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@@ -3,10 +3,11 @@ name: Distribute on release
# Fans a published GitHub Release out to the channels that need a nudge.
# PyPI is handled by publish.yml; the conda-forge channel is handled by its
# autotick bot. This workflow updates the repository recipe and event-drives
# the two channels that would otherwise be manual:
# the three channels that would otherwise be manual:
# - Homebrew tap: rewrite the formula's url + sha256 to the new sdist.
# - HF Space: factory-rebuild so it reinstalls the latest sdist from PyPI.
# Both wait for the freshly published sdist to appear on PyPI first, since the
# - ComfyUI: sync, test, and publish the node against the exact library release.
# All wait for the freshly published sdist to appear on PyPI first, since the
# Release event fires in parallel with publish.yml's upload.
on:
@@ -133,3 +134,75 @@ jobs:
)
print("HF Space factory rebuild triggered")
PY
comfyui:
needs: resolve
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Sync and publish the ComfyUI nodes
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.COMFYUI_RELEASE_TOKEN }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
repo=wiltodelta/ComfyUI-remove-ai-watermarks
workflow=sync-library.yml
dispatched_at=$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ)
gh workflow run "$workflow" \
--repo "$repo" \
--ref main \
--raw-field library_version="${{ needs.resolve.outputs.version }}"
run_id=""
for attempt in $(seq 1 30); do
run_id=$(
gh run list \
--repo "$repo" \
--workflow "$workflow" \
--event workflow_dispatch \
--limit 10 \
--json databaseId,createdAt \
| python3 -c '
import json
import sys
dispatched_at = sys.argv[1]
runs = json.load(sys.stdin)
print(next(
(run["databaseId"] for run in runs if run["createdAt"] >= dispatched_at),
"",
))
' "$dispatched_at"
)
if [ -n "$run_id" ]; then
break
fi
echo "ComfyUI sync run not visible yet (attempt $attempt), waiting..."
sleep 2
done
if [ -z "$run_id" ]; then
echo "::error::The dispatched ComfyUI sync run did not appear"
exit 1
fi
for attempt in $(seq 1 180); do
read -r status conclusion <<< "$(
gh run view "$run_id" \
--repo "$repo" \
--json status,conclusion \
--jq '[.status, (.conclusion // "")] | @tsv'
)"
if [ "$status" = "completed" ]; then
if [ "$conclusion" = "success" ]; then
echo "ComfyUI sync run $run_id succeeded"
exit 0
fi
echo "::error::ComfyUI sync run $run_id completed with $conclusion"
exit 1
fi
echo "ComfyUI sync run $run_id is $status (attempt $attempt), waiting..."
sleep 5
done
echo "::error::ComfyUI sync run $run_id did not finish in time"
exit 1
+1 -1
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@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ Compact map. The full per-module detail (design decisions, tuned thresholds, cal
- `noai/c2pa.py` — C2PA reading. `extract_c2pa_info(path)` uses the official **c2pa-python `Reader`** first (core dep, any container; `read_manifest_store_json` returns the WHOLE store JSON — active + ingredient manifests — so an AI marker on a parent manifest is seen), and falls back to the hand-rolled caBX/CBOR parser (`has_c2pa_metadata` / `extract_c2pa_chunk` / `_extract_c2pa_info_png`) for synthetic/partial blobs the validator rejects or a broken/absent wheel. The registry scan (issuer / source-type / SynthID / soft-binding) is shared by both paths via `_populate_registry_fields`, so the return-dict shape is identical. Do not reimplement chunk parsing; chunk reads are clamped to the remaining file size by design. `extract_c2pa_chunk`/`inject_c2pa_chunk` stay PNG-only (raw caBX bytes, test/extractor use).
- `noai/constants.py` — the single `C2PA_AI_VENDORS` registry (+ `C2PA_SOFT_BINDINGS`) from which `C2PA_ISSUERS` / `SYNTHID_C2PA_ISSUERS` / `C2PA_IDENTITY_AI_ORGS` / `identify._ISSUER_PLATFORM` are all derived. Add a new vendor as one registry entry; never edit the derived dicts and never add inline. A vendor's `asserts_ai=True` flag means its mere presence asserts AI generation even without a `trainedAlgorithmicMedia` digital-source-type (a pure-generator brand with a distinctive issuer/generator string, e.g. **Dreamina** — ByteDance's international Jimeng brand, signed as "Bytedance Pte. Ltd." with a "Dreamina/x.y" claim generator and no source-type); NEVER set it for common-word issuers (Adobe/Google/OpenAI/Microsoft) that appear incidentally in unrelated bytes — those stay source-type-gated in `identify._attribute_platform`.
- `metadata.py` — `scan_head(path)` is the shared (memoized) input for every C2PA/AIGC/IPTC byte scan; use it instead of `open().read(1MB)` for any new marker scan. Also home to `synthid_source`, `xai_signature`, `iptc_ai_system`, `aigc_label`, `huggingface_job`, `samsung_genai`, and `remove_ai_metadata` (fail-safe `strip_c2pa_boxes`). **A caller that REPORTS an outcome must use `strip_and_verify`, not `remove_ai_metadata` directly** -- the stripper is deliberately fail-safe (a file PIL cannot decode is copied through UNCHANGED rather than crashing), so its return value cannot distinguish a no-op from a real strip. `metadata --remove` and `batch --mode metadata|all` both re-scan the OUTPUT through it and fail loudly; verified on Samsung Galaxy S22 C2PA PNGs, where the command printed "stripped" and exited 0 while the output still read as AI (2026-07-19). **`remove_ai_metadata` is the SINGLE metadata stripper** (the legacy PIL-re-encoding `noai/cleaner` was deleted; the diffusion core and the public `noai.remove_ai_metadata` re-export now point here). It strips **losslessly** per container: ISOBMFF (HEIC/AVIF/MP4) blanks tokens / strips boxes in place; **JPEG uses `_strip_jpeg_metadata_lossless`** — a marker-segment walk that drops the AI-bearing APP segments (C2PA APP11; XMP APP1 carrying C2PA, a China-AIGC token, OR an IPTC `digitalSourceType` / 2025.1 AI-disclosure marker; IPTC-IIM APP13) and scrubs AI EXIF tags via piexif, copying the entropy-coded scan verbatim so **the pixels are bit-identical** (no DCT re-encode). **Detection<->removal parity across every marker placement is load-bearing** — anything a scanner flags, the strip must reach, or a re-served file still reads as AI: (a) the APP1-XMP branch of `_jpeg_app_carries_ai` checks the IPTC marker sets too, not only C2PA/AIGC (the Instagram/MidJourney/Meta "Made with AI" `digitalSourceType` lives in XMP, not the APP13 IIM record); (b) a bare `AIGC{...}` / `{"AIGC":{...}}` block in ANY JPEG APP segment — the specific C2PA(APP11)/XMP(APP1)/IPTC(APP13) checks FALL THROUGH to a generic `_is_aigc_exif_value` drop, so a bare AIGC in APP11 (the supported placement, NOT a C2PA manifest) is caught, not swallowed by the C2PA-only 0xEB branch — plus the same AIGC block in a STANDARD **PNG text chunk** value (e.g. `Description`, which `_is_ai_key` keeps) is dropped on the value; (c) the China TC260 `{"AIGC":{...}}` block in EXIF `UserComment`/`ImageDescription` is scrubbed by `_scrub_ai_exif` (Doubao producer + Tencent service-provider schemas); (d) the Samsung Galaxy AI `PhotoEditor_Re_Edit_Data` trailer past the JPEG EOI is truncated by `_strip_samsung_trailer` (and `samsung_genai` reads the file tail so a multi-MB photo's trailer past the 512 KB quick-scan window is still DETECTED). Pixels stay bit-identical throughout, so a `--strip-metadata` on a q100 removal output does NOT crush it back to q75; PNG/WebP re-saves are pixel-lossless (WebP written at cv2 lossless mode, quality 101 — quality 1-100 is lossy). **The PIL-fallback save format is chosen by the source's CONTENT, not its file extension** (`_sniff_image_format`, and the JPEG-lossless gate is content-gated too): inputs can be misnamed (a PNG served as `.jpg` is the common one), and routing on the extension re-encoded a lossless PNG/WebP into a real JPEG — a silent degradation that broke "work with originals". A **misnamed** lossless source (source-extension format != content) is preserved in its true format; a **correctly-named** source still honors a deliberate output-extension conversion (e.g. `source.png -> output.jpg`). Not yet handled: a 16-bit PNG is downconverted to 8-bit on the PIL re-save (rare; would need a byte-level PNG chunk stripper). Regression: `tests/test_metadata.py::TestHasAiMetadata::test_strip_preserves_lossless_content_with_mismatched_extension`. **`remove_ai_metadata` is fail-safe on an undecodable image:** a truncated/corrupt file (PIL raises `OSError` decoding it; some inputs) is copied through UNCHANGED rather than crashing a direct library caller (a web worker would 500 on a partial upload), mirroring `strip_c2pa_boxes` — we cannot strip what we cannot parse, but we never raise. Regression: `tests/test_metadata.py::TestHasAiMetadata::test_remove_ai_metadata_failsafe_on_truncated_png`. Regression: `tests/test_metadata.py::TestHasAiMetadata::{test_jpeg_metadata_strip_is_pixel_lossless, test_jpeg_strip_removes_iptc_marker_in_xmp}`, `TestSamsungGenai::{test_remove_strips_post_eoi_trailer, test_detects_trailer_past_scan_window}`, the AIGC-EXIF/bare-APP removal tests, and `tests/test_noai.py::TestISOBMFF::{test_blank_aigc_block_in_exif, test_blank_xai_signature_pair_in_exif}`. `exif_generator` matches a VALUE against `AI_GENERATOR_TOKENS` across EXIF `Software`/`Make`/`Artist`/`ImageDescription`, XMP `CreatorTool`, AND PNG `tEXt` chunks (`Software`/`Source`/`Title`/`Description` — NovelAI stamps there, not EXIF). **Detection and removal must stay in parity:** a Line truncated
- `metadata.py` — `scan_head(path)` is the shared (memoized) input for every C2PA/AIGC/IPTC byte scan; use it instead of `open().read(1MB)` for any new marker scan. Also home to `synthid_source`, `xai_signature`, `iptc_ai_system`, `aigc_label`, `huggingface_job`, `samsung_genai`, and `remove_ai_metadata` (fail-safe `strip_c2pa_boxes`). **A caller that REPORTS an outcome must use `strip_and_verify`, not `remove_ai_metadata` directly** -- the stripper is deliberately fail-safe (a file PIL cannot decode is copied through UNCHANGED rather than crashing), so its return value cannot distinguish a no-op from a real strip. `strip_and_verify` re-scans the output and, when metadata survived but `image_io` can still decode the raster, normalizes the container and scans again; that recovery preserves pixels but drops standard metadata. A truly undecodable file keeps the surviving-marker result. `metadata --remove` and `batch --mode metadata|all` use this verified path. **`remove_ai_metadata` is the SINGLE metadata stripper** (the legacy PIL-re-encoding `noai/cleaner` was deleted; the diffusion core and the public `noai.remove_ai_metadata` re-export now point here). It strips **losslessly** per container: ISOBMFF (HEIC/AVIF/MP4) blanks tokens / strips boxes in place; **JPEG uses `_strip_jpeg_metadata_lossless`** — a marker-segment walk that drops the AI-bearing APP segments (C2PA APP11; XMP APP1 carrying C2PA, a China-AIGC token, OR an IPTC `digitalSourceType` / 2025.1 AI-disclosure marker; IPTC-IIM APP13) and scrubs AI EXIF tags via piexif, copying the entropy-coded scan verbatim so **the pixels are bit-identical** (no DCT re-encode). **Detection<->removal parity across every marker placement is load-bearing** — anything a scanner flags, the strip must reach, or a re-served file still reads as AI: (a) the APP1-XMP branch of `_jpeg_app_carries_ai` checks the IPTC marker sets too, not only C2PA/AIGC (the Instagram/MidJourney/Meta "Made with AI" `digitalSourceType` lives in XMP, not the APP13 IIM record); (b) a bare `AIGC{...}` / `{"AIGC":{...}}` block in ANY JPEG APP segment — the specific C2PA(APP11)/XMP(APP1)/IPTC(APP13) checks FALL THROUGH to a generic `_is_aigc_exif_value` drop, so a bare AIGC in APP11 (the supported placement, NOT a C2PA manifest) is caught, not swallowed by the C2PA-only 0xEB branch — plus the same AIGC block in a STANDARD **PNG text chunk** value (e.g. `Description`, which `_is_ai_key` keeps) is dropped on the value; (c) the China TC260 `{"AIGC":{...}}` block in EXIF `UserComment`/`ImageDescription` is scrubbed by `_scrub_ai_exif` (Doubao producer + Tencent service-provider schemas); (d) the Samsung Galaxy AI `PhotoEditor_Re_Edit_Data` trailer past the JPEG EOI is truncated by `_strip_samsung_trailer` (and `samsung_genai` reads the file tail so a multi-MB photo's trailer past the 512 KB quick-scan window is still DETECTED). Pixels stay bit-identical throughout, so a `--strip-metadata` on a q100 removal output does NOT crush it back to q75; PNG/WebP re-saves are pixel-lossless (WebP written at cv2 lossless mode, quality 101 — quality 1-100 is lossy). **The PIL-fallback save format is chosen by the source's CONTENT, not its file extension** (`_sniff_image_format`, and the JPEG-lossless gate is content-gated too): inputs can be misnamed (a PNG served as `.jpg` is the common one), and routing on the extension re-encoded a lossless PNG/WebP into a real JPEG — a silent degradation that broke "work with originals". A **misnamed** lossless source (source-extension format != content) is preserved in its true format; a **correctly-named** source still honors a deliberate output-extension conversion (e.g. `source.png -> output.jpg`). Not yet handled: a 16-bit PNG is downconverted to 8-bit on the PIL re-save (rare; would need a byte-level PNG chunk stripper). Regression: `tests/test_metadata.py::TestHasAiMetadata::test_strip_preserves_lossless_content_with_mismatched_extension`. **`remove_ai_metadata` is fail-safe on an undecodable image:** a truncated/corrupt file (PIL raises `OSError` decoding it; some inputs) is copied through UNCHANGED rather than crashing a direct library caller (a web worker would 500 on a partial upload), mirroring `strip_c2pa_boxes` — we cannot strip what we cannot parse, but we never raise. Regression: `tests/test_metadata.py::TestHasAiMetadata::{test_remove_ai_metadata_failsafe_on_truncated_png,test_strip_and_verify_normalizes_decodable_copy_through,test_strip_and_verify_reports_markers_in_undecodable_copy_through}`. Regression: `tests/test_metadata.py::TestHasAiMetadata::{test_jpeg_metadata_strip_is_pixel_lossless, test_jpeg_strip_removes_iptc_marker_in_xmp}`, `TestSamsungGenai::{test_remove_strips_post_eoi_trailer, test_detects_trailer_past_scan_window}`, the AIGC-EXIF/bare-APP removal tests, and `tests/test_noai.py::TestISOBMFF::{test_blank_aigc_block_in_exif, test_blank_xai_signature_pair_in_exif}`. `exif_generator` matches a VALUE against `AI_GENERATOR_TOKENS` Line truncated
- `identify.py` — aggregates every locally-readable signal into one `ProvenanceReport`; `is_ai_generated` is True or None, never asserted False. `ProvenanceReport.ai_source_kind` exposes the C2PA digital-source-type split — `"generated"` (trainedAlgorithmicMedia, fully AI) vs `"enhanced"` (compositeWithTrainedAlgorithmicMedia, a real photo with an AI-composited region), else None — so a caller branches full-frame scrub vs region-targeted clean (see `noai/tiling.feather_region_composite` + `WatermarkRemover.remove_watermark(region=...)`). The sparkle provenance threshold is the SHARED `watermark_registry.GEMINI_SPARKLE_TRUST_CONF` (imported, not a private copy) so the provenance "is there a sparkle" verdict and the removal "take the sparkle" decision can never drift. `import identify` is deliberately light (lazy `noai/__init__`, fits a 512 MB host) — keep heavy imports out (the `watermark_registry` constant import stays light: engines are lazy there). Add capture-camera tokens to `_DEVICE_C2PA_PLATFORM` only when verified against a real C2PA file; editing-app/AI-device signer tokens go to `_SIGNER_C2PA_PLATFORM`; generator/issuer platforms to `C2PA_AI_VENDORS` in `constants.py`. The IPTC `digitalSourceType` **`algorithmicMedia`** (bare) is PROCEDURAL (an algorithm not trained on sampled data), NOT AI/ML generation, so it is deliberately absent from `IPTC_AI_MARKERS` — flagging it made `identify` assert AI + `has_invisible_target` True, scrubbing clean procedural content (it is a distinct token from `trainedAlgorithmicMedia`, so real "Made with AI" labels are unaffected; regression `test_metadata.py::...test_bare_algorithmic_media_not_flagged_ai`). Integrity-clash detection is high-precision by design (only hard generator stamps feed it, source-grouped independence). `_vendor_of` normalizes ByteDance/Canva/ElevenLabs/Black Forest Labs (as well as OpenAI/Google/... ) so their C2PA claims participate in the clash check; the generic **China TC260 AIGC label names no specific vendor**, so when a TC260-applying vendor (ByteDance, `_TC260_VENDORS`) is co-attributed the label is attributed to it (a legit Doubao image carrying its own TC260 label must NOT clash), while a NON-TC260 vendor next to a TC260 label still clashes as a laundering tell. The vendor normalization must not introduce clashes on clean compatibility samples.
- `watermark_registry.py` — the single catalog of known visible watermarks (gemini / doubao / jimeng / qwen / kling / samsung / runninghub / baidu / liblib / jimeng_pill). **Removal is LOCALIZE -> FILL for every mark:** each mark is localized to a binary full-frame footprint mask (a `Localization`), then ONE shared, swappable fill inpaints that mask via `fill(image, mask, backend=...)` (delegates to `region_eraser.erase`). Reverse-alpha (the old `original = (wm - a*logo)/(1-a)` inversion of a captured alpha map + thin residual inpaint) is GONE for ALL marks; why it was dropped is recorded in `docs/module-internals.md`. Backends: `cv2` (classical inpaint, no deps, the floor), `migan` (MI-GAN ONNX, light, the memory-tight pick where LaMa will not fit), `lama` (big-LaMa ONNX, best quality, heavier, auto-preferred when a learned backend is available); `auto` = LaMa > MI-GAN > cv2, best available. The captured alpha maps (`scripts/visible_alpha_solve.py`) are still used to DETECT the marks and to shape the mask, but NOT for pixel recovery. **`--mark auto` removes EVERY detected mark in one pass** via `remove_auto_marks(image, *, sensitivity="auto", provenance=frozenset(), backend="auto")` (marks coexist -- a Jimeng-basic image has the top-left pill AND the bottom-right wordmark; a single-strongest pick would leave one). **Three orthogonal axes:** `backend` (the fill), `sensitivity` (how hard to trust a borderline mark: `auto`/`strict`, see the `Sensitivity` literal), and `provenance` (vendor keys metadata confirms -- the evidence that drives `auto`). **Perception / decision / action are separated:** `_build_candidates(image)` runs every detector at BOTH trust levels (strict + relaxed) and packages raw verdicts + features into `Candidate`s (no policy); the pure arbiter `decide(candidates, Context(sensitivity, provenance)) -> [Decision]` makes every keep/drop call (per-mark `resolve_trust` + the assumed-trust floor + the pill gate) with no image/IO, so it is unit-testable in isolation; then each winner is localized -> filled. Do NOT put policy back into the engines (the one exception, the Gemini FP gate, stays in `gemini_engine` because `identify` shares that confidence). `detect_marks(..., provenance=frozenset())` stays strict (identify verdict, precision over recall); `KnownMark.remove/detect/localize(..., provenance: bool)` take the already-resolved boolean. **How `auto` decides (this is metadata-INDEPENDENT for recall):** the visual detectors are pixel-based and need no metadata; the recall gain comes from RELAXING the false-positive gate, not from metadata. `strict` never relaxes (clean images untouched); `auto` relaxes a mark only on same-product evidence -- metadata provenance for that vendor OR a confidently detected sibling mark of the SAME product (`_PRODUCT_OF`; Doubao and Jimeng are both bottom-right ByteDance but distinct products, so they do NOT cross-relax). **`resolve_trust` resolves TWO levels:** `confirmed` bypasses the engine's false-positive gate, and only `confirmed` has evidence naming THAT vendor, which is exactly what the bypass is contracted to require (`GeminiEngine.detect_watermark`'s `trust_provenance` docstring: "external metadata already proves this is a Google generation"). **Historical, kept as the reason the third level is gone:** a removed `assumed` level let `assume_ai` bypass the gate on the bare assertion an image is AI. It produced unacceptable false positives on clean camera images and was removed. A wrong relaxation only fills a small corner near-losslessly (the localize -> fill benign failure mode), which is what made a SMALL false-fire rate arguable; it was never a licence for a 60% one. Metadata provenance mapping (feeds `auto`, read by `cli._visible_provenance`): Google/Gemini C2PA issuer -> gemini; China-AIGC (TC260) label -> doubao/jimeng; `samsung_genai` -> samsung. **The `jimeng_pill` is capture-less.** It uses a synthetic silhouette and a fixed top-left footprint. `_keep_pill` requires either a confirmed sibling wordmark or Jimeng provenance with a flat footprint. Do not loosen the flatness guard. **`assume_ai` was REMOVED (2026-07-19); `--sensitivity` is now `auto`/`strict` only.** It relaxed every mark's FP gate on the bare assertion an image is AI -- which names no vendor and no location, exactly what the bypass requires -- and had no place in the model (detector finds -> remove; finds nothing -> leave alone; user SEES a mark -> act on that). It took `_ASSUMED_CONF_FLOOR` / `assumed_floor_ok` / the `assumed` trust level with it, collapsing the ladder to `strict`/`confirmed`, and `_keep_pill` lost its `sensitivity` arg. Recall/precision on the unbiased sample are unchanged, so nothing on the default path moved. **Replacement advice is per mark:** `erase --region` is sound by construction; `--mark <text-mark> --no-detect` is reasonable (forced mask = the real glyph blob, non-empty 13/13); **`--mark gemini --no-detect` is NOT** -- it falls back to a fixed slot thLine truncated
- `gemini_engine.py` — visible Gemini-sparkle detector + localizer (cv2/numpy, no GPU): top-K size-weighted fusion candidate selection (`_SELECT_TOPK`), corner-promote, false-positive gate (the provenance prior relaxes the gate + lowers the trust threshold when a Google/Gemini C2PA issuer confirms the vendor). **White-core rescue:** the FP gate demotes a low-gradient match (soft edges), but a real FAINT sparkle also has soft edges -- so the gate keeps a low-grad match that is a strong (conf ≥ `_SPARKLE_KEEP_CONF` 0.52), bright (margin), near-WHITE-core sparkle (`_core_saturation` ≤ `_SPARKLE_WHITE_SAT` 0.20): a real sparkle core is white, a clean bright corner that shape-matches (sky/sun) is colored. This recovers ~14/20 metadata-stripped faint sparkles under the DEFAULT strict/auto (no flag, no metadata) at ~1.25% clean false-fire (baseline 0.55%); the ~0.51-scoring bright-bg FPs stay demoted (below 0.52). A learned classifier on the SAME features was measured WORSE than the tuned gate (2026-07 tier-1: MLP 86.7% recall vs 90.8% at equal FP), so the heuristic stays; a patch-CNN with richer features is the only lever left (roadmapped P2, low expected value -- the wall is fundamental). Detection scores the top-K size-weighted matches by full fusion (spatial+gradient+variance) and keeps the highest — NOT the raw-NCC argmax, which re-admits the tiny-patch FPs the size weight suppresses (the osachub 2026-06-12 sub-0.85 corner-sparkle regression; see `docs/module-internals.md`). Keep the 0.85 corner-promote NCC gate; a margin/chroma-gated lower promote was measured and REJECTED 2026-06-11 (~33% FP on non-Google content). Removal is localize -> fill: `footprint_mask` returns the sparkle footprint (the captured alpha thresholded LOW so the faint halo is included, then dilated by a sparkle-relative margin), and the shared `watermark_registry.fill` inpaints it. The captured alpha maps are used only to detect and to shape the mask, not for pixel recovery. `detect_sparkle_confidence` reuses a process-wide `_shared_engine()` singleton (lru_cache) — the engine holds only constant assets (captures, alpha maps, a precomputed 16..118 template ladder) and takes the image as an arg, so do NOT reconstruct `GeminiEngine()` per call: that reloaded assets + recomputed alpha maps + rebuilt the template cache on every one of ~34k `identify` calls (−24% on the sparkle path once made a singleton, output byte-identical). `detect_watermark`/`footprint_mask` guard `image.size == 0` before `to_bgr`, and return an empty (detected=False) result when no template scale fits (short side < 16 px), rather than dereferencing an empty candidate list.
+4 -1
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@@ -178,7 +178,10 @@ cannot parse the input.
`remove_ai_metadata` may copy an undecodable file through unchanged instead of
raising. User facing callers must use `strip_and_verify` and inspect its
surviving marker mapping before reporting success. The CLI does this.
surviving marker mapping before reporting success. `strip_and_verify` recovers
when `image_io` can still decode the raster by normalizing the container and
checking again. A truly undecodable file still reports the surviving markers.
The CLI uses this verified path.
### Sixteen bit PNG output is not preserved
+4 -1
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@@ -114,7 +114,10 @@ Key contracts:
- The low-level remover is fail-safe and can copy an undecodable file through
unchanged.
- A caller that reports success must use `strip_and_verify`, which scans the
written output for surviving markers.
written output for surviving markers. If the metadata-preserving decoder
rejected the container but `image_io` can still decode its raster,
`strip_and_verify` normalizes that raster and scans again. A truly undecodable
file keeps the surviving-marker result.
Detection and removal must stay in parity. A new marker is incomplete until the
scanner can find it, the remover can reach every supported placement, and a
+4 -1
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@@ -119,7 +119,10 @@ if has_ai_metadata(source):
Use `strip_and_verify` when your application reports that stripping succeeded.
It checks the written output and returns `(output_path, surviving_markers)`.
Treat a nonempty `surviving_markers` mapping as a failure.
When the first strip leaves markers in a malformed but raster-decodable image,
it normalizes the container through `image_io` and checks again. That recovery
path preserves the pixels but drops standard metadata. Treat a nonempty
`surviving_markers` mapping as a failure.
`remove_ai_metadata` is the lower level fail-safe transformer. It may copy an
undecodable input through unchanged, so its return alone must not be presented
+10 -6
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@@ -77,12 +77,15 @@ The package uses hatchling through the unpinned `hatchling` build requirement in
The repository includes a conda recipe under `packaging/conda/recipe.yaml`.
The ComfyUI nodes are maintained and versioned in their own repository. Its
scheduled workflow detects a newer PyPI library release, updates the dependency
floor, runs compatibility tests, bumps the node patch version, and publishes to
the ComfyUI Registry only when those tests pass. The library release event does
not publish the node package directly, so the registry update follows on that
schedule rather than inside `distribute.yml`.
The ComfyUI nodes are maintained and versioned in their own repository. After
the matching source distribution appears on PyPI, `distribute.yml` dispatches
that repository's sync workflow with the exact library version and waits for it
to finish. The sync updates the dependency floor, runs compatibility tests,
bumps the node patch version, and publishes to the ComfyUI Registry only when
those tests pass. Its daily schedule remains as a recovery path if a release
dispatch is interrupted. The `COMFYUI_RELEASE_TOKEN` repository secret is a
fine-grained token limited to the ComfyUI node repository, with Actions read and
write access.
## Release verification
@@ -94,4 +97,5 @@ After publication, verify:
- the distribution workflow completed successfully;
- the repository's conda recipe matches the published version and source
distribution;
- the ComfyUI Registry node requires the new library version;
- a clean install can run `remove-ai-watermarks --version`.
+2 -2
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
schema_version: 1
context:
version: "0.20.0"
version: "0.20.1"
python_min: "3.10"
package:
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ package:
source:
url: https://pypi.org/packages/source/r/remove-ai-watermarks/remove_ai_watermarks-${{ version }}.tar.gz
sha256: 28eb7aaeace7cfa50fe158ed6da72a4afa526d4be11e9f9c614b90edbaccf0b4
sha256: da2370d8b3a8386a2b0483e7bea6bb3c218b2e65cab5fab289eed9ea26c75014
build:
noarch: python
+1 -1
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
[project]
name = "remove-ai-watermarks"
version = "0.20.1"
version = "0.20.2"
description = "AI watermark remover: strip visible and invisible AI watermarks (Gemini / Nano Banana sparkle, SynthID) and provenance metadata (C2PA, EXIF) from images"
readme = "README.md"
requires-python = ">=3.10.1"
+1 -1
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@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ _os.environ.setdefault("TRANSFORMERS_VERBOSITY", "error")
_warnings.filterwarnings("ignore", message=r".*ImageProcessorFast.*")
__version__ = "0.20.1"
__version__ = "0.20.2"
__all__ = ["__version__", "remove_visible", "visible_provenance"]
+23
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@@ -1091,9 +1091,32 @@ def strip_and_verify(
exposed this when `metadata --remove` reported success while the output still read
as AI.
If markers survive but OpenCV can still decode the raster, the verified path
normalizes the container through :mod:`image_io` and scans once more. This
intentionally drops standard metadata on that recovery path because the original
container is too malformed for the metadata-preserving decoder.
Returns ``(output_path, surviving_markers)``; an empty mapping means a real strip.
"""
out = remove_ai_metadata(source_path, output_path, keep_standard=keep_standard)
remaining = get_ai_metadata(out)
if not remaining:
return out, {}
import cv2
from remove_ai_watermarks import image_io
image = image_io.imread(out, cv2.IMREAD_UNCHANGED)
if image is None:
return out, remaining
logger.warning(
"AI metadata survived stripping; normalizing decodable raster: path=%s fields=%s",
out,
",".join(sorted(remaining)),
)
if not image_io.imwrite(out, image):
raise OSError(f"Failed to normalize image after incomplete metadata stripping: {out}")
return out, get_ai_metadata(out)
+56
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@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ from remove_ai_watermarks.metadata import (
iptc_ai_system,
remove_ai_metadata,
samsung_genai,
strip_and_verify,
synthid_source,
xai_signature,
)
@@ -29,6 +30,28 @@ from remove_ai_watermarks.metadata import (
# Real, committed C2PA sample images used to ground the SynthID-source tests.
SAMPLES_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "data" / "fixtures" / "provenance"
def _png_chunk(kind: bytes, payload: bytes, *, corrupt_crc: bool = False) -> bytes:
"""Encode one PNG chunk, optionally corrupting its CRC."""
import zlib
crc = zlib.crc32(kind + payload) & 0xFFFFFFFF
if corrupt_crc:
crc ^= 1
return struct.pack(">I", len(payload)) + kind + payload + struct.pack(">I", crc)
def _corrupt_c2pa_png(path: Path) -> Path:
"""Write a synthetic PNG that Pillow rejects but OpenCV can decode."""
Image.new("RGB", (32, 32), (80, 120, 160)).save(path)
png = path.read_bytes()
idat_start = png.index(b"IDAT") - 4
fake_c2pa = _png_chunk(b"caBX", b"\x00\x00\x00\x10jumbsynthetic-c2pa")
bad_exif = _png_chunk(b"eXIf", b"Exif\x00\x00synthetic", corrupt_crc=True)
path.write_bytes(png[:idat_start] + fake_c2pa + bad_exif + png[idat_start:])
return path
# ── Key detection ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -276,6 +299,39 @@ class TestHasAiMetadata:
assert result == out
assert out.read_bytes() == truncated.read_bytes()
def test_strip_and_verify_normalizes_decodable_copy_through(self, tmp_path: Path):
"""A decodable raster must not retain C2PA after verified stripping."""
import numpy as np
from remove_ai_watermarks import image_io
src = _corrupt_c2pa_png(tmp_path / "source.png")
out = tmp_path / "clean.png"
assert has_ai_metadata(src)
before = image_io.imread(src)
assert before is not None
result, remaining = strip_and_verify(src, out)
assert result == out
assert remaining == {}
assert not has_ai_metadata(out)
after = image_io.imread(out)
assert after is not None
assert np.array_equal(after, before)
def test_strip_and_verify_reports_markers_in_undecodable_copy_through(self, tmp_path: Path):
"""A truly undecodable file keeps the established fail-safe result."""
src = _corrupt_c2pa_png(tmp_path / "source.png")
src.write_bytes(src.read_bytes()[: src.stat().st_size // 2])
out = tmp_path / "copy.png"
result, remaining = strip_and_verify(src, out)
assert result == out
assert "c2pa_manifest" in remaining
assert out.read_bytes() == src.read_bytes()
class TestC2paMarkerIn:
"""The C2PA presence check requires a JUMBF wrapper or the C2PA uuid box, so
Generated
+1 -1
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@@ -3187,7 +3187,7 @@ wheels = [
[[package]]
name = "remove-ai-watermarks"
version = "0.20.1"
version = "0.20.2"
source = { editable = "." }
dependencies = [
{ name = "c2pa-python" },