feat(server): add terminal-agent.ts (PTY for the Terminal sidebar tab)

Translates phoenix gbrowser's Go PTY (cmd/gbd/terminal.go) into a Bun
non-compiled process. Lives separately from `sidebar-agent.ts` so a
WS-framing or PTY-cleanup bug can't take down the chat path (codex
outside-voice review caught the coupling risk).

Architecture:
- Bun.serve on 127.0.0.1:0 (never tunneled).
- POST /internal/grant accepts cookie tokens from the parent server over
  loopback, authenticated with a per-boot internal token.
- GET /ws upgrades require BOTH (a) Origin: chrome-extension://<id> and
  (b) the gstack_pty cookie minted by /pty-session. Either gate alone is
  insufficient (CSWSH defense + auth defense).
- Lazy spawn: claude PTY is not started until the WS receives its first
  data frame. Idle sidebar opens cost nothing.
- Bun PTY API: `terminal: { rows, cols, data(t, chunk) }` — verified at
  impl time on Bun 1.3.10. proc.terminal.write() for input,
  proc.terminal.resize() for resize, proc.kill() + 3s SIGKILL fallback
  on close.
- process.on('uncaughtException'|'unhandledRejection') handlers so a
  framing bug logs but doesn't kill the listener loop.

Test-only `BROWSE_TERMINAL_BINARY` env override lets the integration
tests spawn /bin/bash instead of requiring claude on every CI runner.

Not yet spawned by anything — wired in the next commit.
This commit is contained in:
Garry Tan
2026-04-25 12:33:43 -07:00
parent dc356733ff
commit c5407b101b
+408
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,408 @@
/**
* Terminal Agent — PTY-backed Claude Code terminal for the gstack browser
* sidebar. Translates the phoenix gbrowser PTY (cmd/gbd/terminal.go) into
* Bun, with a few changes informed by codex's outside-voice review:
*
* - Lives in a separate non-compiled bun process from sidebar-agent.ts so
* a bug in WS framing or PTY cleanup can't take down the chat path.
* - Binds 127.0.0.1 only — never on the dual-listener tunnel surface.
* - Origin validation on the WS upgrade is REQUIRED (not defense-in-depth)
* because a localhost shell WS is a real cross-site WebSocket-hijacking
* target.
* - Cookie-based auth via /internal/grant from the parent server, not a
* token in /health.
* - Lazy spawn: claude PTY is not spawned until the WS receives its first
* data frame. Sidebar opens that never type don't burn a claude session.
* - PTY dies with WS close (one PTY per WS). v1.1 may add session
* survival; for v1 we match phoenix's lifecycle.
*
* The PTY uses Bun's `terminal:` spawn option (verified at impl time on
* Bun 1.3.10): pass cols/rows + a data callback; write input via
* `proc.terminal.write(buf)`; resize via `proc.terminal.resize(cols, rows)`.
*/
import * as fs from 'fs';
import * as path from 'path';
import * as crypto from 'crypto';
import { safeUnlink } from './error-handling';
const STATE_FILE = process.env.BROWSE_STATE_FILE || path.join(process.env.HOME || '/tmp', '.gstack', 'browse.json');
const PORT_FILE = path.join(path.dirname(STATE_FILE), 'terminal-port');
const BROWSE_SERVER_PORT = parseInt(process.env.BROWSE_SERVER_PORT || '0', 10);
const EXTENSION_ID = process.env.BROWSE_EXTENSION_ID || ''; // optional: tighten Origin check
const INTERNAL_TOKEN = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('base64url'); // shared with parent server via env at spawn
// In-memory cookie token registry. Parent posts /internal/grant after
// /pty-session; we validate WS cookies against this set.
const validTokens = new Set<string>();
// Active PTY session per WS. One terminal per connection. Codex finding #4:
// uncaught handlers below catch bugs in framing/cleanup so they don't kill
// the listener loop.
process.on('uncaughtException', (err) => {
console.error('[terminal-agent] uncaughtException:', err);
});
process.on('unhandledRejection', (reason) => {
console.error('[terminal-agent] unhandledRejection:', reason);
});
interface PtySession {
proc: any | null; // Bun.Subprocess once spawned
cols: number;
rows: number;
cookie: string;
spawned: boolean;
}
const sessions = new WeakMap<any, PtySession>(); // ws -> session
/** Find claude on PATH. */
function findClaude(): string | null {
// Test-only override. Lets the integration tests spawn /bin/bash instead
// of requiring claude to be installed on every CI runner. NEVER read in
// production (sidebar UI). Documented in browse/test/terminal-agent-integration.test.ts.
const override = process.env.BROWSE_TERMINAL_BINARY;
if (override && fs.existsSync(override)) return override;
// Bun.which is sync and respects PATH. Falls back to a small list of
// common install locations if PATH is stripped (e.g., launched from
// Conductor with a minimal env).
const which = (Bun as any).which?.('claude');
if (which) return which;
const candidates = [
'/opt/homebrew/bin/claude',
'/usr/local/bin/claude',
`${process.env.HOME}/.local/bin/claude`,
`${process.env.HOME}/.bun/bin/claude`,
`${process.env.HOME}/.npm-global/bin/claude`,
];
for (const c of candidates) {
try { fs.accessSync(c, fs.constants.X_OK); return c; } catch {}
}
return null;
}
/** Probe + persist claude availability for the bootstrap card. */
function writeClaudeAvailable(): void {
const stateDir = path.dirname(STATE_FILE);
try { fs.mkdirSync(stateDir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 }); } catch {}
const found = findClaude();
const status = {
available: !!found,
path: found || undefined,
install_url: 'https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code',
checked_at: new Date().toISOString(),
};
const target = path.join(stateDir, 'claude-available.json');
const tmp = path.join(stateDir, `.tmp-claude-${process.pid}`);
try {
fs.writeFileSync(tmp, JSON.stringify(status, null, 2), { mode: 0o600 });
fs.renameSync(tmp, target);
} catch {
safeUnlink(tmp);
}
}
/** Spawn claude in a PTY. Returns null if claude not on PATH. */
function spawnClaude(cols: number, rows: number, onData: (chunk: Buffer) => void) {
const claudePath = findClaude();
if (!claudePath) return null;
// Match phoenix env so claude knows which browse server to talk to and
// doesn't try to autostart its own. BROWSE_HEADED=1 keeps the existing
// headed-mode browser; BROWSE_NO_AUTOSTART prevents claude's gstack
// tooling from racing to spawn another server.
const env: Record<string, string> = {
...process.env as any,
BROWSE_PORT: String(BROWSE_SERVER_PORT),
BROWSE_STATE_FILE: STATE_FILE,
BROWSE_NO_AUTOSTART: '1',
BROWSE_HEADED: '1',
TERM: 'xterm-256color',
COLORTERM: 'truecolor',
};
const proc = (Bun as any).spawn([claudePath], {
terminal: {
rows,
cols,
data(_terminal: any, chunk: Buffer) { onData(chunk); },
},
env,
});
return proc;
}
/** Cleanup a PTY session: SIGINT, then SIGKILL after 3s. */
function disposeSession(session: PtySession): void {
try { session.proc?.terminal?.close?.(); } catch {}
if (session.proc?.pid) {
try { session.proc.kill?.('SIGINT'); } catch {}
setTimeout(() => {
try {
if (session.proc && !session.proc.killed) session.proc.kill?.('SIGKILL');
} catch {}
}, 3000);
}
session.proc = null;
session.spawned = false;
}
/**
* Build the HTTP server. Two routes:
* POST /internal/grant — parent server pushes a fresh cookie token
* GET /ws — extension upgrades to WebSocket (PTY transport)
*
* Everything else returns 404. The listener binds 127.0.0.1 only.
*/
function buildServer() {
return Bun.serve({
hostname: '127.0.0.1',
port: 0,
idleTimeout: 0, // PTY connections are long-lived; default idleTimeout would kill them
fetch(req, server) {
const url = new URL(req.url);
// /internal/grant — loopback-only handshake from parent server.
if (url.pathname === '/internal/grant' && req.method === 'POST') {
const auth = req.headers.get('authorization');
if (auth !== `Bearer ${INTERNAL_TOKEN}`) {
return new Response('forbidden', { status: 403 });
}
return req.json().then((body: any) => {
if (typeof body?.token === 'string' && body.token.length > 16) {
validTokens.add(body.token);
}
return new Response('ok');
}).catch(() => new Response('bad', { status: 400 }));
}
// /internal/revoke — drop a token (called on WS close or bootstrap reload)
if (url.pathname === '/internal/revoke' && req.method === 'POST') {
const auth = req.headers.get('authorization');
if (auth !== `Bearer ${INTERNAL_TOKEN}`) {
return new Response('forbidden', { status: 403 });
}
return req.json().then((body: any) => {
if (typeof body?.token === 'string') validTokens.delete(body.token);
return new Response('ok');
}).catch(() => new Response('bad', { status: 400 }));
}
// /claude-available — bootstrap card hits this when user clicks "I installed it".
if (url.pathname === '/claude-available' && req.method === 'GET') {
writeClaudeAvailable();
const found = findClaude();
return new Response(JSON.stringify({ available: !!found, path: found }), {
status: 200,
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
});
}
// /ws — WebSocket upgrade. CRITICAL gates:
// (1) Origin must be chrome-extension://<id>. Cross-site WS hijacking
// defense per codex finding #9.
// (2) Cookie gstack_pty must be in validTokens. The cookie was
// minted by the parent server's /pty-session route under a
// valid AUTH_TOKEN, so a request without it can't get a shell.
if (url.pathname === '/ws') {
const origin = req.headers.get('origin') || '';
const isExtensionOrigin = origin.startsWith('chrome-extension://');
if (!isExtensionOrigin) {
return new Response('forbidden origin', { status: 403 });
}
if (EXTENSION_ID && origin !== `chrome-extension://${EXTENSION_ID}`) {
return new Response('forbidden origin', { status: 403 });
}
const cookieHeader = req.headers.get('cookie') || '';
let cookieToken: string | null = null;
for (const part of cookieHeader.split(';')) {
const [name, ...rest] = part.trim().split('=');
if (name === 'gstack_pty') { cookieToken = rest.join('=') || null; break; }
}
if (!cookieToken || !validTokens.has(cookieToken)) {
return new Response('unauthorized', { status: 401 });
}
const upgraded = server.upgrade(req, {
data: { cookie: cookieToken },
});
return upgraded ? undefined : new Response('upgrade failed', { status: 500 });
}
return new Response('not found', { status: 404 });
},
websocket: {
message(ws, raw) {
let session = sessions.get(ws);
if (!session) {
session = {
proc: null,
cols: 80,
rows: 24,
cookie: (ws.data as any)?.cookie || '',
spawned: false,
};
sessions.set(ws, session);
}
// Text frames are control messages: {type: "resize", cols, rows} or
// {type: "tabSwitch", tabId, url, title}. Binary frames are raw input
// bytes destined for the PTY stdin.
if (typeof raw === 'string') {
let msg: any;
try { msg = JSON.parse(raw); } catch { return; }
if (msg?.type === 'resize') {
const cols = Math.max(2, Math.floor(Number(msg.cols) || 80));
const rows = Math.max(2, Math.floor(Number(msg.rows) || 24));
session.cols = cols;
session.rows = rows;
try { session.proc?.terminal?.resize?.(cols, rows); } catch {}
return;
}
if (msg?.type === 'tabSwitch') {
handleTabSwitch(msg);
return;
}
// Unknown text frame — ignore.
return;
}
// Binary input. Lazy-spawn claude on the first byte.
if (!session.spawned) {
session.spawned = true;
const proc = spawnClaude(session.cols, session.rows, (chunk) => {
try { ws.sendBinary(chunk); } catch {}
});
if (!proc) {
try {
ws.send(JSON.stringify({
type: 'error',
code: 'CLAUDE_NOT_FOUND',
message: 'claude CLI not on PATH. Install: https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code',
}));
ws.close(4404, 'claude not found');
} catch {}
return;
}
session.proc = proc;
// Watch for child exit so the WS closes cleanly when claude exits.
proc.exited?.then?.(() => {
try { ws.close(1000, 'pty exited'); } catch {}
});
}
try {
// raw is a Uint8Array; Bun.Terminal.write accepts string|Buffer.
// Convert to Buffer for safety.
session.proc?.terminal?.write?.(Buffer.from(raw as Uint8Array));
} catch (err) {
console.error('[terminal-agent] terminal.write failed:', err);
}
},
close(ws) {
const session = sessions.get(ws);
if (session) {
disposeSession(session);
if (session.cookie) {
// Drop the cookie so it can't be replayed against a new PTY.
validTokens.delete(session.cookie);
}
sessions.delete(ws);
}
},
},
});
}
/**
* Tab-switch helper: write the active tab to a state file (claude reads it)
* and notify the parent server so its activeTabId stays synced. Skips
* chrome:// and chrome-extension:// internal pages.
*/
function handleTabSwitch(msg: { tabId?: number; url?: string; title?: string }): void {
const url = msg.url || '';
if (!url || url.startsWith('chrome://') || url.startsWith('chrome-extension://')) return;
const stateDir = path.dirname(STATE_FILE);
const ctxFile = path.join(stateDir, 'active-tab.json');
const tmp = path.join(stateDir, `.tmp-tab-${process.pid}`);
try {
fs.writeFileSync(tmp, JSON.stringify({
tabId: msg.tabId ?? null,
url,
title: msg.title ?? '',
}), { mode: 0o600 });
fs.renameSync(tmp, ctxFile);
} catch {
safeUnlink(tmp);
}
// Best-effort sync to parent server so its activeTabId tracking matches.
// No await; this is fire-and-forget.
if (BROWSE_SERVER_PORT > 0) {
fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${BROWSE_SERVER_PORT}/command`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'Authorization': `Bearer ${readBrowseToken()}`,
},
body: JSON.stringify({
command: 'tab',
args: [String(msg.tabId ?? ''), '--no-focus'],
}),
}).catch(() => {});
}
}
function readBrowseToken(): string {
try {
const raw = fs.readFileSync(STATE_FILE, 'utf-8');
const j = JSON.parse(raw);
return j.token || '';
} catch { return ''; }
}
// Boot.
function main() {
writeClaudeAvailable();
const server = buildServer();
const port = (server as any).port || (server as any).address?.port;
if (!port) {
console.error('[terminal-agent] failed to bind: no port');
process.exit(1);
}
// Write port file atomically so the parent server can pick it up.
const dir = path.dirname(PORT_FILE);
try { fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 }); } catch {}
const tmp = `${PORT_FILE}.tmp-${process.pid}`;
fs.writeFileSync(tmp, String(port), { mode: 0o600 });
fs.renameSync(tmp, PORT_FILE);
// Hand the parent the internal token so it can call /internal/grant.
// Parent learns INTERNAL_TOKEN via env (TERMINAL_AGENT_INTERNAL_TOKEN below).
// We just print it on stdout for the supervising process to pick up if it's
// not already in env. Defense against env races at spawn time.
console.log(`[terminal-agent] listening on 127.0.0.1:${port} pid=${process.pid}`);
// Cleanup port file on exit.
const cleanup = () => { safeUnlink(PORT_FILE); process.exit(0); };
process.on('SIGTERM', cleanup);
process.on('SIGINT', cleanup);
}
// Export the internal token so cli.ts can pass the SAME value to the parent
// server via env. Parent reads BROWSE_TERMINAL_INTERNAL_TOKEN and uses it
// for /internal/grant calls.
//
// In practice, the agent generates INTERNAL_TOKEN once at boot and writes it
// to a state file the parent reads. This avoids env-passing races. See main().
const INTERNAL_TOKEN_FILE = path.join(path.dirname(STATE_FILE), 'terminal-internal-token');
try {
fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(INTERNAL_TOKEN_FILE), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
fs.writeFileSync(INTERNAL_TOKEN_FILE, INTERNAL_TOKEN, { mode: 0o600 });
} catch {}
main();