One committed example per registered mark: 12 PNG (image registry) and 6 MP4
clips (video registry), generated by scripts/render_visible_examples.py from
the committed silhouettes and detector templates -- never from user uploads.
The generator self-verifies (exit 1 when a mark misses its own example) and
tests/test_visible_examples.py holds both sides to it: registry completeness
both ways, per-engine detection on the canonical example, and the shipped
temporal selection accepting each clip.
Second tranche of measured-but-unregistered candidates parked under
scripts/assets/visible-mark-candidates/ with a README recording why none
ships yet (positives do not separate from clean negatives): samsung_en,
gemini_text, notebooklm, dola, mindvideo, higgsfield, jianying, capcut, zsky,
chromastudio, digenai, gendo.
Tiled diffusion was never provider-oracle calibrated with verified text
restoration: the tiled VAE donor path ran anyway and produced results no
oracle had certified. The combination is now rejected at both the
pipeline and the engine seam (ValueError with the reason), and the CLI
help no longer implies support. The invisible help is generalized and
the metadata container list corrected (MKA/OGA/Opus/AAC).
scripts/contentseal_transforms.py reproduces the deterministic crop,
resize, and JPEG variants of the Content Seal corpus from manifest.csv,
hash-verifying every output; its README gains scripts/README.md context
and new data tests. The corpus README is honest about the one crop the
daily oracle limit left unchecked, and the eval CSVs carry the updated
verdicts. The byte-scan SynthID suppression hoists its soft-binding
lookup so the guard is computed once.
Staged on top of 0.33.1; no version bump in this commit.
A standalone-tag file showed 'platform not specified' while the panel
below priced the Muse Content Seal removal - the platform line lagged
the attribution the seal signal and the strength router already make.
The fallback now attributes 'Meta Muse Image (attributed by the
standalone AI digital-source tag)' when no more specific attribution
applies, so the source line and the priced target agree. Apple Photos
Clean Up keeps its own attribution; the hedge names the attribution
basis, not a detection.
The strength router already bets that a file whose only provenance is
the standalone AI digital-source tag is Meta Muse output (C2PA issuers
win first), and Muse stamps every output with the invisible Content
Seal. identify now surfaces that same bet as evidence: the additive
content_seal signal (medium confidence - an attribution, not a decode,
since no public decoder exists) plus the watermark string, emitted on
exactly the standalone_iptc condition that routes the cohort. Clients
select pixel removal from the signal list instead of parsing caveats,
the way InvisMark is additive over soft_binding. The API's invisible
gate already runs on ai_from_metadata, so all/invisible behavior is
unchanged; has_invisible_target needs no edit.
A manifest that names its own forensic soft-binding algorithm carries
that vendor's mark; the generic watermark-action vendor-token inference
must not add a second, differently-attributed invisible watermark from
the same bytes. Microsoft Designer manifests triggered exactly that:
signed by Microsoft, watermarked by InvisMark, with the generation
agent named "Azure OpenAI ImageGen" - the OpenAI issuer token inside
that service name plus the InvisMark watermarked action satisfied the
OpenAI SynthID-evidence rule, and identify reported one forensic mark
as two paid pixel watermarks.
Three changes, one rule at every inference site (the verdict-scan
comment's own lesson: a rule that lives in only one copy is a rule the
others silently lack):
- c2pa.py structured path: SynthID evidence now scopes to the
signer/generator identity strings only (signature issuer, claim
generator), never the raw chain, and is suppressed entirely when a
soft-binding algorithm is named.
- c2pa.py byte fallback and metadata.py synthid_source: suppressed when
the scan names a soft-binding algorithm.
- identify.py verdict scan: same suppression.
Gemini and ChatGPT originals keep their provenance-asserted SynthID
strings; the Designer regression is pinned by
test_designer_synthid_suppression.py (agent name alone is not the
vendor's provenance, and a named soft binding suppresses the
inference).
The InvisMark strength ladder was measured against Microsoft's public
Content Provenance page, but no doc or comment carried its URL - the
API how-to link was the only address recorded anywhere, and the page
is what a human can actually check without an Azure account. Record
https://ai.azure.com/nextgen/validate in supported-signals.md, the
watermarking landscape, and the strength derivation comment, with the
honest caveat that its collapsed verdict tops out at Inconclusive
rather than the API's separate watermark-negative result.
Full Meta Muse Image support in the invisible-removal path:
- QWEN_ZIMAGE_META_STRENGTH = 0.1: derived by the standard
worst-boundary-plus-cross-source-spread method over five oracle-bracketed
generations (data/contentseal/manifest.csv)
- Auto mode: vendor_for_strength routes a file whose only provenance is the
standalone AI IPTC trainedAlgorithmicMedia tag onto the meta cohort; C2PA
issuers win first, so Google/OpenAI/Microsoft routing is unchanged. Muse
WebP outputs place the XMP in a tail chunk, so the scan uses the shared
chunk-aware metadata.scan_head rather than a plain head read
- Explicit override: --vendor on invisible/all/batch and
InvisibleOptions.vendor name the cohort on stripped files; naming a cohort
asserts the watermark is present, so the no-signal gate treats it like
--force at both the CLI and API seams
- sdxl-zimage has no measured Meta rung: an explicit meta vendor falls to
the conservative unknown 0.25 rather than inventing one
- identify emits a Content Seal caveat pointing at the removal path
- The legacy visible 'Imagined with AI' mark stays unregistered: a dedicated
sample hunt (newsroom mockups, community posts, press screenshots, dead
imagine.meta.com, broken Wayback captures) found no pixel-verifiable
capture, and the registry rule forbids encoding a corner without one.
erase --region remains its removal path; outcome recorded in the landscape
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Documentation and corpus release: Meta Muse Image Content Seal support
records (oracle-verified boundaries, wire format, removal verification)
plus the contentseal manifest guard. No runtime behavior change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Muse Image (muse-image-1.0, Meta Superintelligence Labs, 2026-07-07) ships
every output with Content Seal, a proprietary invisible pixel watermark, and
no visible mark. Establish support documentation and a verified corpus:
- data/contentseal/: five own generations via the Meta Model API, every
oracle verdict recorded in manifest.csv (44 rows, settled-text protocol,
fresh-navigation variant for calibration rows)
- Oracle: meta.ai/identification web tool only; no API endpoint exists in
the Meta Model API (verified against dev.meta.ai/docs); internal REST
pair documented with its server-side sliding-window rate limit
- Removal: default qwen-zimage profile clears Content Seal (oracle-verified
on the worst source); strength floor derived at 0.1 by the standard
worst-boundary-plus-cross-source-spread method, recorded but not encoded
as a constant since no provenance signal routes Muse output onto a vendor
cohort
- Seal robustness measured: survives resize, JPEG q85, metadata stripping,
CDN WebP transcode; dies to center crops and diffusion regeneration
- tests/test_contentseal_corpus.py guards manifest integrity
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Minor, not patch: the C2PA confidence mapping changed. A cryptographically bound
manifest now reports high confidence where 0.27.0 through 0.30.1 reported medium,
because the previous gate required a trust anchor no installation has. Consumers
that branch on `confidence` will see verdicts move on files whose bytes did not.
The provenance report stays at schema 1. No field was added, removed, renamed or
retyped, and the meaning of `confidence` is unchanged -- the value it carried for a
verified claim was wrong. Bumping the output schema instead would break every
pinned schema-1 consumer on a corrected value rather than a new shape.
pre-commit: 1) maintain.sh - exit 1 on uv-secure, lightning PYSEC-2026-3624 unchanged from 0.30.1, no fixed release exists, vulnerable API unreachable (no load_from_checkpoint in project or trustmark); ruff, ruff format, pyright src/, and 1394 tests passed separately; 2) /simplify - version bump only; 3) docs sync - no version refs outside pyproject, __init__.py, uv.lock; 4) CLAUDE.md - no change
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
High-confidence C2PA attribution required signingCredential.trusted, a status code
the reader emits only when a trust anchor list is loaded. None ships, so from 0.27.0
through 0.30.0 the branch was unreachable in production for every vendor: an intact,
cryptographically bound manifest scored the same medium as a fallback parse that
validated nothing, which collapsed the one distinction the official reader exists to
draw. A hand-built info dict stamping that code kept the branch green in the suite.
Confidence now follows the binding. Signer trust and certificate expiry stay visible
as their own dimensions and as caveats, because a trust list that was never
configured is a missing input, not a finding against the credential. Every committed
provenance fixture with a reader result and an intact binding now reaches high
confidence, and test_no_committed_fixture_reports_a_trusted_signer guards the
reachability itself rather than a synthesized status set.
Revocation joins binding and signature failures as disqualifying. It arrives only on
signer_validity, so a check reading the other two returned a confident AI verdict off
a credential the issuer had disowned, with an empty integrity_clashes -- quieter than
a hash mismatch on the same file. Expiry stays non-disqualifying: it does not imply
the signed bytes changed, and a signature genuinely made outside validity already
arrives as claimSignature.outsideValidity.
The rule now lives in one place. _validation_fields maps status codes to the four
dimensions and names the failures that moved one; c2pa_info_has_invalid_credential
maps dimensions to disqualified. The ingredient-reachability walk and the
user-visible reason both consume that path instead of re-classifying raw codes, so
adding this one rule no longer means editing three layers in lockstep.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
pre-commit: 1) maintain.sh - docs-only change, full gate ran this session with identical code state (exit 1 on the known lightning triage, rest green); 2) /simplify - docs only; 3) docs sync - this is the sync; 4) CLAUDE.md - no change
pre-commit: 1) maintain.sh - exit 1 on uv-secure, lightning PYSEC-2026-3624 unchanged from 0.29.0, no fixed release exists, vulnerable API unreachable (no load_from_checkpoint in project or trustmark); ruff, pyright src/, and 1391 tests passed separately; 2) /simplify - version bump only; 3) docs sync - no version refs outside pyproject, __init__.py, uv.lock; 4) CLAUDE.md - no change
Reachable c2pa.soft-binding assertions now surface their exact alg and the
bounded printable block value next to the normalized vendor label; a value
without its algorithm stays hidden because it cannot be attributed.
com.microsoft.invismark.1 uses that value as the pixel-watermark identifier
in Microsoft Paint output, so identify names it, metadata carries it, and an
InvisMark soft binding keeps the invisible-removal gate fail-safe even after
C2PA asset binding goes invalid. Content fingerprints still do not trigger
pixel regeneration. Removal is verified against Microsoft's Content
Provenance Detection API, which reports Watermark and C2PA separately; the
protocol and the pixel-identical control requirement are documented.
Implemented in a parallel session; verified, gated, and committed by pi.
pre-commit: 1) maintain.sh - exit 1 on the known uv-secure lightning PYSEC-2026-3624 triage (no fix available, unchanged from 0.29.0); ruff, pyright src/, and 1391 tests passed separately; 2) /simplify - single-pass, clean; 3) docs sync - five docs updated by the author session, no remaining references found; 4) CLAUDE.md - invariants recorded in module-internals, no change needed
The Space demo is deployed from wiltodelta/raiw-hf-space: its uv lock pins the
library version, its sync workflow mirrors the files, and a factory reboot
alone re-installs the pinned version rather than upgrading. Document the manual
pin bump, the smoke-test CI in that repository, and live-call verification of
the running Space.
pre-commit: 1) maintain.sh - docs-only change, full gate ran this session with identical code state (exit 1 on the known lightning triage, rest green); 2) /simplify - docs only; 3) docs sync - this is the sync, no other references found; 4) CLAUDE.md - existing Space mention remains accurate
pre-commit: 1) maintain.sh - docs-only change, last full run minutes ago: exit 1 on the known uv-secure lightning triage, ruff/pyright/1386 tests green; 2) /simplify - docs only; 3) docs sync - these are the doc updates; 4) CLAUDE.md - no change
pre-commit: 1) maintain.sh - exit 1 on uv-secure, lightning PYSEC-2026-3624 unchanged from 0.28.1, no fixed release exists, vulnerable API unreachable (no load_from_checkpoint in project or trustmark); ruff, pyright src/, and 1386 tests passed separately; 2) /simplify - version bump only; 3) docs sync - no version refs outside pyproject, __init__.py, uv.lock; 4) CLAUDE.md - no change
Tile the Qwen VAE donor the same way as the global pass. Glyph restore already runs on the blended full frame, so the old tile ban was an artificial gate.
verified:true may attest machine-verified geometry (stability-gated
boxes inside caps) set by a service; the pipeline consumes box/script
only, text is advisory, so the verification burden is on the geometry.
Move the draft-annotation logic (PaddleOCR line detection, word-box
grouping, three script-chosen recognition engines, crop-jitter
stability gate) from the evaluation-only scripts into the installable
package, with lazy paddle imports and a text-draft extra (CPU, no
torch). draft_text_lines() returns accepted (crop-stable, NEVER
ground-truth-correct - precision on the reference posters was 90.0% /
94.4%) and rejected proposals; source_pixel_sha256 is re-exported for
manifest building. scripts/infer_text_lines.py now dogfoods the
package module instead of loading the eval script by path.
The resolution curve's 0.154 top left the 4.33 MP CJK-sign fixture
SynthID-detected x3 in Gemini on the full production path (visible
stage -> qwen-zimage seed 0 -> resize-back -> metadata strip), with a
valid pixel-identical stripped control in the same session
(2026-08-18). Google-provenance content now resolves to the flat
QWEN_ZIMAGE_GOOGLE_STRENGTH 0.30 floor instead of the area curve -
anchors at 0.30 measured clean in Gemini on two fixtures (CJK sign +
18-face) at 3/3 checks across two work accounts, and stayed clean
under the vae-glyphs donor layer. openai/unknown content keeps the
curve; an explicit strength still wins.
The engine forwards the new kwarg into WatermarkRemover.remove_watermark,
which rejected it with TypeError on the real (non-fake) path - caught by
the deployed Modal smoke test, not by the unit fakes.
The whole-frame 15% Qwen-VAE blend returned detector-visible OpenAI
SynthID on poster-scale manifests through the engine text-manifest
path (official Content Provenance API, 2026-08-19: restored detected
x6 with the anchor, clean x6 without it; base outputs clean x6;
pixel-identical stripped controls detected, proving the pixel channel).
Add fidelity_anchor=False to remove_watermark and InvisibleOptions and
--fidelity-anchor on the CLI to reproduce the 0.27.0 research
behavior. Text-box MAE cost of the new default is under one point on
all three fixtures (11.60->11.72, 7.79->7.86, 7.57->8.13).
Issue #84: text, tables, and UI screenshots are the worst case for
--force regeneration. Document that the default pipeline skips the
invisible stage without a detectable signal, that visible/metadata
stages never redraw glyphs, and why paste-back is not offered.
Victor Kuznetsov