mirror of
https://github.com/JGoyd/iOS-Activation-Flaw.git
synced 2026-02-12 21:12:48 +00:00
76 lines
3.0 KiB
Markdown
76 lines
3.0 KiB
Markdown
# Apple iOS Activation Infrastructure Vulnerability
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
## Overview
|
||
|
||
A **critical vulnerability** exists in Apple’s device activation infrastructure.
|
||
|
||
The backend endpoint:
|
||
|
||
https://humb.apple.com/humbug/baa
|
||
|
||
accepts **unauthenticated and unsigned XML property list (.plist) payloads**, exposing devices to **pre-activation tampering** during the setup phase.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
## Impact
|
||
- **Arbitrary Provisioning:** Attackers can inject custom provisioning logic into the activation workflow.
|
||
- **Bypass Security:** MDM enrollment, signature checks, and user consent are fully bypassed.
|
||
- **Persistence:** Malicious profiles and configurations remain after activation.
|
||
- **Attack Vectors:** Exploitable remotely via captive portals, rogue access points, or compromised provisioning servers.
|
||
- **Techniques:** XML External Entity (XXE) injection, malformed payload acceptance, and silent background task injection.
|
||
|
||
Server responses confirm consistent **HTTP 200 OK** acceptance of illicit payloads without validation.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## Risk
|
||
- **Enterprise & Supply Chain:** Devices can be manipulated before reaching end users.
|
||
- **Stealth:** Changes are invisible to standard logs and forensic tools.
|
||
- **High Severity:** Exploitation requires no jailbreak or physical access.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## Evidence (Artifact-Based)
|
||
**Primary artifact:** `artifacts/mobileactivationd_sdcrt_baa_response.txt`
|
||
|
||
Key observations from the server response:
|
||
- `HTTP Status Code: 200 (no error)` — confirms the endpoint accepted the request.
|
||
- Headers: `Server: Apple`, `Host: humb.apple.com`, `HUMBUG_XHEADER_STATUS: 0`.
|
||
- Response body contained multiple PEM certificate blocks (`-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- …`).
|
||
- Timestamp in `Date:` header allows correlation with device/system logs.
|
||
|
||
**Interpretation:** Instead of rejecting invalid/unsigned provisioning data, the server processed the request and returned cryptographic material, demonstrating insufficient validation.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## Attack Surface & Technical Impact
|
||
- **Pre-activation phase:** The flaw manifests before MDM enrollment or user consent.
|
||
- **Delivery vectors:** captive portals, rogue Wi-Fi/APs, compromised provisioning servers.
|
||
- **Technical outcomes:**
|
||
- Arbitrary provisioning injection
|
||
- Bypass of signature/consent enforcement
|
||
- Persistent, stealthy configuration drift in caches such as `CloudKitAccountInfoCache` and `CommCenter`
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## Detection
|
||
### Network Indicators
|
||
- Responses from `humb.apple.com/humbug/baa` with `200 OK` and PEM certificate blocks.
|
||
- Presence of `HUMBUG_XHEADER_STATUS: 0` in response headers.
|
||
|
||
### Host Indicators
|
||
- Unexpected entries in:
|
||
- `CloudKitAccountInfoCache`
|
||
- `CommCenter` modem/network configurations
|
||
- Profiles/configs applied post-activation without user or MDM actions.
|
||
|
||
### Safe Triage Commands
|
||
```bash
|
||
# Search response captures for certificate blocks
|
||
grep -R "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----" /path/to/response_captures/
|
||
|
||
# Look for humbug headers in activation logs
|
||
grep -i "HUMBUG_XHEADER_STATUS" /var/log/mobileactivationd*
|