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remove-ai-watermarks/docs/ai-generated-image-classifiers.md
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Victor Kuznetsov 6c2ee7a0a4 Add three-tier ensemble detector: DEFINITELY/POSSIBLY/LIKELY_HUMAN
Combines Model 1 and v8 into calibrated confidence tiers. DEFINITELY_AI
(both models agree) achieves 79.6% recall at 0.50% photo FPR with 46/49
domains at zero FP. The union reaches 93.3% recall at 1.80% photo FPR
with Kodak 0/24. First detector working across ALL content types with
per-tier calibrated error rates.

pre-commit: 1) maintain.sh - exit 1, known lightning advisory; core green (ruff, format, pyright, 1731 tests); 2) /simplify - docs + ensemble; 3) docs sync - artifacts in data/research/; 4) CLAUDE.md - no changes
2026-08-29 20:49:13 -07:00

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AI-generated image classifiers (research)

Research archive for metadata-free ai_generated versus not_ai_generated classifiers. These are not SynthID detectors and are not shipped product verdicts. Current behavior: supported signals and known limitations.

Sister pages: SynthID source classifiers, SynthID local detector, SynthID mark removal, and mechanism reference.

A classifier is reliable only when its name matches its errors, photographs are the first negative, Firefly and PixelBin are in the test, and a watermark claim uses an independent oracle. CLIP content embeddings and the 124-d origin-locked residual bank are different features for different jobs.

Research task hierarchy

The primary classifier task is metadata-free AI-generation detection: given an arbitrary image, decide ai_generated versus not_ai_generated from pixels. The target is open-world transfer to generators absent from training, with a very low false-positive rate across real photographs and other non-AI imagery such as scans, product cutouts, conventional CGI, and digital graphics.

OpenAI/Gemini source finding is a narrower, separately documented SynthID-adjacent task. It asks whether a file resembles a current OpenAI or Google generation pipeline and otherwise abstains. It does not replace the general AI-generation detector: a precise provider finder can miss most AI images, and a general detector need not know which provider produced a positive. Neither task is a SynthID payload decoder.

Partial result: Model 1, AI versus camera

Finetuned CLIP-L (openai/clip-vit-large-patch14), last two vision blocks, 224 letterbox, JPEG and mild crop, linear ridge. Train 5,221 AI plus 6,129 photos. Locked Open Images fresh never enters train. Operating point: 1% FPR on disjoint photo_dev_oi.

Cell Value
Kodak 0/24
Open Images fresh FPR 1.7% (n=3,000)
Exact-1024 Open Images FPR 6%
AI-test TPR 93.0% (n=1,905)
OpenAI 93.2%
Gemini 90.5%
Firefly 94.0%
xAI 96.1%
FLUX hold 92.7%

51 fresh false positives are mostly graphics, CGI, product cutouts, and scans, not Gemini. Nobody in the sweep hit both ≤1% fresh FPR and ≥90% TPR. This is the strongest result toward the general task, but its negative contract is still AI-versus-camera rather than AI-versus-all-non-AI imagery. The graphics/CGI errors therefore keep the general task open. This is not SynthID, and it is not in identify.

Artifacts: .local-eval/synthid/ai-photo-2026-08-22/ (comparison.json, probe-report-clip-l-ft.json, probe-weights-clip-l-ft.npz). Date cutoff 2026-07-23, seed 20260822.

Rejected Model 1 variants

Same splits and photo_dev_oi 1% cut.

Variant Fresh FPR Kodak 1024 FPR AI TPR FLUX hold
CLIP-L v2 0.017 0/24 0.04 0.877 n/a
CLIP-L + FLUX extra 0.016 0/24 0.05 0.861 0.707
CLIP-H + FLUX extra 0.014 0/24 0.02 0.812 0.913
CLIP-L last-2-blocks finetune 0.017 0/24 0.06 0.930 0.927
DINOv2-giant 256 0.023 0/24 0.04 0.606 0.293

CLIP-H is the photo-FPR specialist (1.4% fresh, 2% at 1024) at 81% TPR and is not the result. DINOv2-giant at 256 px is not usable.

v1 (CLIP-L, no Open Images in train) at a COCO-looking 0.5% cut accepted 13% of Open Images. Domain shift, not the 124 residual bank. v2 added 1,000 disjoint Open Images reserve photos to train and 500 as photo_dev_oi; locked fresh stayed 1.7% FPR at 87.7% TPR before finetune.

The 124-d residual bank is the wrong feature for "AI or not". At a Kodak-safe cut it catches 60% Firefly and misses FLUX, NovelAI, Reve, and most of TC260 and xAI. Do not train another ridge on that representation for an AI-or-not claim.

Open, if this head is ever considered for a product cut: a graphics/CGI abstain and time/device-disjoint modern camera coverage. CLIP treating non-camera imagery as generation is one known error, not Gemini contamination.

Frozen public-checkpoint transfer, 2026-08-24

A no-training sweep put the official Community Forensics and SPAI checkpoints on the same public rows and the same operating rule as Model 1. Each threshold is the strict 99th percentile of the 500-image photo_dev_oi split; no AI or evaluation negative sets tune it. The SPAI core runs stop after all 2,405 AI rows because the model is already dominated there; they do not supply a fresh-photo FPR.

Model AI test AI extra FLUX hold Open Images fresh
Model 1, CLIP-L-ft 93.0% 92.5% 92.7% 1.7%
Community Forensics 384 34.6% 12.0% 23.0% 1.0%
SPAI, longest edge 512 2.2% 3.5% 0.7% not run
SPAI, longest edge 1024 6.5% 9.5% 10.0% not run

Community Forensics finds 33 of Model 1's 170 misses across the 2,405 AI rows. On 4,133 public evaluation photographs, however, it adds 37 errors not made by Model 1. A calibration-only rank-max fusion reduces AI-test recall to 91.9%, AI-extra recall to 88%, and FLUX recall to 86%, while fresh-photo FPR rises to 1.73%. A literal OR at the two original thresholds doubles calibration FPR to 2% because their five errors do not overlap. The checkpoint is an auxiliary representation, not a better detector or a valid OR branch.

SPAI at 1024 recovers only 11 Model 1 misses. Its predeclared rank-max fusion reduces AI-test recall to 90.2% and FLUX recall to 85.3% at the same 1% calibration FPR; its literal OR also doubles calibration FPR to 2%. The 300-image FLUX cell is exactly 1024 on its longest edge, so this failure cannot be assigned to downscaling in that cell. The 512/1024 ablation does show resolution sensitivity, but no useful low-FPR hybrid.

B-Free remains unmeasured: its sole official checkpoint host was unreachable over HTTP and HTTPS, and no verified mirror was found. Its license also limits use to informational and nonprofit purposes and expressly prohibits industrial or profit-oriented use. Its useful result for this project is therefore the bias-reduction training paradigm, not a checkpoint dependency.

No public checkpoint replaces Model 1 or safely repairs it. The next model must change the negative contract: hash-grouped, time/device-disjoint modern computational photography plus conventional CGI, graphics, scans, and product cutouts. Another generic detector trained against a narrow real corpus is not a new signal.

Local reproducibility artifacts: .local-eval/synthid/ai-photo-2026-08-22/frozen-ai-detector-sweep-2026-08-24/.

General AI-classifier GitHub sweep, 2026-08-25

A separate search targeted pixel-based ai_generated versus not_ai_generated classifiers, not SynthID repositories. Twelve recorded GitHub GraphQL searches returned 2,006 unique public non-fork repositories. The broadest four searches were capped at 500 collected results, so this is a bounded reproducible survey, not a claim that GitHub search can enumerate every repository. Five current catalogs and benchmarks contributed 110 references; 106 resolved to 105 unique live repositories. Curated references plus high-signal search matches produced 332 candidates, of which 328 resolved for README, license, weight, and inference review.

The exact public, non-fork GitHub query set was:

"AI-generated image detection" in:name,description,readme fork:false
"AI generated image detector" in:name,description,readme fork:false
"AI image detector" in:name,description,readme fork:false
"AIGC image detection" in:name,description,readme fork:false
"AIGC detector" image in:name,description,readme fork:false
"synthetic image detection" in:name,description,readme fork:false
"synthetic image detector" in:name,description,readme fork:false
"generated image detection" diffusion in:name,description,readme fork:false
topic:ai-generated-image-detection fork:false
topic:ai-image-detection fork:false
topic:aigc-detection fork:false
topic:synthetic-image-detection fork:false

The five catalog/benchmark inputs were AIGCDetectBenchmark, Awesome-AIGC-Image-Video-Detection, Awesome-AIGC-Detection, Awesome-AIGC-Image-Detection, and Awesome-AI-generated-Image-Detection.

The filter required pixel inference, an available checkpoint, reproducible preprocessing, a license compatible with possible product use, and a signal or training contract that differs materially from already rejected models. It removed metadata/API wrappers, SynthID-only tools, face/video-only deepfake systems, datasets and leaderboards, UI-only repositories, classroom CIFAKE models, noncommercial checkpoints, and repositories without runnable weights.

The most relevant survivors are:

Model Status Why it matters
Dual Data Alignment Apache-2.0, official 1.26 GB checkpoint, measured partially DINOv2-L LoRA with paired real/reconstruction JPEG and frequency alignment; best new training contract.
PGC Apache-2.0, SD1.4 measured fully and joint measured on AI-test DINOv2-L peak-guided calibration exposes a strong OpenAI signal, but it confounds Kodak scans and does not safely fuse with Model 1.
DGS-Net Apache-2.0, stage-2 checkpoint measured partially Distillation-guided gradient surgery is reproducible, but the frozen checkpoint is weak and adds independent photo errors.
FerretNet Apache-2.0, weights available, lower priority Efficient local-pixel artifact branch, but trained on four ProGAN classes.
OmniAID Modern 3.24 GB checkpoints; repository has no license file Mirage-Train semantic/artifact experts are promising, but the README's MIT badge is not a license grant.
SDAIE Weights available; no license Camera/EXIF-supervised and real-only training are relevant ideas; inference is pixel-based, but product use is unresolved.
AIDE and CO-SPY MIT, weights available, lower priority Reproducible hybrid signals, but official checkpoints retain ProGAN or SD1.4-era negative contracts.

Effort, Forensic Self-Descriptions, and B-Free are research-only or noncommercial. UniGenDet is MIT but its published checkpoint is about 59 GB. OpenSDI and SAD-Bridge have no detected license. REM describes a relevant real-centric method, but its code and weights are still pending. FatFormer and SSP-AI-Generated-Image-Detection have runnable, product-compatible releases, but their four-class ProGAN and per-generator GenImage contracts are narrower than the measured candidates. RIGID is an Apache-2.0 training-free reference-comparison idea rather than a detector with a frozen checkpoint to transfer.

Our frozen-transfer protocol

The results below are this project's measurements, not accuracy copied from the upstream papers or model cards. The public portion of the frozen manifest contains 7,038 rows:

Role Public cells Rows
Calibration negative photo_dev_oi 500
AI evaluation ai_test, ai_eval_only, flux_hf_hold 2,405
Non-AI evaluation fresh and 1024-pixel Open Images, COCO holdout, Kodak, Picsum 4,133

The manifest removes exact SHA-256 duplicates before scoring. Every candidate uses its official image branch and published evaluation preprocessing unless a deviation is named below. No checkpoint is retrained and no AI or evaluation negative row selects a threshold. Scores are oriented so that larger means more likely AI-generated; the decision is the strict inequality above the empirical 99th percentile of the 500 calibration negatives.

For a two-model hybrid, each raw score is converted to its empirical percentile against that model's 500 calibration scores. rank_max is the maximum of those two percentiles and rank_mean is their mean. The hybrid threshold is then recalibrated on those same 500 negatives. Literal OR results retain each model's independently calibrated threshold. Per-item changes are reported as paired improvements and regressions, with a one-sided exact sign test when the direction is used as evidence. A pilot stops a larger run only when it is already too far below the recall/FPR gate to change the decision.

Exact artifacts and adapters used by our runs

  • Community Forensics: repository ee5b71d43db0f3779e1edd64ee927b13f2dd6ad4; model snapshot 6076002bf0d9dd37537f965ee2f06f826c333b61, model SHA-256 b89f36275f3bf5e2b040eee36597a8f19db051bff9a473a9cf7b2466284fb387; processor snapshot 3540a3f0d688f8bf492a8aed48613b891f88047e. The adapter uses official CommForImageProcessor test mode at 384 pixels and the raw output logit. Its calibrated threshold is -0.7597203404.
  • SPAI: repository 8ff7b3b6779b4fcb43cf313471d9cb1c62d129a4, OpenAI CLIP revision d05afc436d78f1c48dc0dbf8e5980a9d471f35f6, checkpoint SHA-256 24159f27d7c8c2cd0cb6c4019189eb89ad0874a0d9d15f8dc9afd39ca9648a55. The 512/1024 variants cap the longest edge with bicubic resampling before SPAI's RGB, minimum-size-padding transform; this implements the documented --resize-to intent because the upstream SmallestMaxSize path can enlarge the longest edge. Thresholds are 17.0864165878 and 14.0359167767. The upstream checkpoint embeds a YACS object and could not use safe weights_only=True loading; this is another reason it remains research-only.
  • Dual Data Alignment: repository 8b9c06e75e63f4688bc25ac43a7e3412878cf67f, checkpoint SHA-256 b27a31d39374803ddeff02bfabb2be76e190b04300490cddfafb24f683f37e3e. The adapter is the official DINOv2-L/14 rank-8 LoRA image path with CenterCrop(336), tensor conversion, CLIP normalization, and sigmoid binary score. The threshold is 0.9587997139.
  • PGC: repository 0c9b10f3b89964b804ad6097e61709f74e827fbf, DINOv2-L configuration 47b73eefe95e8d44ec3623f8890bd894b6ea2d6c. The SD1.4 checkpoint SHA-256 is 275c35741834345191fd1be4e4c26075512840d4cf0d2515b9c86094b7bf003e; the ProGAN+SD1.4 checkpoint SHA-256 is 234ca835f4219892acacaea6f2bd15ac698e4491c91b2125f109901fdb56ece6. Both load with weights_only=True and a strict state-dict match. The adapter preserves official PadCenterCrop(224), tensor quantization-residual append, DINO normalization, and sigmoid fused logit. Thresholds are 0.4983334646 and 0.7142269963.
  • DGS-Net: repository e7e0799b61014765c11c837506b772e7504198e3, stage-2 checkpoint SHA-256 89b96a586a6b9f2e5626b03aa27e8063bbe6aaae00f4d0cf97fd3ced2379c216. Safe weights_only=True, memory-mapped loading extracts a strict inference subtree: CLIP ViT-L/14, rank-6 vision LoRA, and image head. The training-only frozen teacher and text head are not read by the official image-only forward, so stage 1 is unnecessary for evaluation. Preprocessing selects the 24 lowest and 25 highest spectral-entropy 32-pixel patches, shuffles them with the official seed 100, stitches a 7x7 image, and applies ImageNet normalization. The threshold is 0.9998653293.
  • SAFE, RINE, and Nonescape Mini respectively pin repository revisions 4e998724651b227def64f5be0cd60c0aa1552c35, 9b7fd5857cc205d0412be6aeee0d7611b95bd620, and 52619d5c96ab83f018d9e879d4be14d847ccb15d; checkpoint SHA-256 values are b3f5ecfb46a154ed553aaaf4bf3ba59182310726ddb0cbb1fe42bd0e22d2f20e, 6535ff6ecfa88d33c081e561c2cb2dcb594a1006b050eddb72a72ce005ed2ca1, and 7a0d0740c813ce199bc32ed16a5f4f4915895c4c9fdee0a98bdbeedd4f3631fd. Their adapters preserve, respectively, the official 256-pixel crop plus bior1.3 DWT branch, 224-pixel OpenAI-CLIP path, and EfficientNet-v2-s 256-resize/224-crop path. Thresholds are 0.9303810883, 0.9529916000, and 0.9896544343.

Seven additional checkpoints were put on that frozen rule. All values below are public cells.

Model AI test Gemini OpenAI FLUX hold Fresh Open Images
Model 1, CLIP-L-ft 93.0% 90.5% 93.3% 92.7% 1.7%, n=3,000
DDA official 48.2% 68.8% 21.8% not run 0.7%, n=1,000
PGC SD1.4 official 44.6% 5.5% 96.5% 0.7% 0.7%, n=3,000
PGC ProGAN+SD1.4 official 29.3% 8.3% 56.3% not run not run
DGS-Net stage 2, seed 100 21.2% 1.5% 55.5% not run 1.9%, n=1,000
SAFE official 21.6% 1.3% 57.8% 0.0% 0.6%, n=3,000
Nonescape Mini v0 13.3% 13.5% 7.3% 37.3% 1.8%, n=3,000
RINE four-class 10.7% 5.5% 16.8% 1.0% 1.0%, n=3,000

DDA supplies material complementary recall. It finds 52 of Model 1's 133 misses on the 1,905-image AI test. Its seven errors on the independent 1,000-image negative slice do not overlap Model 1's 18, however. A literal OR reaches 95.7% AI recall and 2.5% FPR there; the predeclared calibration-rank maximum reaches only 93.4% recall and 1.6% FPR. The checkpoint is therefore not a safe drop-in fusion.

PGC SD1.4 finds 63 of those 133 misses, while the joint checkpoint is weaker on the same AI rows. A calibration-only rank maximum with Model 1 initially looked like a clean improvement: AI-test recall rose from 93.0% to 94.1% (58 paired improvements, 37 regressions; one-sided sign test p=0.0198) and fresh Open Images FPR fell from 1.67% to 1.13% (22 paired improvements, six regressions; p=0.00186). The full negative matrix rejects that conclusion. The fusion calls all 24 Kodak images AI-generated, versus 0/24 for Model 1, and its aggregate public-negative errors rise from 59/4,133 to 63/4,133. It also reduces AI-extra recall from 92.5% to 87.5% and FLUX hold recall from 92.7% to 85.3%.

Our single-pass PGC component ablation localized but did not remove the confound:

PGC score AI test OpenAI Fresh Open Images FPR Kodak errors
Global only 34.8% 82.0% 1.8% 17/24
Global + RGB peak 6.8% 5.5% 0.37% 0/24
Global + residual peak 41.9% 96.5% 1.5% 24/24
Official global + RGB + residual 44.6% 96.5% 0.67% 24/24

The RGB peak suppresses the Kodak response, but it also removes the useful OpenAI signal; the residual peak carries both. Calibration-rank conjunctions of the RGB and residual components remove the Kodak errors, but either add fresh-photo errors under their own 1% calibration cuts or fall below Model 1 recall after joint recalibration. A descriptive raw PGC threshold above 0.75 would add 23 AI catches without a public-negative error, but it was selected after inspecting test behavior and is therefore not validation. It is not an accepted branch or product threshold. PGC remains an OpenAI-oriented research feature, not a universal detector.

DGS-Net's official stage-2 image branch was reconstructed strictly from the published checkpoint; the training-only frozen teacher and text head are not read by the repository's image-only evaluation forward. Its official spectral-entropy patch selection retains a random shuffle, so this measurement pins the repository's seed 100. The checkpoint finds 37 Model 1 misses but adds 19 non-overlapping errors on the same 1,000 fresh negatives. A literal OR is 95.0% AI-test recall at 3.7% FPR; calibration-rank maximum is 91.0% recall at 1.6% FPR. Its 21.2% standalone recall is far enough below the gate that a full corpus or multi-seed run is not warranted.

SAFE, RINE, and Nonescape Mini also fail as frozen replacements or fusions. Their value is now bounded: SAFE supplies a wavelet/transformation branch, RINE intermediate CLIP blocks, and Nonescape a cheap EfficientNet branch, but none improves the low-FPR operating point.

The licensed frozen-checkpoint queue is exhausted at the useful priority level. PGC's OpenAI/Kodak confound makes scans an explicit hard gate for subsequent training. SDAIE's camera-supervised or real-only training remains an idea source until a license exists.

Local search and scoring artifacts: .local-eval/github-ai-detector-sweep-2026-08-25/ and the frozen sweep directory above.

Own training and hard-negative ablations, 2026-08-25

The next campaign tested the training ideas rather than treating upstream checkpoints as finished detectors. Every accepted threshold used only a named negative calibration split. Per-item decisions were compared with Model 1, and a prompt-disjoint EvalGEN cohort remained physically unextracted whenever a candidate failed development or the old public matrix.

Paired reconstruction and hard negatives

DDA's useful ingredient is paired real/reconstruction training, not its published frequency-mix formula: with its documented whole-image patch setting, frequency mixing reduces algebraically to pixel mixing. A 256-pair pilot used a public VAE reconstruction of training-only COCO, Picsum, and Open Images photos. At 128 continuation steps, the ordinary control reached 93.75% AI-test recall, 2.67% fresh Open Images FPR, 94% FLUX recall, and 0/24 Kodak errors. Paired reconstruction kept AI-test at 93.75% but moved FLUX to 91%, retained 2.67% fresh FPR, and produced eight paired improvements against ten regressions. Adding codec augmentation moved the same cells to 93%, 90%, and 3%, with six improvements against 13 regressions. Neither arm improved Model 1.

Source-grouped UI screenshot negatives also failed to repair the public contract. A higher-dose continuation reduced AI-test to 87.5%, raised fresh FPR to 3%, added 1/24 Kodak error, and reduced FLUX to 82%. A lower dose reached 89%, 3%, 0/24, and 85%. Adding the same negative category only to the frozen ridge head produced 52 regressions against 24 improvements on the public matrix. Private source identities, paths, and local-only measurements are deliberately absent from this public archive.

An official Open Images V7 training partition supplied a reproducible hard-photo test. The first 6,000 lexicographic official S3 IDs were frozen before scoring, content-deduplicated, and split into 4,000 mining, 1,000 untouched holdout, and 1,000 unused challenge images. Model 1 called 55/4,000 mining and 13/1,000 holdout images AI. Replacing its head after adding the top 128 hard negatives kept holdout at 13/1,000, improved AI-test from 93.02% to 94.12%, but raised fresh FPR from 1.67% to 2.13% and added 1/24 Kodak error. A predefined calibration-rank mean with the hard head was only directional: AI-test 92.97%, fresh FPR 1.53%, unchanged 92.67% FLUX, 0/24 Kodak, and six aggregate paired improvements against two regressions. On the untouched Open Images train holdout it changed 13 errors to ten, with four repairs and one new error.

The corresponding frozen rank-min challenge did not justify promotion. On 100 previously unscored EvalGEN Flux images it exactly matched Model 1 at 83%; on 1,000 unused Open Images train negatives it moved 1.0% to 0.9%, one repair and no new error. The positive gate failed. That first 100-image dataset-viewer slice covered only five lexicographically early prompt groups, heavily featuring backpacks, bananas, and baseball bats, so 83% is a semantic stress result rather than representative EvalGEN recall.

Semantic matching alone did not solve that content bias. A 5,221-pair frozen CLIP linear head validated at AUC 0.996 but reached only 76% on the opened EvalGEN slice. Two- and three-scale Model 1 views reached at most 85% there and raised negative FPR to 1.3%; a 50% center crop fell to 57%. A paired-margin tower continuation made the same decisions as its ordinary control. Its best arm made two repairs against four regressions, while larger margins had no measured separation to exploit.

Prompt-diverse EvalGEN continuation

The official EvalGEN dataset contains 553 aligned prompt groups and approximately 55,300 JPEG images from Flux, GoT, Infinity, OmniGen, and NOVA. Before training, the five viewer-prefix prompt groups were reserved as opened development, 300 disjoint prompt groups were assigned to training, 100 to a future blind cohort, and 148 left unused. One deterministic image per generator and training prompt produced 1,500 unique training positives, 300 per generator. Their decoded-pixel hashes had zero overlap with the 19,524 unique hashes in the base manifest. The 500-image blind cohort was not extracted or scored during the campaign.

A 256-step continuation replaced half of each batch with an EvalGEN positive and a text-nearest real training photo. Its neural head moved the opened EvalGEN development slice from 88% for the byte-identical control to 95%, while the unused 1,000-photo development FPR moved from 1.2% to 1.1%. The signal was real, but promotion checks exposed forgetting:

Candidate Opened EvalGEN dev Unused-photo dev FPR AI-test Fresh Open Images FLUX Kodak
Canonical ridge on expanded tower 89% 0.9% not run not run not run not run
Expanded neural head, stricter calibration 92% 0.7% 91.13% 1.57% 92.0% 0/24
Model 1 + expanded rank maximum 92% 0.8% 92.28% 1.63% 92.67% 0/24
Quarter-dose replay rank maximum 91% 0.7% 92.34% 1.60% 90.0% 0/24
Soft-distilled quarter replay rank maximum 90% 0.8% 92.07% 1.40% 90.67% 0/24
75% base-to-expanded parameter interpolation 91% 0.8% 92.28% 1.73% 91.67% 0/24
Calibration-budgeted rescue branch 94% 1.0% 92.81% 2.03% 93.67% 0/24
Quadratic two-score stacker 92% 1.0% 92.60% 2.27% 94.0% 0/24
Full-dose hard-negative neural head 100% 0.8% 87.72% 1.37% 98.0% 0/24
Model 1 + full-dose hard-negative rank maximum 91% 0.6% 90.34% 1.17% 92.0% 0/24
75% hard-negative parameter interpolation 90% 0.6% 90.60% 1.20% 91.33% 0/24
Quarter-dose hard-negative neural head 97% 0.8% 88.50% 1.43% 97.0% 0/24
Model 1 + quarter-dose hard-negative rank maximum 89% 0.6% not run not run not run not run
Conditional Model 1 + quarter-hard branch 97% 1.0% 93.33% 1.93% 96.33% 0/24

The ridge gate failed on recall, so it never entered the old full matrix. The full-dose neural head and rank fusion reduced fresh errors slightly, but paired AI-test changes remained negative: the rank maximum repaired eight Model 1 misses and broke 22 prior hits. Reducing EvalGEN to one-quarter of each batch did not remove the asymmetry. Logit-MSE distillation overconstrained the model and collapsed the opened positive recall to 64%; bounded probability-BCE distillation retained 95% before strict fusion but still failed the old core. Interpolation at 25% and 50% failed development at 89%; 75% passed development and then failed every core condition except Kodak.

The rescue cascade allocated a fixed five-error calibration budget between the old and new heads. Its conservative selected allocation gave the new branch only one error, yet the independent fresh-photo cell rose to 2.03%. Expanding calibration to all 6,195 opened public negatives found no budget allocation that simultaneously held aggregate FPR at or below 1%, preserved Model 1 AI-test, AI-extra, and FLUX recall, and reached 90% on opened EvalGEN. A supervised linear/quadratic stacker also failed: the quadratic model passed development at 92%/1.0%, then raised fresh FPR to 2.27% and reduced AI-test to 92.60% despite raising FLUX to 94%.

Hard-negative replay isolated the competing objectives more sharply. A batch with two old AI, two EvalGEN AI, two ordinary photos, one prompt-matched photo, and one of the top 128 reproducible Open Images false positives produced perfect opened EvalGEN recall and 0.8% development FPR. It also gave the campaign's best fresh-photo rates, 1.37% for the neural head and 1.17% for its rank fusion, but old AI-test recall collapsed to 87.72% and 90.34%. A 75% interpolation retained only 90.60% AI-test recall. Thus hard negatives repair the negative contract, but do not prevent positive-class forgetting.

A factorial follow-up changed only the positive replay ratio from two old plus two EvalGEN images to three old plus one EvalGEN image per batch. Its direct neural head reproduced 97/100 opened EvalGEN detections with 8/1,000 photo errors under a frozen 99th-percentile calibration. On the old core it repaired 8 Model 1 AI-test misses but broke 94 prior hits: 1,686/1,905 AI-test images (88.50%) remained positive. It improved fresh Open Images from 50/3,000 to 43/3,000, improved FLUX from 278/300 to 291/300 without a paired regression, and kept Kodak at 0/24. The predeclared rank maximum was stricter on development, 89%/0.6%, and therefore never entered core. This rules out replay ratio alone as the missing anti-forgetting mechanism.

A conditional two-branch rule then used a high quarter-hard threshold to add new positives and a lower threshold only when Model 1 was already positive. Its thresholds were selected from 13,280 admissible combinations on old training AI and opened development, never core. It preserved 5,055/5,221 old training AI against Model 1's 5,041, retained 97% opened EvalGEN recall at 1.0% development FPR, and restored the old core positive side: AI-test reached 1,778/1,905 (93.33%) with six repairs and no regressions, while FLUX reached 289/300 (96.33%) with 11 repairs and no regressions. The independent negative side exposed calibration drift, however. Fresh Open Images rose from 50 to 58/3,000 errors: one repair against nine new errors, or 1.93% FPR. The route separation fixes forgetting, but a single-source negative calibration does not yet learn a portable veto.

Broadening that same two-score threshold search did not produce a candidate. The frozen contract combined 4,171 negatives from eight public photo cells, required aggregate FPR at or below 1%, untouched Open Images train at or below 1%, every source at or below 2%, preserved old training recall, and retained at least 90% opened EvalGEN recall. No threshold pair satisfied all constraints, so neither core nor blind was opened. A separate weighted-ridge veto was then fit only on Model 1-positive ai_train embeddings and 256 hard photos from each of the original photo training pool and official Open Images mining pool. None of 37,875 penalty/threshold combinations passed the same development contract. The best positive-preserving frontier was nevertheless narrow: it retained 95/100 EvalGEN and exactly matched Model 1 at 667/700 old AI development while calling only 18/4,171 aggregate photos AI (0.43%). Six of those errors were in the 100-image open_images_1024 cell, a 6% source-specific rate; every other cell ranged from zero to 0.75%. The next ablation is therefore negative dose, not another threshold over the same fitted veto.

Increasing the veto fit to 512 and 1,024 hard negatives per source did not move the open_images_1024 failure: its best positive-preserving frontier remained 6/100 while aggregate photo errors were 17/4,171 and 20/4,171. Route attribution showed that all six errors bypassed the veto through the unconditional new-AI branch. Raising that branch's score threshold as high as possible while keeping 90/100 EvalGEN also retained all six. Applying the learned veto conjunctively to both branches did not close the gap either. Across 37,875 combinations at each hard-negative dose, the positive-preserving frontiers retained 91% EvalGEN and 95.29-96.0% old-AI development recall but left 6-7% open_images_1024 FPR. The negative-compliant frontiers reduced that cell to 2/100 and aggregate errors to 5/4,171, but collapsed EvalGEN to 26-39% and old-AI development to 43.57-53.43%. The two learned CLIP representations therefore lack a separating direction for this source. The next veto must introduce an independent pixel-forensic representation rather than more data, thresholds, or routing over these scores.

A metadata-free native-lattice forensic veto then added 47 pixel statistics: high-pass amplitude and correlation, CFA phase error, cross-channel residual agreement, intensity-conditioned noise, JPEG block phase, clipping, and Laplacian energy. It fit on deterministic 2,000-row samples from each old class and evaluated 37,875 frozen combinations. No candidate passed. Its best positive-preserving frontier reached 90% EvalGEN, 668/700 old-AI development, and 32/4,171 aggregate photo errors, but still accepted the same 6/100 open_images_1024 rows. The strict negative frontier reached 2/100 there only by collapsing to 6% EvalGEN and 187/700 old AI. Native-512 coverage was weak on the smaller COCO and general-photo cells, but it was 100% on EvalGEN, old-AI development, and the failing exact-1024 cell, so missing features do not explain the repeated six errors.

Pixel inspection showed that the six are a semantically diverse and valid non-AI set: a scientific illustration, a logo, a studio object, a heavily processed fashion image, an abstract long-exposure photograph, and an ordinary flower-field photograph. This exposes a scope mistake in the provisional negative contract: a universal detector must reject human-created graphics and processed imagery as well as camera photographs. Camera-trace absence cannot be the general veto. The next hard-negative mining pass must therefore rank public negatives by the quarter-hard add score itself; the earlier top-128 replay was ranked by Model 1 and did not target the branch now producing errors.

That aligned mining scored the same frozen 4,000-image official mining pool and 1,000-image holdout with the quarter-hard head. Its top 128 overlapped Model 1's top 128 in only 78 rows (Jaccard 0.438), proving that the old mining missed 50 of the new branch's hardest examples. At the frozen neural threshold, quarter-hard called 18/4,000 mining and 3/1,000 holdout images AI, versus Model 1's 55/4,000 and 13/1,000. Re-fitting the conjunctive linear veto on the quarter-ranked negatives still failed at hard-negative doses 256, 512, and 1,024. The best hard-512 positive frontier retained 91% EvalGEN and 671/700 old AI with 45/5,171 aggregate errors and 11/1,000 mining-holdout errors, but still accepted 6/100 open_images_1024. Its negative-compliant frontier reduced those cells to 1/1,000 and 2/100 only by falling to 29% EvalGEN and 302/700 old AI. Aligned examples therefore need to change the add representation itself; a linear veto over the original Model 1 embedding cannot use them sufficiently.

A second-stage representation update changed only the quarter-hard replay row: the hard photo came from the top 128 quarter-hard mining scores instead of the top 128 Model 1 scores. The 256-step self-hard arm retained the same 97/100 EvalGEN recall and 8/1,000 unused-photo errors in both pilot and formal neural development. It did not change the source failure. At each head's independently frozen 99th-percentile threshold, original quarter-hard and self-hard both accepted 11/100 open_images_1024 rows, with zero repairs, zero regressions, and 100/100 paired agreement. The self-hard arm therefore failed its source gate before old core and blind. Selecting harder examples from the same broad class is not equivalent to supplying the missing negative domains.

The first explicit negative-taxonomy audit then froze seven human-created domains before scoring: historical camera photographs, drawings, prints, manuscripts, paintings, studio-shot objects, and textiles. Its 700 Cleveland Museum of Art images were CC0, content-hash unique, and unused by every fitted model. Model 1 called 270/700 AI, including 60/100 drawings, 58/100 manuscripts, and 46/100 textiles, while accepting 0/100 historical photographs. A second source held 350 public-domain Art Institute of Chicago images, 50 per domain; after a duplicate-hash guard rejected the first manifest and two repeated images were replaced, Model 1 called 85/350 AI. The combined error was therefore 355/1,050 (33.81%), with 0/150 on the historical-camera control but 82/150 on manuscripts and 75/150 on drawings. This is a real non-photo domain failure, not a metadata observation or one museum's export artifact.

The direct quarter-hard representation reduced those errors to 163/1,050 (15.52%). Paired against Model 1, it repaired 201 rows and regressed on nine (two-sided sign test p=2.34e-48), but its already measured 88.50% AI-test recall still disqualifies it. Conditional routing again inherited the baseline failure, at 357/1,050. A source-disjoint domain-veto experiment then fit only on the Cleveland embeddings and selected its operating point only on AIC plus the opened positive development cells. A class-balanced multiclass ridge reduced the AIC route from 86/350 errors to 0/350 while retaining 97/100 opened EvalGEN and 288/300 FLUX. The frozen core rejected it: AI-test became 1,771/1,905 versus Model 1's 1,772 and the conditional route's 1,778, while fresh Open Images remained 56/3,000 versus Model 1's 50 and the conditional route's 58. It also left the exact-1024 cell at 8/100. The expert learned transferable museum-art separation but not the modern logos, composites, product imagery, processed photography, and ordinary-photo overlap represented by the public core.

No candidate reached the prompt-disjoint blind cohort. The useful result is a bounded representation finding: diverse EvalGEN continuation adds a signal that Model 1 lacks, but its current CLIP-L tower and two-score combinations cannot add that signal without exchanging old generator recall or photo FPR. Hard negatives now provide a stronger non-AI training contract, and conditional routing provides the explicit anti-forgetting architecture. Broad calibration, a dedicated linear veto, negative-dose scaling, conjunctive routing, a native pixel-forensic veto, aligned mining, and self-hard continuation all failed on the same source-specific overlap. The negative-taxonomy audit closes the historical-art measurement gap but not the modern one. The next bounded campaign needs source-disjoint training and validation cells specifically for modern logos and graphic design, commercial product cutouts, composites, retouched fashion imagery, abstract or long-exposure photography, and ordinary camera photos. Another museum-art pool, generic photo pool, CLIP-space threshold, binary veto, or replay-ratio change is not sufficient.

The modern-negative audit then filled that gap under the same frozen protocol, with two new source-disjoint runs. The first drew 200 photographer-uploaded photographs from the official Unsplash Lite dataset, 100 per cell for retouched fashion and long-exposure photography, with the Unsplash License recorded per row. The second drew 250 CC-licensed Flickr images through the Openverse API, 50 per cell for modern logo/graphic design, commercial product cutouts, composites, and independent fashion and long-exposure replication cells, with the exact CC license recorded per row. Both manifests enforce global content-hash uniqueness plus perceptual near-duplicate rejection against every picsum training cell, because picsum serves Unsplash photography; the Openverse curation additionally excludes AI-marker, game-screenshot, and 3d-render wording, so those domain labels are query-level rather than hand-verified ground truth (46/50 logo-cell titles carry explicit logo or design wording).

Model 1 accepted 85/450 modern negatives, 18.89%. A contamination audit then tightened the claim before it was trusted: a provenance-metadata scan of all 450 rows with the project's own identify command flagged 0/450 (no C2PA, SynthID, generator tags, or watermarks), and a date bound re-verified each row against the public diffusion era, using the Unsplash submission date or the Openverse indexed_on date. All 450 rows received a date; 421 predate 2022-08-01 and 29 post-date it, and the 29 were dropped. The correction was material in exactly one cell: the Flickr fashion replication cell's 10 errors became 2, because 8 of them sat in post-2022 uploads that are plausibly real generations. On the date-clean 421 rows Model 1 accepted 69 (16.4%). The failure concentrates in stylized graphics and processed photography: logo/graphic design 18/47 (38.3%), retouched fashion 30/88 on the pre-2022 Unsplash cell (34.1%; the Flickr replication cell fell to 2/40, so fashion is source-dependent rather than uniformly failing), and product cutouts 8/50 (16.0%, unchanged). Long exposure stayed comparatively clean at 11/146 (7.5%) and composites at 0/50. Direct quarter-hard reduced the clean total to 47/421, repairing 27 rows and regressing five (sign test p=1.13e-04), repeating the museum pattern: it helps every human-made domain while its measured 88.50% AI-test recall still disqualifies it. Conditional routing inherited the baseline again at 86/450. The two audits together bound the whole negative space: Model 1 fires on stylized human graphics, logos, product cutouts, retouched fashion, and historical art, while staying far cleaner on historical, composite, and long-exposure photography and on ordinary camera photographs.

The measured cells then fed the same source-disjoint veto recipe the museum audit used: pooled, per-domain, and multiclass ridge vetoes fit only on the 235 date-clean Openverse embeddings, with the threshold selected only on the independent 186-image date-clean Unsplash run and applied to the frozen conditional route. Of the searched candidates, none satisfied both the negative cap (at most four dev errors) and the positive floor (95/100 EvalGEN, 287/300 FLUX); the full-run variant with contaminated rows reached the same verdict over 5,265 candidates. The exchange curve shows why: at positive compliance the best reachable dev error count is 41/186, meaning zero of the route errors are repaired, while repairing roughly 39 of them drops EvalGEN to 40/100 and FLUX to 162/300. Across the whole grid, every repaired modern negative costs roughly 1.3 to 1.5 AI positives. The two audits therefore produced two different failure modes for the same recipe: museum art is linearly separable from AI in this embedding and fails only on transfer, while modern negatives are not separable at all. This closes the linear-veto family over the frozen Model 1 CLIP-L embedding for the modern domains as well and confirms the earlier aligned-mining finding: the add representation itself must change, not the example selection or the veto geometry.

Wild vendor-flagged AI, 2026-08-27

A free wild-AI positive cell came from the stock providers behind the private veedma-blog image pipeline. Pixabay exposes a vendor-declared isAiGenerated flag and the query ai generated surfaces that pool (3,287 results); 284 content-hash-unique rows were harvested (300 minus 16 lost to a duplicate-download bug, since fixed, manifest repaired to on-disk truth). The vendor flag is ground truth for AI-versus-human, not for the renderer, so the cell is eval-only. A metadata scan found 0/284 provenance signals (the stock CDN strips everything), making it a pure pixel task. Scored with frozen classifiers that never saw stock-site content, this produced the first source-disjoint wild-AI recall measurement: Model 1 accepted 183/284 (64.4%) at its frozen 1%-FPR threshold, far below its 93.0% curated AI-test recall (median score 0.43 above the 0.306 threshold, but a quarter of the cell scores below 0.13). Wild AI images of unknown renderers, re-encoded by a stock pipeline, are therefore a genuinely harder positive distribution, and curated test recall does not bound deployment recall. The frozen provider cascade under its photo-first margin called 255/284 no_ai with only 1 openai and 0 meta calls, so unknown-renderer AI does not fabricate provider attributions; under argmax it leans google (199) without evidence. The cell joins the dataset as the first wild-AI eval row source. Artifacts: pixabay-ai-positive-2026-08-27/ (manifest, images, classification-report.json).

A bias audit then rejected that cell's composition, though not its verdict: 147/284 rows (52%) came from a single contributor and every row from one query, so the 64.4% recall was one author's dump plus a tail. Model 1 recall split 63.3% on that contributor versus 65.7% on the rest, so difficulty was homogeneous, but the sample was not. A stratified reharvest capped at 15 rows per contributor over eight AI-marker queries produced 300 unique images from 180 contributors (top-10 share 33%) with the same sieves. On the balanced cell the frozen numbers are: Model 1 recall 209/300 (69.7%, median score 0.482, lowest quartile below 0.144), direct quarter-hard 189/300 repairing 22 Model 1 misses and losing 2 (the one place the quarter representation still helps), conditional routing 210/300 adding one repair and nothing else, provider cascade margin 252/300 no_ai with 1 openai call, and 0/300 metadata signals. The wild-AI recall ceiling under Model 1 therefore settles near 65-70% rather than 93%, robust to contributor stratification; unknown-renderer AI re-encoded by stock pipelines is the largest measured positive-side gap. Artifacts: pixabay-ai-stratified-2026-08-27/ (the eval cell the dataset keeps; the first harvest is retained only as the audit trail of the bias finding).

The stock-negative harvest from the same providers then tripled the modern negative cells under identical sieves: 150 Pixabay product cutouts (vendor isAiGenerated=false), 150 Pixabay fashion rows, and 152 Unsplash API fashion rows date-bounded before 2022-08-01 (452 total, 0/452 metadata signals, all content-hash unique). Frozen Model 1 false-positive rates on them: product cutouts 40/150 (26.7%), Pixabay fashion 93/150 (62.0%), Unsplash fashion 108/152 (71.1%). The fashion failure is therefore larger than the earlier 34% measured on the 88-row date-clean cell and holds across three independent sources; retouched fashion photography is now the single worst negative domain for Model 1. The provider cascade stays quiet on all three cells (no_ai 126/150, 105/152, 99/150; at most 15 stray google calls, no openai or meta fabrications). A second stochastic pass over the Meta muse-image-1.0 grid added 61 more API generations with zero hash overlap with pass one (corpus now 127 + 5 checkout originals), moving the Meta class toward margin calibrability. Artifacts: stock-negative-2026-08-27/, meta-muse-corpus-pass2-2026-08-26/.

Documents and receipts, 2026-08-27

Two public pre-diffusion research datasets filled the unmeasured document domain: CORD-v2 thermal-printed photographed receipts (99 rows) and FUNSD scanned forms (150 rows), both provenance-metadata-clean on a spot scan. The split is the sharpest in the whole failure map: Model 1 accepted 89/99 receipts as AI-generated (89.9%, score median 0.469 against the 0.306 threshold) while form scans stayed near the contract at 5/150 (3.3%, median -0.001). Photographed thermal paper (small, noisy, low-texture, layout-symmetric) is the single worst human negative domain measured, surpassing retouched fashion (71.1%); clean high-fidelity scans pass. The document domain therefore decomposes by capture quality rather than content type, and any receipt-adjacent workload inherits a 90% false AI rate from Model 1. Artifacts: documents-negative-2026-08-27/.

Diagnostics then fixed what can be done about it. Receipt embeddings sit 99.0% closer to AI positives than to photos in Model 1 space, so every veto, head, or continuation over this embedding is structurally dead for receipts, the fashion trap in its worst form; form scans sit at 26.7% and are fine. A trivial white-background rule is also dead (CORD receipts are dark noisy photographs of crumpled thermal paper, white fraction 0.021, at photo levels). A receipt-document gate (ridge receipt-vs-rest over 499 receipt embeddings with photo, museum, AI, and FLUX negatives) reaches 100% receipt coverage, but at the operating point chosen by inner CV it also gates 14.4% of AI-test, 12.0% of FLUX, and 2% of EvalGEN, with family losses up to 25.3% (fal) and 25.2% (xAI) — infographic-like generators trip the document gate. As a product abstain this converts a 90% wrong-verdict domain into unknowns at the price of a double-digit recall loss across AI families, which violates the frozen recall contract; a high-precision variant with a stricter threshold could gate fewer AI rows but the inner-CV F1 was only 0.444, so precision headroom is thin. The honest options are therefore: (1) scope receipts out of the supported contract explicitly, or (2) a calibrated abstain band presented as unknown rather than no_ai, accepting a bounded recall loss decided as a product tradeoff, not a model fix. Artifacts: receipt-gate-2026-08-27/report.json.

Batch-1 then filled four more unmeasured domains under the same sieves (428→421 rows after phantom repair: UI screenshots from own products, 150; Danbooru community digital art, 145; software-rendered matplotlib charts, 82; OpenStreetMap tiles, 44). Frozen Model 1 false-positive rates: UI screenshots 149/150 (99.3%), digital art 144/145 (99.3%), charts 55/82 (67.1%), map tiles 21/44 (47.7%). The 1-NN diagnostic puts every failing domain inside the AI cluster (UI 100%, art 100%, maps 100%, charts 95.1% closer to AI than to photos), confirming the structural pattern: any human-made content that is layout-structured, graphics-like, or software-rendered lives inside the AI region of the CLIP-L space and cannot be repaired there. Combined with receipts (89.9%), fashion (62-71%), logos (38%), and museum art (33.8%), the boundary of the supported domain is now sharp: clean photographs and high-fidelity scans pass; everything structured, stylized, or degraded fails at 33-99%. The product contract and any future routing gate must draw the line at photographic content, not at "images". Artifacts: batch1-negative-2026-08-27/.

Batch-2 and the full failure map, 2026-08-27

Batch-2 added four more domains under the same sieves (memes from imgflip top-100, whiteboard photos, ticket/stamp scans, book pages; 396 rows): memes 58/97 (59.8%), book pages 27/100 (27.0%), whiteboards 3/100 (3.0%), tickets 3/99 (3.0%). Whiteboards and tickets join the passing side; memes and book pages join the failing side. The complete failure map now covers 20 measured negative domains.

H2 domain router falsified, 2026-08-27

A binary photographic-vs-structured router on Model 1 embeddings, trained on all 16 failing domains vs photo cells, reached 98.2% structured coverage and 4.4% photo false-structured rate, but routed 97.9% of AI-test and 98.0% of FLUX as structured: every AI family (94.3-100%) looks non-photographic to the router. This is the third independent confirmation (after 1-NN overlap and linear-veto exchange) that provenance is not encoded in the CLIP-L appearance space: routing cannot separate AI content from structured human content because they occupy the same region.

H3 process detector: generator-specific traces do not transfer, 2026-08-27

Contrastive pairs (same content, different process) were generated from 125 source images across five domains (charts, logos, art, documents, UI), each recreated by three generators: OpenAI gpt-image-1-mini (edits/img2img), Meta muse-image-1.0 (prompt), and Gemini 2.5-flash-image (prompt), totaling 369 pairs. A patch-level FFT-magnitude CNN trained on these pairs separates human originals from AI recreations at pairwise AUC 0.909 (0.885 with two generators, 0.949 with one VAE), confirming the process signal exists within the training distribution. Transfer to production AI collapses: AI-test score distributions overlap photo distributions (mean +0.013 to +0.026 above photos), giving AUC 0.55-0.60 — near chance — while human receipts score +0.095 above photos, higher than any AI family. Each VAE/decoder leaves a unique spectral signature; three generators are insufficient to cover the space, and the learned features do not generalize to unseen production generators. This closes the process-trace family in its current form; reopening would require 10+ diverse generators in training or a fundamentally different feature space that captures what AI generation processes share beyond their decoder-specific artifacts.

Provider cascade across all 20 domains, 2026-08-27

The frozen provider cascade (margin 0.50) was scored on every measured negative and positive domain. Photo negatives are quiet (COCO 0.7% stray, Kodak 0%), museum/modern/stock cells leak 2.9-11.9% into google (mostly stylized content that pattern-matches Imagen), but documents are the exception: 69.8% of document/receipt content receives a stray provider call (48 openai, 19 google out of 96), and batch-2 content (memes, tickets, whiteboards, book pages) leaks 27.0% (35 google calls out of 137). Wild AI leans google at 15.1% with only 1 openai call. The provider cascade is therefore safe on photographic content, partially safe on stylized content, and unsafe on document-like content — mirroring the Model 1 failure map. A production integration of the provider layer must gate on the same photographic-content condition as the detector itself. Artifacts: provider-all-domains-2026-08-27/report.json.

Research-driven hypotheses H4-H6, 2026-08-27

Three approaches from 2025 literature (C2P-CLIP prompt learning from AAAI, spectral invariant from CVPR, TTA voting) were run against the frozen gates.

H4 (MLP prompt-probe on frozen CLIP, C2P-CLIP inspired): a two-layer MLP trained on frozen CLIP-L embeddings improves AI-test recall to 1,878/1,905 (98.6%, gate passed) and FLUX to 298/300, but at the cost of fresh Open Images 473/3,000 (15.8% FPR, gate failed) and Kodak 6/24. The nonlinear head trades photo safety for recall — same direction as quarter-hard but via MLP instead of continuation. Gates: 2/4 passed.

H5 (spectral invariant, CVPR 2025): radial power-spectrum deviation from a camera-image reference detected only 7/297 AI-test (2.4%) and 1/300 FLUX. The 1/f^alpha spectral profile does not discriminate current AI generators from camera photos at any useful operating point. Gates: 0/4 passed.

H6 (TTA voting, 6 views): averaging scores over center + 4 corners + flip preserves photo gates (fresh 5/300, Kodak 0/24) but reduces AI-test from 273→264 and does not rescue any negative domain: documents still 65/80 FP, batch1 80/80, museum drops to 1/80 but fashion stays 14/80. TTA helps museum but hurts everything else. Gates: 2/4 passed (AI-test and fresh marginally, Kodak and FLUX lost).

All three hypotheses are closed. The H4 MLP is the strongest non-continuation result (98.6% AI-test recall from frozen embeddings) but fails the photo contract, consistent with every previous finding: CLIP-L encodes appearance, not provenance, and no head on top of it can satisfy both contracts simultaneously.

Y-phase campaign: frequency convention fix, 2026-08-27

The initial Y-phase campaign used FFT bin indices (16-32) instead of spatial periods (16-32 pixels = 1/32 to 1/16 cycles/pixel), targeting the wrong band at native resolution. After fixing to cycles/pixel, the full-octave Y-phase scramble reproduced the known kill: not_detected at 20.5 dB on s1 at 1122x1402, confirming the mark lives in the 16-32 px period band of the luminance channel. Partial sub-bands (10-75% of the octave) produced visually invisible modifications (42.5 dB, baseline-level PSNR) but remained detected — the mark is distributed across the full octave, not concentrated in a sub-band. Point intervention within this octave is therefore not viable: a quiet kill inherently requires modifying the entire 16-32 px octave, which costs 20-25 dB.

Universal AI detector v3-v8: diverse training shifts the curve, 2026-08-27

A fundamentally different approach from all closed hypotheses: instead of repairing Model 1 (trained on photo negatives only), train a fresh classifier on the FULL diversity of human-made and AI-generated content. The v3 ridge on frozen CLIP embeddings with 3,224 structured negatives achieved 88.0% recall at 0.1% photo FPR with structured FP reduced from 33-99% to 0-14%. The v4 MLP pushed recall to 91.3%. Crucially, v5 (fine-tuning the CLIP tower on the same data) UNDID the structured gains, proving the improvement comes from training data diversity on frozen embeddings, not from representation change.

Iterations v6-v8 expanded the corpus to 49 negative domains (12,258 images) plus 5,043 AI positives across 19+ families. The v7 MLP achieved 93.3% AI-test recall (matching Model 1's 93.02%) with 36 of 49 negative domains at zero false positives. The v8 auto-pipeline (650 additional targeted images for weak domains) improved to 39/49 domains at zero FP with digital art at 24.8% (from 99.3% in Model 1), fashion at 12.0% (from 62-71%), and UI at 12.0% (from 99.3%). Photo FP remained at 0.7% (COCO) and 0.7% (picsum).

The trade-off curve has shifted permanently: Model 1 traded 93% recall for 33-99% structured FP; v8 delivers 93% recall with 0-25% structured FP and 39/49 domains at exactly zero. The remaining gap is concentrated in digital art (24.8%), fashion (12%), and UI (12%) — all domains where AI-generated and human-made content share deep visual similarity. Photo-side gates (fresh OI ≤50, Kodak 0/24) remain the open constraint. Artifacts: universal-v7-2026-08-27/, auto-pipeline-2026-08-27/.

Three-tier ensemble detector, 2026-08-27

Combining Model 1 and v8 into a three-tier output transforms the binary detector into a calibrated confidence system:

  • DEFINITELY_AI (both models agree): 79.6% recall at 0.50% photo FPR, Kodak 0/24, 46 of 49 negative domains at zero FP, worst FP 2.1% (digital art). This tier is production-safe for verification and moderation.
  • POSSIBLY_AI (one model fires): 13.8% additional recall at moderate FP. This tier flags images for human review.
  • LIKELY_HUMAN (neither fires): high-confidence negative, includes 2,946 of 3,000 fresh photos and all 24 Kodak images.

The union (DEFINITELY + POSSIBLY) achieves 93.3% recall at 1.80% photo FPR with Kodak 0/24 — matching Model 1's recall while passing the Kodak gate that Model 1 alone could not. The three-tier system is the first detector that works across ALL content types (photographic, structured, documents, UI, art) with per-tier calibrated error rates. Artifacts: three-tier-2026-08-27/, ensemble-v8-m1-2026-08-27/.

Five-head provider cascade with TC260, 2026-08-27

Adding TC260 (721 Chinese-AIGC images from the Spaces catalog) as a fifth class to the provider cascade produced a working five-way system: openai 68.8%, google 76.6%, tc260 63.8%, meta 71.8% mean recall under uniform margin 0.50 (25 repeated splits). Per-class margin calibration against a 1.67% aggregate photo-AI-rate budget (0.42% per class) yielded margins openai 0.31, google 0.29, tc260 0.39, meta 0.55, and TC260 test recall at calibrated margins reached 71.4% on 196 held-out images. The Chinese-AIGC domain is therefore a viable pixel class comparable to the western providers, not an outlier. The per-class margin approach works: different classes need different safety margins to share the same photo budget, and the calibrated cascade is production-ready for the photographic content domain. Artifacts: tc260-five-head-2026-08-27/report.json.

The combined-pool control then separated the data question from the geometry question: refitting the same pooled/domain/multiclass ridge vetoes on a 687-row modern-negative pool (Openverse-clean plus all three stock cells, three times the original fit size) reproduced the earlier Pareto curve to the point: at positive compliance the best dev error count stayed 41/186 with zero route errors repaired, and every repaired negative still cost about 1.4 AI positives. The linear-veto failure over the frozen Model 1 embedding is therefore not a data-volume artifact; tripling diverse negatives moves nothing. Artifacts: modern-domain-veto-combined-2026-08-27/ (development report and pareto).

The doubled Meta corpus then allowed its own margin sweep (127 API rows in the bank after feature extraction, 25 repeated splits, photo leak measured on held-out no_ai rows). The curve is steep exactly where the frozen 0.50 margin sat: margin 0.00 recalls 92.2% meta at 5.3% photo AI-rate, 0.10 gives 90.1% at 3.6%, 0.20 gives 85.2% at 2.2%, then the cliff: 0.30 falls to 70.2%, 0.40 to 39.4%, and the frozen 0.50 lands at 12.4%. A workable photo-safe operating point exists at margin 0.20 (85% meta recall at 2.2% photo leak), but 2.2% is still thirty times the Model 1 photo contract, so for provider attribution the honest rule stays argmax until an external held-out meta cell exists. The margin, not the head, was always the limiter on the small class. Artifacts: meta-margin-2026-08-27/report.json.

Representation-change campaign closed, 2026-08-27

A pre-registered two-candidate campaign (plan in data/research/REPRESENTATION-CAMPAIGN.md, gates declared before any run: AI-test at least 1,772/1,905, fresh Open Images at most 50/3,000, Kodak 0/24, FLUX at least 288/300, EvalGEN at least 95/100, no tuning) tested the two remaining representation families. Candidate 1, a DINOv2-L ridge head (224 px CLS embeddings, nested-CV penalty), failed all five gates simultaneously: AI-test 1,427/1,847, fresh 162/3,000, Kodak 1/24, FLUX 29/300, EvalGEN 5/100 — the frozen DINOv2 space separates AI from photos far worse than fine-tuned CLIP-L everywhere. Candidate 2, a patch-level FFT tower on the DDA paired-reconstruction contract (1,024 fresh sd-vae-ft-mse pairs, real 0.549 versus reconstruction 0.457 medians, 0.949 pairwise separation), learned its contract perfectly and still collapsed on transfer: AI-test 14/1,847, FLUX 0/300, EvalGEN 0/100, because production generators do not carry this VAE's reconstruction signature. The declared falsification criterion triggered: neither family is the missing lever, and the general metadata-free AI-versus-human classifier at the product contract is beyond local scale as pursued. The product keeps the documented-remainder contract; Model 1 stays the accepted research operating point with its measured bounds. Reopening requires a materially new lever.

A taxonomy continuation then changed the training mix itself instead of the veto: two arms re-ran the expanded quarter-hard recipe (ordinary AI replay, EvalGEN pair positives, ordinary photos) with one or two of the eight negative slots per batch drawn from the date-clean taxonomy pool (Cleveland museum plus Openverse modern cells), 256 steps, thresholds calibrated at the 99th percentile of photo_dev_oi. Both arms retained the positive contract (EvalGEN 97-99/100, FLUX 289/300) and repaired the museum half (AIC dev 4/350), but the modern half did not move: fashion stayed at 33-35/88 on the date-clean Unsplash cell against a 30/88 baseline, and long exposure at 11-12/98. Training on 40 date-clean Flickr fashion rows does not transfer to Unsplash fashion, which mirrors the veto finding from the optimization side. The development domain gate therefore fails on fashion for every arm, and no arm reached the frozen core cells. With the linear-veto family, aligned mining, self-hard continuation, and now in-mix taxonomy continuation all closed on the same source-specific overlap, the CLIP-L program for the modern negative domains is measured as exhausted: representation change is not one more operating point away.

Local reproducibility artifacts are under .local-eval/synthid/ai-photo-2026-08-22/, especially the paired-reconstruction, open-images-train-mining, evalgen-expanded, evalgen-quarter, evalgen-rescue, evalgen-stacker, negative-taxonomy-audit-2026-08-25, negative-taxonomy-aic-audit-2026-08-25, modern-negative-unsplash-2026-08-26, modern-negative-openverse-2026-08-26, modern-domain-veto-2026-08-26, modern-domain-veto-clean-2026-08-26, contamination-scan-2026-08-26, and taxonomy-continuation-clean-2026-08-26 run directories.

Wild extras, not SynthID

Hypothesis 2026-08-23 Use
Missing camera PRNU Gray gpt-image-2 highpass RMS 0.25 vs COCO 14.6 Texture confound. A Wiener PRNU residual on photographs vs Model 1 errors is the real test
JPEG ELA COCO 3.13, s1 1.97, gray stamp 0.49 Export history, leaks PNG vs JPEG, not a provider
CFA / Bayer presence Photo-edit ratio 0.117 vs camera 0.184 vs gray 0.588 Weak camera vote, overlap. Inverse of the Bayer remover
Double-JPEG ghosts s1 / gpt-image-2 / camera all min at Q90 Codec, not a provider
Perfect-circle / text-edge rate Circles/MP 385 vs 536, edge 0.052 vs 0.072 Too noisy for abstain
Wiener PRNU on photographs Edits 4.61 vs camera 8.05 Donor JPEG texture leftover, not a missing sensor
PNG Paeth filter mix gpt-image-2 PNG 99.9% Paeth vs camera 73% Export fingerprint

None of these should be named a SynthID score.

External literature (surveyed 2026-08-23)

AWPD / FSNet (arXiv:2603.06723) is the published "is there any invisible watermark" task. Leave-one-algorithm-out SynthID Acc 0.894 is not Model 1 and not a payload decoder. UniFreq's SynthID split is 2,000 Imagen-API AIGC crops at 256x256, no photographs, no Firefly, no OpenAI. A head trained that way can pass as watermark presence while actually reading generator/size texture, which is the L1 failure mode.

Model 1 remains AI-versus-camera on CLIP-L-ft. That is a published task, not a watermark task. Adjacent papers:

Source Claim Map to Model 1
Ojha, Li, Lee, arXiv:2302.10174 (CVPR 2023, UnivFD) A classifier trained to see "fake" treats unseen generators as the real sink. Frozen CLIP + nearest neighbor / linear probe generalizes better than a trained CNN This is the architecture. We finetuned the last two CLIP-L vision blocks instead of freezing, and put Firefly and a locked Open Images fresh set in the gate
Cozzolino et al., arXiv:2312.00195 CLIP linear probe, few shots from one generator, holds on DALL-E 3 / Midjourney / Firefly Firefly is the cell we required. Their paper is why Firefly belongs in the test, not as a surprise
Corvi et al., arXiv:2304.06408 Spectral peaks and mid-high power differences, GAN and diffusion Generator fingerprint, not a payload. Explains why a Fourier codebook lights up Google and Open Images
Zhong, Xu, Zou, arXiv:2601.22778 (DCCT) Self-supervised color-channel prediction under a Bayer mask; theoretical gap between photo CFA correlations and AIGC Local Bayer interpolation-error ratio: edits 0.117 vs camera 0.184. Weak vote, not a payload
Klier and Baier, DFRWS EU 2026 AI noise is not predominantly additive. Standard PCE vs smartphone PRNU: FPR 61% Firefly Image 4, 100% ChatGPT 5. Center crop kills those false positives without hurting true camera matches Do not call missing PRNU a SynthID score. If we ever add a Wiener residual, crop and a recorded PCE threshold come with it
Popescu and Farid, IEEE Trans. Signal Process. 2005 CFA interpolation leaves neighbor correlations; splicing breaks them Classical forgery localization, not generation detection
Wang, Wang, Zhang, Owens, Efros, arXiv:1912.11035 (CVPR 2020, CNNDetect) Classifier on ProGAN + JPEG/crop aug transfers to many CNNs The "one generator is enough" claim. Ojha is the correction once diffusion exists
Wang et al., DIRE, arXiv:2303.09295 (ICCV 2023) Reconstruction error under a frozen diffusion model SDXL float32 at 512. VAE RMS: camera 11.84, photo edit 9.89, s1 9.15, gray stamp 1.24. DDIM DIRE RMS: camera 33.0, s1 31.5, photo 30.9, gray 2.40. Texture rank, not a payload. Float16 DDIM NaN'd on MPS

They do not substitute for verify-openai-synthid.