New `mobile` engagement mode: `neurosploit mobile <app.apk|app.ipa|binary>`
reverse-engineers a local artifact with a dedicated `mobile` agent set, all
headless and provisioned on demand (Ghidra analyzeHeadless, MobSF REST/Docker,
Frida, apktool/jadx, radare2).
Twelve original, generic skills (agents_md/mobile/, English): static binary
triage, APK static analysis, IPA static analysis, RASP & anti-tamper mapping,
root/jailbreak detection + bypass, TLS pinning detection + bypass, anti-debug
detection + bypass, obfuscation analysis & deobfuscation, code-integrity /
tamper-check bypass, hardcoded-secrets extraction, insecure local storage, and
mobile network traffic analysis. Findings are proven from the artifact
(decompilation or Frida trace), non-destructively.
- agents.rs: new `mobile` Library category (loaded, counted).
- pipeline.rs: run_mobile() mirroring the host pipeline with a mobile recon and
headless tooling doctrine; exported from the crate.
- CLI: `Cmd::Mobile` + `Mode::Mobile`, wired in main and the TUI.
- README + TUTORIAL document the new test type; engagement-modes badge + table
updated; "New in v4.2.0" note. Version bumped to 4.2.0 across the workspace.
383 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Version bumped to 4.1.0 across the workspace, binaries, web console and Typst
template.
README: new "New in v4.1.0" summary; trimmed the verbose highlight bullets and
the TypeSafe section; removed the anti-plagiarism/provenance section (provenance
stays in the code, just not front-and-centre in the README); TypeSafe promoted
to its own top-level section; agent count 446.
TUTORIAL: new section 17 "Assurance & authorization" covering the target gate,
--scope-file, evidence-graded CVSS, audit anchoring + assurance bundle, sandbox,
intercept proxy, PoC re-validation, compliance mapping, TypeSafe, and the
internal/AD graph + budget governor.
benchmarks/typesafe-2026-09-20/: the with/without TypeSafe measurement —
report.html, scorer, both runs' findings/assurance/meta/logs, and a README.
No secrets committed (env-only during the runs, verified clean).
381 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Budget (opt-in, unlimited by default so an un-budgeted run is unchanged):
- crates/harness/src/budget.rs — modes, phase shares, Token Governor
- CLI: --budget/--token-limit/--deep-test-limit/--coverage-first/
--depth-first/--sample-per-route; same controls in the web wizard
- pipeline honours it: vote_n narrows, evidence rounds are capped
Run control parity in the web console:
- /pause in the REPL, backed by a pause gate in the model pool: in-flight
agents finish, then the run holds with every finding kept
- POST /api/exploit/:id/{pause,continue,report} + GET .../log
Provenance (crates/harness/src/provenance.rs):
- JOASNSCOPE sigil leads every canary, so a marker found in a response,
a log or someone else's report extracts whole and names its build
- per-build fingerprint, per-run id, optional per-customer build id
- findings.json stamped with _engine; signed provenance.json manifest
- structural signature survives rewording but not a changed result set
- prompts watermarked at the single pool chokepoint
- `neurosploit provenance show|scan|verify`
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Driven by the Arena Hockey engagement, where all 24 findings shipped with an
empty CVSS field and the PDF ran payloads off the page edge.
CVSS
- Derived deterministically from what the harness knows: the weakness class
sets the impact shape, the PROVEN exploitability sets attack complexity, and
the auth context sets privileges required. The vector is emitted with the
score, because a score without its vector cannot be checked and an unchecked
score is just a bigger adjective.
- The base equation is the v3.1 specification verbatim, including round-up and
the scope-changed privileges table. Tests anchor it against known values
(9.8 unauthenticated RCE, 10.0 with scope change, 6.1 reflected XSS, 0.0 for
no impact).
- An unknown weakness stays conservative — guessing high impact from a class
nobody mapped is how reports get inflated. An agent-supplied score is never
overwritten.
PDF
- Steps are passed as an ARRAY and rendered as a real numbered list, one command
per box. The previous template flattened them into a single `raw` block, which
rendered five separate commands as one run-on paragraph.
- Finding blocks are breakable, so a long evidence dump flows to the next page
instead of off the bottom of this one.
- `wrappable()` inserts zero-width breaks so encoded payloads wrap. The first
attempt broke prose mid-word ("rota ted", "lockoutOnFailu re=false") by
breaking every N characters regardless of context; it now works per token and
leaves anything that fits on a line exactly as it was.
- rebuild() re-enriches before rendering, so a run that finished before a
mapping existed picks it up instead of reprinting the gap forever.
Over-claimed findings are capped, not deleted
- The engagement rejected "no rate limiting on the password-reset flow" because
the agent claimed inbox flooding and only proved 25 unthrottled requests. The
claim was inflated; the measurement was real, and dropping it hid a genuine
gap. A unanimously rejected finding that still carries a checkable receipt is
now capped to Low and flagged for review, with the validator's reason
attached — the reader gets the fact without the story built on it.
- The agent contract now says impact must be what was MEASURED, and warns that
inflating it costs the whole finding.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A finding is useful only if the reader can find the problem, see why it
matters, fix it, and reproduce it without trusting us. The report answered the
last one badly and the other three not at all: it printed a payload blob and an
evidence blob, and "payload: ' OR 1=1--" tells a developer nothing about WHERE
to look. A PoC script attached as a file is a black box unless you run it.
Findings are now rendered in the order a reader works through them — where the
problem is, what it means, how to fix it, then the proof — in the HTML report,
the Markdown, the Typst/PDF and the web console's finding modal.
The proof is numbered, pasteable steps: baseline request, attack request, how
to read the result, with the real URL and the real payload. They come from the
agent's `repro_steps` when it recorded them, and are derived from the
endpoint/payload/identity pair otherwise, so every finding carries something
runnable. The generated curl redacts Authorization/Cookie/API-key headers — a
report gets shared, and a live session cookie inside one is a new bug. A PoC
script is now offered as an extra artifact that automates the steps, never as
the proof itself.
Technical evidence is the measured difference, not a paraphrase: baseline vs
attack status, size, timing and delta; how many repeats reproduced it; the
controlled marker and whether a browser or a callback observed it; then each
recorded exchange with the headers that decide a class (Location, Set-Cookie,
Access-Control-*, X-Frame-Options, CSP, Retry-After) and a body excerpt.
Finding gains `location` (the parameter/field/flow step, not just the URL) and
`repro_steps`, and the agent contract now asks for them explicitly, along with
impact tied to this app's data and remediation that names the control rather
than saying "sanitise input".
The web console offers the run's PDF when Typst produced one — and only then,
since a dead download button is worse than none.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: embed proof screenshots in reports, correlated to findings
Define a convention that ties each proof image to its vulnerability and
renders it in every report format.
- Finding gains `screenshots: Vec<String>` (paths relative to the run
workdir, e.g. evidence/<finding-id>-1.png).
- Exploit prompt injects an EVIDENCE SCREENSHOTS doctrine: agents save
proof PNGs into the run's absolute evidence/ dir named by a vuln slug,
and list them in the finding JSON `screenshots` array.
- collect_evidence() resolves whatever the agent captured (absolute,
workdir-relative, evidence/, /tmp basename), copies it to a stable
evidence/<finding-id>-N.png, and rewrites the field; unresolved refs
are dropped so a report never embeds a missing image.
- Typst (image()), HTML (<img>) and Markdown (![]) render each finding's
screenshots beside its evidence.
Tests: slugify + collect_evidence resolution/rename; verified a real PDF
compiles with an embedded image.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018BGLy4j5qsqqid6CoovowC
* feat: source-able env.sh to activate neurosploit in the current shell
Add env.sh: `source` it to export NEUROSPLOIT (binary path),
NEUROSPLOIT_BASE (agents base) and prepend the binary dir to PATH —
no reinstall or new terminal needed. Auto-detects the install/repo dir,
honors NEUROSPLOIT_DIR, idempotent. setup.sh now writes a ready env.sh
into the install dir and points users at `source <dir>/env.sh`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018BGLy4j5qsqqid6CoovowC
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Partial observability is now first-class:
- belief.rs — property-graph world model; nodes (host/service/vuln/exploit/cred)
carry a probability, not a boolean. Bayesian observation updates; per-node
Shannon entropy; mean-uncertainty + recon-frontier. Black-box = diffuse priors
that sharpen with observation; white-box collapses toward deterministic (MDP).
- pomdp.rs — value_of_information(), decide() (recon vs exploit falls out of
belief entropy), and may_assert() — the mathematical anti-hallucination gate:
no exploitability claim while the belief is diffuse (high entropy) → observe first.
- grounding.rs — verification engine, hard rule "no claim without a tool receipt":
empirical grounding for black-box (raw HTTP/OOB/error markers), symbolic for
white-box (file:line into reviewed source). Ungrounded claims demoted + flagged
receipt_missing (feeds future reward shaping).
- pipeline.finish(): grounding gate before reporting + belief-uncertainty readout.
- bump 3.5.0 → 3.5.1; README documents the v3.5.1 belief/grounding architecture
and the infra/bandit/reward roadmap.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- New persistent interactive session (app/src/repl.rs), launched when run with no args:
banner, model selection, API-key config (/key) or subscription (/sub), then a live
session to set /target, /repo, /auth, and free-text /focus instructions (or just type
them) that STEER which agents run and how.
- Slash-commands: /model /providers /key /sub /target /repo /auth /focus /mcp /votes
/agents /show /run /quit (+ bare text = focus).
- RunConfig gains `instructions` and `auth`:
* instructions bias both LLM agent-selection and the heuristic (focus keywords →
injection/access-control/etc. agents get a strong boost)
* operator directives (focus + auth) injected into recon and exploit prompts so agents
test as an authenticated user and prioritise the requested vuln classes
- bump 3.4.1 → 3.5.0 (CLI, harness, reports, credits)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Task-based model ROUTER (recon/select prefer a fast model; exploit prefers primary; validate uses a different model than the finder)
- ReAct doctrine injected into exploit prompts (Thought→Action→Observation, token-efficient)
- Dedup: unique agents per run + findings deduped by CWE/endpoint/title (highest confidence kept)
- Token economy: recon blob capped for selector + per-agent context
- Configurable MCP: merge user mcp.servers.json into the pipeline's .mcp.json
- +54 white-box/code-analysis agents (NoSQLi, LDAP/XPath, JWT-none, Java/.NET/PHP/Go/Node/Python
specifics, SSTI, ReDoS, deserialization, etc.) → 303 agents total (78 code)
- Credits: Joas A Santos & Red Team Leaders (CLI banner, interactive header, HTML+Typst report)
- README: GitHub stars/forks badges, 60-second quick start, full API config steps, intuitive layout
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
