project-scoped search block.

Blast radius proof: all committed Claude SKILL.md files and the three golden
fixtures are byte-identical; the behavior diff lands only in the gitignored
external-host trees (hand-verified: .cursor review's learnings section swaps
the cross-project AskUserQuestion block for the project-scoped search).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(gen): small config scrubs — openclaw blobs to real files, setup host drift, dead artifacts

- The three openclaw markdown blobs hardcoded inside gen-skill-docs.ts (which
  silently reverted any hand edit to their tracked outputs on regen) move to
  openclaw/templates/*.md source files; output shasums byte-identical.
- setup's --host allowlists gain cursor + slate — both fully registered hosts
  with generated output, but './setup --host cursor' exited 1 because two
  hand-rolled lists in setup had drifted from hosts/index.ts.
- scripts/proactive-suggestions.json deleted: 31KB regenerated on every run,
  read by nobody (the catalog-trim design's reader was never built); its
  emitter and three determinism tests (which guaranteed a file nothing reads
  didn't churn) retired with stays-retired pins.
- claude/SKILL.md.tmpl deleted: a complete 8.9KB skill that never generated
  output (directory name collides with the host id 'claude'), in no registry.
  Recoverable from git if ever wanted under a non-colliding name.
- openclaw's frozen extraFields.version '0.15.2.0' stamp dropped;
  includeSkills: [] no-ops omitted (the generator treats [] as absent);
  llms.txt 55 -> 54 skills.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(gen): correct preamble tiers for the 8 silently-heaviest skills

With tiers now explicit, set them RIGHT by analogy to the tiered population:
scrape/diagram/open-gstack-browser (+ the connect-chrome symlink) -> tier 1
(launchers and artifact generators, like browse and make-pdf);
landing-report/pair-agent/skillify -> tier 2 (dashboards and session tools,
like health and canary); spec -> tier 3 (interactive planning, like the
plan-*-review family). Each tier-1 skill sheds 271 lines of onboarding
prose it never needed; tier-2 shed 20 each.

Verification per the review protocol: regen diff reviewed (pure
section-removal), skill-validation + size-budget + catalog-budget +
v0-dormancy suites green (822 tests), and live smoke of the tier-corrected
skills confirms the preamble renders the intended sections at each tier.
These skills have ~no eval coverage — stated honestly; the wave's gate-tier
eval run is the backstop.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(test): e2e-gate — one tier-gate implementation, side-effect-free, with the trap pinned

The EVALS/EVALS_TIER gate was copy-pasted into ~40 test files and had drifted
into six different predicates — the drift that made 'eval:bg:all runs
everything' silently false. test/helpers/e2e-gate.ts owns the semantics now:
describeE2ETier(tier) + e2eTierEnabled(tier), env read at call time, zero
side effects (the existing e2e-helpers module runs a ~30s claude ping at
import under EVALS=1, so the gate lives in its own module; purity is pinned
by tests that scan imports and comment-stripped source).

The unit matrix pins all four env combos — including EVALS=1 with EVALS_TIER
unset -> SKIP, the exact trap that made eval:bg:all a non-run. The
tier-alignment tripwire gains a second regex for the helper shape (old shape
still detected — stragglers can't hide), and the sharded paid runner's
PRE-SPAWN tier classifier learns the helper shape too: without that, every
gate-sharded run would have spawned all 28 periodic shards just to skip them,
each paying the e2e-helpers import ping (~15 min of dead wall clock in the
CI-blocking lane). Verified: gate runs exclude the 29 periodic files,
periodic excludes the 8 gate files — identical to pre-migration.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(test): migrate the 36 tier-gated eval files to describeE2ETier

Mechanical two-liner swap in 34 files (each keeping its declared tier — all
36 predicates verified against E2E_TIERS before migrating); the two files
with compound gates (overlay-harness's EvalCollector feed, codex-e2e's
CODEX_AVAILABLE) keep their extra conditions via e2eTierEnabled. Tier
rationale comments preserved. codex-e2e/gemini-e2e/benchmark-providers keep
their distinct stderr-message gate shapes by design.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(test): skill-e2e + skill-llm-eval adopt the shared selection machinery

Both files re-implemented the diff-selection machinery e2e-helpers already
exported. The helper gained computeDiffSelection() (extracted, identical
behavior) and a trailing optional selection param on the *IfSelected helpers
(defaults preserve all 30+ existing importers). skill-e2e.test.ts drops ~120
duplicated lines; skill-llm-eval keeps its LLM_JUDGE_TOUCHFILES selection and
test.concurrent semantics via testConcurrentIfSelected.

Deliberate deltas, stated: skill-e2e.test.ts now honors the EVALS_TIER
intersection its local copy lacked (affects only direct bun test invocations
of that file — it matches no eval-script glob); its recordE2E gains the
helper's three diagnostic fields; skill-llm-eval sharded solo now runs
e2e-helpers' module-scope preflight it already ran in combined processes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(test): kill the silent-truncation race; exempt the tier-corrected shrinks

The full-suite shakeout (budgeted by the plan) surfaced both immediately:

1. server-embedder-terminal-port.test.ts stubbed process.exit and restored
   the REAL exit in its finally — but shutdown() schedules async work that
   can call process.exit AFTER restoration, killing the entire bun process
   mid-suite with exit 0 and NO summary. This is the silent-truncation class
   the new free-suite CI job guards against, reproduced locally on the first
   full run. Exit now stays a logging no-op between tests (late async exits
   become visible stderr lines, not process death); the true exit returns in
   afterAll.

2. The 80%-of-baseline shrink guard correctly flagged the six tier-corrected
   skills — their baseline was measured at the silent tier-4 default. Added
   to INTENTIONAL_SHRINKS with the reason, joining spec's double-preamble
   entry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* release: v1.64.0.0 — the code-smell fix wave

35 commits, one PR: guard repairs (free suite in CI per-file, all-host
freshness gates, tunnel allowlist, diff-selection validation), the
sidebar-agent ghost exorcism (dead ML layers, dead endpoints, dead exports,
ghost comments), config honesty (defineHost factory, dead fields deleted,
preamble tiers explicit, spec double-render fixed), and dedup with safety
nets (session-cookie factory, fs-atomic, jsonl-store contract, one eval
tier-gate). Net -24,943 lines across 183 files.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(ci): free-tests step runs under bash (container sh rejects pipefail)

Maiden-voyage shakeout, exactly as budgeted: the CI container's default
shell is dash, which errors on 'set -o pipefail' before the first test ran.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(ci): free-tests curates 8 container-incompatible files with reasons

Second maiden-voyage shakeout round: 376 of 384 files ran green in the
container on the first completed pass. The 8 that can't run there yet are
excluded the same way the Windows shards curate POSIX-bound files — each
with its reason inline (headed-Chrome handoff, real-PTY round-trip, X server
management, extension-origin identity, the job's own TMPDIR override, and
three pre-existing env failures that fail on dev machines too). Anything
outside the list that fails still fails the job; trimming the list is
tracked follow-up.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(test): gstack-config-key-locale — suppress the skill_prefix auto-relink side effect

The test invokes the repo's own bin/gstack-config, whose 'set skill_prefix'
auto-runs $(dirname $0)/gstack-relink — resolving the install dir to the
repo itself. In any environment where the loop shares a working tree (the
free-tests CI container, a fresh-HOME run), gstack-patch-names rewrote all
52 tracked SKILL.md names to gstack- prefixed, poisoning five unrelated
suites downstream (hermetic-skills-seeding, host-config golden, skill-census,
skill-validation, spec-template-sync). GSTACK_SETUP_RUNNING=1 is the
documented suppression; relink behavior stays covered by relink.test.ts's
mock install.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(bin): gstack-codex-session-import — empty sessions dir exits 0 on Linux

GNU xargs runs 'ls -t' once even on empty input, listing the cwd and
producing a bogus LATEST from the repo root; BSD xargs (macOS) skips the
run, which is why the NO_SESSIONS path only broke on Linux. xargs -r pins
the BSD behavior on both platforms.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(parity): rebaseline v1.57.7.0 → v1.64.1.0 + skeleton-cap headroom

The two parallel v1.64 waves (code-smell fix wave + main's #2571) each
added shared-preamble prose, pushing document-release / design-consultation
/ cso past their size ratios on the v1.57.7.0 anchor and four carved
skeletons (plan-ceo-review, plan-eng-review, office-hours,
design-consultation) 22-280 B over their absolute caps. New baseline is
union-normalized (skeleton + sections/*.md, matching what the harness
measures); caps get +~1 KB headroom each with per-cap rationale. The
v1.57.7.0 fixture stays in test/fixtures/ for the audit trail, and
capture-parity-baseline.ts now documents the union-normalization step so
the next rebaseline doesn't re-trip on it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(ci): free-tests container parity — tools, pinned bun, git identity, mutation tripwire

- Dockerfile.ci: add python3 (gstack-jsonl-merge/brain-sync/detach shell out
  to it), file (skill-validation's binary check), poppler-utils (make-pdf
  e2e gates hard-require pdftotext/pdffonts/pdfinfo), fonts-noto-color-emoji
  (emoji render gate, mirrors make-pdf-gate.yml). Fix the bun pin: the
  bun.sh installer ignores a BUN_VERSION env var, so the old form silently
  installed latest on every rebuild (observed 1.3.13/1.3.14 drift vs the
  1.3.10 devs run locally); pass the version as the positional arg.
- free-tests.yml: git identity + safe.directory for the git-exercising
  tests (container checkout is owned by a different uid than runner);
  post-loop tree-mutation tripwire that names a tracked-file-mutating test
  instead of letting downstream collateral confuse the report; skip the
  documented variants-retry-after timing flake.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(bin): gstack-session-update — detached updater owns its stdio (SIGPIPE)

The backgrounded update subshell inherited the session hook's stdout/stderr
pipes. Once the hook exits and the caller closes them, any child that writes
— git pull's autostash notice, setup output — dies of SIGPIPE, logged as
PULL_FAILED exit=141 with an empty stderr capture (observed in the free-tests
container, and reachable by any production hook runner that closes stdio
promptly). Redirect the fork to /dev/null; all observability already flows
through the session-update log file.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(test): gstack-decision-bins — explicit branch context for the scope filter

CI checks out a detached HEAD, where gitBranch() returns undefined on both
the log and search sides, so an implicitly branch-scoped decision can never
surface (filterByScope requires a matching non-empty ctx.branch). Pass the
branch explicitly on both sides — the filter logic is what's under test, not
git branch detection.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(test): ring-buffer lease interplay — same TTL window, not same millisecond

Two back-to-back mintLease() calls each stamp Date.now() + TTL; when they
straddle a millisecond boundary the exact-equality assertion flakes
(observed in CI: expiries of ...525 vs ...526). Assert the expiries are
within a 50 ms window instead — the invariant under test is that leases
share a TTL policy, not that they mint in the same clock tick.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-15 09:37:04 -07:00

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# Browser — Complete Reference
gstack's browser surface in one document. Headless Chromium daemon, ~70+
commands, ref-based element selection, codifiable browser-skills, real-browser
mode with a Chrome side panel, an in-sidebar Claude PTY, an ngrok pair-agent
flow, and a layered prompt-injection defense — all behind a compiled CLI that
prints plain text to stdout. ~100-200ms per call. Zero context-token overhead.
If you've used gstack in the last release or two, the productivity loop is the
new headline: `/scrape <intent>` drives a page once, `/skillify` codifies the
flow into a deterministic Playwright script, and the next `/scrape` on the
same intent runs in ~200ms instead of ~30 seconds of agent re-exploration.
---
## Quick start
```bash
# One-time: build the binary (browse/dist/browse, ~58MB)
bun install && bun run build
# Set $B once and forget about it
B=./browse/dist/browse # or ~/.claude/skills/gstack/browse/dist/browse
# Drive a page
$B goto https://news.ycombinator.com
$B snapshot -i # @e refs you can click/fill/inspect later
$B click @e30 # click ref 30 from the snapshot
$B text # get clean page text
$B screenshot /tmp/hn.png
# Codify a repeated flow
/scrape latest hacker news stories
/skillify # writes ~/.gstack/browser-skills/hn-front/...
/scrape hacker news front page # second call: 200ms via the codified skill
# Watch Claude work in real time
$B connect # headed Chromium + Side Panel extension
```
---
## Table of contents
1. [What it is](#what-it-is)
2. [The productivity loop — `/scrape` + `/skillify`](#the-productivity-loop)
3. [Architecture](#architecture)
4. [Command reference](#command-reference)
5. [Snapshot system + ref-based selection](#snapshot-system)
6. [Browser-skills runtime](#browser-skills-runtime)
7. [Domain-skills (per-site agent notes)](#domain-skills)
8. [Real-browser mode (`$B connect`)](#real-browser-mode) — including [`--headed` + `--proxy` + `--navigate` (v1.28.0.0)](#headed-mode--proxy--browser-native-downloads-v12800)
9. [Side Panel + sidebar agent](#side-panel--sidebar-agent)
10. [Pair-agent — remote agents over an ngrok tunnel](#pair-agent)
11. [Authentication + tokens](#authentication)
12. [Prompt-injection security stack (L1L6)](#security-stack)
13. [Screenshots, PDFs, visual inspection](#screenshots-pdfs-visual)
14. [Local HTML — `goto file://` vs `load-html`](#local-html)
15. [Batch endpoint](#batch-endpoint)
16. [Console, network, dialog capture](#capture)
17. [JS execution — `js` + `eval`](#js-execution)
18. [Tabs, frames, state, watch, inbox](#tabs-frames-state)
19. [CDP escape hatch + CSS inspector](#cdp)
20. [Performance + scale](#performance)
21. [Multi-workspace isolation](#multi-workspace)
22. [Environment variables](#environment-variables)
23. [Source map](#source-map)
24. [Development + testing](#development)
25. [Cross-references](#cross-references)
26. [Acknowledgments](#acknowledgments)
---
## What it is
A compiled CLI binary that talks to a persistent local Chromium daemon over
HTTP. The CLI is a thin client — it reads a state file, sends a command,
prints the response to stdout. The daemon does the real work via
[Playwright](https://playwright.dev/).
Everything that was a Chrome MCP server in the early days now happens through
plain stdout. No JSON-schema framing, no protocol negotiation, no persistent
WebSocket — Claude's Bash tool already exists, so we use it.
Three escalating modes:
- **Headless** (default). Daemon runs Chromium with no visible window. Fastest,
cheapest, what skills like `/qa`, `/design-review`, `/benchmark` use by
default.
- **Headed via `$B connect`**. Same daemon, but Chromium is visible (rebranded
as "GStack Browser") with the Side Panel extension auto-loaded. You watch
every command tick through in real time.
- **Pair-agent over a tunnel**. Daemon binds a second listener that ngrok
forwards. A remote agent (Codex, OpenClaw, Hermes, anything that can speak
HTTP) drives your local browser through a 26-command allowlist with a
scoped, single-use token.
---
## The productivity loop
The shipped headline of v1.19.0.0. Two gstack skills wrap the browser-skills
runtime so the second time you ask Claude to scrape a page, it runs in ~200ms.
### `/scrape <intent>`
One entry point for pulling page data. Three paths under the hood:
1. **Match path (~200ms)** — agent runs `$B skill list`, semantically matches
the intent against each skill's `triggers:` array + `description` + `host`,
and runs `$B skill run <name>` if a confident match exists.
2. **Prototype path (~30s)** — no match, agent drives the page with `$B goto`,
`$B text`, `$B html`, `$B links`, etc., returns the JSON, and appends a
one-line "say `/skillify`" suggestion.
3. **Mutating-intent refusal** — verbs like *submit*, *click*, *fill* route
to `/automate` (Phase 2b, P0 in `TODOS.md`). `/scrape` is read-only by
contract.
### `/skillify`
Codifies the most recent successful `/scrape` prototype into a permanent
browser-skill on disk. Eleven steps, three locked contracts:
- **D1 — Provenance guard.** Walks back ≤10 agent turns for a clearly-bounded
`/scrape` result. Refuses with one specific message if cold. No silent
synthesis from chat fragments.
- **D2 — Synthesis input slice.** Extracts ONLY the final-attempt `$B` calls
that produced the JSON the user accepted, plus the user's intent string.
Drops failed selectors, drops chat, drops earlier-session content.
- **D3 — Atomic write.** Stages everything to `~/.gstack/.tmp/skillify-<spawnId>/`,
runs `$B skill test` against the temp dir, and only renames into the final
tier path on test pass + user approval. Test fail or rejection: `rm -rf` the
temp dir entirely. No half-written skill ever appears in `$B skill list`.
Mutating-flow sibling `/automate` is split out as P0 in `TODOS.md` and ships
on the next branch — same skillify machinery, per-mutating-step confirmation
gate when running non-codified.
See [`docs/designs/BROWSER_SKILLS_V1.md`](docs/designs/BROWSER_SKILLS_V1.md)
for the full design + decision trail.
---
## Architecture
```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Claude Code │
│ │
│ $B goto https://staging.myapp.com │
│ │ │
│ ▼ │
│ ┌──────────┐ HTTP POST ┌──────────────┐ │
│ │ browse │ ──────────────── │ Bun HTTP │ │
│ │ CLI │ 127.0.0.1:rand │ daemon │ │
│ │ │ Bearer token │ │ │
│ │ compiled │ ◄────────────── │ Playwright │──── Chromium │
│ │ binary │ plain text │ API calls │ (headless │
│ └──────────┘ └──────────────┘ or headed) │
│ ~1ms startup persistent daemon │
│ auto-starts on first call │
│ auto-stops after 30 min idle │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```
### Daemon lifecycle
1. **First call.** CLI checks `<project>/.gstack/browse.json` for a running
server. None found — it spawns `bun run browse/src/server.ts` in the
background. Daemon launches headless Chromium via Playwright, picks a
random port (1000060000), generates a bearer token, writes the state
file (chmod 600), starts accepting requests. ~3 seconds.
2. **Subsequent calls.** CLI reads the state file, sends an HTTP POST with
the bearer token, prints the response. ~100-200ms round trip.
3. **Idle shutdown.** After 30 minutes of no commands, daemon shuts down and
cleans up the state file. Next call restarts it.
4. **Crash recovery.** If Chromium crashes, the daemon exits immediately —
no self-healing, don't hide failure. CLI detects the dead daemon on the
next call and starts a fresh one.
### Multi-workspace isolation
Each project root (detected via `git rev-parse --show-toplevel`) gets its
own daemon, port, state file, cookies, and logs. No cross-workspace
collisions. State at `<project>/.gstack/browse.json`.
| Workspace | State file | Port |
|-----------|-----------|------|
| `/code/project-a` | `/code/project-a/.gstack/browse.json` | random (1000060000) |
| `/code/project-b` | `/code/project-b/.gstack/browse.json` | random (1000060000) |
---
## Command reference
~70 commands across read, write, and meta. Selectors accept CSS, `@e` refs
from `snapshot`, or `@c` refs from `snapshot -C`. Full table:
### Reading
| Command | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| `text [sel]` | Clean page text (or scoped to a selector) |
| `html [sel]` | innerHTML, or full page HTML if no selector |
| `links` | All links as `text → href` |
| `forms` | Form fields as JSON |
| `accessibility` | Full ARIA tree |
| `media [--images\|--videos\|--audio] [sel]` | Media elements with URLs, dimensions, types |
| `data [--jsonld\|--og\|--meta\|--twitter]` | Structured data: JSON-LD, OG, Twitter Cards, meta tags |
### Inspection
| Command | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| `js <expr> [--out <file>] [--raw]` | Run inline JavaScript expression in page context, return as string. With `--out <file>` the result is written to disk instead of returned (a `data:*;base64,...` result is decoded to raw bytes unless `--raw`). `--out` makes the invocation a WRITE (needs `write` scope, never allowed over the tunnel). |
| `eval <file> [--out <file>] [--raw]` | Run JS from a file (path under /tmp or cwd; same sandbox as `js`). `--out`/`--raw` behave as for `js`. |
| `css <sel> <prop>` | Computed CSS value |
| `attrs <sel\|@ref>` | Element attributes as JSON |
| `is <prop> <sel\|@ref>` | State check: visible, hidden, enabled, disabled, checked, editable, focused |
| `console [--clear\|--errors]` | Captured console messages |
| `network [--clear]` | Captured network requests |
| `dialog [--clear]` | Captured dialog messages |
| `cookies` | All cookies as JSON |
| `storage` / `storage set <key> <val>` | Read both localStorage + sessionStorage; set localStorage |
| `perf` | Page load timings |
| `inspect [sel] [--all] [--history]` | Deep CSS via CDP — full rule cascade, box model, computed styles |
| `ux-audit` | Page structure for behavioral analysis: site ID, nav, headings, text blocks, interactive elements |
| `cdp <Domain.method> [json-params]` | Raw CDP method dispatch (deny-default; allowlist in `cdp-allowlist.ts`) |
### Navigation
| Command | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| `goto <url>` | Navigate to URL (`http://`, `https://`, `file://`) |
| `load-html <file>` | Load local HTML in memory (no `file://` URL; survives viewport scale changes) |
| `back`, `forward`, `reload` | Standard nav |
| `url` | Current page URL |
| `wait <sel\|--networkidle\|--load>` | Wait for element, network idle, or page load (15s timeout) |
### Interaction
| Command | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| `click <sel\|@ref>` | Click element |
| `fill <sel> <val>` | Fill input |
| `select <sel> <val>` | Select dropdown option (value, label, or visible text) |
| `hover <sel>` | Hover element |
| `type <text>` | Type into focused element |
| `press <key>` | Playwright keyboard key (case-sensitive: Enter, Tab, ArrowUp, Shift+Enter, Control+A, ...) |
| `scroll [sel\|@ref]` | Scroll element into view, or jump to page bottom if no selector |
| `viewport [<WxH>] [--scale <n>]` | Set viewport size + optional `deviceScaleFactor` 1-3 (retina screenshots) |
| `upload <sel> <file> [...]` | Upload file(s) |
| `dialog-accept [text]` | Auto-accept next alert/confirm/prompt; text is sent for prompts |
| `dialog-dismiss` | Auto-dismiss next dialog |
### Style + cleanup
| Command | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| `style <sel> <prop> <val>` | Modify CSS property (with undo support) |
| `style --undo [N]` | Undo last N style changes |
| `cleanup [--ads\|--cookies\|--sticky\|--social\|--all]` | Remove page clutter |
| `prettyscreenshot [--scroll-to <sel\|text>] [--cleanup] [--hide <sel>...] [path]` | Clean screenshot with optional cleanup, scroll, hide |
### Visual
| Command | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| `screenshot [--selector <css>] [--viewport] [--clip x,y,w,h] [--base64] [sel\|@ref] [path]` | Five modes: full page, viewport, element crop, region clip, base64 |
| `pdf [path] [--format letter\|a4\|legal] [...]` | PDF with full layout: format, width/height, margins, header/footer templates, page numbers, --tagged for accessibility, --toc waits for Paged.js |
| `responsive [prefix]` | Three screenshots: mobile (375x812), tablet (768x1024), desktop (1280x720) |
| `diff <url1> <url2>` | Text diff between two URLs |
### Cookies + headers
| Command | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| `cookie <name>=<value>` | Set cookie on current page domain |
| `cookie-import <json>` | Import cookies from JSON file |
| `cookie-import-browser [browser] [--domain d]` | Import from installed Chromium browsers (interactive picker, or `--domain` for direct import) |
| `header <name>:<value>` | Set custom request header (sensitive values auto-redacted) |
| `useragent <string>` | Set user agent (triggers context recreation, invalidates refs) |
### Tabs + frames
| Command | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| `tabs` | List open tabs |
| `tab <id>` | Switch to tab |
| `newtab [url] [--json]` | Open new tab; `--json` returns `{tabId, url}` for programmatic use |
| `closetab [id]` | Close tab |
| `tab-each <command> [args...]` | Fan out a command across every open tab; returns JSON |
| `frame <sel\|@ref\|--name n\|--url pattern\|main>` | Switch to iframe context (or back to main); clears refs |
### Extraction
| Command | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| `download <url\|@ref> [path] [--base64]` | Download URL or media element using browser cookies |
| `scrape <images\|videos\|media> [--selector] [--dir] [--limit]` | Bulk download all media from page; writes `manifest.json` |
| `archive [path]` | Save complete page as MHTML via CDP |
### Snapshot
| Command | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| `snapshot [-i] [-c] [-d N] [-s sel] [-D] [-a] [-o path] [-C]` | Accessibility tree with `@e` refs; `-i` interactive only, `-c` compact, `-d N` depth, `-s` scope, `-D` diff vs previous, `-a` annotated screenshot, `-C` cursor-interactive `@c` refs |
### Server lifecycle
| Command | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| `status` | Daemon health + mode (headless / headed / cdp) |
| `stop` | Shut down daemon |
| `restart` | Restart daemon |
| `connect` | Launch headed GStack Browser with Side Panel extension |
| `disconnect` | Close headed Chrome, return to headless |
| `focus [@ref]` | Bring headed Chrome to foreground (macOS); `@ref` also scrolls into view |
| `state save\|load <name>` | Save or load browser state (cookies + URLs) |
| `memory [--json]` | Snapshot Bun heap + per-tab JS heap + Chromium process tree + bounded buffer sizes. Use `--json` for programmatic consumers; text mode renders sorted top-10 tabs with "and N more" tail. |
### Handoff
| Command | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| `handoff [reason]` | Open visible Chrome at current page for user takeover (CAPTCHA, MFA, complex auth) |
| `resume` | Re-snapshot after user takeover, return control to AI |
### Meta + chains
| Command | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| `chain` (JSON via stdin) | Run a sequence of commands. Pipe `[["cmd","arg1",...],...]` to `$B chain`. Stops at first error. |
| `inbox [--clear]` | List messages from sidebar scout inbox |
| `watch [stop]` | Passive observation — periodic snapshots while user browses; `stop` returns summary |
### Browser-skills runtime
| Command | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| `skill list` | List all browser-skills with resolved tier (project > global > bundled) |
| `skill show <name>` | Print SKILL.md |
| `skill run <name> [--arg k=v...] [--timeout=Ns]` | Spawn the skill script with a per-spawn scoped token |
| `skill test <name>` | Run the skill's `script.test.ts` against bundled fixtures |
| `skill rm <name> [--global]` | Tombstone a user-tier skill |
### Domain-skills
| Command | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| `domain-skill save\|list\|show\|edit\|promote-to-global\|rollback\|rm <host?>` | Per-site agent notes (host derived from active tab). Lifecycle: quarantined → active (after N=3 successful uses without classifier flag) → global (explicit promote) |
Aliases: `setcontent`, `set-content`, `setContent``load-html` (canonicalized
before scope checks, so a read-scoped token can't use the alias to run a
write command).
---
## Snapshot system
The browser's key innovation is **ref-based element selection** built on
Playwright's accessibility tree API. No DOM mutation. No injected scripts.
Just Playwright's native AX API.
### How `@ref` works
1. `page.locator(scope).ariaSnapshot()` returns a YAML-like accessibility tree.
2. The snapshot parser assigns refs (`@e1`, `@e2`, ...) to each element.
3. For each ref, it builds a Playwright `Locator` (using `getByRole` + nth-child).
4. The ref→Locator map is stored on `BrowserManager`.
5. Later commands like `click @e3` look up the Locator and call `locator.click()`.
### Ref staleness detection
SPAs can mutate the DOM without navigation (React router, tab switches,
modals). When this happens, refs collected from a previous `snapshot` may
point to elements that no longer exist. `resolveRef()` runs an async
`count()` check before using any ref — if the element count is 0, it throws
immediately with a message telling the agent to re-run `snapshot`. Fails fast
(~5ms) instead of waiting for Playwright's 30-second action timeout.
### Extended snapshot features
- **`--diff` (`-D`).** Stores each snapshot as a baseline. On the next `-D`
call, returns a unified diff showing what changed. Use this to verify that
an action (click, fill, etc.) actually worked.
- **`--annotate` (`-a`).** Injects temporary overlay divs at each ref's
bounding box, takes a screenshot with ref labels visible, then removes the
overlays. Use `-o <path>` to control the output.
- **`--cursor-interactive` (`-C`).** Scans for non-ARIA interactive elements
(divs with `cursor:pointer`, `onclick`, `tabindex>=0`) using `page.evaluate`.
Assigns `@c1`, `@c2`... refs with deterministic `nth-child` CSS selectors.
These are elements the ARIA tree misses but users can still click.
---
## Browser-skills runtime
Per-task directories that codify a repeated browser flow into a deterministic
Playwright script. The compounding layer.
### Anatomy of a browser-skill
```
browser-skills/<name>/
├── SKILL.md # frontmatter + prose contract
├── script.ts # deterministic Playwright-via-browse-client logic
├── _lib/browse-client.ts # vendored copy of the SDK (~3KB, byte-identical to canonical)
├── fixtures/<host>-<date>.html # captured page for fixture-replay tests
└── script.test.ts # parser tests against the fixture (no daemon required)
```
The bundled reference is `browser-skills/hackernews-frontpage/`: scrapes the
HN front page, returns 30 stories as JSON. Try it:
```bash
$B skill list # shows hackernews-frontpage (bundled)
$B skill show hackernews-frontpage
$B skill run hackernews-frontpage # JSON of 30 stories in ~200ms
$B skill test hackernews-frontpage # runs script.test.ts against fixture
```
### Three-tier storage
`$B skill list` walks all three in priority order; first hit wins. Resolved
tier is printed inline next to each skill name:
| Tier | Path | When |
|------|------|------|
| **Project** | `<project>/.gstack/browser-skills/<name>/` | Project-specific skills (committed or gitignored) |
| **Global** | `~/.gstack/browser-skills/<name>/` | Per-user skills, all projects |
| **Bundled** | `<gstack-install>/browser-skills/<name>/` | Ships with gstack, read-only |
### Trust model
Two orthogonal axes — daemon-side capability and process-side env — independently
configured.
| Axis | Mechanism | Default |
|------|-----------|---------|
| **Daemon-side capability** | Per-spawn scoped token bound to read+write scope (browser-driving commands minus admin: `eval`, `js`, `cookies`, `storage`). Single-use clientId encodes skill name + spawn id. Revoked when spawn exits. | Always scoped — never the daemon root token |
| **Process-side env** | `trusted: true` frontmatter passes `process.env` minus `GSTACK_TOKEN`. `trusted: false` (default) drops everything except a minimal allowlist (LANG, LC_ALL, TERM, TZ) and pattern-strips secrets (TOKEN/KEY/SECRET/PASSWORD, AWS_*, ANTHROPIC_*, OPENAI_*, GITHUB_*, etc.) | Untrusted (must opt in) |
`GSTACK_PORT` and `GSTACK_SKILL_TOKEN` are injected last, so a parent process
can't override them.
### Output protocol
stdout = JSON. stderr = streaming logs. Exit 0 / non-zero. Default 60s
timeout, override via `--timeout=Ns`. Max stdout 1MB (truncate + non-zero
exit if exceeded). Matches `gh` / `kubectl` / `docker` conventions.
### How the SDK distribution works
Each skill ships its own copy of `browse-client.ts` at `_lib/browse-client.ts`,
byte-identical to the canonical `browse/src/browse-client.ts`. `/skillify`
copies the canonical SDK alongside every generated script. Each skill is
fully self-contained: copy the directory anywhere, it runs. Version drift
impossible — the SDK is frozen at the version the skill was authored against.
### Atomic write discipline (`/skillify` D3)
`browse/src/browser-skill-write.ts` provides three primitives:
- `stageSkill(opts)` — writes files to `~/.gstack/.tmp/skillify-<spawnId>/<name>/`
with restrictive perms.
- `commitSkill(opts)` — atomic `fs.renameSync` into the final tier path.
Refuses to follow symlinked staging dirs (`lstat` check), refuses to
clobber existing skills, runs `realpath` discipline on the tier root.
- `discardStaged(stagedDir)``rm -rf` the staged dir + per-spawn wrapper.
Idempotent. Called on test failure or approval rejection.
There is no "almost shipped" state. Tests pass + user approves = atomic
rename. Tests fail or user rejects = staging vanishes.
See [`docs/designs/BROWSER_SKILLS_V1.md`](docs/designs/BROWSER_SKILLS_V1.md)
for the full design rationale.
---
## Domain-skills
Different mental model from browser-skills: agent-authored *notes* about a
site (not deterministic scripts). One per hostname. Lifecycle:
1. `domain-skill save <host>` — agent writes a note about the site (e.g.,
"GitHub: PR creation needs `--draft` flag for non-staff", "X.com: timeline
uses cursor pagination, not page numbers"). Default state: **quarantined**.
2. After **N=3** successful uses without the L4 prompt-injection classifier
flagging the note, it auto-promotes to **active**.
3. `domain-skill promote-to-global <host>` lifts it to the global tier
(machine-wide, all projects).
4. `domain-skill rollback <host>` demotes; `domain-skill rm <host>` tombstones.
The classifier flag is set automatically by the L4 prompt-injection scan;
agents do not set it manually.
Storage:
- Per-project: `<project>/.gstack/domain-skills/<host>.md`
- Global: `~/.gstack/domain-skills/<host>.md`
Source: `browse/src/domain-skills.ts`, `domain-skill-commands.ts`.
---
## Real-browser mode
`$B connect` launches **GStack Browser** — a rebranded Chromium controlled by
Playwright with the Side Panel extension auto-loaded and anti-bot stealth
patches applied. You watch every command tick through a visible window in
real time.
```bash
$B connect # launches GStack Browser, headed
$B goto https://app.com # navigates in the visible window
$B snapshot -i # refs from the real page
$B click @e3 # clicks in the real window
$B focus # bring window to foreground (macOS)
$B status # shows Mode: cdp
$B disconnect # back to headless mode
```
The window has a subtle golden shimmer line at the top and a floating
"gstack" pill in the bottom-right corner so you always know which Chrome
window is being controlled.
### What "GStack Browser" means
Not your daily Chrome — a Playwright-managed Chromium with custom branding
in the Dock and menu bar (the `.app` name, Dock icon, and tray, NOT the UA
string), always-on Layer C anti-bot stealth (most JS-observable automation
tells are masked, so many anti-bot-protected sites load cleanly), a
stock-Chrome user agent that reports the underlying Chromium version, and the
gstack extension pre-loaded via `launchPersistentContext`. The UA no longer
carries a `GStackBrowser` suffix — that branding string was itself a
high-entropy tell, so the browser now reports a plain `Chrome/<version>` UA.
Deepest-layer CDP-protocol detection still gets through (Google can still
trigger captchas; see the CDP-patch item in `TODOS.md`). Your regular Chrome
with your tabs and bookmarks stays untouched.
### When to use headed mode
- **QA testing** where you want to watch Claude click through your app
- **Design review** where you need to see exactly what Claude sees
- **Debugging** where headless behavior differs from real Chrome
- **Demos** where you're sharing your screen
- **Pair-agent** sessions (the remote agent drives your local browser)
### CDP-aware skills
When in real-browser mode, `/qa` and `/design-review` automatically skip
cookie import prompts and headless workarounds — the headed browser already
has whatever session you logged into.
### Headed mode + proxy + browser-native downloads (v1.28.0.0)
Three coordinated flags for sites that block headless browsers, fingerprint
Playwright defaults, or sit behind authenticated upstream proxies:
```bash
# Visible Chromium. Auto-spawns Xvfb on Linux containers without DISPLAY.
$B --headed goto https://example.com
# SOCKS5 with auth — Chromium can't prompt for SOCKS5 creds, so $B runs a
# local 127.0.0.1 bridge that handles the auth handshake.
$B --proxy socks5://user:pass@residential.proxy.host:1080 goto https://example.com
# HTTP/HTTPS proxy passes through to Chromium directly.
$B --proxy http://corp-proxy:3128 goto https://example.com
# Browser-native download for Content-Disposition, redirect chains, anti-bot
# CDNs where page.request.fetch() falls over.
$B download "https://protected.example.com/file" /tmp/file.bin --navigate
# Combined.
$B --headed --proxy socks5://user:pass@host:1080 \
download "https://protected.example.com/file" /tmp/file.bin --navigate
```
**Credential policy.** Pass creds via the URL (`socks5://user:pass@host`) OR
the env vars `BROWSE_PROXY_USER` / `BROWSE_PROXY_PASS` — never both. `$B`
refuses with a clear hint when both are set; silent override created
"works on my machine" debugging traps.
**Daemon discipline.** `--proxy` and `--headed` are daemon-startup config.
A running daemon with config A meeting a new invocation with config B exits
1 with a `browse disconnect` hint instead of silently restarting and dropping
tab state, cookies, or sessions.
**Stealth scope (Layer C, always on).** Every context — headless `launch`,
`--headed`/`--proxy`, `handoff`, and the `useragent`/`viewport --scale`
rebuild (`recreateContext`) — gets the full Layer C mask, no opt-in flag.
Layer C masks `navigator.webdriver`, restores the `window.chrome.*` shape
(`runtime`, `app`, `csi`, `loadTimes`), aligns `Notification.permission`
with the Permissions API, reports a per-install
`hardwareConcurrency`/`deviceMemory` from the host profile, sweeps the known
Selenium/Phantom/Nightmare/Playwright globals, and installs a
`Function.prototype.toString` proxy so every patched getter reports
`[native code]` even under the depth-3 recursion check. It still does NOT
fake `navigator.plugins` or `navigator.languages` — modern fingerprinters
cross-check those for consistency, and synthesizing fixed values flags MORE
bot-like, not less. ChromeDriver's `cdc_`/`__webdriver` runtime artifacts and
the Permissions notifications tell are also cleaned up on every path.
`GSTACK_STEALTH=extended` (also accepts `1` or `true`; off by default) layers
six more aggressive patches on top — WebGL renderer spoof, a faked
`navigator.plugins` PluginArray, `navigator.mediaDevices`. That mode actively
lies and can break sites that reflect on those properties; use it only when
the default triggers detection. For gbrowser builds with the C++ patches, the
`GSTACK_*` host-profile env (GPU vendor/renderer, UA-CH platform/model,
hardware) emits the Pack 1 `--gstack-gpu-vendor` / `--gstack-gpu-renderer` /
`--gstack-ua-platform` / `--gstack-ua-model` / `--gstack-hw-concurrency` /
`--gstack-device-memory` switches that push the GPU/UA-CH/hardware spoof down
to native code, and `GSTACK_CDP_STEALTH=on` (or `1`/`true`) emits the Pack 2
`--gstack-suppress-prepare-stack-trace` switch (closes the Cloudflare
`Error.prepareStackTrace` canary). On stock Playwright Chromium every one of
these switches is a safe no-op.
`launchHeaded` / `handoff` also strip Playwright's automation-tell launch
defaults via `ignoreDefaultArgs` (`STEALTH_IGNORE_DEFAULT_ARGS`):
`--enable-automation` (the "Chrome is being controlled by automated test
software" infobar), `--disable-extensions`,
`--disable-component-extensions-with-background-pages`,
`--disable-popup-blocking`, `--disable-component-update`, and
`--disable-default-apps`.
**Container support.** `--headed` on Linux without `DISPLAY` walks the
display range (`:99`, `:100`, ...) until `xdpyinfo` reports a free slot,
then spawns Xvfb. Cleanup-on-disconnect validates the recorded PID's
`/proc/<pid>/cmdline` matches `Xvfb` AND start-time matches before sending
any signal — no PID-reuse footguns. Skips spawn entirely when
`WAYLAND_DISPLAY` is set (Chromium uses Wayland natively). Standard
Debian/Ubuntu containers work out of the box; minimal images (alpine,
distroless) may need fonts/dbus/gtk libs for headed Chromium to render.
**Failure modes.** SOCKS5 upstream rejected or unreachable — fail-fast at
startup with a redacted error after 3 retries (5s budget). Mid-stream
upstream drop — bridge kills the affected client connection only; no
transport retries that could corrupt browser traffic.
---
## Side Panel + sidebar agent
The Chrome extension that ships baked into GStack Browser shows a live
activity feed of every browse command in a Side Panel, plus `@ref` overlays
on the page, plus an interactive Claude PTY inside the sidebar.
### The Terminal pane (the headline)
The Side Panel's primary surface is the **Terminal pane** — a live `claude -p`
PTY you can type into directly from the sidebar. Activity / Refs / Inspector
are debug overlays behind the footer's `debug` toggle. WebSocket auth uses
`Sec-WebSocket-Protocol` (browsers can't set `Authorization` on a WebSocket
upgrade), and the PTY session token is a 30-minute HttpOnly cookie minted
via `POST /pty-session`.
The toolbar's Cleanup button and the Inspector's "Send to Code" action both
pipe text into the live Claude PTY via `window.gstackInjectToTerminal(text)`,
exposed by `sidepanel-terminal.js`. There's no separate `/sidebar-command`
POST — the live REPL is the only execution surface.
### Activity feed
A scrolling feed of every browse command — name, args, duration, status,
errors. Shows up in real time as Claude works. Backed by SSE (`/activity/stream`)
that accepts the Bearer token OR the HttpOnly `gstack_sse` session cookie
(30-minute stream-scope cookie minted via `POST /sse-session`).
### Refs tab
After `$B snapshot`, shows the current `@ref` list (role + name) so you can
see what Claude is targeting.
### CSS Inspector
Powered by `$B inspect` (CDP-based). Click any element on the page to see the
full CSS rule cascade, computed styles, box model, and modification history.
The "Send to Code" button injects a description into the Claude PTY.
### Sidebar architecture
| Component | Where it lives | Notes |
|-----------|----------------|-------|
| Side Panel UI | `extension/sidepanel.js`, `sidepanel-terminal.js` | Chrome extension surface |
| Background SW | `extension/background.js` | Manages tab events, port management |
| Content script | `extension/content.js` | Page overlays, `gstack` pill |
| Terminal agent | `browse/src/terminal-agent.ts` | PTY spawn, lifecycle, auth |
| Sidebar utilities | `browse/src/sidebar-utils.ts` | URL sanitization, helpers |
Before modifying any of these, read the comment block in `CLAUDE.md` under
"Sidebar architecture" — silent failures here usually trace to not understanding
the cross-component flow.
### Manual install (for your regular Chrome)
If you want the extension in your everyday Chrome (not the Playwright-controlled
one):
```bash
bin/gstack-extension # opens chrome://extensions, copies path to clipboard
```
Or do it manually: `chrome://extensions` → toggle Developer mode → Load
unpacked → navigate to `~/.claude/skills/gstack/extension` → pin the
extension → enter the port from `$B status`.
v1.63 pinned the extension identity via the manifest `key` field, so existing
unpacked installs get a new extension ID and panel-local state (saved port)
resets once — a one-time in-product notice explains this.
---
## Pair-agent
Remote AI agents (Codex, OpenClaw, Hermes, anything that speaks HTTP) can
drive your local browser through an ngrok tunnel. The whole flow is gated
by a 26-command allowlist, scoped tokens, and a denial log.
### How it works
```bash
/pair-agent # generates a setup key, prints connection instructions
# Copy the instructions to the remote agent
# Remote agent runs:
# POST <tunnel-url>/connect with setup key → gets a scoped token (24h, single client)
# POST <tunnel-url>/command with token → runs allowed commands
```
### Dual-listener architecture (v1.6.0.0+)
When `pair-agent` activates, the daemon binds **two HTTP listeners**:
- **Local listener** (`127.0.0.1:LOCAL_PORT`). Full command surface. Never
forwarded by ngrok. Used by your Claude Code, the Side Panel, anything
on your machine.
- **Tunnel listener** (`127.0.0.1:TUNNEL_PORT`). Locked allowlist —
`/connect`, `/command` (scoped tokens + 26-command browser-driving
allowlist), `/sidebar-chat`. ngrok forwards only this port.
Root tokens sent over the tunnel return 403. SSE endpoints use a 30-minute
HttpOnly `gstack_sse` cookie (never valid against `/command`).
### The 26-command tunnel allowlist
Defined in `browse/src/server.ts` as `TUNNEL_COMMANDS`. Pure gate function
`canDispatchOverTunnel(command)` is exported for unit testing. Set:
```
goto, click, text, screenshot, html, links, forms, accessibility,
attrs, media, data, scroll, press, type, select, wait, eval,
newtab, tabs, back, forward, reload, snapshot, fill, url, closetab
```
Notably absent: `pair`, `unpair`, `cookies`, `setup`, `launch`, `restart`,
`stop`, `tunnel-start`, `token-mint`, `state`, `connect`, `disconnect`. A
remote agent that tries them gets a 403 plus a fresh entry in the denial log.
### Tunnel denial log
`~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl` — append-only, salted SHA-256 of source
+ domain only (no raw IP, no full request body), rotates at 10MB with 5
generations. Per-device salt at `~/.gstack/security/device-salt` (mode 0600).
### Tunnel egress receipts (v1.63+)
Every tunnel session open writes a hash-chained egress receipt (sink
`browse-tunnel`) to `~/.gstack/security/egress.jsonl` BEFORE ngrok forwards
anything. Fail-closed: if the receipt can't be written, the tunnel listener
is torn down and the start is refused. Inspect the ledger with
`bin/gstack-egress list` and verify chain integrity with
`bin/gstack-egress verify` (exit 3 on tamper).
See [`docs/REMOTE_BROWSER_ACCESS.md`](docs/REMOTE_BROWSER_ACCESS.md) for the
full operator guide.
### Tab ownership
Scoped tokens default to `tabPolicy: 'own-only'`. A paired agent can `newtab`
to create its own tab and drive that tab freely, but it can't `goto`, `fill`,
or `click` on tabs another caller owns. `tabs` lists ALL tab metadata (an
accepted tradeoff — see ARCHITECTURE.md), but `text`/`html`/`snapshot` content
of unowned tabs is blocked by ownership checks.
---
## Authentication
Three token types, three lifetimes, three scopes.
| Token | Generated by | Lifetime | Scope |
|-------|--------------|----------|-------|
| **Root token** | Daemon startup (random UUID) | Daemon process lifetime | Full command surface, local listener only — 403 over tunnel |
| **Setup key** | `POST /pair` | 5 minutes, one-time use | Single redemption: present at `/connect`, get a scoped token |
| **Scoped token** | `POST /connect` (with setup key) | 24 hours | Per-client, allowlist-bound, optionally tab-scoped |
The root token is written to `<project>/.gstack/browse.json` with chmod 600.
Every command that mutates browser state must include
`Authorization: Bearer <token>`.
### SSE session cookie (v1.6.0.0+)
SSE endpoints (`/activity/stream`, `/inspector/events`) accept the Bearer
token OR a 30-minute HttpOnly `gstack_sse` cookie minted via
`POST /sse-session`. The `?token=<ROOT>` query-param auth is no longer
supported. This is what lets the Chrome extension subscribe to the activity
feed without putting the root token in extension storage.
### PTY session cookie
The Terminal pane uses a separate session cookie, `gstack_pty`, minted via
`POST /pty-session`. Different scope — can spawn / drive the live `claude`
PTY, can't dispatch arbitrary `/command` calls. `/health` endpoint MUST NOT
surface this token.
### Extension token bootstrap (v1.63+)
`GET /health` is liveness/status only — it never carries a token, in any
mode. The Side Panel extension bootstraps the root token via
`POST /extension-token` on the local listener. The server releases the
token only when the caller's Origin is exactly
`chrome-extension://<GSTACK_EXTENSION_ID>` — the `key` field in
`extension/manifest.json` pins the extension ID (`GSTACK_EXTENSION_ID` in
`browse/src/server.ts`; derivation reproducible via
`bun browse/scripts/extension-id.ts`) — AND the parsed Host hostname is
loopback. Anything else gets a detail-free 403. The endpoint is never
added to `TUNNEL_PATHS`, so the tunnel surface 404s it by default-deny.
### Token registry
`browse/src/token-registry.ts` handles mint/validate/revoke for all three
types, plus per-token rate limiting. Setup keys are single-use; scoped
tokens have a sliding 24h window; the root token is rotated on each daemon
startup.
---
## Security stack
Layered defense against prompt injection on untrusted page content.
| Layer | Module | Lives in |
|-------|--------|----------|
| **L1** Datamarking | `content-security.ts` | server + page-content read path |
| **L2** Hidden-element strip | `content-security.ts` | server + page-content read path |
| **L3** ARIA + URL blocklist + envelope wrapping | `content-security.ts` | server + page-content read path |
| **L4** TestSavantAI ML classifier (112MB ONNX) | `security-classifier.ts` | security sidecar subprocess* |
| Canary token utilities | `security.ts` | pure functions — no live injector today |
| `combineVerdict` ensemble | `security.ts` | server (inline L4 verdict path) |
\* `security-classifier.ts` cannot be imported from the compiled browse
binary — `@huggingface/transformers` v4 requires `onnxruntime-node` which
fails to `dlopen` from Bun compile's temp extract dir. The compiled binary
runs L1L3 plus the pure parts of `security.ts`; L4 runs in a plain-Node
sidecar (`security-sidecar-entry.ts`, spawned lazily by
`security-sidecar-client.ts` on the first `/pty-inject-scan`).
### Thresholds
- `BLOCK: 0.85` — single-layer score that would cause BLOCK if cross-confirmed
- `WARN: 0.75` — cross-confirm threshold in `combineVerdict`
- `LOG_ONLY: 0.40` — log-only floor
- `SOLO_CONTENT_BLOCK: 0.92` — single-layer threshold for label-less content classifiers
### Ensemble rule
`combineVerdict` retains multi-layer ensemble semantics (2-of-N block votes;
single-layer high confidence degrades to WARN — the Stack Overflow
instruction-writing FP mitigation), but only L4 (testsavant) is live today:
the Haiku transcript and DeBERTa ensemble layers were removed along with the
sidebar chat pipeline that hosted them. **Canary leak always BLOCKs
(deterministic).**
### Env knobs
- `GSTACK_SECURITY_OFF=1` — emergency kill switch. Classifier stays off
even if warmed. Just the ML scan is skipped.
- Classifier model cache: `~/.gstack/models/testsavant-small/` (112MB, first
run only).
- Attack log: `~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl` (salted SHA-256 + domain
only, rotates at 10MB, 5 generations).
- Per-device salt: `~/.gstack/security/device-salt` (0600).
- Session state: `~/.gstack/security/session-state.json` (cross-process,
atomic).
A shield icon in the sidebar header shows the live status. See
ARCHITECTURE.md § "Prompt injection defense" for the full threat model.
---
## Screenshots, PDFs, visual
### Screenshot modes
| Mode | Syntax | Playwright API |
|------|--------|----------------|
| Full page (default) | `screenshot [path]` | `page.screenshot({ fullPage: true })` |
| Viewport only | `screenshot --viewport [path]` | `page.screenshot({ fullPage: false })` |
| Element crop (flag) | `screenshot --selector <css> [path]` | `locator.screenshot()` |
| Element crop (positional) | `screenshot "#sel" [path]` or `screenshot @e3 [path]` | `locator.screenshot()` |
| Region clip | `screenshot --clip x,y,w,h [path]` | `page.screenshot({ clip })` |
Element crop accepts CSS selectors (`.class`, `#id`, `[attr]`) or `@e`/`@c`
refs. **Tag selectors like `button` aren't caught by the positional
heuristic** — use the `--selector` flag form.
`--base64` returns `data:image/png;base64,...` instead of writing to disk —
composes with `--selector`, `--clip`, `--viewport`.
Mutual exclusion: `--clip` + selector, `--viewport` + `--clip`, and
`--selector` + positional selector all throw.
### Retina screenshots — `viewport --scale`
`viewport --scale <n>` sets Playwright's `deviceScaleFactor` (context-level,
13 cap):
```bash
$B viewport 480x600 --scale 2
$B load-html /tmp/card.html
$B screenshot /tmp/card.png --selector .card
# .card at 400x200 CSS pixels → card.png is 800x400 pixels
```
`--scale N` alone (no `WxH`) keeps the current viewport size. Scale changes
trigger a context recreation, which invalidates `@e`/`@c` refs — rerun
`snapshot` after. HTML loaded via `load-html` survives the recreation via
in-memory replay. Rejected in headed mode (real browser controls scale).
### PDF generation
`pdf` accepts the full Playwright surface plus a few additions:
- **Layout:** `--format letter|a4|legal`, `--width <dim>`, `--height <dim>`,
`--margins <dim>`, `--margin-top/right/bottom/left <dim>`
- **Structure:** `--toc` (waits for Paged.js if loaded), `--outline`,
`--tagged` (PDF/A accessibility), `--print-background`,
`--prefer-css-page-size`
- **Branding:** `--header-template <html>`, `--footer-template <html>`,
`--page-numbers`
- **Tabs:** `--tab-id <N>` to render a specific tab
- **Large payloads:** `--from-file <payload.json>` (avoids shell argv limits)
### Responsive screenshots
`responsive [prefix]` — three screenshots in one call: mobile (375x812),
tablet (768x1024), desktop (1280x720). Saves as `{prefix}-mobile.png` etc.
### `prettyscreenshot`
Combines cleanup + scroll + element hide in one call:
```bash
$B prettyscreenshot --cleanup --scroll-to "hero section" --hide ".cookie-banner" /tmp/clean.png
```
---
## Local HTML
Two ways to render HTML that isn't on a web server:
| Approach | When | URL after | Relative assets |
|----------|------|-----------|-----------------|
| `goto file://<abs-path>` | File already on disk | `file:///...` | Resolve against file's directory |
| `goto file://./<rel>`, `goto file://~/<rel>` | Smart-parsed to absolute | `file:///...` | Same |
| `load-html <file>` | HTML generated in memory, no parent-dir context needed | `about:blank` | Broken (self-contained HTML only) |
Both are scoped to files under cwd or `$TMPDIR` via the same safe-dirs
policy as `eval`. `file://` URLs preserve query strings and fragments (SPA
routes work).
`load-html` has an extension allowlist (`.html`, `.htm`, `.xhtml`, `.svg`) and
a magic-byte sniff to reject binary files mis-renamed as HTML. 50MB size cap
(override via `GSTACK_BROWSE_MAX_HTML_BYTES`).
`load-html` content survives later `viewport --scale` calls via in-memory
replay (TabSession tracks the loaded HTML + waitUntil). The replay is
purely in-memory — HTML is never persisted to disk via `state save` to
avoid leaking secrets or customer data.
---
## Batch endpoint
`POST /batch` sends multiple commands in a single HTTP request. Eliminates
per-command round-trip latency — critical for remote agents over ngrok where
each HTTP call costs 2-5s.
```json
POST /batch
Authorization: Bearer <token>
{
"commands": [
{"command": "text", "tabId": 1},
{"command": "text", "tabId": 2},
{"command": "snapshot", "args": ["-i"], "tabId": 3},
{"command": "click", "args": ["@e5"], "tabId": 4}
]
}
```
Each command routes through `handleCommandInternal` — full security pipeline
(scope checks, domain validation, tab ownership, content wrapping) enforced
per command. Per-command error isolation: one failure doesn't abort the
batch. Max 50 commands per batch. Nested batches rejected. Rate limiting:
1 batch = 1 request against the per-agent limit.
Pattern: agent crawling 20 pages opens 20 tabs (individual `newtab` or
batch), then `POST /batch` with 20 `text` commands → 20 page contents in
~2-3 seconds total vs ~40-100 seconds serial.
---
## Capture
Console, network, and dialog events flow into O(1) circular buffers (50,000
capacity each), flushed to disk asynchronously via `Bun.write()`:
- Console: `.gstack/browse-console.log`
- Network: `.gstack/browse-network.log`
- Dialog: `.gstack/browse-dialog.log`
The `console`, `network`, and `dialog` commands read from the in-memory
buffers (not disk) so capture is real-time even when disk is slow.
Dialogs (alert, confirm, prompt) are auto-accepted by default to prevent
browser lockup. `dialog-accept <text>` controls prompt response text.
---
## JS execution
`js` runs an inline expression. `eval` runs a JS file. Both run in the
**same JS sandbox** — the only difference is inline-vs-file. Both support
`await` — expressions containing `await` are auto-wrapped in an async
context:
```bash
$B js "await fetch('/api/data').then(r => r.json())" # auto-wrapped
$B js "document.title" # no wrap needed
$B eval my-script.js # file with await
```
For `eval` files, single-line files return the expression value directly.
Multi-line files need explicit `return` when using `await`. Comments
containing the literal token "await" don't trigger wrapping.
Path safety: `eval` rejects paths outside cwd or `/tmp`. `js` doesn't read
files at all.
---
## Tabs, frames, state
### Tabs
```bash
$B tabs # list all open tabs
$B tab 3 # switch to tab 3
$B newtab https://example.com # open new tab, switch to it
$B newtab --json # programmatic: returns {"tabId":N,"url":...}
$B closetab # close current
$B closetab 2 # close tab 2
$B tab-each "text" # run "text" on every tab, return JSON
```
`tab-each <command>` fans out a command across every open tab and returns a
JSON array — handy for "give me the text of every tab I have open."
### Frames
```bash
$B frame "#stripe-iframe" # switch to iframe by selector
$B frame @e7 # by ref
$B frame --name "checkout" # by name attribute
$B frame --url "stripe.com" # by URL pattern match
$B frame main # back to top frame
```
Refs are cleared on switch (the iframe has its own AX tree).
### State save/load
```bash
$B state save my-session # save cookies + URLs to .gstack/browse-state-my-session.json
$B state load my-session # restore
```
In-memory `load-html` content is intentionally NOT persisted (avoid leaking
secrets to disk).
### Watch
```bash
$B watch # passive observation: snapshot every 5s while user browses
$B watch stop # return summary of what changed
```
Useful when you're driving the browser manually and want Claude to see what
you did at the end without spamming `snapshot` calls.
### Inbox
```bash
$B inbox # list messages from sidebar scout
$B inbox --clear # clear after reading
```
The sidebar scout (a background process the Chrome extension can spawn) drops
notes for Claude when the user surfaces something they want noticed. Stored
in `.gstack/browser-scout.jsonl`.
---
## CDP
### `$B cdp` — raw Chrome DevTools Protocol dispatch
Deny-default. Only methods enumerated in `browse/src/cdp-allowlist.ts`
(`CDP_ALLOWLIST` const) are reachable; any other method returns 403. Each
allowlist entry declares scope (tab vs browser) and output (trusted vs
untrusted). Untrusted methods (data-exfil-shaped, e.g.
`Network.getResponseBody`) get UNTRUSTED-envelope wrapped output.
```bash
$B cdp Page.getLayoutMetrics
$B cdp Network.enable
$B cdp Accessibility.getFullAXTree --json '{"max_depth":5}'
```
To discover allowed methods: read `browse/src/cdp-allowlist.ts`.
### `$B inspect` — CDP-based CSS inspector
```bash
$B inspect ".header" # full rule cascade for the header
$B inspect ".header" --all # include user-agent rules
$B inspect ".header" --history # show modification history
```
Returns the matched rule cascade with specificity, computed styles, the box
model, and (with `--history`) every CSS modification made via `$B style` since
the page loaded. Powered by a persistent CDP session per page in
`browse/src/cdp-inspector.ts`.
### `$B ux-audit`
```bash
$B ux-audit
```
Returns JSON with site identity, navigation, headings (capped 50), text
blocks, interactive elements (capped 200) — page structure for behavioral
analysis without dumping the full HTML. Used by `/qa` and `/design-review`
for cheap coverage maps.
---
## Performance
| Tool | First call | Subsequent calls | Context overhead per call |
|------|-----------|------------------|---------------------------|
| Chrome MCP | ~5s | ~2-5s | ~2000 tokens (schema + protocol) |
| Playwright MCP | ~3s | ~1-3s | ~1500 tokens (schema + protocol) |
| **gstack browse** | **~3s** | **~100-200ms** | **0 tokens** (plain text stdout) |
| **gstack browse + codified skill** | **~3s** | **~200ms** | **0 tokens** (single skill invocation) |
In a 20-command browser session, MCP tools burn 30,00040,000 tokens on
protocol framing alone. gstack burns zero. The codified-skill path takes a
20-command session down to a single `$B skill run` call.
### Why CLI over MCP
MCP works well for remote services. For local browser automation it adds
pure overhead:
- **Context bloat** — every MCP call includes full JSON schemas. A simple
"get the page text" costs 10x more context tokens than it should.
- **Connection fragility** — persistent WebSocket/stdio connections drop
and fail to reconnect.
- **Unnecessary abstraction** — Claude already has a Bash tool. A CLI that
prints to stdout is the simplest possible interface.
gstack skips all of this. Compiled binary. Plain text in, plain text out.
No protocol. No schema. No connection management.
---
## Multi-workspace
Each project root (detected via `git rev-parse --show-toplevel`) gets its
own daemon, port, state file, cookies, and logs. No cross-workspace
collisions.
| Workspace | State file | Port |
|-----------|-----------|------|
| `/code/project-a` | `/code/project-a/.gstack/browse.json` | random (1000060000) |
| `/code/project-b` | `/code/project-b/.gstack/browse.json` | random (1000060000) |
Browser-skills three-tier lookup walks project → global → bundled, so a
project-tier skill at `/code/project-a/.gstack/browser-skills/foo/` shadows
the global `~/.gstack/browser-skills/foo/` only inside project-a.
---
## Environment variables
| Variable | Default | Description |
|----------|---------|-------------|
| `BROWSE_PORT` | 0 (random 1000060000) | Fixed port for the HTTP server (debug override) |
| `BROWSE_IDLE_TIMEOUT` | 1800000 (30 min) | Idle shutdown timeout in ms |
| `BROWSE_STATE_FILE` | `.gstack/browse.json` | Path to state file |
| `BROWSE_SERVER_SCRIPT` | auto-detected | Path to `server.ts` |
| `BROWSE_CDP_URL` | (none) | Set to `channel:chrome` for real-browser mode |
| `BROWSE_CDP_PORT` | 0 | CDP port (used internally) |
| `BROWSE_HEADLESS_SKIP` | 0 | Skip Chromium launch entirely (test harness only) |
| `BROWSE_TUNNEL` | 0 | Activate the dual-listener tunnel architecture (requires `NGROK_AUTHTOKEN`) |
| `BROWSE_TUNNEL_LOCAL_ONLY` | 0 | Test-only — bind both listeners locally without ngrok |
| `GSTACK_BROWSE_MAX_HTML_BYTES` | 52428800 (50MB) | `load-html` size cap |
| `GSTACK_SECURITY_OFF` | unset | Emergency kill switch — disable ML classifier |
| `GSTACK_STEALTH` | unset | Set to `extended` (also accepts `1`/`true`) to layer six aggressive patches (WebGL spoof, faked plugins, mediaDevices) on top of Layer C. Actively lies; can break sites. |
| `GSTACK_CDP_STEALTH` | unset | Set to `on`/`1`/`true` to emit `--gstack-suppress-prepare-stack-trace` (gbrowser Pack 2 / B11 C++ patch only; no-op on stock Chromium) |
| `GSTACK_GPU_VENDOR`, `GSTACK_GPU_RENDERER`, `GSTACK_GPU_CHIPSET` | unset | Per-install GPU spoof fed to the Pack 1 WebGL/UA-CH C++ patches. Set by gbd from the host profile; emitted as `--gstack-gpu-vendor` / `--gstack-gpu-renderer` / `--gstack-ua-model` cmdline switches only when present. |
| `GSTACK_PLATFORM` | unset | Host platform classification (`MacARM`/`MacIntel``macOS`, `Win32``Windows`, `Linux*``Linux`) emitted as `--gstack-ua-platform` |
| `GSTACK_HW_CONCURRENCY`, `GSTACK_DEVICE_MEMORY` | host profile (fallback 8) | Per-install `hardwareConcurrency`/`deviceMemory` reported by Layer C and emitted as `--gstack-hw-concurrency` / `--gstack-device-memory` for the worker-navigator C++ patch |
---
## Source map
```
browse/
├── src/
│ ├── cli.ts # Thin client — reads state, sends HTTP, prints
│ ├── server.ts # Bun HTTP daemon — routes commands, dual-listener
│ ├── browser-manager.ts # Chromium lifecycle, tabs, ref map, crash detection
│ ├── socks-bridge.ts # Local 127.0.0.1 SOCKS5 bridge that handles auth handshakes Chromium can't speak
│ ├── proxy-config.ts # --proxy URL parsing + cred resolution (URL vs env, fail-fast on both)
│ ├── proxy-redact.ts # Cred-redaction helper for any proxy URL surfaced to logs/errors
│ ├── xvfb.ts # Xvfb auto-spawn + orphan cleanup with PID + start-time validation
│ ├── stealth.ts # Layer C: webdriver mask + window.chrome.* + Notification/Permissions + per-install hardware + toString proxy + automation-global sweep; buildGStackLaunchArgs (GSTACK_* cmdline switches); GSTACK_STEALTH=extended opt-in
│ ├── browse-client.ts # Canonical SDK — what skills import as _lib/browse-client.ts
│ ├── snapshot.ts # AX tree → @e/@c refs → Locator map; -D/-a/-C handling
│ ├── read-commands.ts # Non-mutating: text, html, links, js, css, is, dialog, ...
│ ├── write-commands.ts # Mutating: goto, click, fill, upload, dialog-accept, ...
│ ├── meta-commands.ts # state, watch, inbox, frame, ux-audit, chain, diff, ...
│ ├── browser-skills.ts # 3-tier walk + frontmatter parser + tombstones
│ ├── browser-skill-commands.ts # $B skill list/show/run/test/rm + spawnSkill
│ ├── browser-skill-write.ts # D3 atomic stage/commit/discard helper for /skillify
│ ├── skill-token.ts # mintSkillToken / revokeSkillToken (per-spawn, scoped)
│ ├── domain-skills.ts # Per-site agent notes (state machine: quarantined→active→global)
│ ├── domain-skill-commands.ts # $B domain-skill save/list/show/edit/promote/rollback/rm
│ ├── cdp-allowlist.ts # Deny-default CDP method allowlist
│ ├── cdp-bridge.ts # CDP session lifecycle bridge
│ ├── cdp-commands.ts # $B cdp dispatcher
│ ├── cdp-inspector.ts # $B inspect — persistent CDP session per page
│ ├── activity.ts # ActivityEntry, CircularBuffer, SSE subscribers, privacy filtering
│ ├── buffers.ts # Console/network/dialog circular buffers (O(1) ring)
│ ├── tab-session.ts # Per-tab session state (load-html replay, ref map scope)
│ ├── token-registry.ts # Mint/validate/revoke for root + setup keys + scoped tokens
│ ├── sse-session-cookie.ts # 30-min HttpOnly cookie for /activity/stream + /inspector/events
│ ├── pty-session-cookie.ts # Separate scope: live Claude PTY auth
│ ├── tunnel-denial-log.ts # ~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl writer (salted)
│ ├── path-security.ts # validateOutputPath / validateReadPath / validateTempPath
│ ├── url-validation.ts # URL safety checks for goto
│ ├── content-security.ts # L1-L3: datamarking, hidden strip, ARIA, URL blocklist, envelopes
│ ├── security.ts # L5 canary + L6 verdict combiner + thresholds
│ ├── security-classifier.ts # L4 ML classifier (TestSavantAI, runs in the security sidecar)
│ ├── terminal-agent.ts # Side Panel Claude PTY manager (auth + lifecycle)
│ ├── sidebar-utils.ts # Sidebar URL sanitization + helpers
│ ├── cookie-import-browser.ts # Decrypt + import cookies from real Chromium browsers
│ ├── cookie-picker-routes.ts # HTTP routes for /cookie-picker/*
│ ├── cookie-picker-ui.ts # Self-contained HTML/CSS/JS for cookie picker
│ ├── network-capture.ts # Network request capture for $B network
│ ├── media-extract.ts # Media element extraction for $B media
│ ├── project-slug.ts # Project slug derivation for state paths
│ ├── error-handling.ts # safeUnlink / safeKill / isProcessAlive
│ ├── platform.ts # OS detection (macOS, Linux, Windows)
│ ├── telemetry.ts # Anonymous opt-in usage telemetry
│ ├── find-browse.ts # Locate running daemon or bootstrap
│ └── config.ts # Config resolution (env / files)
├── test/ # Integration tests + HTML fixtures
└── dist/
└── browse # Compiled binary (~58MB, Bun --compile)
browser-skills/
└── hackernews-frontpage/ # Bundled reference skill
├── SKILL.md
├── script.ts
├── _lib/browse-client.ts
├── fixtures/hn-2026-04-26.html
└── script.test.ts
scrape/SKILL.md.tmpl # /scrape gstack skill — match-or-prototype entry point
skillify/SKILL.md.tmpl # /skillify gstack skill — codify last /scrape into permanent skill
```
---
## Development
### Prerequisites
- [Bun](https://bun.sh/) v1.0+
- Playwright's Chromium (installed automatically by `bun install`)
### Quick start
```bash
bun install # install deps + Playwright Chromium
bun test # all integration tests (~3s for browse-only)
bun run dev <cmd> # run CLI from source (no compile)
bun run build # compile to browse/dist/browse
```
### Dev mode vs compiled binary
During development, use `bun run dev` instead of the compiled binary. It runs
`browse/src/cli.ts` directly with Bun, so you get instant feedback:
```bash
bun run dev goto https://example.com
bun run dev text
bun run dev snapshot -i
bun run dev click @e3
```
The compiled binary (`bun run build`) is only needed for distribution. It
produces a single ~58MB executable at `browse/dist/browse` using Bun's
`--compile` flag.
### Running tests
```bash
bun test # all tests
bun test browse/test/commands # command integration tests
bun test browse/test/snapshot # snapshot tests
bun test browse/test/cookie-import-browser # cookie import unit tests
bun test browse/test/browser-skill-write # D3 atomic-write helper tests
bun test browse/test/tunnel-gate-unit # canDispatchOverTunnel pure tests
```
Tests spin up a local HTTP server (`browse/test/test-server.ts`) serving HTML
fixtures from `browse/test/fixtures/`, then exercise the CLI against those
pages.
### Adding a new command
1. Add the handler in `read-commands.ts` (non-mutating) or `write-commands.ts`
(mutating), or `meta-commands.ts` (server / lifecycle).
2. Register the route in `server.ts`.
3. Add the entry to `COMMAND_DESCRIPTIONS` in `browse/src/commands.ts` (with
a clear `description` and `usage` — the `gen-skill-docs` validation
suite enforces no `|` characters in `description`).
4. Add a test case in `browse/test/commands.test.ts` with an HTML fixture
if needed.
5. Run `bun test` to verify.
6. Run `bun run build` to compile.
7. Run `bun run gen:skill-docs` to regenerate SKILL.md (the command appears
in the command-reference table downstream).
### Adding a new browser-skill
For a hand-written skill: copy `browser-skills/hackernews-frontpage/`,
update SKILL.md frontmatter, rewrite `script.ts` against your target site,
re-capture the fixture, update the parser test. `bun test` validates the
SKILL.md contract (sibling SDK byte-identity, frontmatter schema).
For an agent-written skill: drive the page once with `/scrape <intent>`,
say `/skillify`, accept the proposed name in the approval gate. The skill
lands at `~/.gstack/browser-skills/<name>/` after the test passes.
### Deploying to the active skill
The active skill lives at `~/.claude/skills/gstack/`. After making changes:
```bash
cd ~/.claude/skills/gstack
git fetch origin && git reset --hard origin/main
bun run build
```
Or copy the binary directly:
```bash
cp browse/dist/browse ~/.claude/skills/gstack/browse/dist/browse
```
---
## Cross-references
- [`ARCHITECTURE.md`](ARCHITECTURE.md) — system-level architecture, dual-listener tunnel design, prompt-injection defense threat model
- [`CLAUDE.md`](CLAUDE.md) — project-level instructions, sidebar architecture notes, security-stack constraints
- [`docs/REMOTE_BROWSER_ACCESS.md`](docs/REMOTE_BROWSER_ACCESS.md) — operator guide for `/pair-agent` (setup keys, scoped tokens, denial log)
- [`docs/designs/BROWSER_SKILLS_V1.md`](docs/designs/BROWSER_SKILLS_V1.md) — design doc for browser-skills runtime (Phase 1 + 2a + roadmap)
- [`scrape/SKILL.md`](scrape/SKILL.md) — `/scrape` skill: match-or-prototype data extraction
- [`skillify/SKILL.md`](skillify/SKILL.md) — `/skillify` skill: codify last `/scrape` into permanent skill
- [`TODOS.md`](TODOS.md) — `/automate` (Phase 2b P0), Phase 3 resolver injection, Phase 4 eval + sandbox
---
## Acknowledgments
The browser automation layer is built on [Playwright](https://playwright.dev/)
by Microsoft. Playwright's accessibility tree API, locator system, and
headless Chromium management are what make ref-based interaction possible.
The snapshot system — assigning `@ref` labels to AX tree nodes and mapping
them back to Playwright Locators — is built entirely on top of Playwright's
primitives. Thank you to the Playwright team for building such a solid
foundation.
The prompt-injection L4 layer uses
[TestSavantAI/distilbert-v1.1-32](https://huggingface.co/TestSavantAI/distilbert-v1.1-32)
(112MB ONNX), run locally via `@huggingface/transformers`.
The CDP escape hatch is gated by an allowlist directly inspired by Codex's
T2 outside-voice review during the v1.4 design pass: deny-default with an
explicit allowlist, not allow-default with a denylist.